Cross-Strait Political and Military Relations --
2000-2001 Inter-Election Developments

By Philip Yang

Dec. 2001

              In observing changes and developments of cross-strait relations and military tensions between Taiwan and China, the inter-election period has become the major focal point.  Because elections in Taiwan may bring about power transition in the executive or legislative branches of the government, which can bring about changes cross-strait policy and relations.  Also, major elections in Taiwan, including elections of the President, legislators, and Mayors of Taipei and Kaoshiung cities, always focus on cross-strait relations as primary policy debates issues.  Therefore, the paper will discuss cross-strait relations and military tensions during the period between the presidential election held in March 2000 and the election of legislators of the Legislative Yuan on Dec. 1, 2001.

              The author would like to raise three major issues as fellows. First, President Chen Shui-bian's cross-strait policy has shifted from a pragmatic position in the beginning to a more traditional DPP attitude.  However, closer scrutiny of  new developments will be necessary to see whether this is a true manifestation of Chen's cross-strait policy or just an election campaign strategy .  Second, China’s response toward Chen has been changed from “wait-and-see” attitude to “wait-but-blame” approach.  Beijing has gradually come to regard Chen’s goodwill gestures as rhetoric, and blames Chen and his government for not accepting the “one China” principle.  Third, military issues between Taiwan and the PRC represent not only military tension across the Taiwan Strait but have become a regional security dilemma.  Both the US and the PRC have regarded the military posture across the Taiwan Strait as one of the major aspects of a larger regional military balance of power. 

 

I. Chen Shui-bian's Cross-Strait Policies: From Pragmatism to Revisionism?

During the first year of Chen Shui-bian’s government, Chen offered many "goodwill gestures" in terms of cross-strait relations and issues.  These goodwill gestures revealed Chen's pragmatic attitude and approach in dealing with cross-strait issues, and also earned him praise for revising his pro-independence position and moving toward a "new central line."  However, the so-called "new central line" was no longer a major slogan when Chen's administration entered the second year of his term in 2001, especially as he campaigned for the year-end election of legislators.  For rejecting the so-called "92 consensus" and the "one-China principle," Chen's cross-strait policy was criticized by the opposition parties as abandoning the previous pragmatic position and leaning toward a "two-states" approach. 

Chen Shui-bian, former mayor of Taipei and candidate of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), won the presidential election in March 2000 and was inaugurated as the 10th president of the Republic of China on Taiwan on May 20, 2000.  Chen's victory formally ended more than 50 years’ Kuomintang's (KMT) rule of Taiwan. However, it was a victory unexpected by most Taiwanese people and even the DPP itself, As a result, the DPP came to power lacking experience in running the central government and dealing with cross-strait relations. 

The DPP also came to power with a minority government, with only one-third of the seats, 68 as of the October 2000, in the 225-seat Legislative Yuan.  Opposition parties still hold more than half of seats, with KMT at 115, the People's First Party (PFP) at 17, and the New Party at 9.  In forming his Executive Yuan cabinet, therefore, Chen named the former defense minister and a member of KMT, Tang Fei, as premier.  However, Tang Fei has become one of the most short-lived premiers due to his objection to Chen's decision to stop the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant.  Tang resigned in September and was succeeded by Chang Chun-hsong of the DPP. 

 

Five No's

              As to Chen's cross-strait policy, Chen set the tone in his inauguration speech, which was known as "five no’s," which showed his effort in seeking a stable cross-strait relations.  Chen first pledged to "defend the Constitution of the Republic of China and secure its sovereignty." He also emphasized that "as long as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime has no intention to use military force against Taiwan," he will:

1. not declare independence of Taiwan,

2. not push forth the inclusion of the so-called "state-to-state" relations description in the Constitution,

3. not endorse a referendum on independence or unification,

4. not change Taiwan's formal name, and

5. not abolish the National Reunification Guidelines. 

It was obvious that, in his new role as leader of the central government after the KMT's 50-year rule, Chen's intention was not to excessively provoke the PRC in the beginning of his new administration.  Chen's cross-strait policy, modeling the idea of his first cabinet, emphasized the so-called "new central line" -- moving from the DPP’s traditional pro-independence position toward a more central or neutral position for a short-term cross-strait relationship. By declaring the conditional “five no’s” policy toward mainland China, Chen hoped to pass any possible blame for causing a cross-strait stalemate with Beijing and to prevent Beijing from taking military force to solve cross-strait problems<1>. 

 

Political Integration

              Another significant gesture is the concept of "political integration," which President Chen offered in his first New Year's Address in January 2001. By referring to the politically loaded "one China" term as a "question for the future," Chen mentioned in the Address the prospect of Taiwan's eventual "political integration" with mainland China in the future.  He proclaimed that "the integration of our economies, trade, and culture can be a starting point for gradually building faith and confidence in each other.  This, in turn, can be the basis for a new framework of permanent peace and political integration."

              The language and idea of political integration provoked much discussion in Taipei and overseas with different interpretations.  Some argued that this was one step closer to a goal of one China in the process of political integration,<2> and some opposition politicians argued that this would be in fact an interim stage in a progression to "one China."<3>  However, DPP chairman, Frank Hsie, said that political integration should only be seen as another goodwill gesture and it should not be equated to the meaning of "reunification."<4> 

 

Three Mini-Links

              Taiwan has adhered to the policy of "no haste, be patient" in prohibiting direct transportation, trade and postal linkages with mainland China ever since Lee Teng-hui's KMT government.  After Chen's New Year Address regarding political integration in January 2001, his administration announced the three "mini-links" between the two offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu and mainland China.  The mini-links announcement was seen as the first concrete step toward the relaxation of "three links" and the  improving the cross-strait relationship.  But due to lack of follow-up measures, the mini-links policy continues to have only limited impact on cross-strait trade and economic relations.

               

No “’92 Consensus”

From the beginning of Chen’s presidency, a war of words over the “one China” issue has been a major gap and dispute not just between Taipei and Beijing but also between the Chen administration and opposition parties in Taiwan.  In the press conference marking his first month in office, President Chen said that he was willing to discuss the issue of “future one China.”<5> Since then, the Chen administration has officially argued that there exists no so-called “one China principle” but that Taipei is willing to discuss the issue of “one China” in the cross-strait dialogue or negotiation. 

However, the "new central line" has been revised by default in the second year of Chen's administration in 2001, through his rejection of the so-called "92 consensus" -- one China, with each side having its own interpretation -- and claiming that accepting the "92 consensus" would mean  the elimination of the ROC on Taiwan. President Chen made these controversial remarks on October 22, 2001 while campaigning in Hualien county for DPP candidates for the year-end Hualien County magistrate and legislative elections. Chen harshly criticized the opposition parties for trying to force him to accept the "92 consensus." "The oppositionists have pushed me to accept the '1992 consensus,''one country, two systems,' and the 'one China' principle. Accepting those conditions will be selling out Taiwan, eliminating the Republic of China," Chen said. To accept the consensus, according to the president, is to take the "one country, two systems" promoted by Beijing, which says that Taiwan would be "granted" partial sovereignty if Taiwan agreed to unify with mainland China. Chen argued that accepting the 1992 consensus was therefore tantamount to "exterminating the ROC" and "selling out Taiwan."<6>

Some opposition party politicians warned that against Chen’s perceived use of the China issue for his own political gain in Taiwan.  "[I]t is dangerous for government leaders to try stirring up anti-China feelings with distorted facts. And it is very clear that they are doing so to get votes," said Su Chi, former chairman of Mainland Affairs Council which charts the island's China policy<7>. KMT Chairman Lien Chan also said that the KMT has always insisted that sound cross-strait relations must be constructed on the basis of the 1992 consensus. Lien said that "[t]he terms ‘92 consensus ' or 'one China with separate interpretations' have always been our fundamental stance on the cross-strait relations."<8>

              In fact, no matter whether the so-called “92 consensus” existed or not, the real issue is about “one China” – a vague and ill-defined term loaded with too many political and strategic meanings.  However, due to the complex developments and experiences in the past several decades, there are three significant aspects related to the one China principle which work together to maintain the current peaceful status quo across the Taiwan Strait.

First, in the 1990s both the KMT and Beijing governments upheld the “one China principle” even though each side differed in its interpretation. This is the reason why the KMT government argued that there existed a so-called "92 consensus."  Beijing therefore is reluctant to talk with the Chen Shui-bian government and demands the acceptance of “one China principle” as a precondition for any talks.

Second, the "one China principle" has been also supported by the United States as the cornerstone of Sino-US relationship ever since the Shanghai Communique.  There are three major elements in the Shanghai Communiqué that constitute the basic principles of U.S. policy toward the PRC and Taiwan: first, the one China policy; second, peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question; and third, the cross-strait problem should be solved by the Chinese themselves. These three principles are the pillars of U.S. policy toward the cross-strait issue and Taiwan question. With respect to the “one China” policy, in the Shanghai Communiqué the U.S. declared that it “acknowledges that all Chinese on either part of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China.” The term “acknowledge” was carefully chosen to maintain ambiguity, for example, in not dealing with the possibility that what the U.S. acknowledged might someday no longer be true. By acknowledging “one China” but leaving ambiguity in its definition, the US’s policy of “one China” is very similar in nature to the “92 consensus” (one China but allowing different interpretations).  Therefore, by denying the “92 consensus” and the “one China principle,” Chen Shui-bian is also hoping to change the Beijing-Taipei-Washington trilateral, ambiguous consensus of “one China.”  However, Washington has already showed some reluctance and implied that there did exist a “minimum necessary consensus” between Beijing and Taipei in 1992, meaning that Washington still sees “one China” as an important aspect in maintaining both the Sino-US relations and cross-strait status quo.<9>

Third, the "one China principle" is viewed by Beijing as the bottom-line for conducting cross-strait contacts, either political or economic negotiations, and for ensuring China’s self-restraint not to engage in military actions in the region.  Beijing on many occasions indicated that it cannot compromise on the “one China” principle, nor can Beijing tolerate an indefinite postponement of resolution of the cross-strait issue.  Therefore, by refuting the “92 consensus” and “one China” principle, Chen may have started a war of words over “one China,” along with political and military tensions across the Taiwan Strait that could be intensified in the future.

              However, it is true that the current cross-strait political stalemate is to a large extent the result of rigidity on the part of Beijing.  Beijing’s insistence on the “one China principle” and diplomatic isolation of Taiwan in the international arena make Taiwanese people perceive Beijing as behaving like a bully.  This means that if the Taipei government agrees with Beijing’s definition of “one China principle” it will be tantamount to total surrender and acceptance of the position that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China.  Beijing’s rigidity on “one China” and isolation of Taiwan in international society can only prevent the Taipei government, regardless of which party is ruling, from coming to the negotiation table for any cross-strait political issues.

              On the other hand, the Taipei government should also be flexible and sophisticated enough to understand that “one China” should be viewed as a strategy to deal with Beijing, especially when mainland China is experiencing a process of political and economic transformation and the cross-strait relationship is tending towards a greater degree of interdependence. Taipei can take the initiative to be more ambivalent on the issue of “one China,” leaving it for the future development of cross-strait relations and Taiwanese people’s decision, but can treat the issue of “one China principle” as a starting point and basis for talks and dialogue, which are only the first step of building mutual trust and confidence between Beijing and Taipei. 

 

II. Beijing's Response: From Wait-and-See to Wait-but-Blame

China's response to Chen's cross-strait initiatives has been passive.  Beijing adopted the so-called "wait and see" attitude toward Chen's cross-strait initiatives and proposals, meaning that they will judge Chen Shui-bian by "deeds, not just words."<10>  Leaders in Beijing worry about Chen's track record of supporting Taiwan independence, even though Chen promised in his inaugural address not to declare Taiwan independence as long as China refrains from using military force. 

      Beijing accused President Chen’s inaugural address of being vague and evasive, charging him with a lack of sincerity<11>.  Officials and scholars in Beijing criticized Chen, saying he only wanted to create a false impression that cross-strait relations remained relatively stable.  However, according to a Washington Post report, officials and academics in Beijing also said they understood the internal political pressures Chen faced as he formulated his cross-strait policy. They also said that “Beijing much prefers dealing with Chen than with his predecessor, Lee Teng-hui.”<12>  Even so, the opening of the three "mini-links" and other cross-strait goodwill gestures made by President Chen also received lukewarm reception in Beijing.  Likewise, his idea of political integration in his New Year Address, was criticized by scholars in mainland China criticized who said "the meaning is ambiguous".<13>

              In the first several months of Chen Shui-bian’s new administration, Beijing took a position of “wait-and-see,” waiting for Chen to put forward his cross-strait policies and observing whether he would truly accept “one China.” The mainland has since refused all official contacts with Chen Shui-bian since his election last year, until Chen is willing to admit “one China” principle.  That is, Beijing demands Chen Shui-bian accept the principle that there is "one China" before talks can resume, and that doing so would mark a return to the position adopted by Taipei during the historic talks in 1992, the so-called “92 consensus.”

              In response to Chen’s rejection of the “one China principle,” China tried to soften its language and logic of  the principle.  In January 2001, Vice Premier Qian Qichen remarked that “there is only one China, and Taiwan and mainland belong to China.”<14>  On the surface, Qian’s remark seemed to treat Taiwan as an equal of the mainland, a major shift from the traditional position that Taiwan is only a province of China.  However, while it is difficult to examine whether this represents a sincere change of Beijing’s cross-strait policy, it was of course a statement intended for Taiwanese consumption.  Taipei’s response to Qian’s new formula of “one China” was that it was “nothing new,” and that cross-strait talks remained stalled<15>. 

              Besides strong criticism of Chen Shui-bian’s goodwill gestures as being insincere and evasive, Beijing has softened its rhetoric since attacking Taipei in the first year of Chen administration.  However, Beijing’s policy has gradually changed to adopt the policy of “wait-but-blame” – waiting for Chen Shui-bian to accept “one China” and meanwhile blaming his administration for insincerity.  The purpose of this policy is to put pressure on the Chen administration, from international and Taiwanese media and opposition parties in Taiwan.

              In response to Chen Shui-bian’s rejection of the “92 consensus” and the Taiwanese economy’s slowdown, the People’s Daily, the major official newspaper of Beijing government, published the editorial opinion indicated that “[h]ow to face up the one-China principle and the ’92 consensus’ is the key to stabilizing Taiwan’s political situation, stabilizing cross-strait relations, bringing about closer cross-strait economic and trade ties and proceeding to push Taiwan’s economy out of difficulties, and guaranteeing the long-term development of the Taiwanese economy.”<16> Clearly, Beijing has adopted a multi-pronged strategy to appeal to Taiwanese people and blamed the Chen administration for causing cross-strait economic and political impasses.

              One dramatic incident happened during the press conference of the Ministerial Meeting of APEC in Shanghai in late October, where Tang Jiaxuan, China's foreign minister, angered many in Taiwan by sharply refusing to allow Lin Hsin-I, Taiwan's economics minister, to respond to a question. Taipei later boycotted the APEC summit after Beijing refused its choice of representative. At a campaign rally, two days after the incident happened in Shanghai, Chen branded Beijing as "arrogant" and "barbaric" for barring him from the October 20-21 informal leaders' summit and rejecting his chosen representative, former vice president Li Yuan-zu. Critics said the testy exchanges come amid fierce campaigning for Taiwan's crucial legislative and local elections on December 1.<17>  This represents an attempt by Chen to use the argument for domestic political gain by showing he’s tough on the China issue.

              The latest proof of Beijing’s subtle change of its policy of “wait-and-see” to “wait-but-blame” appeared on Nov. 12, 2001, when Tang Jiaxuan was asked by reporters about Chen Shui-bian’s denial of the `92 Consensus.  Tang, well-known for his very undiplomatic comments about Taipei’s leaders, described Chen Shui-bian as a contemptible liar amid an increasingly harsh level of rhetoric between Beijing and Taipei. Tang said that "I have never placed importance on Chen Shui-bian's words, because I hold him in contempt" and that "[h]is mouth cannot speak the truth and everything he says is a lie."<18>

              Beijing’s policy change was also a result of its perception of the change in the international security environment, due to the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11. Therefore, a toughening of Chinese rhetoric and the subtle change to “wait-but-blame” attitude reflects Beijing’s confidence that it can take a tougher line with Taipei without reprisals from the US government, which is focusing on the war in Afghanistan.

              However, Beijing should understand that even if Chen goes back to the “consensus of 1992,” the “one China principle” will be defined in such a way that it is unsuitable for Beijing’s purpose.  The KMT’s “one China principle” seeks  a united China under democratic governance.  Chen Shui-bian’s “political integration” and “one China issue” will put more attention on how to secure Taiwan’s independence and autonomy in the process of cross-strait contact and negotiation.  Therefore, it is quite pointless for Beijing to insist on the “one China principle” as a precondition for talks.  What Beijing wants is reunification or, at least, prevention of de jure Taiwan independence.  This means that Beijing also acknowledges that there are currently two Chinese governments across the Taiwan Strait.  Therefore, Beijing should be more flexible to take the initiative to drop “one China principle” as a precondition for the cross-strait dialogue.

 

III. Military Situation: From Cross-Strait Military Tension to Regional Security Dilemma

              Perhaps because China realizes that excessive military tension is not to its advantage, or because China is responding to Chen’s proclamation that “as long as the CCP regime has no intention of using military force against Taiwan, I will not declare independence,” cross-strait military tension during the inter-election period between March 2000 and December 2001 has been defused.  While both Chen’s policy and China’s patience contribute to a relatively stable cross-strait situation, the author argues that it is also because cross-strait military tension has become a regional security dilemma.  With the new Bush administration’s more sympathetic policy toward Taiwan security, military tension between Taipei and Beijing has become embedded in a different regional context in comparison with the Clinton administration, which saw the Taiwan issue as one of the major obstacles to improving relations between Washington and Beijing.  But with the September 11 incident to deal with, Washington has to re-direct its security priority  to the war against terrorism and to seek Beijing’s cooperation in rebuilding stability in Central Asia.  Whether this development will divert Washington’s attention on cross-strait and Taiwan security issues is a focal point to observe in the year of 2002.

Immediately after the inauguration of his presidency, Chen Shui-bian visited military posts and made a point of attaching high importance to the defense of Taiwan., he has thus demonstrated to the Taiwanese people and international society that he places national security and defense as a high priority in his government by seizing the opportunities of visiting military bases, holding military ceremonies, and stressing the importance of building a strong military.  Chen also tried to promote a new military strategy to face new challenges from the PLA (China’s People’s Liberation Army).  In his speech delivered to the Army Academy, President Chen indicated that Taiwan should develop a strategy of “fully engaging the enemy in the territory outside Taiwan,” a concept that advocates that hostile forces invading Taiwan should be repelled not on the land of Taiwan but on the sea before they land in Taiwan. 

              The focus of military balance between Taiwan and mainland China has shifted from quantity to quality in the past two years.  With the PLA’s aggressive modernization program, the military strength of the PLA is likely to surpass that of Taiwan in the next several years.  Taiwan could lose its long-time qualitative edge if it does not acquire enough defensive weapons in time.  Furthermore, the methods the PLA can use in a military action against Taiwan will become increasingly diversified. 

              In August 2000, the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense published its 2000 National Defense Report (Defense White Paper), analyzing the PLA's military situation and estimated strength of troops that could be used to invad Taiwan, and making clear the defense posture of Taiwan to counter such a threat.<19>  In the White Paper, the missile threat from China is viewed as an asymmetrical military advantage of China's military threat to Taiwan.  According to this report, China has deployed over 400 ballistic missiles on the opposite shore of Taiwan, including the short-range mobile ballistic missiles known as the Dongfeng-11 (M-11) with a range of 300 kilometers and the Dongfeng-15 (M-9) with a range of 600 kilometers.  It is expected that the number of ballistic missiles deployed by the PLA in this area will increase to 600 by 2005.  These ballistic missiles have been viewed as the greatest threat to the security of Taiwan.<20> 

              As to Taiwan’s military equipment and capability in the cross-strait military race and military balance, US arms sales to Taiwan have been the major source for Taiwan to upgrade its military equipment and to maintain its qualitative edge.  Normally in April each year, Taipei and Washington negotiate with each other for the purchase of weapons.  In 2000, the United States decided to sell Taiwan a long-range radar known as PAVEPAWS (Precision Acquisition Vehicle Entry Phased-Array Warning System), an upgraded version of the Maverick air-to-ground missiles, and advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM), and some rear-area supports systems and training equipment.  In June 2001, Taiwan’s navy received one Anchorage-class dock landing ship on lease from the United States, which can enhance Taiwan’s amphibious operations.  In July 2001, the navy again took delivery of the three of 11 S-70C9M-2 Thunderhawk anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters from the United States.  Taiwan’s Air Force now has 60 Mirage 2000-5 fighters, 150 F-16A/B fighters, and 130 A-1 Ching-kuo.  Because the PLA has started enhancing its air force capability by adding long-range Su-27SK fighters and Su-30 fighters, Taiwan is also trying to implement a program improving the combat capability of IDF fighters.

              In April 2001, the Bush administration approved the sale of the following weapons to Taiwan, the largest package of arms sales in nearly a decade.<21>

–Four Kidd-class destroyers ready by 2003

–12 P-3C Orion aircraft

–Eight diesel submarines designed to counter blockades and invasions

–Paladin self-propelled artillery system

–MH-53E minesweeping helicopters

–AAV7A1 Amphibious Assault Vehicles

–Mk 48 torpedoes without advanced capabilities

–Avenger surface-to-air missile system

–Submarine-launched and surface-launched torpedoes

–Aircraft survivability equipment

–The United States also will give Taiwan a technical briefing on the Patriot anti-missile system the island has been developing.

After examining Taiwan’s military capability and possible PLA military actions, the United States decided to sell Taiwan four less-advanced Kidd-class destroyers, a dozen anti-submarine planes and as many as eight diesel-powered submarines to help Taiwan defend itself against possible attack or blockade by mainland China, even though Bush has decided not to sell Taiwan Aegis destroyers equipped with more sophisticated radar and battle management system. A White House official called the arms sales list "a balanced package but a substantial package."  As to US intention and interest in its arms sales to Taiwan, the official said that "our message is this is driven by China. If they will reduce the threat to Taiwan and make clear that they will not use force against Taiwan to resolve cross-strait issues, that would certainly have an impact on what we would do in the future."<22>

              By selling these long-needed weapons to Taiwan the US demonstrated to both Beijing and Taipei that Washington has great interests in maintaining the peaceful status quo across the Taiwan Strait.  Therefore, any Chinese move, military or non-military, on Taiwan has to take the international environment into consideration, especially US policy and involvement.  However, the US views the weapons sale to Taiwan, which conform to Taiwan’s defensive needs, as being the key factor in the maintenance of military parity in the Taiwan Strait. Maintaining parity does not imply an arms race. Taiwan in particular hopes to establish military parity in terms of defensive and deterrent approaches; this is a passive attempt to maintain qualitative superiority with respect to certain types of military facilities and capabilities and to prevent further increase in the other side’s advantage. This means that Taiwan’s defensive capabilities need to be strengthened with respect to guided missile defense, maintaining air superiority in the Taiwan Strait, anti-blockade measures, anti-submarine warfare, mine-sweeping, electronic warfare, and personnel training.

              By maintaining military parity in the Taiwan Strait, it should be possible to create the necessary political and psychological climate and the necessary trust for cross-strait dialogue and the maintenance of peace. From Taiwan’s point of view, the military threat from mainland China has always been the main reason why the public does not trust mainland China, and has cast a shadow over the discussion between the various political parties in Taiwan as to how to implement negotiations with China.  If Taiwan’s defensive superiority and the military parity between Taiwan and mainland China can be maintained, this will strengthen confidence within Taiwan with respect to the development of cross-strait relations; there will be no need for concern whether mainland China’s military superiority will enable it to make unreasonable demands during negotiations, which Taiwan would be unable to resist.  The policies adopted by the US and its arms sales to Taiwan therefore constitute a strategic deterrent strategy aimed at maintaining Taiwan’s defensive capabilities and the balance of military power between Taiwan and mainland China.<23>

              The distinction traditionally made in security dilemma theory between offensive and defensive weapons <24> (i.e. the concept that only an increase in offensive weapons will cause other countries to feel threatened, and that the possession of defensive weapons should not cause a security dilemma) cannot be applied to relations between Taiwan and mainland China, because mainland China feels that even the possession of purely defensive weapons will give Taiwan increased self-confidence and encourage it to move towards independence. As a result, the government in Beijing is constantly accusing the US of violating their “August 17 declaration,” in which the US stated that they would gradually decrease arms sales to Taiwan, in terms of both quality and quantity. Mainland China is also constantly criticizing US support for Taiwan’s national defense as interference in Chinese internal affairs. However, Taiwan is seeking only to strengthen its defensive capabilities in response to the threat from mainland China; this would help give ordinary people in Taiwan more confidence in developing peaceful and mutually beneficial relations with mainland China. From Taiwan’s point of view, therefore, maintaining military parity with mainland China and strengthening Taiwan’s defensive capability are considered as a confidence-building measure.

              Aside from the United States, Japan is another important player on the cross-strait stage.  Though Japan is still constrained by its domestic legal and political limitation and by concerns from other regional countries, Japan has demonstrated significant commitment to Taiwan’s security and to the maintenance of regional peace and security as a whole.  Thus, Japan's role in a response to a possible PLA action against Taiwan has become more obvious than before.  Not only does Japan have a special affinity with Taiwan for reasons of history, geography and trade, it is also an important military ally of the US in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.  The importance of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance system is perhaps greater now than during the Cold War. 

              One particular issue that has come up in the US-Japan-Taiwan dialogue pertains to the problem of defining the phrase “areas surrounding Taiwan” as used in the 1997 New Guidelines of the US-Japan Security Treaty. Both the Japanese and the American governments have emphasized that this is a situational concept rather than a geographical one – “any situation having a significant influence on Japan's peace and security” – and both point out that this explanation is not a painstaking way of avoiding a sensitive issue, but rather the reflection of strategic and military realism and common sense.  Therefore, Japan's decision whether or not to provide support to US troops, except in a case where the United States required such cooperation, would be based on whether or not a situation arising in the region would have a significant influence on Japan's security.  Moreover, the phrase “having a significant influence on Japan's security” would also be defined in a situational context.  In defining “areas surrounding Japan,” therefore, if one clings to a narrow interpretation of the idea of a geographic border, one will fail to grasp the central logic of the collective self-defense concept of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.  However, the New Guidelines do provide a new opportunity for the US-Japan alliance to demonstrate its regional concerns, especially in a possible military conflict on the Korea peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait.

      Therefore, by showing that Taiwan's security problems are a structural and strategic issue, it becomes clear that American interests are consistent with those of Taiwan.  The decision to maintain the current peace and security is not simply a default decision due to the lack of a better policy; rather, it is the most suitable option for both parties in terms of security and development.  This is true in spite of the fact that infringing on Taiwan's interests and breathing space is often an effective bargaining chip in the game of U.S.-China relations, used by each in turn to get the other's attention.  Perhaps Taiwan should also temporarily make a distinction between participation in this dialogue in substance and participation in title.  Doing so would also allow Taiwan a greater chance for appeals of a tactical and policy-based nature, so that cross-strait relations and regional security would no longer be related solely to structural and strategic considerations.

Maintaining Taiwan's security is a comprehensive task.  Non-military security strategies, tactics, and behaviors are just as important as military guarantees to protect the island, and may play an increasingly important role in the East Asia politico-economic environment of the 21st century.  United States policies, the regional security environment, and Japan's influence on issues in the region all affect, to varying degrees, the guarantee of Taiwan's security.

 

Conclusion

The paper has discussed three major developments related to cross-strait political and military relations during the inter-election period between March 2000 and December 2001.  The three core issues are as follows. First, President Chen Shui-bian's cross-strait policy has shifted from a pragmatic position in the beginning to a more traditional DPP attitude.  However, closer attention to new developments will be necessary to see whether this is a true manifestation of Chen's cross-strait policy or just an example of domestic  election campaign strategy.  Second, China’s response toward Chen has been changed from “wait-and-see” attitude to “wait-but-blame” approach.  Beijing has come to regard Chen’s goodwill gestures as rhetoric, and blames Chen and his government for not accepting the “one China” principle, which Beijing sees as a precondition for any cross-strait dialogue.  Third, military issues between Taiwan and PRC are not only military tension across the Taiwan Strait but have become a regional security dilemma.  Both the US and PRC have come to regard the military situation across the Taiwan Strait as one of the major aspects of a larger regional military balance of power. 

 

Notes

<1> See Willem van Kemenade, “Taiwan: Domestic Gridlock, Cross-Strait Deadlock,” Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2001, pp. 55-70; See also “Five No’s Puts Ball in PRC Court,” Taipei Times, May 22, 2000.

<2> See Harvey Sicherman, “Taiwan’s Chen Shui-bian: A President’s Progress,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 11, 2001, in the Taiwan Security Research at http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/2001/FPRI-051101.htm.

<3> "Political Analysts Says Chen's 'Political Integration" Interim Stage to Unification," Central News Agency, Feb. 2, 2001.

<4> "DPP Head: 'Integration' Not (Does not)Necessarily Means (Mean) Reunification," Central News Agency, Feb. 2, 2001.

<5> “Trend Emerging on Chen’s Statements,” Straits Times, June 21, 2000.

<6> “Debate over 1992 'One China' Consensus Rages On,” Taipei Times, Oct. 24, 2001.

<7> “Growing Anti-China Feeling May Dampen Cross-Strait Ties: Analysts,” Agence France Presse, Oct. 29, 2001.

<8> “'1992 Consensus' Does Not Sell Out Taiwan: Opposition,” China Post, Oct. 23, 2001.

<9> See “US Senior Official: Cross-Strait Consensus Exists,” China Times, Nov. 21, 2001; and “US Official: There was a Consensus in 1992,” United Daily News, Nov. 21, 2001.

<10> Ted Plafker, "Beijing Softens Rhetoric on Taiwan," Washington Post, May 23, 2000.

<11> “China Disappointed by Taiwan Head,” CNN.com, May 20, 2000; “Taiwan’s Change of Power is Met by a Moderate Response from Beijing,” New York Times, May 21, 2000.

<12> Ted Plafker, “Beijing Softens Rhetoric On Taiwan,” Washington Post, May 23, 2000.

<13> "Political Says Chen's 'Political Integration" Interim Stage to Unification," Central News Agency, Feb. 2, 2001.

<14> Julian Baum, “Tightrope,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 14, 2000.

<15> See Dennis Van Vranken Hickey and Yitan Li, “Cross-Strait Relations in the Aftermath of the Election of Chen Shui-bian,” July 2001, at Taiwan Security Research (http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/2001/Hickey-0701.htm).

<16> “Improved Cross-Strait Relations: Key to Getting Taiwan Economy Out of Predicament,” People’s Daily, Nov. 10, 2001.

<17> Stephanie Low and Crystal Hsu, “'1992 Consensus' Becoming a Heated Campaign Issue,” Taipei Times, Nov. 5, 2001.

<18> Mure Dickie, “China's Minister Steps Up Rhetoric Against Taiwan,” Financial Times, Nov. 13, 2001.

<19> Ministry of National Defense, 2000 National Defense Report, http://www.mnd.gov.tw/report/830/html/e-03.html

<20> Ibid.

<21> “Weapons the U.S. Will Sell Taiwan,” Associated Press, Apr. 23, 2001.

<22> Steven Mufson and Dana Milbank, “Taiwan to Get Variety of Arms,” Washington Post, Apr. 24, 2001.

<23> For PLA’s modernization and arms procurement, see Shirley A. Kan, et. al. “China's Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions: Background and Analysis,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, Oct. 10, 2000.

<24> For a discussion of offensive and defensive weapons and the roles they play in bringing about war, see Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War”; and L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufman, “What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4, Spring 1998, pp. 44-82.

 

Philip Yang is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science of the National Taiwan University.  The paper was delivered in the Conference of East Asian Regional Security Order, Yonsei University, Korea.