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2005-7
~1998 , 1999 , 2000 , 2001-2 , 2003-4 Cross-Strait
Relations: In Search of Peace By Alan
D. Romberg Applying
to the UN “in the name of ‘Taiwan’” By Alan D. Romberg U.S.-China
Relations After Resolution of Taiwan’s Status By Roger Cliff and David A. Shlapak (RAND, 2007) The
consequences of peaceful outcome –including peaceful irresolution- are more
predictable and generally better for relations between Washington and
Beijing. In contrast, nonpeaceful
resolutions of Taiwan’s status could cause U.S.-China relations to
fall anywhere from reasonable amity to a Cold War-like confrontation. Military
Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2007 The
US-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right Through 2020 By Richard L. Armitage & Joseph S. Nye (CSIS, Feb. 16, 2007) With half the world's population, one-third
of the global economy, and growing economic, financial, technological, and
political weight in the international system, Asia is key to a stable,
prosperous world order that best advances American interests. The goal of
this report is to outline a vision that offers the best prospect for
achieving "a balance of power that favors freedom." Doubly Dualistic Dilemma: U.S. Strategy towards China and Taiwan By Philip Yang (International Relations of the Asia Pacific, 6:2, August 2006) In its relations with Taiwan and China, Washington has begun to implement separate dual strategies in order to simultaneously deter unilateral action while balancing out the rival political and military forces of each other. US policy has to mirror the duality of the cross-strait arena by implementing dual balancing and deterrent strategies. Explaining
Taiwan’s Revisionist Diplomacy By Robert Ross Taiwan-U.S.
Political Relations: New Strains and Changes By Kerry Dumbaugh
(CRS Report, Oct. 2006) Faced with competing pressures from Beijing and
Taipei and with changes in the PRC and continuing transformations in the
Taiwan systems, U.S. officials are likely to continue facing new and more
difficult policy choices concerning Taiwan. In addition to raising the risks
of political and economic instability, growing political polarization in
Taiwan could further erode the quality of U.S.-Taiwan contacts. The Chinese Journal of
International Politics Some
Reflections on My Time in Taiwan By Douglas H. Paal The
Taiwan Tangle By Alan D. Romberg Risks
and Opportunities of a Rising China By Larry M. Wortzel Halfway to China’s Collapse By Gordon G. Chang Chinese Responses to U.S. Military
Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defense (RAND, April 2006) Over the past
decade, Chinese military strategists have keenly observed changes in U.S.
national strategy and military transformation. The acceleration of its own
military modernization suggests that China is not dissuaded by U.S. military
prowess but instead is driven by a range of strategic and military
motivations to keep pace. Taiwan’s
Fading Independence Movement By Robert S.
Ross A
Realist Policy for Managing US-China Competition By Robert S. Ross (Stanley
Foundation, April 2006) When crafting US foreign and security policies toward
East Asia, do not assume that the rise of China will entail Cold War
hostilities. Avoid US policies that would lead toward economic, political,
and military polarization of Asia into two adversarial blocs. China’s Rise:
implications for U.S. Leadership in Asia By Robert G. Sutter
(East-West Center Washington, March 2006) Foreign policy makers in the United
States should not be misled by prevailing media and scholarly assessment that
exaggerate China’s influence in Asia relative to that of the United States. The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable? By Aaron L. Friedberg (International Security, Vol. 30, Issue 2, Fall 2005) Most analysts who write on U.S.-China relations deploy arguments derived from the three main camps in contemporary international relations theorizing: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. It is possible to identify realists who believe that the relationship will basically be stable and peaceful, liberals who expect confrontation and conflict, and constructivists who think that things could go either way. Regime
Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in
Territorial Disputes By M. Taylor Fravel (International Security, Vol. 30,
Issue 2, Fall 2005) Since the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, scholars and policymakers
have become increasingly concerned about China’s territorial ambitions. Yet
China has also used peaceful means to manage conflicts, settling seventeen of
its twenty-three territorial disputes, often with substantial compromises. Will China Become a "Responsible Stakeholder"?—The Six Party Talks, Taiwan Arms Sales, and Sino-Japanese Relations By Thomas Christensen (China Leadership Monitor, Hoover Institution, Fall 2005) In recent months, China's security policy has enjoyed significant successes. Relations with the United States have improved, particularly on issues related to North Korea. U.S.
-China Economic and Security Review Commission Annual Reports to Congress (Nov. 8, 2005) China is in the midst of an extensive military
modernization program aimed at building its force projection capabilities to
confront U.S. and allied forces in the region. A major goal is to be able to
deter, delay, or complicate a timely U.S. and allied intervention in an armed
conflict over Taiwan so China can overwhelm Taiwan and force a quick
capitulation by Taiwan’s government. China Fails to Adequately Control
WMD Exports China
and Taiwan: Uneasy Détente (International Crisis Group, Sep. 2005) After drifting toward crisis
for much of 2004, the outlook for stability across the Taiwan Strait has
improved. Constraints on Taiwan pursuing pro-independence initiatives that
risk conflict with China will likely remain strong through to the end of
President Chen Shui-bian's term of office in 2008. America’s
Bismarckian Asia Policy By Eric Heginbotham and Christopher P.
Twomey (Current History, Sep. 2005) US policy is
not achieving the goals set out for it. It is ceding regional leadership
while seeding regional rivalry. It is missing opportunities to help
shape the development of a new security environment through regional
institutions and instead acting to exacerbate the rise of nationalism. Looking Beyond the Nuclear Bluster: Recent Progress and Remaining Problems in PRC Security Policy By Thomas Christensen (China Leader Monitor, Summer 2005) Beijing's diplomacy on security issues over the same period has improved, a more basic trend that should not be overshadowed by General Zhu's bluster and Beijing's heated response to the Pentagon report. Have Old Problems Trumped New Thinking? China's Relations with Taiwan, Japan, and North Korea By Thomas Christensen (China Leadership Monitor, Spring 2005) On diplomatic policies toward Taiwan, Japan, and North Korea, respectively, Beijing has appeared bullying, emotional, and ineffective. China
under Hu Jintao By Joseph
Fewsmith SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, June 2005) World military expenditure in 2004 is estimated to have been $975 billion at constant (2003) prices and exchange rates or $1035 billion in current dollars. The major determinant of the world trend in military expenditure is the change in the USA, which makes up 47 per cent of the world total. Taiwan and Nonproliferation By Monte Bullard Modernizing China’s Military: Opportunities and
Constraints (RAND, May 2005) Projects future growth in Chinese government
expenditures as a whole and on defense in particular, evaluates the current
and likely future capabilities of China’s defense industries, and compares
likely future expenditure levels with recent defense expenditures by the
United States and the U.S. Air Force. Strait Talk: Avoiding a Nuclear War
between the United States and China over Taiwan By Monte R. Bullard (Center
for Nonproliferation Studies) A web book, examines the Cross Strait issue in
detail and recommends that all three political entities establish an active
status quo policy. |