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~1998
1999: Jan. - June, July - Dec.
2000: Jan. - Mar. , Apr. - June , July - Sept. , Oct. - Dec.
Jan. - Mar., 2001
Measuring the Breadth of
Cross-Strait Division
(Taipei Times, Mar. 31, 2001) Professor Robert O'Neill, council chairman of
the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and Dr
John Chipman, director of the IISS, analyzed how "clarity" and
"firmness" will characterize the Bush Administration's future
foreign policy conduct. They explained why it has become important for
Taiwan's government to seek to pragmatically advance its relations with China
after more than a year-long dispute over the meaning of "one
China."
Strait
Talk: China and Taiwan
(PBS'S Online NewsHour, Mar. 22, 2001)
President Bush said during his campaign that he views the U.S. relationship
with China as competitive, not as the "strategic partnership"
envisioned by the Clinton administration. After a background report, three
analysts discuss a plan to sell strategic weapons to Taiwan.
Bates Gill: China's always reminding us of the so-called three communiqués:
One of which the last one under the Reagan administration wrote in the text
that we would decrease in quantity and quality our arms sales to Taiwan. But
the context of that agreement was that there would be stability in the
strait, that China wouldn't take steps to destabilize the situation, which
they have done with this missile build-up.
Sino-US Ties Could See Clear
Skies at Year's End By Jin Canrong
(Straits Times, Mar. 26, 2001) Since Mr George W. Bush became American
President two months ago, he has done primarily three things on the
foreign-policy front: promoted National-Missile Defence (NMD) plans
vigorously, bombed Iraq and enhanced ties with allied nations. These actions
highlight some features of the new United States government's foreign policy.
But it is still in the formative stage. Mr Bush could later shift the
importance he now places on geopolitics and security to trade and human
rights.
Bush's Lack of a
Comprehensive China Policy Spells Danger By Patrick
M. Cronin and Emily Metzgar
(International Herald Tribune, Mar. 26, 2001) China sees the Bush
administration giving priority to preserving U.S. alliances in the
Asia-Pacific region, including those with Japan and South Korea. Beijing
interprets U.S. actions as hegemonic behavior intended to contain China.
While it is necessary to build U.S. policy on regional alliances, it is also
important to recognize that East Asia's security is equally dependent on
cooperative U.S.-China relations.
Rumsfeld Outlines Defense
Overhaul By Thomas E. Ricks
(Washington Post, Mar. 23, 2001) The Pacific Ocean is the most likely
theater of major U.S. military operations, as China becomes more
powerful and Russia less so. This would require a reorientation of a defense
policy that has been geared since the end of World War II to keeping the
peace in Europe and deterring the Soviet Union. Operating in
the Pacific will require an additional emphasis on "long-range power
projection," which means greater attention to airlift capacity and other
ways of sending troops and firepower across thousands of miles.
A Partnership Worth
Preserving By Jiemian Yang
(New York Times, Mar. 21, 2001) Since Mr. Qian is the Beijing official
overseeing Taiwan affairs, the Taiwan issue is likely to be central to the
discussion tomorrow. Last August Mr. Qian significantly redefined the
"one- China" concept in a pragmatic way that was not given
sufficient attention in the United States. He announced that one China includes
both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, a modification from the previous
statement of Taiwan being a part of China only. This formulation allows
considerably more flexibility in easing cross-strait tensions.
China's Dream of the Century
is on Course By Ching Cheong
(Straits Times, Mar. 21, 2001) The 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) that the
National People's Congress (NPC), or Parliament, adopted last week is a
crucial step towards achieving modernisation by the middle of this century.
Twenty years ago, late Chinese patriarch Deng Xiaoping designed this long
journey towards modernisation in three stages, at a time when the Chinese
economy was almost bankrupt after practising communism for three decades.
Former U.S. Defense Official
Speaks on Taiwan Security Issues
(Central News Agency, March 20, 2001) The new U.S. administration will likely
make it very clear to Beijing that Washington will not stand by while Beijing
makes any coercive or provocative military moves toward. Former U.S. Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell believes the Bush administration
will make "absolutely clear" that the two sides of the Taiwan
Strait should try to get back to discussions and work out problems at the
negotiating table instead of the use of "enormous military expenditures
and military exercises."
Former U.S. Defense Official
Speaks on Taiwan Security Issues
(Central News Agency, March 20, 2001) The new U.S. administration will likely
make it very clear to Beijing that Washington will not stand by while Beijing
makes any coercive or provocative military moves toward. Former U.S. Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell believes the Bush administration
will make "absolutely clear" that the two sides of the Taiwan
Strait should try to get back to discussions and work out problems at the negotiating
table instead of the use of "enormous military expenditures and military
exercises."
US Should Sell Arms to
Taiwan By James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara
(Boston Globe, Mar. 17, 2001) Selective American military support, carefully
tailored to blunt China's strategy, is crucial to buoy Taiwanese morale and
allow Taipei to pursue a negotiated settlement in its own time. Indeed, this
prudent approach already enjoys strong bipartisan support and was codified in
the 1998 Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. The United States should sell the
island defensive weaponry to counter China's air, naval, and
ballistic-missile threats.
Spend on China's Poor, Not
Arms By Chien Hsi-chieh
(Taipei Times, Mar. 17, 2001) China recently made public its 141 billion yuan
(US$17 billion) military spending plans for 2001, which is a 17.7 percent
increase from last year. It is generally believed that China's actual defense
spending is two to three times the official budget. Some of it is hidden in
the budgets of non-defense ministries, while some is simply not listed in any
official budget. The increase in defense spending appears ironic in the face
of Beijing's repeated emphasis on peace and development.
Forum Shows Beijing's
Strategies By Wang Kung-yi
(Taipei Times, Mar. 11, 2001) Beijing has trumpeted "economic globalization"
at the recently held Boao Asian Forum. After two decades of reforms and
liberalization, the thriving China market has absorbed considerable capital.
The Boao forum gives a picture of China's global strategic blueprint -- to
build up positions across East Asia, ride on Asia's peaceful development,
rally the Pacific Rim nations, help the Third World rise to its feet, and
break the US and European monopoly on the world.
China's Door Isn't Open to
All By Jim Mann
(LA Times, Mar. 7, 2001) Come have a look, the Chinese government proclaims
to the world. Come see for yourself how things in China aren't so bad. Come
observe how our country is changing. This is the misleading message China
puts out whenever it wants something from abroad--in the past, when its trade
benefits were in doubt in the U.S. Congress, and now when it is trying to
land the 2008 Summer Olympics for Beijing. It would be a fair enough offer if
China extended it equally to everyone. But China doesn't: If you say or write
something too critical of China, forget it. The invitation to visit is
withdrawn.
Has China Turned Into a
Frankenstein? By Joseph A. Bosco
(LA Times, Mar. 6, 2001) Chinese enhancement of Iraq's air defense system in
violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions confronts American
policymakers with a disturbing question: Has China launched a new Cold War
against the United States? Beijing's global "anti-hegemonism"
policy can no longer be dismissed as mere rhetoric. It has supplied the
technology for delivering Baghdad's chemical and biological weapons. It was
instrumental in the emergence of North Korea's and Pakistan's nuclear weapons
programs and has transferred missile technology to Iran and Syria.
U.S. Policy Toward China By Kenneth Lieberthal
(Brookings Institute, March 2001) The Bush administration's China policy must
be part of a larger Asian strategy that keeps America fully engaged,
maintains the region's strength and dynamism in an era of globalization, and
encourages China's own constructive engagement in the region. This would
provide both the best prospect for encouraging China's internal reform and
external cooperation and for creating the conditions to cope with the
consequences should China ultimately seek to confront the United States
across the region.
Transits, Visas and US Diplomacy By Nat Bellocchi
(Taipei Times, March 1, 2001) There is much talk these days that the US
should play a more active role in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait.
But is this possible with the constraints we have imposed on ourselves?
Whether called policies or guidelines, however, many of them are demeaning,
and place constraints on our communicating with each other. Transits and
visits, including those experienced more recently for the first time by the
new government in Taiwan, are examples of that. Who we welcome to our
country, who we do not, or who comes just to visit or do business, are
domestic matters.
China Seeking to Keep U.S. Relationship on Track:
Analysis
(AFP, Feb. 28, 2001) China has adopted a cooperative attitude on U.S. charges
it helped Iraq restore its air defenses in order not to further burden
already strained ties with Washington, analysts said Wednesday. Beijing has
angrily dismissed a U.S. report which said China's human rights abuses
worsened last year. But it has struck a noticeably more conciliatory tone on
Iraq, saying it would look into U.S. allegations that it had provided
technical assistance .
US Fears of China's Influence Extend Far Beyond
Iraq
(Editorial, Asia Times, Feb. 23, 2001)
The spat between the United States and China over the latter's alleged military
assistance to Iraq is overshadowing a number of contentious issues between
the two countries, such as Taiwan, human rights and US plans for a missile
defense shield. It is also deflecting attention from Central Intelligence
Agency concerns over Chinese missile-related technical assistance to Pakistan
and the "provision of other missile-related items and raw materials to
several countries of proliferation concern, including Iran, North Korea and
Libya".
'Chinese Confederation' verses 'One
China' By Lee Chang-kuei
(Taipei Times, Feb. 23, 2001) A confederacy is neither the outright
independence that Taiwan wants nor a unification under the "one country,
two systems" model that China expects. China would think in terms of
preventing Taiwan's declaration of independence by first incorporating Taiwan
into an integration framework. Taiwan should think in terms of the price in
terms of national security and economic losses in cross-strait cooperation,
if Taiwan does not join the unification process through a confederacy.
Chen: 'Integration' to
Follow Constitution
(Central News Agency, Feb. 22, 2001) On the eve of the 10th anniversary of
the promulgation of the Guidelines for National Unification, President Chen
Shui-bian yesterday said that any form of political integration between
mainland and Taiwan should be subject to the ROC Constitution. Chen told a
group of visiting European Union Parliament members that the mainland and
Taiwan should seek a permanent peace through political integration which, no
matter whether it takes the form of a federation, a confederation, a
commonwealth or a model like that of the European Union, should be in
conformity with the Constitution.
The Blind Spot in US-Taiwan
Policy By Lin Cheng-yi
(Taipei Times, Feb. 20, 2001) A blind spot in the US policy however, is that
Taiwan's future must be jointly decided by the two sides of the Strait
without the use of force or the imposition of the will of one side over the
other side. If the future of Taiwan is to be decided by the people of both
sides of the Strait, then the verdict is out already. So Chen told Roth that
Taiwan's future could not be decided by the people on the two sides of the
Strait, but rather that the free will of the Taiwanese people must be
respected.
'Integration' a Step to
'Future One China', MAC Official
(CNA, Feb. 18, 2001) The concept of "political integration"
proposed by President Chen Shui-bian during his New Year's speech is a step
towards fulfilling the idea of a "future one China." "The
integration concept is only a process leading toward Taiwan's final goal,
which is to establish a system in which both mainland China and Taiwan can
seek mutual prosperity and co-existence," said MAC Vice Chairman Chen
Ming-tung.
How the Bush People Should
Deal with China By Susan Shirk
(Asia Pacific Media Network, Feb. 2001) First of all, continue to do what we
did, which is just to be in almost constant contact with the two sides,
urging them actively to restore the dialogue. Secondly, it is important for
the US government to keep a very stable and consistent set of policies toward
the two sides and for cross-strait relations. Finally, on arms sales, which
is politically a very difficult subject. Of course the United States must
fulfill its responsibility to assist Taiwan in providing for its own
self-defense. But it must do this in a prudent way.
Taiwan Should Consider
Hosting APEC: Analysts By Monique Chu
(Taipei Times, Feb. 13, 2001) "Taiwan should make its case [for hosting
the summit] to emphasize its right as a member of APEC to host the meeting
but it should avoid overtly politicizing the issue," said Philip Yang.
"Now that the issue has been brought up, the government should remind
the group's other members of the nature of APEC, Taiwan's ability to take
part in the regional grouping, as well as its right as a member economy to
host the meeting."
Communist
Ideologues Struggle to Make Room for Capitalists By Charles Wolf Jr.
(LA Times, Feb. 11, 2001) China's socialist market economy is starting to
look much more like capitalism, creating a new dilemma for the nation's
Communist leadership. In the next few months, mainland China's first free and
competitive stock market, known as the second board market, will open. Unlike
existing stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen, whose listings are mainly
state-owned, partly privatized companies, the new market's listings will
consist largely of private Chinese businesses, many involved in high
technology, and joint ventures between Chinese and foreign investors whose
companies are registered in China.
China's
Acquisitions of Russian SU Fighters: A Great Leap Forward? By Ming-yen Tsai
(Peace Forum, Taiwan Research Institute, Feb. 8, 2001) China's purchases of
Russian fighters suggest that the modernization of the PLAAF's outdated
aircraft fleet has been put at the top of China's defense modernization.
However, due to Russia's intention to restrict China's air projection
capacities, and China's problems with absorbing Russian fighters, China has
yet to achieve a meaningful enhancement of its air power capabilities from
the purchases. The impact of Russian weapons on the PLAAF's modernization so
far has been more symbolic than substantial.
Bush's Emerging
Asia Policy: What's Still Missing By Ralph A. Cossa
(PacNet 6, Pacific Forum, CSIS, Feb. 9, 2001) What was conspicuously absent
from Powell's comments was any reference to Asian multilateralism.
The U.S. is currently involved in two major region-wide efforts: the
security-oriented ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) effort. Both are in need of stimulation but are still
worthy of continued U.S. support. ... some thought should be given to
proposing that, in the future, the APEC Leaders' Meeting be held every
other year, substituting an ARF Leaders' Meeting on the off years, in order
to promote higher-level security as well as economic dialogue.
Japan Divided
On U.S. Call for Missile Defense By Doug Struck
(Washington Post, Feb. 8, 2001) The missile defense system advocated by the
Bush administration is pushing Japan toward a stronger military stance,
exposing the national divide between the country's pacifist post-World War II
constitution and calls for Tokyo to assume a broader defense role. Japan is
worried that cooperating with the United States on a missile system -- the
likely first test of the new, closer relationship promised by the Bush
administration -- would bring a larger role for its military that would
arouse fierce opposition and would require a politically volatile change in
Japan's anti-militarist constitution.
China Has to Acknowledge Taiwan By Kam Yiu-yu, Chris Wu and Yu Hao-cheng
(Taipei Times, Feb. 8, 2001) In our view, if the two sides of the Strait are
unable to truly return to a recognition that there are two China entities and
on this basis begin talks on "`one China,' with each side having its own
interpretation," then the three links, political integration, and the
distant future prospect of "one China" will all be difficult to
realize. For the Beijing authorities, the greatest difficulty at present is
that they don't recognize that the ROC has already existed for 90 years. Like
ostriches with their heads in the sand, they consider the ROC to have
vanished of its own accord.
Risky British Arms Sales to China? By Richard D. Fisher Jr.
(Washington Times, Feb. 7, 2001) Our most important alliance partnership,
that with the United Kingdom, is already troubled, and is about to be more
so. It appears the British government of Prime Minister Tony Blair is
determined to sell China military technology that could be used against
Taiwan, and against American forces that may have to come to Taiwan's rescue.
According to British and U.S. government sources, over the objections of the
Pentagon in the last year, London is proceeding with the sale of 80 to 90
Rolls Royce Spey turbofan engines that will used to power one or more
squadrons of Chinese Xian JH-7 fighter-bombers.
Managing Relations Across the Strait By Lin Chong-Pin
(Taipei Times, Feb. 5, 2001) How does Taipei perceive and how will Taipei
manage cross-strait relations? Current relations: compounded uncertainties.
The actual tension that broke out between Beijing and Taipei in the fall of
1999 has since dissipated, but some still perceive a precarious cross-strait
situation. Since mid-2000, the cross-strait relationship has evolved into a
mixture of four elements: lingering, though less confrontational, political
stalemate; growing and even accelerating economic exchanges; rapidly
expanding social interactions and heightened military competition.
Beijing Fears about Chen Shui-bian Subside as
Taiwan's Political and Economic Troubles Mount By Bonnie S. Glaser
(Pacific Forum, CSIS, PacNet 5, Feb. 2, 2001) China's alarmist reaction to
the election of Chen Shui-bian as Taiwan's president last March has
given way to a more relaxed posture. Beijing is no longer worried that
Chen will seek a near-term separation of Taiwan from the Mainland.
Chen's political and economic difficulties have evoked a self-satisfied response
from China, which largely attributes Chen's predicament to his vacillating
policy toward China and his failure to improve cross-Strait relations.
It judges Chen as beleaguered and constrained by political opponents from
within his own party (the DPP) and from the opposition. Taiwan's
political confusion and economic woes are seen as pressuring Chen to make
concessions to Beijing.
Missile Defense and U.S.-China Relations By Wade Huntley and Robert Brown
(Foreign Policy in Focus, Jan. 2001) Huntley and Brown make the case that the
pursuit of an aggressive theater missile defense system in
East Asia could lead to new U.S.-China military tensions and preempt
important proposals for the establishment of new common security regimes
in the Asia-Pacific region. -Taiwan is central to China’s perceptions of TMD
and NMD. -U.S.-Japan cooperation on TMD development acts to strengthen the
U.S.-Japan alliance in the post-cold war context, raising Chinese concerns
regarding the Northeast Asia region. -As its strategic role expands, China’s
reactions to TMD and NMD become increasingly important.
Aggressive Tilt Towards Japan Could Spell Trouble
in Asia By Tom Plate
(Straits Times, Jan. 30, 2001) Not to be uncharitable, but President George
Bush has appointed so many old foreign-policy hands that one has to wonder:
Is America asking too many of yesterday's men - and women - to solve too many
of today's pressing problems? It is obvious that the Bush administration will
push US policy towards Tokyo and away from Beijing, at least incrementally.
Taiwan Outlook (Taiwan
Studies Institute, Jan. 2001) This newest issue features: Stephen J. Yates of
the Heritage Foundation examines developments in Chen's mainland policy.
Asian security expert Carl Ford argues why the time is right for the Bush
administration to approve Taiwan's request to purchase advanced weapons from
the U.S. University of Richmond Professor Vincent Wei-cheng Wang examines why
Beijing's latest "one-China" formulations should be viewed with
skepticism.
Experts Try to
Make Missile Shield Plan Palatable to China By Erik
Eckholm
(New York Times, Jan. 28, 2001) With President Bush dead set on building a
national missile defense, American and Chinese military experts have begun
exploring ways to make such a shield more palatable to China and say a
compromise, though extremely difficult, might be possible. A way out of the
impasse might be found, military experts say, but it will require
near-heretical political steps by leaders in Washington and Beijing.
U.S.
Looks to Its Allies for Stability in Asia and the Pacific By Colin Powell
(International Herald Tribune, Jan. 27, 2001) It is the United States' strong
relationships with its Asia-Pacific allies and friends, particularly Japan.
All else in the Pacific and East Asia flows from those relationships. With
these fundamentals in mind, consider China. It is a giant trying to find its
way in the world, with a Communist leadership still, yet with distinctly
Chinese textures that belie any real categorization other than capitalism
that now weaves a strong strain throughout the country. Our challenge with
China is to do what we can that is constructive, helpful and in our
interests.
Toward a
Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Can Japan Meet Great
Expectation?
By Yuki Tatsumi
(Pacific Forum, CSIS, PacNet 4, Jan. 26, 2001) With familiar Asia hands
such as Richard Armitage, James Kelly, and Paul Wolfowitz making significant
contributions to the formulation of Asia policy, it seems clear that the Bush
administration will put a higher priority on U.S. relations with Japan. This,
in general, is good news for Japan. But when one thinks more
deeply about the implications of the new administration's enhanced interest
in the U.S.-Japan alliance, Bush's inauguration also poses a great challenge
to Japan.
New U.S.-Sino
Power Diplomacy By Willy Wo-Lap Lam
(CNN, Jan. 26, 2001) Beijing officials have pointed out the first test of
Sino-U.S. relations will be in April, when Washington will decide on the
types of weapons it will sell Taiwan this year. Aides to President Jiang, who
is expected to retire in 2003, have cited "great power diplomacy,"
particularly stabilizing relations with the United States, as one of his
major legacies.
Beijing in
Battle With Sect: 'A Giant Fighting a Ghost' By Elisabeth Rosenthal
(New York Times, Jan. 26, 2001) As he ambles down the street with a newspaper
under his arm, the clean-shaven engineer, dressed in a neat down jacket and blue
slacks, could be an advertisement for the new urban China. He has a Ph.D.,
speaks a bit of English, likes to surf the Net and has moved steadily up in
his profession. He could be, that is, except for one problem: He remains a
committed — though mostly closeted — follower of Falun Gong, the banned
spiritual movement. And that represents a challenge to the Chinese
government.
Consider
'Special Domestic Links' By Tsai Horng-ming
(Taipei Times, Jan. 24, 2001) In a recent meeting with a Taiwanese delegation
comprising KMT and New Party legislators, Chinese Vice Premier Qian
Qichen suggested that the "three
links" between the two sides of
the Taiwan Strait could be treated as "special domestic links."
Since the "one China" principle was not mentioned, Qian's
suggestion was taken as a positive response from Beijing. The strategic
meaning of such a suggestion as well as its effect in promoting business
exchanges between Taiwan and China after the two sides enter the WTO are
worth examining.
Qian's Remarks Show
Flexibility in Beijing's Strategy: KMT Official
(Central News Agency, Jan. 22, 2001) Mainland Chinese Vice Premier Qian
Qichen's latest speech on relations across the Taiwan Strait indicates that
Beijing is ready to adopt a more flexible strategy toward Taiwan, an
opposition Kuomintang (KMT) official said. According to Chang, Qian's speech
made use of Chinese history, ethnic sentiment and the concept of Chinese
people to signify Beijing's sovereignty claim over Taiwan. Chang pointed out
that the mainland leadership apparently has found the need to emphasize the
"Chinese consciousness" after the KMT lost power to the DPP in last
year's ROC presidential election.
Restoring
Perspective and Priorities in U.S. Relations with China By Stephen J.
Yates
(Priorities for the President, Heritage Foundation, Jan. 2001) Understanding
the limits of China's own development and its role within the American global
and regional strategy should be the starting point for U.S. policy. The
United States should welcome, but not rely upon, China's cooperation in
advancing American interests in Asia. And the Administration should focus
more on how Beijing's external behavior helps or hinders regional progress
rather than becoming captive to the machinations of domestic Chinese
politics.
India and China: Not Quite Brothers Yet By Sultan Shahin
(Asia Times, Jan. 18, 2001) A 10-day visit to India by senior Chinese leader
Li Peng, culminating in his meeting with Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee
on January 15, has strengthened the "China-is-no-threat" lobby in
the country. The two have decided to continue to refashion old ties, a
process that started with former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's trip to
China in 1988 and was given a big push by President Jiang Zemin's visit in
1996.
Dialogue in Neutral; Private Sector in Gear By David Brown
(Comparative Connection, Pacific Forum, CSIS, Jan. 20, 2001) With Taipei
domestic politics in turmoil and Beijing fixated on its version of the
one-China principle, cross-Strait dialogue has gone nowhere this
quarter. Taipei has taken some unilateral steps to increase
cross-Strait contacts, the most important being the "mini three
links" legalizing trade and travel between the off-shore islands and
adjacent Mainland ports. The new Bush administration will have time to
carefully review U.S. policy on cross-Strait issues, reiterate abiding U.S.
interests, and consider key decisions it will face this spring on Taiwan arms
sales.
Beijing
Tightens Its Grip By Bruce Gilley
(Far Eastern Economic Review, Jan. 25, 2001) "Leading officials must
emphasize politics," China's Communist Party chief Jiang Zemin has been
saying for the last five years. Translation: Toe the line or you're out. On
January 12, that imperative finally landed in Hong Kong with the sudden
resignation of the principled and popular head of the territory's civil
service, Anson Chan. The sudden resignation of Anson Chan, head of Hong
Kong's civil service, may encourage a stronger grassroots push for democracy.
But in the meantime the territory can expect Beijing's hand to weigh yet more
heavily on its affairs.
Powell
Vows Activism In Foreign Relations By Steven
Mufson
(Washington Post, Jan. 18, 2001) Retired Gen. Colin L. Powell,
President-elect Bush's nominee for secretary of state, declared yesterday
that the new administration will not withdraw "into a fortress of
protectionism or island of isolationism." Responding to wide-ranging
questions at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Powell called for continuing sanctions on Iraq, engagement with
China, talks with North Korea, U.S. involvement in Middle East peace
negotiations and greater attention to Africa.
Integration
Offers a Strait Solution By Chang Ya-chung
(Taipei Times, Jan. 18, 2001) In his New Year speech, President Chen
Shui-bian gave a new view of cross-strait "integration." I would
like to comment on the concept of "integration." Two different
kinds of discourse exist in discussions concerning integration. One concerns
integration as a process toward an eventual coming together of the two sides.
This process involves designing a mechanism for integration and cultivating a
consensus. Another discourse construes integration as a permanent state of
existence. Federations and confederations are examples of political
integration.
The Ghosts of
Tiananmen
By Allen T. Cheng and Tim Healy
(Asiaweek, Jan. 19, 2001) Tiananmen Square was eerily quiet on June 4, 1989,
just after PLA soldiers killed hundreds of protesters. How the tragedy still
haunts China's leaders? In a way, today's struggle is still about Mao jackets
and blue jeans. But it's also more than that. It's a question of how far
China is prepared to go to join the world. The Tiananmen Papers brings the
ghosts of Tiananmen back to life. "Tiananmen is a nightmare for China's
leaders," says former student leader Wang. "The truth will never be
forgotten by the Chinese people." Sooner or later, the day of reckoning
will come.
U.S.-China?Expect
More of the Same By Ralph A. Cossa
(International Herald Tribune, Jan. 17, 2001) Chinese leaders worry about the
incoming administration in Washington, given comments by George W. Bush about
China being more a "competitor" than a "strategic
partner." Call it cooperative engagement or managed competition,
Chinese-U.S. relations in the next four years may well look much like what
they have been under President Bill Clinton during the past eight. But on
Taiwan, the issue most pressing to China, no U.S. administration would be
able to ignore an unprovoked Chinese attack. U.S. credibility in Asia and
globally would be at stake.
Bush Faces Busy
Time on Asia
(Agence France Presse, Jan. 16, 2001) When George W. Bush walks into the Oval
Office for the first time as president, he will find his inbox filled with a
large pile of Asian issues demanding his attention. The implications of a
rising China, slumbering Japan, gathering economic storm, unraveling
Indonesia, volatile North Korea and newly nuclear South Asia will pose a stiff
challenge for his foreign policy team. "There's a lot of evidence ...
that President Bush during his four years could face a serious crisis in some
part of Asia," said Michael Pillsbury, of the National Defence
University.
Taiwan Nuclear
Row Might Explode Despite Ruling
(Reuters, Jan. 16, 2001) A ruling by Taiwan's constitutional court that a
cabinet decision to scrap a nuclear plant was flawed cheered the island's
financial markets on Tuesday but might have sown the seeds of political
turmoil. Analysts said the ruling had only postponed confrontation between
President Chen Shui-bian's anti-nuclear government and the
Nationalist-dominated legislature which wants the plant to be built. The
confrontation could lead to the resignation of Prime Minister Chang
Chun-hsiung or the dissolution of the legislature and fresh parliamentary
elections.
Bush
Push for Modified 'One China,' 'Integration'
(Editorial, China Post, Jan. 16, 2001) A timely agenda for the new Bush
administration is: to encourage the two rivals to turn their words into
deeds-Beijing's modified definition of "one-China" and Taipei's
suggestion of promoting "political integration" with the mainland.
President Chen Shui-bian's "integration" initiative, an
unprecedented appeasement offer announced in his New Year's Eve message, has
surprised both his friends and foes. In Beijing, PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen
has been busy, since last August, promoting the new conception of "one
China," which is also surprisingly conciliatory.
A
New Vicar for U.S. Asia Policy By Tom Plate
(Asia Pacific Media Network, Jan. 15, 2001) Honolulu-based James A. Kelly
will be a key figure in reordering U.S.-Asia policy. Like
Powell's, Kelly's basic instincts tend to be cautious and controlled, but he
is known to believe that U.S. policy in Asia needs a lot of work. He worries,
as do others in this incoming administration, that U.S. policy has too glibly
downplayed China's potential security threat in order to talk up its economic
potential. Kelly has real concerns about the Taiwan security issue and the
corrosive effect that Clinton's courting of China has had on the U.S.-Japan
relationship.
Beijing
Tightens Its Grip By Bruce Gilley
(Far Eastern Economic Review, Jan. 25, 2001) "Leading officials must
emphasize politics," China's Communist Party chief Jiang Zemin has been
saying for the last five years. Translation: Toe the line or you're out. On
January 12, that imperative finally landed in Hong Kong with the sudden
resignation of the principled and popular head of the territory's civil
service, Anson Chan. The sudden resignation of Anson Chan, head of Hong
Kong's civil service, may encourage a stronger grassroots push for democracy.
But in the meantime the territory can expect Beijing's hand to weigh yet more
heavily on its affairs.
Powell
Vows Activism In Foreign Relations By Steven
Mufson
(Washington Post, Jan. 18, 2001) Retired Gen. Colin L. Powell,
President-elect Bush's nominee for secretary of state, declared yesterday
that the new administration will not withdraw "into a fortress of
protectionism or island of isolationism." Responding to wide-ranging
questions at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Powell called for continuing sanctions on Iraq, engagement with
China, talks with North Korea, U.S. involvement in Middle East peace
negotiations and greater attention to Africa.
Integration
Offers a Strait Solution By Chang Ya-chung
(Taipei Times, Jan. 18, 2001) In his New Year speech, President Chen
Shui-bian gave a new view of cross-strait "integration." I would
like to comment on the concept of "integration." Two different
kinds of discourse exist in discussions concerning integration. One concerns
integration as a process toward an eventual coming together of the two sides.
This process involves designing a mechanism for integration and cultivating a
consensus. Another discourse construes integration as a permanent state of
existence. Federations and confederations are examples of political
integration.
The Ghosts of
Tiananmen
By Allen T. Cheng and Tim Healy
(Asiaweek, Jan. 19, 2001) Tiananmen Square was eerily quiet on June 4, 1989,
just after PLA soldiers killed hundreds of protesters. How the tragedy still
haunts China's leaders? In a way, today's struggle is still about Mao jackets
and blue jeans. But it's also more than that. It's a question of how far
China is prepared to go to join the world. The Tiananmen Papers brings the
ghosts of Tiananmen back to life. "Tiananmen is a nightmare for China's
leaders," says former student leader Wang. "The truth will never be
forgotten by the Chinese people." Sooner or later, the day of reckoning
will come.
U.S.-China?Expect
More of the Same By Ralph A. Cossa
(International Herald Tribune, Jan. 17, 2001) Chinese leaders worry about the
incoming administration in Washington, given comments by George W. Bush about
China being more a "competitor" than a "strategic
partner." Call it cooperative engagement or managed competition,
Chinese-U.S. relations in the next four years may well look much like what
they have been under President Bill Clinton during the past eight. But on
Taiwan, the issue most pressing to China, no U.S. administration would be
able to ignore an unprovoked Chinese attack. U.S. credibility in Asia and
globally would be at stake.
China Beefing
Up Air Defenses Opposite Taiwan
(Strafor.com, Jan. 16, 2001) China is beefing up its coastal air defenses
opposite Taiwan to help tip the military balance in the Taiwan Straits in
Beijing’s favor. If a permanent air defense missile base materializes, Taipei
and Washington are likely to consider it an escalation, sparking a new round
of confrontation. If Beijing alters the military balance in the Taiwan
Straits it will get a swift response from an increasingly hard-line
government in Washington, including the transfer of high-tech arms to Taiwan
to keep Chinese military advancements in check.
Bush Faces Busy
Time on Asia
(Agence France Presse, Jan. 16, 2001) When George W. Bush walks into the Oval
Office for the first time as president, he will find his inbox filled with a
large pile of Asian issues demanding his attention. The implications of a
rising China, slumbering Japan, gathering economic storm, unraveling
Indonesia, volatile North Korea and newly nuclear South Asia will pose a
stiff challenge for his foreign policy team. "There's a lot of evidence
... that President Bush during his four years could face a serious crisis in
some part of Asia," said Michael Pillsbury, of the National Defence
University.
Taiwan Nuclear
Row Might Explode Despite Ruling
(Reuters, Jan. 16, 2001) A ruling by Taiwan's constitutional court that a
cabinet decision to scrap a nuclear plant was flawed cheered the island's
financial markets on Tuesday but might have sown the seeds of political
turmoil. Analysts said the ruling had only postponed confrontation between
President Chen Shui-bian's anti-nuclear government and the
Nationalist-dominated legislature which wants the plant to be built. The
confrontation could lead to the resignation of Prime Minister Chang
Chun-hsiung or the dissolution of the legislature and fresh parliamentary
elections.
Bush Push for
Modified 'One China,' 'Integration'
(Editorial, China Post, Jan. 16, 2001) A timely agenda for the new Bush
administration is: to encourage the two rivals to turn their words into
deeds-Beijing's modified definition of "one-China" and Taipei's
suggestion of promoting "political integration" with the mainland.
President Chen Shui-bian's "integration" initiative, an
unprecedented appeasement offer announced in his New Year's Eve message, has
surprised both his friends and foes. In Beijing, PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen
has been busy, since last August, promoting the new conception of "one
China," which is also surprisingly conciliatory.
Beijing
And Moscow To Sign Pact: Strong Ties Sought To Check U.S. Influence
(Washington Post, Jan. 13, 2001) China and Russia are negotiating their first
political treaty since an ill-fated peace and friendship pact at the outset
of the Cold War, united this time by a desire to counter U.S. preeminence in
world affairs and oppose U.S. proposals for building a missile defense shield.
Diplomats and Russian media reports said the treaty is likely to be signed in
the middle of the year, when Chinese President Jiang Zemin travels to Moscow.
For China, the treaty marks another step in a policy
of avoiding heavy reliance on the United States as a big-power interlocutor,
modernizing its military and working to dilute American power in Asia.
Big Three Links a Challenge
(Editorial, Taipei Times, Jan. 12, 2001) Taiwan has made a solid goodwill
gesture to mainland China with the opening of "mini links" between
the mainland coast and the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu. If these
small links can be implemented smoothly, the natural next step will be the
much hyped "big three links" or "three direct links"
between the mainland and Taiwan proper. During his meeting with American
Institute in Taiwan Chairman Richard Bush yesterday, Premier Chang
Chun-hsiung said the WTO framework makes it impossible for Taiwan to not
implement the three direct links.
Senator Lugar Delivers Keynote Address on U.S.
Relations with China and Taiwan
(Jan. 11, 2001) The Bush Administration should begin a review of U.S.-Sino relations
and the Cross-Strait issue. It should take into consideration past policy
pronouncements that are embedded in three communiques with China and in the
Taiwan Relations Act. It should also consider the substantive changes that
have evolved over the past two decades because China and Taiwan -- and the
United States, for that matter -- are not the same countries that signed the
three bilateral communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. Nuances are
particularly important in the Cross-Strait issue. The smallest shift in
language or tone by one party may have great significance to the others.
Tests Loom for U.S.-China
Ties By Ralph Cossa
(Japan Times, Jan. 10, 2001) How will the election of George W. Bush affect
U.S.-China relations? The conventional wisdom was that a Gore administration
would have been more favorable to China -- a questionable assumption based in
part on the belief that Al Gore would be more inclined to continue President Bill
Clinton's policies of engagement and support for "one China," the
real litmus tests for Washington as far as Beijing is concerned. However,
these policies have been consistently followed for years by Republican and
Democratic administrations alike, and there is no reason to believe that any
future U.S. administration is going to change them, absent some dramatic
destabilizing action by Beijing.
China Tries a New Tactic on Taiwan - Sweet Talk By Philip Bowring
(International Herald Tribune, Jan. 9, 2001) Threats and missile tests have
been counter-productive so Beijing is now adopting a "good cop"
routine to lure Taiwan toward eventual reunification. A deputy prime
minister, Qian Qichen, suggested last week that China was now showing
increased flexibility in its attitude, even acknowledging a degree of
equality between the two sides. At the same time, opposition legislators from
Taiwan were being told in Beijing that direct air, sea and telecom links
across the strait were possible without a formal agreement or Taiwan's
acceptance of the "one China" principle.
Right Face By Al Kamen
(Washington Post, Jan. 8, 2001) A few dozen eyebrows are said to have gone up
last week when Secretary of State-designate Colin L. Powell opined broadly
about China policy with a group of Pentagon, State, intelligence and military
types. Powell, according to one participant, noted this was "a
conservative administration with certain expectations on China policy."
Taiwan: A Bumpy Boat Ride By Mahlon Meyer and William Ide
(Newsweek International, Jan. 15, 2001) After 50 years of hostilities, no one
expected a peace voyage to be easy. But for the handful of Taiwanese
officials making the first legal, direct crossing of the Taiwan Strait in
modern times, just getting started was a nightmare. Some of Chen’s staunchest
supporters have counseled against making concessions, arguing that the
communist regime will collapse in the near future. But Chen cannot simply
wait. He must consolidate his power base and salvage Taiwan’s battered
economy, and he needs a respite from China tensions.
Documents Reveal Top Chinese
Split Before Crackdown By Steven Mufson
(Washington Post, Jan. 6, 2001) A trove of newly released documents reveals
the secret conversations of top Chinese leaders as they battled one another
over the decision to crush the massive student-led protests in Tiananmen
Square that rocked the country during the spring of 1989. The documents
confirm that then-Chinese Premier Li Peng led the internal campaign to crack
down on the students, whose appeals for openness and broader elections he
dismissed in one leadership meeting as "nonsense."
China's Energy Strategy in
the 21st Century By Chien Chung
(Taiwan Research Institute, Peace Forum, Jan. 5, 2001) The strategic oil
reserve in China is surprisingly thin: less than three-day stock for domestic
oil refinery and petrochemical industry.
In view of the depleting production of domestic oil field and growing
dependence on imported oil, China has decided to reshape its energy
policy. China will possess three-week
oil reserve in hand by 2010 to cope with future world-wide energy shortage
and potential regional armed conflict.
Consensus Nears on
Confederation
(Editorial, Taipei Times, Jan. 5, 2001) The recent policy statements made by
the ruling and opposition parties show a narrowing gap between their
cross-strait policies as they gradually move toward a common path. Despite
the different terminology - be it "integration" or
"unification" or "fusion" or even the New Party's earlier
"shared roof" dictum, the ruling and opposition parties seem to
have found something vaguely acceptable in the confederation concept.
Ripples of Hope Follow
Taiwan-China Voyages By John
Pomfret
(Washington Post, Jan. 3, 2001) With his 3-year-old son in tow, Huang
Zhicheng went for a walk today along a windy path by the water's edge. Under
balmy skies, the Taiwanese islands of Big Quemoy and Little Quemoy were
clearly visible at the entrance of Xiamen's harbor. When he was a boy, Huang
remembered, no one could come here because of fears of a war between China
and Taiwan. "It was a military zone. We used to hear them firing
artillery at the other side," he said. But times have changed.
Taiwan Boats Land in China;
First Direct Legal Link Since '49 By Craig S.
Smith
(New York Times, Jan. 2, 2001) Two tourist boats, one from the tiny fortified
island of Matsu, and one from the larger island of Quemoy, arrived on the
Chinese mainland today, the first legal direct link between China and Taiwan
since they were separated by civil war in 1949. But Taiwan's elimination of
the ban is less significant than it may seem. Legal, though indirect, travel
and trade between Taiwan and the mainland have already been growing for
years, with most goods and people passing through a third territory, usually
Hong Kong.
China Deserves the Back
Burner
(Editorial, Taipei Times, Jan. 2, 2001) President Chen Shui-bian has made two
important speeches -- one on the eve of the new year and one on its first
day. In the speeches, he sent out messages that allow flexible
interpretations of his cross-strait policy that are therefore seen as
important signals in Taiwan's quest for reconciliation with China. The
spotlight is again on cross-strait relations. This was the first time Chen
proposed a long-term framework for cross-strait relations
An Asian-Pacific Checklist
for the Incoming Bush Administration By Tom
Plate
(Japan Times, Jan. 1, 2001) George W. Bush's greatest foreign policy
challenges over the next four years may well originate in the Asian-Pacific
region, where two-thirds of the world's population reside, and where probably
two-thirds of the world's major geopolitical crises fester. None of the top
officials nominated so far have any special experience with Asia, but the
region will present the new President with issues more difficult and thorny
than ever.
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