Comments

~1998

1999: Jan. - June, July - Dec.

2000: Jan. - Mar. , Apr. - June , July - Sept. , Oct. - Dec.

Jan. - Mar., 2001

Measuring the Breadth of Cross-Strait Division
(Taipei Times, Mar. 31, 2001) Professor Robert O'Neill, council chairman of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and Dr John Chipman, director of the IISS, analyzed how "clarity" and "firmness" will characterize the Bush Administration's future foreign policy conduct. They explained why it has become important for Taiwan's government to seek to pragmatically advance its relations with China after more than a year-long dispute over the meaning of "one China."

Strait Talk: China and Taiwan
(PBS'S Online NewsHour, Mar. 22, 2001) President Bush said during his campaign that he views the U.S. relationship with China as competitive, not as the "strategic partnership" envisioned by the Clinton administration. After a background report, three analysts discuss a plan to sell strategic weapons to Taiwan. Bates Gill: China's always reminding us of the so-called three communiqués: One of which the last one under the Reagan administration wrote in the text that we would decrease in quantity and quality our arms sales to Taiwan. But the context of that agreement was that there would be stability in the strait, that China wouldn't take steps to destabilize the situation, which they have done with this missile build-up.

Sino-US Ties Could See Clear Skies at Year's End By Jin Canrong
(Straits Times, Mar. 26, 2001) Since Mr George W. Bush became American President two months ago, he has done primarily three things on the foreign-policy front: promoted National-Missile Defence (NMD) plans vigorously, bombed Iraq and enhanced ties with allied nations. These actions highlight some features of the new United States government's foreign policy. But it is still in the formative stage. Mr Bush could later shift the importance he now places on geopolitics and security to trade and human rights.

Bush's Lack of a Comprehensive China Policy Spells Danger By Patrick M. Cronin and Emily Metzgar
(International Herald Tribune, Mar. 26, 2001) China sees the Bush administration giving priority to preserving U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, including those with Japan and South Korea. Beijing interprets U.S. actions as hegemonic behavior intended to contain China. While it is necessary to build U.S. policy on regional alliances, it is also important to recognize that East Asia's security is equally dependent on cooperative U.S.-China relations.

Rumsfeld Outlines Defense Overhaul By Thomas E. Ricks
(Washington Post, Mar. 23, 2001) The Pacific Ocean is the most likely theater of major U.S. military operations, as China becomes more powerful and Russia less so. This would require a reorientation of a defense policy that has been geared since the end of World War II to keeping the peace in Europe and deterring the Soviet Union. Operating in the Pacific will require an additional emphasis on "long-range power projection," which means greater attention to airlift capacity and other ways of sending troops and firepower across thousands of miles.

A Partnership Worth Preserving By Jiemian Yang
(New York Times, Mar. 21, 2001) Since Mr. Qian is the Beijing official overseeing Taiwan affairs, the Taiwan issue is likely to be central to the discussion tomorrow. Last August Mr. Qian significantly redefined the "one- China" concept in a pragmatic way that was not given sufficient attention in the United States. He announced that one China includes both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, a modification from the previous statement of Taiwan being a part of China only. This formulation allows considerably more flexibility in easing cross-strait tensions.

China's Dream of the Century is on Course By Ching Cheong
(Straits Times, Mar. 21, 2001) The 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) that the National People's Congress (NPC), or Parliament, adopted last week is a crucial step towards achieving modernisation by the middle of this century. Twenty years ago, late Chinese patriarch Deng Xiaoping designed this long journey towards modernisation in three stages, at a time when the Chinese economy was almost bankrupt after practising communism for three decades.

Former U.S. Defense Official Speaks on Taiwan Security Issues
(Central News Agency, March 20, 2001) The new U.S. administration will likely make it very clear to Beijing that Washington will not stand by while Beijing makes any coercive or provocative military moves toward. Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell believes the Bush administration will make "absolutely clear" that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should try to get back to discussions and work out problems at the negotiating table instead of the use of "enormous military expenditures and military exercises."

US Should Sell Arms to Taiwan By James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara
(Boston Globe, Mar. 17, 2001) Selective American military support, carefully tailored to blunt China's strategy, is crucial to buoy Taiwanese morale and allow Taipei to pursue a negotiated settlement in its own time. Indeed, this prudent approach already enjoys strong bipartisan support and was codified in the 1998 Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. The United States should sell the island defensive weaponry to counter China's air, naval, and ballistic-missile threats.

Spend on China's Poor, Not Arms By Chien Hsi-chieh
(Taipei Times, Mar. 17, 2001) China recently made public its 141 billion yuan (US$17 billion) military spending plans for 2001, which is a 17.7 percent increase from last year. It is generally believed that China's actual defense spending is two to three times the official budget. Some of it is hidden in the budgets of non-defense ministries, while some is simply not listed in any official budget. The increase in defense spending appears ironic in the face of Beijing's repeated emphasis on peace and development.

Forum Shows Beijing's Strategies By Wang Kung-yi
(Taipei Times, Mar. 11, 2001) Beijing has trumpeted "economic globalization" at the recently held Boao Asian Forum. After two decades of reforms and liberalization, the thriving China market has absorbed considerable capital. The Boao forum gives a picture of China's global strategic blueprint -- to build up positions across East Asia, ride on Asia's peaceful development, rally the Pacific Rim nations, help the Third World rise to its feet, and break the US and European monopoly on the world.

China's Door Isn't Open to All By Jim Mann
(LA Times, Mar. 7, 2001) Come have a look, the Chinese government proclaims to the world. Come see for yourself how things in China aren't so bad. Come observe how our country is changing. This is the misleading message China puts out whenever it wants something from abroad--in the past, when its trade benefits were in doubt in the U.S. Congress, and now when it is trying to land the 2008 Summer Olympics for Beijing. It would be a fair enough offer if China extended it equally to everyone. But China doesn't: If you say or write something too critical of China, forget it. The invitation to visit is withdrawn.

Has China Turned Into a Frankenstein? By Joseph A. Bosco
(LA Times, Mar. 6, 2001) Chinese enhancement of Iraq's air defense system in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions confronts American policymakers with a disturbing question: Has China launched a new Cold War against the United States? Beijing's global "anti-hegemonism" policy can no longer be dismissed as mere rhetoric. It has supplied the technology for delivering Baghdad's chemical and biological weapons. It was instrumental in the emergence of North Korea's and Pakistan's nuclear weapons programs and has transferred missile technology to Iran and Syria.

U.S. Policy Toward China By Kenneth Lieberthal
(Brookings Institute, March 2001) The Bush administration's China policy must be part of a larger Asian strategy that keeps America fully engaged, maintains the region's strength and dynamism in an era of globalization, and encourages China's own constructive engagement in the region. This would provide both the best prospect for encouraging China's internal reform and external cooperation and for creating the conditions to cope with the consequences should China ultimately seek to confront the United States across the region.

Transits, Visas and US Diplomacy By Nat Bellocchi
(Taipei Times, March 1, 2001) There is much talk these days that the US should play a more active role in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait. But is this possible with the constraints we have imposed on ourselves? Whether called policies or guidelines, however, many of them are demeaning, and place constraints on our communicating with each other. Transits and visits, including those experienced more recently for the first time by the new government in Taiwan, are examples of that. Who we welcome to our country, who we do not, or who comes just to visit or do business, are domestic matters.

China Seeking to Keep U.S. Relationship on Track: Analysis
(AFP, Feb. 28, 2001) China has adopted a cooperative attitude on U.S. charges it helped Iraq restore its air defenses in order not to further burden already strained ties with Washington, analysts said Wednesday. Beijing has angrily dismissed a U.S. report which said China's human rights abuses worsened last year. But it has struck a noticeably more conciliatory tone on Iraq, saying it would look into U.S. allegations that it had provided technical assistance .

US Fears of China's Influence Extend Far Beyond Iraq
(Editorial, Asia Times, Feb. 23, 2001)
The spat between the United States and China over the latter's alleged military assistance to Iraq is overshadowing a number of contentious issues between the two countries, such as Taiwan, human rights and US plans for a missile defense shield. It is also deflecting attention from Central Intelligence Agency concerns over Chinese missile-related technical assistance to Pakistan and the "provision of other missile-related items and raw materials to several countries of proliferation concern, including Iran, North Korea and Libya".

'Chinese Confederation' verses 'One China' By Lee Chang-kuei
(Taipei Times, Feb. 23, 2001) A confederacy is neither the outright independence that Taiwan wants nor a unification under the "one country, two systems" model that China expects. China would think in terms of preventing Taiwan's declaration of independence by first incorporating Taiwan into an integration framework. Taiwan should think in terms of the price in terms of national security and economic losses in cross-strait cooperation, if Taiwan does not join the unification process through a confederacy.

Chen: 'Integration' to Follow Constitution
(Central News Agency, Feb. 22, 2001) On the eve of the 10th anniversary of the promulgation of the Guidelines for National Unification, President Chen Shui-bian yesterday said that any form of political integration between mainland and Taiwan should be subject to the ROC Constitution. Chen told a group of visiting European Union Parliament members that the mainland and Taiwan should seek a permanent peace through political integration which, no matter whether it takes the form of a federation, a confederation, a commonwealth or a model like that of the European Union, should be in conformity with the Constitution.

The Blind Spot in US-Taiwan Policy By Lin Cheng-yi
(Taipei Times, Feb. 20, 2001) A blind spot in the US policy however, is that Taiwan's future must be jointly decided by the two sides of the Strait without the use of force or the imposition of the will of one side over the other side. If the future of Taiwan is to be decided by the people of both sides of the Strait, then the verdict is out already. So Chen told Roth that Taiwan's future could not be decided by the people on the two sides of the Strait, but rather that the free will of the Taiwanese people must be respected.

'Integration' a Step to 'Future One China', MAC Official
(CNA, Feb. 18, 2001) The concept of "political integration" proposed by President Chen Shui-bian during his New Year's speech is a step towards fulfilling the idea of a "future one China." "The integration concept is only a process leading toward Taiwan's final goal, which is to establish a system in which both mainland China and Taiwan can seek mutual prosperity and co-existence," said MAC Vice Chairman Chen Ming-tung.

How the Bush People Should Deal with China By Susan Shirk
(Asia Pacific Media Network, Feb. 2001) First of all, continue to do what we did, which is just to be in almost constant contact with the two sides, urging them actively to restore the dialogue. Secondly, it is important for the US government to keep a very stable and consistent set of policies toward the two sides and for cross-strait relations. Finally, on arms sales, which is politically a very difficult subject. Of course the United States must fulfill its responsibility to assist Taiwan in providing for its own self-defense. But it must do this in a prudent way.

Taiwan Should Consider Hosting APEC: Analysts By Monique Chu
(Taipei Times, Feb. 13, 2001) "Taiwan should make its case [for hosting the summit] to emphasize its right as a member of APEC to host the meeting but it should avoid overtly politicizing the issue," said Philip Yang. "Now that the issue has been brought up, the government should remind the group's other members of the nature of APEC, Taiwan's ability to take part in the regional grouping, as well as its right as a member economy to host the meeting."

Communist Ideologues Struggle to Make Room for Capitalists By Charles Wolf Jr.
(LA Times, Feb. 11, 2001) China's socialist market economy is starting to look much more like capitalism, creating a new dilemma for the nation's Communist leadership. In the next few months, mainland China's first free and competitive stock market, known as the second board market, will open. Unlike existing stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen, whose listings are mainly state-owned, partly privatized companies, the new market's listings will consist largely of private Chinese businesses, many involved in high technology, and joint ventures between Chinese and foreign investors whose companies are registered in China.

China's Acquisitions of Russian SU Fighters: A Great Leap Forward? By Ming-yen Tsai
(Peace Forum, Taiwan Research Institute, Feb. 8, 2001) China's purchases of Russian fighters suggest that the modernization of the PLAAF's outdated aircraft fleet has been put at the top of China's defense modernization. However, due to Russia's intention to restrict China's air projection capacities, and China's problems with absorbing Russian fighters, China has yet to achieve a meaningful enhancement of its air power capabilities from the purchases. The impact of Russian weapons on the PLAAF's modernization so far has been more symbolic than substantial.

Bush's Emerging Asia Policy: What's Still Missing By Ralph A. Cossa
(PacNet 6, Pacific Forum, CSIS, Feb. 9, 2001) What was conspicuously absent from Powell's comments was any reference to Asian multilateralism. The U.S. is currently involved in two major region-wide efforts: the security-oriented ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) effort. Both are in need of stimulation but are still worthy of continued U.S. support. ... some thought should be given to proposing that, in the future, the APEC Leaders' Meeting be held every other year, substituting an ARF Leaders' Meeting on the off years, in order to promote higher-level security as well as economic dialogue.

Japan Divided On U.S. Call for Missile Defense By Doug Struck
(Washington Post, Feb. 8, 2001) The missile defense system advocated by the Bush administration is pushing Japan toward a stronger military stance, exposing the national divide between the country's pacifist post-World War II constitution and calls for Tokyo to assume a broader defense role. Japan is worried that cooperating with the United States on a missile system -- the likely first test of the new, closer relationship promised by the Bush administration -- would bring a larger role for its military that would arouse fierce opposition and would require a politically volatile change in Japan's anti-militarist constitution.

China Has to Acknowledge Taiwan By Kam Yiu-yu, Chris Wu and Yu Hao-cheng
(Taipei Times, Feb. 8, 2001) In our view, if the two sides of the Strait are unable to truly return to a recognition that there are two China entities and on this basis begin talks on "`one China,' with each side having its own interpretation," then the three links, political integration, and the distant future prospect of "one China" will all be difficult to realize. For the Beijing authorities, the greatest difficulty at present is that they don't recognize that the ROC has already existed for 90 years. Like ostriches with their heads in the sand, they consider the ROC to have vanished of its own accord.

Risky British Arms Sales to China? By Richard D. Fisher Jr.
(Washington Times, Feb. 7, 2001) Our most important alliance partnership, that with the United Kingdom, is already troubled, and is about to be more so. It appears the British government of Prime Minister Tony Blair is determined to sell China military technology that could be used against Taiwan, and against American forces that may have to come to Taiwan's rescue. According to British and U.S. government sources, over the objections of the Pentagon in the last year, London is proceeding with the sale of 80 to 90 Rolls Royce Spey turbofan engines that will used to power one or more squadrons of Chinese Xian JH-7 fighter-bombers.

Managing Relations Across the Strait By Lin Chong-Pin
(Taipei Times, Feb. 5, 2001) How does Taipei perceive and how will Taipei manage cross-strait relations? Current relations: compounded uncertainties. The actual tension that broke out between Beijing and Taipei in the fall of 1999 has since dissipated, but some still perceive a precarious cross-strait situation. Since mid-2000, the cross-strait relationship has evolved into a mixture of four elements: lingering, though less confrontational, political stalemate; growing and even accelerating economic exchanges; rapidly expanding social interactions and heightened military competition.

Beijing Fears about Chen Shui-bian Subside as Taiwan's Political and Economic Troubles Mount By Bonnie S. Glaser
(Pacific Forum, CSIS, PacNet 5, Feb. 2, 2001) China's alarmist reaction to the election of Chen Shui-bian as Taiwan's president last March has given way to a more relaxed posture. Beijing is no longer worried that Chen will seek a near-term separation of Taiwan from the Mainland. Chen's political and economic difficulties have evoked a self-satisfied response from China, which largely attributes Chen's predicament to his vacillating policy toward China and his failure to improve cross-Strait relations. It judges Chen as beleaguered and constrained by political opponents from within his own party (the DPP) and from the opposition. Taiwan's political confusion and economic woes are seen as pressuring Chen to make concessions to Beijing.

Missile Defense and U.S.-China Relations By Wade Huntley and Robert Brown
(Foreign Policy in Focus, Jan. 2001) Huntley and Brown make the case that the pursuit of an aggressive theater missile defense system in
East Asia could lead to new U.S.-China military tensions and preempt
important proposals for the establishment of new common security regimes
in the Asia-Pacific region. -Taiwan is central to China’s perceptions of TMD and NMD. -U.S.-Japan cooperation on TMD development acts to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance in the post-cold war context, raising Chinese concerns regarding the Northeast Asia region. -As its strategic role expands, China’s reactions to TMD and NMD become increasingly important.

Aggressive Tilt Towards Japan Could Spell Trouble in Asia By Tom Plate
(Straits Times, Jan. 30, 2001) Not to be uncharitable, but President George Bush has appointed so many old foreign-policy hands that one has to wonder: Is America asking too many of yesterday's men - and women - to solve too many of today's pressing problems? It is obvious that the Bush administration will push US policy towards Tokyo and away from Beijing, at least incrementally.

Taiwan Outlook (Taiwan Studies Institute, Jan. 2001) This newest issue features: Stephen J. Yates of the Heritage Foundation examines developments in Chen's mainland policy. Asian security expert Carl Ford argues why the time is right for the Bush administration to approve Taiwan's request to purchase advanced weapons from the U.S. University of Richmond Professor Vincent Wei-cheng Wang examines why Beijing's latest "one-China" formulations should be viewed with skepticism.

Experts Try to Make Missile Shield Plan Palatable to China By Erik Eckholm
(New York Times, Jan. 28, 2001) With President Bush dead set on building a national missile defense, American and Chinese military experts have begun exploring ways to make such a shield more palatable to China and say a compromise, though extremely difficult, might be possible. A way out of the impasse might be found, military experts say, but it will require near-heretical political steps by leaders in Washington and Beijing.

U.S. Looks to Its Allies for Stability in Asia and the Pacific By Colin Powell
(International Herald Tribune, Jan. 27, 2001) It is the United States' strong relationships with its Asia-Pacific allies and friends, particularly Japan. All else in the Pacific and East Asia flows from those relationships. With these fundamentals in mind, consider China. It is a giant trying to find its way in the world, with a Communist leadership still, yet with distinctly Chinese textures that belie any real categorization other than capitalism that now weaves a strong strain throughout the country. Our challenge with China is to do what we can that is constructive, helpful and in our interests.

Toward a Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Can Japan Meet Great Expectation? By Yuki Tatsumi
(Pacific Forum, CSIS, PacNet 4, Jan. 26, 2001) With familiar Asia hands such as Richard Armitage, James Kelly, and Paul Wolfowitz making significant contributions to the formulation of Asia policy, it seems clear that the Bush administration will put a higher priority on U.S. relations with Japan. This, in general, is good news for Japan. But when one thinks more deeply about the implications of the new administration's enhanced interest in the U.S.-Japan alliance, Bush's inauguration also poses a great challenge to Japan.

New U.S.-Sino Power Diplomacy By Willy Wo-Lap Lam
(CNN, Jan. 26, 2001) Beijing officials have pointed out the first test of Sino-U.S. relations will be in April, when Washington will decide on the types of weapons it will sell Taiwan this year. Aides to President Jiang, who is expected to retire in 2003, have cited "great power diplomacy," particularly stabilizing relations with the United States, as one of his major legacies.

Beijing in Battle With Sect: 'A Giant Fighting a Ghost' By Elisabeth Rosenthal
(New York Times, Jan. 26, 2001) As he ambles down the street with a newspaper under his arm, the clean-shaven engineer, dressed in a neat down jacket and blue slacks, could be an advertisement for the new urban China. He has a Ph.D., speaks a bit of English, likes to surf the Net and has moved steadily up in his profession. He could be, that is, except for one problem: He remains a committed — though mostly closeted — follower of Falun Gong, the banned spiritual movement. And that represents a challenge to the Chinese government.

Consider 'Special Domestic Links' By Tsai Horng-ming
(Taipei Times, Jan. 24, 2001) In a recent meeting with a Taiwanese delegation comprising KMT and New Party legislators, Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen suggested that the "three links" between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait could be treated as "special domestic links." Since the "one China" principle was not mentioned, Qian's suggestion was taken as a positive response from Beijing. The strategic meaning of such a suggestion as well as its effect in promoting business exchanges between Taiwan and China after the two sides enter the WTO are worth examining.

Qian's Remarks Show Flexibility in Beijing's Strategy: KMT Official
(Central News Agency, Jan. 22, 2001) Mainland Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen's latest speech on relations across the Taiwan Strait indicates that Beijing is ready to adopt a more flexible strategy toward Taiwan, an opposition Kuomintang (KMT) official said. According to Chang, Qian's speech made use of Chinese history, ethnic sentiment and the concept of Chinese people to signify Beijing's sovereignty claim over Taiwan. Chang pointed out that the mainland leadership apparently has found the need to emphasize the "Chinese consciousness" after the KMT lost power to the DPP in last year's ROC presidential election.

Restoring Perspective and Priorities in U.S. Relations with China By Stephen J. Yates
(Priorities for the President, Heritage Foundation, Jan. 2001) Understanding the limits of China's own development and its role within the American global and regional strategy should be the starting point for U.S. policy. The United States should welcome, but not rely upon, China's cooperation in advancing American interests in Asia. And the Administration should focus more on how Beijing's external behavior helps or hinders regional progress rather than becoming captive to the machinations of domestic Chinese politics.

India and China: Not Quite Brothers Yet By Sultan Shahin
(Asia Times, Jan. 18, 2001) A 10-day visit to India by senior Chinese leader Li Peng, culminating in his meeting with Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee on January 15, has strengthened the "China-is-no-threat" lobby in the country. The two have decided to continue to refashion old ties, a process that started with former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's trip to China in 1988 and was given a big push by President Jiang Zemin's visit in 1996.

Dialogue in Neutral; Private Sector in Gear By David Brown
(Comparative Connection, Pacific Forum, CSIS, Jan. 20, 2001) With Taipei domestic politics in turmoil and Beijing fixated on its version of the one-China principle, cross-Strait dialogue has gone nowhere this quarter. Taipei has taken some unilateral steps to increase cross-Strait contacts, the most important being the "mini three links" legalizing trade and travel between the off-shore islands and adjacent Mainland ports. The new Bush administration will have time to carefully review U.S. policy on cross-Strait issues, reiterate abiding U.S. interests, and consider key decisions it will face this spring on Taiwan arms sales.

Beijing Tightens Its Grip By Bruce Gilley
(Far Eastern Economic Review, Jan. 25, 2001) "Leading officials must emphasize politics," China's Communist Party chief Jiang Zemin has been saying for the last five years. Translation: Toe the line or you're out. On January 12, that imperative finally landed in Hong Kong with the sudden resignation of the principled and popular head of the territory's civil service, Anson Chan. The sudden resignation of Anson Chan, head of Hong Kong's civil service, may encourage a stronger grassroots push for democracy. But in the meantime the territory can expect Beijing's hand to weigh yet more heavily on its affairs.

Powell Vows Activism In Foreign Relations By Steven Mufson
(Washington Post, Jan. 18, 2001) Retired Gen. Colin L. Powell, President-elect Bush's nominee for secretary of state, declared yesterday that the new administration will not withdraw "into a fortress of protectionism or island of isolationism." Responding to wide-ranging questions at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Powell called for continuing sanctions on Iraq, engagement with China, talks with North Korea, U.S. involvement in Middle East peace negotiations and greater attention to Africa.

Integration Offers a Strait Solution By Chang Ya-chung
(Taipei Times, Jan. 18, 2001) In his New Year speech, President Chen Shui-bian gave a new view of cross-strait "integration." I would like to comment on the concept of "integration." Two different kinds of discourse exist in discussions concerning integration. One concerns integration as a process toward an eventual coming together of the two sides. This process involves designing a mechanism for integration and cultivating a consensus. Another discourse construes integration as a permanent state of existence. Federations and confederations are examples of political integration.

The Ghosts of Tiananmen By Allen T. Cheng and Tim Healy
(Asiaweek, Jan. 19, 2001) Tiananmen Square was eerily quiet on June 4, 1989, just after PLA soldiers killed hundreds of protesters. How the tragedy still haunts China's leaders? In a way, today's struggle is still about Mao jackets and blue jeans. But it's also more than that. It's a question of how far China is prepared to go to join the world. The Tiananmen Papers brings the ghosts of Tiananmen back to life. "Tiananmen is a nightmare for China's leaders," says former student leader Wang. "The truth will never be forgotten by the Chinese people." Sooner or later, the day of reckoning will come.

U.S.-China?Expect More of the Same By Ralph A. Cossa
(International Herald Tribune, Jan. 17, 2001) Chinese leaders worry about the incoming administration in Washington, given comments by George W. Bush about China being more a "competitor" than a "strategic partner." Call it cooperative engagement or managed competition, Chinese-U.S. relations in the next four years may well look much like what they have been under President Bill Clinton during the past eight. But on Taiwan, the issue most pressing to China, no U.S. administration would be able to ignore an unprovoked Chinese attack. U.S. credibility in Asia and globally would be at stake.

Bush Faces Busy Time on Asia
(Agence France Presse, Jan. 16, 2001) When George W. Bush walks into the Oval Office for the first time as president, he will find his inbox filled with a large pile of Asian issues demanding his attention. The implications of a rising China, slumbering Japan, gathering economic storm, unraveling Indonesia, volatile North Korea and newly nuclear South Asia will pose a stiff challenge for his foreign policy team. "There's a lot of evidence ... that President Bush during his four years could face a serious crisis in some part of Asia," said Michael Pillsbury, of the National Defence University.

Taiwan Nuclear Row Might Explode Despite Ruling
(Reuters, Jan. 16, 2001) A ruling by Taiwan's constitutional court that a cabinet decision to scrap a nuclear plant was flawed cheered the island's financial markets on Tuesday but might have sown the seeds of political turmoil. Analysts said the ruling had only postponed confrontation between President Chen Shui-bian's anti-nuclear government and the Nationalist-dominated legislature which wants the plant to be built. The confrontation could lead to the resignation of Prime Minister Chang Chun-hsiung or the dissolution of the legislature and fresh parliamentary elections.

Bush Push for Modified 'One China,' 'Integration'
(Editorial, China Post, Jan. 16, 2001) A timely agenda for the new Bush administration is: to encourage the two rivals to turn their words into deeds-Beijing's modified definition of "one-China" and Taipei's suggestion of promoting "political integration" with the mainland. President Chen Shui-bian's "integration" initiative, an unprecedented appeasement offer announced in his New Year's Eve message, has surprised both his friends and foes. In Beijing, PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen has been busy, since last August, promoting the new conception of "one China," which is also surprisingly conciliatory.

A New Vicar for U.S. Asia Policy By Tom Plate
(Asia Pacific Media Network, Jan. 15, 2001) Honolulu-based James A. Kelly will be a key figure in reordering U.S.-Asia policy. Like Powell's, Kelly's basic instincts tend to be cautious and controlled, but he is known to believe that U.S. policy in Asia needs a lot of work. He worries, as do others in this incoming administration, that U.S. policy has too glibly downplayed China's potential security threat in order to talk up its economic potential. Kelly has real concerns about the Taiwan security issue and the corrosive effect that Clinton's courting of China has had on the U.S.-Japan relationship.

China Beefing Up Air Defenses Opposite Taiwan
(Strafor.com, Jan. 16, 2001) China is beefing up its coastal air defenses opposite Taiwan to help tip the military balance in the Taiwan Straits in Beijing’s favor. If a permanent air defense missile base materializes, Taipei and Washington are likely to consider it an escalation, sparking a new round of confrontation. If Beijing alters the military balance in the Taiwan Straits it will get a swift response from an increasingly hard-line government in Washington, including the transfer of high-tech arms to Taiwan to keep Chinese military advancements in check.

Beijing And Moscow To Sign Pact: Strong Ties Sought To Check U.S. Influence
(Washington Post, Jan. 13, 2001) China and Russia are negotiating their first political treaty since an ill-fated peace and friendship pact at the outset of the Cold War, united this time by a desire to counter U.S. preeminence in world affairs and oppose U.S. proposals for building a missile defense shield. Diplomats and Russian media reports said the treaty is likely to be signed in the middle of the year, when Chinese President Jiang Zemin travels to Moscow. For China, the treaty marks another step in a policy of avoiding heavy reliance on the United States as a big-power interlocutor, modernizing its military and working to dilute American power in Asia.

Big Three Links a Challenge
(Editorial, Taipei Times, Jan. 12, 2001) Taiwan has made a solid goodwill gesture to mainland China with the opening of "mini links" between the mainland coast and the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu. If these small links can be implemented smoothly, the natural next step will be the much hyped "big three links" or "three direct links" between the mainland and Taiwan proper. During his meeting with American Institute in Taiwan Chairman Richard Bush yesterday, Premier Chang Chun-hsiung said the WTO framework makes it impossible for Taiwan to not implement the three direct links.

Senator Lugar Delivers Keynote Address on U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan
(Jan. 11, 2001) The Bush Administration should begin a review of U.S.-Sino relations and the Cross-Strait issue. It should take into consideration past policy pronouncements that are embedded in three communiques with China and in the Taiwan Relations Act. It should also consider the substantive changes that have evolved over the past two decades because China and Taiwan -- and the United States, for that matter -- are not the same countries that signed the three bilateral communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. Nuances are particularly important in the Cross-Strait issue. The smallest shift in language or tone by one party may have great significance to the others.

Tests Loom for U.S.-China Ties By Ralph Cossa
(Japan Times, Jan. 10, 2001) How will the election of George W. Bush affect U.S.-China relations? The conventional wisdom was that a Gore administration would have been more favorable to China -- a questionable assumption based in part on the belief that Al Gore would be more inclined to continue President Bill Clinton's policies of engagement and support for "one China," the real litmus tests for Washington as far as Beijing is concerned. However, these policies have been consistently followed for years by Republican and Democratic administrations alike, and there is no reason to believe that any future U.S. administration is going to change them, absent some dramatic destabilizing action by Beijing.

China Tries a New Tactic on Taiwan - Sweet Talk By Philip Bowring
(International Herald Tribune, Jan. 9, 2001) Threats and missile tests have been counter-productive so Beijing is now adopting a "good cop" routine to lure Taiwan toward eventual reunification. A deputy prime minister, Qian Qichen, suggested last week that China was now showing increased flexibility in its attitude, even acknowledging a degree of equality between the two sides. At the same time, opposition legislators from Taiwan were being told in Beijing that direct air, sea and telecom links across the strait were possible without a formal agreement or Taiwan's acceptance of the "one China" principle.

Right Face By Al Kamen
(Washington Post, Jan. 8, 2001) A few dozen eyebrows are said to have gone up last week when Secretary of State-designate Colin L. Powell opined broadly about China policy with a group of Pentagon, State, intelligence and military types. Powell, according to one participant, noted this was "a conservative administration with certain expectations on China policy."

Taiwan: A Bumpy Boat Ride By Mahlon Meyer and William Ide
(Newsweek International, Jan. 15, 2001) After 50 years of hostilities, no one expected a peace voyage to be easy. But for the handful of Taiwanese officials making the first legal, direct crossing of the Taiwan Strait in modern times, just getting started was a nightmare. Some of Chen’s staunchest supporters have counseled against making concessions, arguing that the communist regime will collapse in the near future. But Chen cannot simply wait. He must consolidate his power base and salvage Taiwan’s battered economy, and he needs a respite from China tensions.

Documents Reveal Top Chinese Split Before Crackdown By Steven Mufson
(Washington Post, Jan. 6, 2001) A trove of newly released documents reveals the secret conversations of top Chinese leaders as they battled one another over the decision to crush the massive student-led protests in Tiananmen Square that rocked the country during the spring of 1989. The documents confirm that then-Chinese Premier Li Peng led the internal campaign to crack down on the students, whose appeals for openness and broader elections he dismissed in one leadership meeting as "nonsense."

China's Energy Strategy in the 21st Century By Chien Chung
(Taiwan Research Institute, Peace Forum, Jan. 5, 2001) The strategic oil reserve in China is surprisingly thin: less than three-day stock for domestic oil refinery and petrochemical industry. In view of the depleting production of domestic oil field and growing dependence on imported oil, China has decided to reshape its energy policy. China will possess three-week oil reserve in hand by 2010 to cope with future world-wide energy shortage and potential regional armed conflict.

Consensus Nears on Confederation
(Editorial, Taipei Times, Jan. 5, 2001) The recent policy statements made by the ruling and opposition parties show a narrowing gap between their cross-strait policies as they gradually move toward a common path. Despite the different terminology - be it "integration" or "unification" or "fusion" or even the New Party's earlier "shared roof" dictum, the ruling and opposition parties seem to have found something vaguely acceptable in the confederation concept.

Ripples of Hope Follow Taiwan-China Voyages By John Pomfret
(Washington Post, Jan. 3, 2001) With his 3-year-old son in tow, Huang Zhicheng went for a walk today along a windy path by the water's edge. Under balmy skies, the Taiwanese islands of Big Quemoy and Little Quemoy were clearly visible at the entrance of Xiamen's harbor. When he was a boy, Huang remembered, no one could come here because of fears of a war between China and Taiwan. "It was a military zone. We used to hear them firing artillery at the other side," he said. But times have changed.

Taiwan Boats Land in China; First Direct Legal Link Since '49 By Craig S. Smith
(New York Times, Jan. 2, 2001) Two tourist boats, one from the tiny fortified island of Matsu, and one from the larger island of Quemoy, arrived on the Chinese mainland today, the first legal direct link between China and Taiwan since they were separated by civil war in 1949. But Taiwan's elimination of the ban is less significant than it may seem. Legal, though indirect, travel and trade between Taiwan and the mainland have already been growing for years, with most goods and people passing through a third territory, usually Hong Kong.

China Deserves the Back Burner
(Editorial, Taipei Times, Jan. 2, 2001) President Chen Shui-bian has made two important speeches -- one on the eve of the new year and one on its first day. In the speeches, he sent out messages that allow flexible interpretations of his cross-strait policy that are therefore seen as important signals in Taiwan's quest for reconciliation with China. The spotlight is again on cross-strait relations. This was the first time Chen proposed a long-term framework for cross-strait relations

An Asian-Pacific Checklist for the Incoming Bush Administration By Tom Plate
(Japan Times, Jan. 1, 2001) George W. Bush's greatest foreign policy challenges over the next four years may well originate in the Asian-Pacific region, where two-thirds of the world's population reside, and where probably two-thirds of the world's major geopolitical crises fester. None of the top officials nominated so far have any special experience with Asia, but the region will present the new President with issues more difficult and thorny than ever.