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Challenges to the U.S. East Asian Security Policy: Implications for Taiwan's Security

By Philip Yang

 

Paper delivered at the conference of "The United States and Cross-Straits Relations Since the Taiwan Elections" Center for East Asian and Pacific Studies University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

October 6-7, 2000

 

 

Throughout the cold war, Taiwan security was influenced by the United States' containment strategy toward China and the subsequent policy of engagement between the two countries.  Since the end of the Cold War, questions of security have been the crux of survival and development for Taiwan.  Taiwan's security problems are not only influenced by military pressure from Mainland China and the ever-changing status of cross-straits relations, but also by the U.S. security policies and strategies.  A discussion of Taiwan's security status, therefore, should begin with a discussion of the U.S. security policies toward East Asian region, in order to better identify and explain the structural factors affecting Taiwan's security.

 

The author believes the major pillars of the U.S. East Asia security policies in the post-Cold War era can be separated into three categories: the continued presence of American forces; the U.S-Japan security alliance; and engagement of China.  From an international relations theory standpoint, these three types of structural factors can be explained as: hegemonic stability; collective self-defense; and constructive engagement.  Naturally, these three are closely interrelated, yet there remains at the same time a degree of complementarity.  The United States' Asia security strategy considerations have great influence on the regional security framework.  In fact, the three main security policies of the U.S. can be viewed also as the three major structural factors for maintaining regional peace and security.

 

However, the stability of the East Asia security environment has not been without its challenges, most importantly from the questioning or provocative behavior of certain countries.  These challenges have resulted in changes or additions to Washingotn's relevant policies.  The author wishes to point out the correlation between four structural factors and three distinct developments in the East Asia security framework, namely the conflict between maritime and continental powers; challenges to the status quo; and the balance of threat.  The whole can be summarized as three types of dynamic structural factors: hegemonic stability vs. struggle between maritime powers and continental powers; collective self-defense vs. challenges to the status quo; constructive engagement and balance of threat.  The presence of these three challenges and changes means that the East Asia security environment is currently in the process of creating a new dynamic equilibrium, which will naturally have important repercussions for Taiwan's security situation.  Based on an investigation of the U.S. East Asian security policies and strategies, this paper will examine the structural determinants and recent changes in the regional security situation, and indicate potential influences on Taiwan's security.

 

I.  U.S. Military Presence in East Asia

 

1.  Hegemonic Stability: U.S. Military Presence

 

The continued hegemonic status of the United States in East Asia region is the single most unique structural component of the region's post-Cold War security environment.  The era of bipolar confrontation ended with the breakup of the Soviet Union, leaving the United States as the sole superpower in a unipolar international system.  American military, economic, political, and technological superiority reinforced the country's position, allowing the United States to take a deciding role as hegemon in security and military issues that arose in any region of the globe.  Consequently, whether or not the United States can maintain or strengthen its commitments around the globe will be a decisive factor in the ability of any region of the world to maintain peace and security in the post-Cold War era.  Joseph Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia region, indicated in 1995 that the basis of the United States' Asia-Pacific security policy for the next twenty years will be to continue to maintain U.S. military strength in the region, in order to protect American interests and Asia-Pacific security.<1> 

 

According to the theory of hegemonic stability, a hegemonic power's government and arrangement of the international system is a guarantee of international and regional security and peace.  In other words, the existence of a superpower is helpful in constructing and maintaining such peace.  The military, political, and economic superiority of the superpower on the one hand discourages regional powers from directly challenging the superpower, and on the other hand encourages other countries to adopt a policy of cooperation with the superpower.  This kind of cooperation leads to the construction of interrelated international organizations and norms, which in turn help maintain international and regional peace and security.<2>  Another primary application of hegemonic stability theory to international security is in the maintenance of a peaceful and stable status quo.  Powerful countries, especially the one in the hegemonic position, have a vested interest in the maintenance of such a status quo, for it represents not only the prestige of the hegemonic power, but also the continuation of economic profit for that power.  At the same time, it can increase the cost for secondary powers who might wish to challenge the existing power structure.  In short, the reason for a hegemonic power's desire to construct and maintain an international politico-economic order and system is that a free economic system and peaceful world order best suit the interests of the hegemonic power.

 

The assertion that the United States is the sole superpower in the post-Cold War era has gone virtually unchallenged.  In 1997, the Department of Defense's Defense Intelligence Agency published A DIA Global Security Assessment, in which the outline indicated that the content of the report was based on two effective basic assumptions: the first was that the United States would continue to be a political, economic, and military hegemon; the second, that the United States would continue to play a role of active intervention in global affairs.<3>  The U.S. currently maintains 100,000 forward-deployed military forces in East Asia.  The U.S. has also deepened its military alliance relations with Cold War allies like Japan, South Korea, and Australia and strengthened its military cooperation arrangements with other countries like Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines.  The U.S. Pacific Command is geographically the largest unified command in the U.S. defense structure.  These forces constitute the tangible commitment of the United States plays a crucial dual role of regional security guarantor and balancer.

 

2.  Maritime Powers vs. Continental Powers?

 

According to the realist view of the international system, regional powers under a unipolar, multilateral system will gradually begin to challenge the arrangement established by the superpower.  Yet in the realm of international security, the view that China, Russia, and India will unite in opposition to the United States, Japan, and Europe has not yet received much support.  China purchases large amounts of progressive weapons from Russia in support of its campaign to modernize the People's Liberation Army.  But economic problems in both countries and their dependence on developmental cooperation and assistance from Western countries cannot be simply solved by the notion of strategic partnership. With regard to relations between China and India, even though two countries have made attempts to better their relations following India's first successful nuclear test, territorial issues and China's support of Pakistan continue to be problematic.  Given these and other developments, some research has warned that China, India, and Russia may form a continental strategic alliance in opposition to the U.S.-led western countries is probably exaggerated.  Since the problems and conflicts among China, India, and Russia are far greater than the potential benefits of joining in opposition to the United States, the idea of such a three-country axis seems far-fetched at best. <4>

 

However, we see a tendency in the East Asia security environment towards continental powers in confrontation against coastal powers.  The continued military presence and security commitments of the United States have boosted stability in the region, but have also brought about questions from certain countries within the region.  Most important, obviously, is the potential mid- to long-term challenge from Beijing, along with the immediate problem of Pyongyang.  Not only are China and North Korea vastly different from the rest of the region's democratic countries in terms of political systems, ideology, and socioeconomic development; their language and behavior with respect to security strategy also challenges the existing American hegemony.  Japan is gradually developing a more self-reliant security strategy, which treats North Korea and China as potential threats.  The conflict in the South China Sea between the Philippines and China, meanwhile, continues to worsen.  Faced with this seemingly bleak picture, Robert Ross suggested a trend toward a bipolar Asia, in which western countries, led by the United States, are pitted against continental powers, led by China.<5>

 

The U.S. believes that the presence of the U.S. military in the region serves as a deterrent against potentially hostile states as well as helping to maintain regional peace and stability.  However, the PRC does not accept either of these rationales for the U.S. forward military presence.  Beijing has long warned against American hegemonic leadership, and has charged that the New Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, the potential development and deployment of TMD (Theater Missile Defense) systems, the United States' handling of the Korean Peninsula issue, and other issues are the source of instability in East Asia region.  In its July 1998 Defense White Paper, the Beijing government stated that hegemony and power politics are still the primary threats to world peace and stability.<6>  The destruction of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by American B2 bombers during the Kosovo conflict, the Cox Report accusations that China had stolen U.S. nuclear and missile secrets, and the United States' continued sales of military equipment to Taiwan have all given China more than enough reasons to be dissatisfied with American hegemonic leadership.  Since the United States initiated military contacts and dialogue with China, U.S. military leaders have discovered that high-level Chinese military officials, especially PLA generals, commonly believe that the United States' East Asia strategic policy is a wolf in sheep's clothing: underneath the sugar coating of exchanges lies America's true hope of containing and preventing China's growth and development.  Such an attitude of extreme mistrust and doubt provides the psychological basis for China's policy and behavior of challenging the status quo.<7>

 

3.  Influences on Taiwan Security

 

The Taiwan security issue is not merely a question of regional security, but one of the most important foreign policy problems of this new century.  The Taiwan "question" remains the most troublesome aspect of U.S.-China relations, and has real potential to bring the two countries into military conflict.  Also, a cross-strait military conflict would disrupt regional trade and development, and might force other regional countries to side with or against the PRC, which would change the security environment and structure in the Asia-Pacific region.  Beijing then would explicitly oppose the U.S. continued military presence in East Asia.

 

The fact that the United States considers East Asia a high priority is obviously helpful to the maintenance of Taiwan's security.  The security and peace of Taiwan is a key part of the United States' overall security strategy in the region.  The possibility of U.S. military intervention does have an important deterrent effect on the PRC.  As is stated in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), a military conflict or war in the Taiwan Straits would have a profound impact on the peace and stability of the entire Western Pacific; therefore, defensive weapons must be sold to Taiwan in order to maintain Taiwan's relative ability to ward off and defend itself against a large-scale military attack by China.  Yet the Taiwan Relations Act is not intended to be an alliance treaty.  It only points out that Taiwan's security and stability are “grave concerns” of the United States, the United States will therefore provide defensive weaponry to Taiwan in order to face the problem of the island’s self defense capability in the event of a military threat.<8> 

 

Taiwan security issues are therefore the major differences between the Chinese and U.S. governments.  Among those issues, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is the most significant one.  According to the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), "it is the policy of the United States" to resist military intervention of Taiwan, through both the sales of defensive weapons to Taiwan and by possible U.S. involvement to deter such military crisis in the Taiwan Straits.  Among the arms systems under consideration for sale to Taiwan, theater missile defense (TMD) issue is the focus point.  Beijing has already protested in many ways against a possible deployment of TMD in Taiwan.  However, the consideration of TMD is in fact driven by the necessity to defend against China's own M-9 and M-11 mobile short-range ballistic missiles at bases close to the Taiwan Straits.  According the U.S. Department of Defense report, at the current rate, the 150 presently deployed will reach 650 by 2005.<9>

 

The question of whether the United States should protect Taiwan's security in the event the mainland China uses force against Taiwan is a difficult one, and were such a situation to arise, the United States would find itself caught between a rock and a hard place.  If it came to the defense of Taiwan, it would no doubt incur the enmity of China.  Even if a large-scale regional war were avoided, a “New Cold War” between the U.S. and China would begin, which would probably mean a rearrangement of the global international security order.  On the other hand, if the United States decided not to react in a significant manner to a military attack on Taiwan, it would face the misgivings of its allies in East Asia region and elsewhere in the world, and perhaps even the crumbling of its regional and global security strategic policy.  Moreover, if the United States wishes to maintain the moral footing of its hegemonic leadership, democratic government and free economy, it would forego its legitimacy and appeal by not coming to Taiwan’s aid. Constrained by this double-edged strategic sword, the United States has continued to advocate one fundamental principle for the resolution of the Taiwan question: that it should be by peaceful means.  Beginning with the Shanghai Communiqué, and continuing through the August 17, 1982, Communiqué, and the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. position has always been that the Taiwan question should be resolved by peaceful means.  A peaceful resolution of the cross-straits issue, regardless of the system under which the problem is resolved, will best serve U.S. strategic and economic interests in the region.  As Andrew Nathan argues that "[t]he United States has no vested interest in the outcome of the Taiwan issue so long as the resolution is arrived at peacefully."<10>

 

As far as the executive branch of the American government is concerned, Taiwan's strategic importance now is no longer what is was at the beginning of the Cold War, and U.S. economic interests in Taiwan are now subsumed by those of the so-called Greater China economic circle.  Congress and American domestic public opinion, however, regard Taiwan's democratization as a concrete realization of American values.  Add to this the diplomatic efforts expended by Taiwan toward the United States, and it becomes clear that any ruling political party in the United States will have to focus on maintaining the importance of Taiwan's security and stable cross-straits relations.  This is why U.S. presidential candidates across the board almost unanimously promise to strengthen relations with Taiwan and guarantee its security during any given presidential election.  Yet making Taiwan's security a high priority does not necessarily mean sending troops to the island's defense. Thus most newly elected American presidents quickly abandon their strong campaign rhetoric, and settle for emphasizing a formulaic policy of peaceful resolution to the cross-straits problem.

 

As a result, in the current U.S.-led Asia-Pacific security environment, “peace” and “self-defense” are two basic principles of cross-straits relations and Taiwan security.  Key to the idea of “peace” is peace of the status quo.  Thus “peaceful resolution” is nothing more than a policy expectation; maintaining the peace and security of the status quo, though, is still important.  As Andrew Nathan argues, that “the United States has no vested interest in the outcome of the Taiwan issue so long as the resolution is arrived at peacefully.”<11>  Meanwhile, “self-defense” is a circumstantial principle in response to China's continual threat to use military force to resolve the Taiwan problem.  On the one hand, the Taiwan Relations Act guarantees that Taiwan will have sufficient weaponry to defend itself in the event of an attack from the mainland.  On the other hand, it does not rule out the possibility that the United States, upholding the principle of collective self-defense, might send troops to defend the island.  The fundamental goal is to provide a deterrence measure against a military threat from China.  Robert Ross claims that if the East Asia region moves toward a situation of maritime power (the United States) versus continental power (China), regional stability will increase.  Yet he neglects to take into account the importance of the problem in the Taiwan Strait.  In the maritime-versus-continental situation described by Ross, cross-straits relations and the Taiwan issue will become an even greater point of conflict and stalemate for the two countries.

 

 

II.  U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

 

1.  Collective Self-Defense: The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance System

 

With the end of the Cold War came the reduction, if not disappearance, of the Soviet Union's threat to the North Pacific.  The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty underwent a revision and redefining process in order to better respond to the new changes and developments in East Asia security environment.  Basically, the new treaty relies on the principle of collective self-defense as the basis for strategic planning; it includes more preventive and crisis management measures.  The idea of collective self-defense is clearly stipulated in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”  In this article, the notion of collective self-defense accepts mutual commitments among countries to use regional security organizations, bilateral, or multilateral defensive military alliances in order to help protect each other's national security, so long as such arrangements are conducive to the preservation of regional peace and security.  The use of regional security organizations, or bilateral and multilateral agreements to combine the collective strength and resolve of several countries raises the cost of aggression for potential challengers to the peace and stability of the status quo, thereby helping preserve regional peace and security.  For this reason, the author refers to this method as “preventive collective defense”.  In other words, it is not a case of pure collective military self-defensive behavior, but rather a preventive collective arrangement for guaranteeing that regional peace and security is not disrupted.

 

The importance of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance system is perhaps greater now than during the Cold War.  Previously, the alliance was simply one link in the United States' global containment policy.  Now, however, it is an important mechanism to the United States for maintaining balance in the region.  Likewise, Japan's role under the new security arrangement is significantly different.  Before, it was simply a provider of a base for American forces advance troops; now, it provides support for American military actions.  Both countries understand that in the post-Cold War period, the primary threats and greatest military hotspots in East Asia are the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, not Japan itself.  Yet secondary regional military conflict will influence the security and stability of the entire region; for this reason, Japan, under the new security alliance arrangement, agrees to provide necessary support and bases to American troops, allowing the United States greater flexibility and assistance in facing potential military conflicts.  Accordingly, the New Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance are still based on the idea of collective self-defense, a strategic plan for combining the strength and resolve of Asia-Pacific's two power countries to preserve the peace and security of the region.  The aim of the newly revised U.S.-Japan alliance is to be able to guarantee a peaceful and stable environment in the East Asia region, thus benefiting all countries in the region.  As a result, the majority of countries there agree that the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance is fundamental for preserving peace and security in the region.

 

Regarding the problem of defining the phrase “areas surrounding Japan” as used in the 1997 New Guidelines, both the Japanese and the American governments have emphasized that this is a situational concept rather than a geographical one – “any situation having a significant influence on Japan's peace and security” – and point out that this explanation is not a painstaking way of avoiding a sensitive issue, but rather an example of strategic and military realism and common sense.  Therefore, Japan's decision whether or not to provide support to U.S. troops, except in a case where the United States required such cooperation, would be based on whether or not a situation arising in the region would have a significant influence on Japan's security.  Moreover, the phrase “having a significant influence on Japan's security” would also be defined in a situational context.  Returning to the question of defining “areas surrounding Japan,” therefore, if one clings to a narrow interpretation of the idea of a geographic border, one will fail to grasp the central logic of the collective self-defense concept of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.

 

2.  Challenging the Status Quo?

 

Any state that is not satisfied with the status quo order, arrangement, or power distribution status is referred to as a non-status quo state.  Currently, China and North Korea are both believed to be non-status quo states to varying degrees.  China's case is particularly clear.  After twenty years of economic development, on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, Jiang Zemin wore the same type of clothing Mao Zedong wore fifty years before when he announced in front of the Gate of Heavenly Peace (Tiananmen) that China had finally stood up.  In a similar vein, Jiang declared to the world China's determination to become a “wealthy country with a strong military” (fuguo qiangbing).<12>  This type of slogan, reminiscent of Japan's Meiji restoration, reminds the rest of Asia-Pacific to pay attention to China's development as a future challenger of existing Asia-Pacific order, especially given China's efforts at economic and military modernization while attempting to tighten the Communist Party's exclusive rule on the country.  All this, combined with Beijing's continued attempts to stir up nationalist sentiment throughout the country, leads other governments to worry even more that China may go from being a non-status quo country to a revisionist country, intent on changing the status quo order and arrangement in order to achieve the status of regional hegemon. 

 

From the standpoint of traditional security dilemma theory, offensive weaponry poses a security threat to neighboring countries and other related countries, causing them to develop similar weaponry in order to increase their self-defense capability.  This, in turn, leads to a regional arms race and security dilemma.  Defensive weaponry, on the other hand, should not present the same type of suspicion or perception of threat.<13>  Yet a non-status quo or revisionist country is likely to perceive any military weaponry or alliance developments as a serious threat, and will therefore adamantly oppose any other country's deployment of defensive weapons systems or entrance into military agreements.  Moreover, the threatened country will likely develop similar or counter-effective weapons systems and agreements.  If a country is suspicious of, or opposed to, defensive weapons and alliances within that same region, one can infer that said country is a non-status quo country or revisionist country.  Mainland China's suspicions about and opposition to a U.S.-Japan defensive alliance and the research and deployment of a defensive TMD system offer proof that China is in fact quite sensitive to the regional security order and to its own power status.

 

Following the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, China sped up its plans to modernize its army, and in the 1992 People's Congress passed the National Sovereignty Law, drawing the entire South China Sea into the reach of China's territorial sovereignty.  In 1995, China followed up by occupying Mischief Reef.  Its nuclear test the same year reminded regional countries once more that China is East Asia's sole nuclear power, and the 1996 Taiwan missile crisis was a performance verging on war.  China's reason for strongly opposing and suspecting the motives of U.S.-Japan TMD research is that such work will destroy regional peace and bring about an arms race.  In other words, this means China will itself step up acquisition and deployment of weapons installations and missile systems.  Such warnings have led to feelings of insecurity in the Japanese government and populace, and spurred debate inside Japan about new security policies, and even about the possibility of new interpretations or revisions of constitutional limitations.  The end result is that Japan has begun to take on a more active and autonomous role to face potential security challenges in the region.

 

The strategic triangle formed by China, Japan, and the United States is an important factor influencing Asia-Pacific security.  Yet this triangle is not equilateral: Japan and the United States are closer to each other in many ways than either is to China.  Moreover, the three bilateral relations that form the triangle all have their own particularities.  China views the effort to revitalize the U.S.-Japan alliance, and especially the 1997 Defense Guidelines revision, as specifically aimed against China.  For its part, China's attitude toward the United States and Japan reflects an overall desire to cooperate, but also a distance based on mutual mistrust.  The real consensus of the U.S.-China-Japan triangle is that it maintains the existing environment conducive to economic cooperation, while continuing to promote dialogue mechanisms and engagement relations.  Yet in the realm of military and security issues, conflicts and differences in viewpoints between China and the U.S.-Japan grow more evident by the day.

 

3.  Influence on Taiwan's Security

 

It is impossible to apply traditional security dilemma theory distinctions between offensive and defensive weaponry to cross-straits relations.  According to the theory, only a buildup of offensive weaponry by one country will cause related countries to feel their security is threatened; a buildup of defensive weaponry is less likely to cause such a reaction.  Yet this theory does not apply to cross-straits relations, since mainland China believes that even a buildup of purely defensive weapons has the potential to increase Taiwan's self-confidence and cause it to move further toward independence.  It is for this reason that Beijing incessantly accuses the United States of failing to adhere to the 817 Communiqué, wherein Washington agreed to gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan, both in quality and quantity.  At the same time, China continues to attack the United States for its support of Taiwan's defense, claiming such behavior amounts to meddling in China's internal affairs.  In the United States, meanwhile, State Department officials and scholars who have traditionally placed greater emphasis on U.S.-China ties are gradually leaning towards supporting China's point of view on the sensitive issue of Taiwan.  Fortunately, the Taiwan Relations Act emphasizes the importance of arms sales to Taiwan.  The American Congress's recent decision that all Department of Defense arms sales to Taiwan must first involve consultation with Congress provided Taiwan with the greater diplomatic maneuvering room needed to obtain effective defensive weaponry.

 

Strictly speaking, traditional security dilemma theory basically does not apply to East Asia as a whole: any defensive weaponry in the region is seen as a serious threat.  This is especially true for non-status quo countries like North Korea and China: these two can launch ballistic missiles but vehemently oppose the development of anti-missile defense systems by other countries; they can perform nuclear weapons tests, but oppose defensive military alliances among other countries; they can construct military fortifications on reefs, but oppose attempts by others to send aircraft carriers to observe the exercises.  It is optimistic, even naïve, to believe that by reducing the defensive behavior perceived by some countries as a security threat, we will be able to gain the willingness and cooperation of these non-status quo countries.  China is determined to become the East Asia superpower of the 21st century, but that the primary problem is the resolution of the Taiwan issue, which is not in fact a matter of China's internal affairs, but rather an important strategic problem in U.S.-China relations.  The existence of a democratic Taiwan serves as a stumbling block in authoritarian China's path toward regional power status.<14>

 

The United States government understands quite well the fact that cross-straits relations have the potential to influence the overall security environment of East Asia region.  Numerous policies and publications emphasize this point, and as a result, the Clinton administration has continued to seek a foreign policy behavior that will reduce the possibility of military conflicts.  Yet these behaviors, seen from Taiwan's point of view, represent nothing more than further sacrifices of Taiwan's international breathing space and dignity, and are therefore opposed by Taiwan.  From a certain angle, then, Taiwan can be seen as a special type of non-status quo country, based on its continued dissatisfaction with the existing limits placed on it by the international society and countries in the East Asia region.  A truly sovereign, independent, democratic, and economically vibrant country, Taiwan is nevertheless not recognized by a single country in the region.  Yet Taiwan's self-identity and democratization grow stronger day by day, and the Taiwanese government is stepping up efforts to enlarge its international role and increase its participation in international organizations.  The United States and other countries feel that a free and democratic Taiwan should be able to understand and accept the arrangement, and lack of alternatives, imposed by current structural limitations.  Add to this the fact that Taiwan has had to bear the ramifications of the Clinton administration's China policy, which has shown a tendency toward gradually sacrificing Taiwan's interests to obtain the cooperation of the Beijing government.  Therefore, Lee Teng-hui's “special state-to-state relations” can be seen as a wake-up call to the international community that Taiwan is also a non-status quo country.  Naturally, there are significant differences in degree and nature of demands made by Taiwan and those of other non-status quo countries; yet the United States and Japan should understand that appropriate engagement of Taiwan and gradual integration is also necessary.

 

III.  Engaging China

 

1.  Constructive Engagement: Engaging China

 

Since 1994, the Clinton administration's “China Policy” has gradually revealed clear political orientation, namely engagement and enlargement, more simply referred to as a policy of engagement.<15>  The fundamental premise is that the Beijing regime is daily becoming a more powerful and less stable non status-quo country.  Given the present Asia-Pacific security environment and structural situation built upon hegemonic stability and collective self-defense, the United States has the best chance of bringing China into regional and international society as a country satisfied with the status quo if it can broaden the range of exchange with China and provide sufficient incentives. 

 

The term “engagement” has already become something of a magic word in U.S.-China bilateral relations, setting the direction and content of current relations between the two countries as they develop.  In American policy pronouncements and security research regarding East Asia and China, phrases related to engagement are often almost too numerous to count: conditioned engagement, constructive engagement, comprehensive engagement, pragmatic engagement, and so on.  Based on the Clinton administration's engagement and enlargement policy, the United States and China have opened a so-called “strategic dialogue,” systematizing mutual official visits by the two heads of state, members of the American Congress, and other high-level officials, while strengthening military dialogue and transparency on issues of economics, trade, culture, and security.  Though the policy of engagement has been the official language in describing the U.S.-China relationship, it is impossible for the U.S. and China to bury their considerable strategic differences and build a relationship of "strategic partners."<16>  Therefore, Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush criticized the current policy of constructive engagement and used the term "strategic competitors" to describe the current U.S.-China relationship.  However, even the new term still implies certain elements of engagement between the two countries, as David Shambaugh points out that "[t]he current state of strategic relations between the U.S. and China is, in fact, mixed – with elements of cooperation and competition.  There remains an opportunity for the United States and its allies and security partners to work to establish a strategic relationship that enhances the elements of cooperation with China."<17>

 

One of the recent examples of U.S.-China military engagement bears noting here.  Following the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by American warplanes, China halted all exchanges and engagement of a military nature with the United States.  This moratorium held until the two countries completed an agreement regarding China's accession to the World Trade Organization in November 1999; only then did Beijing agree to carry out joint military exercises in the waters off Hong Kong.  These exercises have shown that even though military exchange and engagement between the United States and China is still limited to initial mutual confidence-building measures, the two countries have so far been able to make the exercises practical and not simply a matter of formality.  In short, there have been four major concerns in U.S.-China security relations: 1) Taiwan; 2) U.S. proposals for deploying theater missile defense (TMD) systems in Asia; 3) supposed leaks to China of military-related technologies and nuclear secrets; and 4) Chinese arms export policies.<18>  Especially with issues like the Taiwan question and TMD issue, emerging frictions result from the post-Cold war changes in both China and U.S. policy toward regional and security affairs.  Therefore, after Defense Secretary William Cohen visited China in July 2000, he commented that “differences remain.”<19>

 

2.  Balance of Threat

 

Why must the United States, a hegemonic country that carries out a policy of engagement with non-status quo countries, at the same time adopt certain preventive and defensive arrangements and behaviors?  This question can be analyzed through revisionist realism's “balance of threat” theory, a modification of balance of power theory.  Stephen Walt, who proposed the balance of threat theory, pointed out that states may not simply look to the power fluctuations of other states within the system when changing their foreign policy.  Rather, they will take into account the intentions and behavior demonstrated by the diplomatic policies of those states.  If a new regional power poses any threat to states with vested interests in the existing system, then the concerned states will adopt power balancing or active containment policies, in order to prevent changes in the system order and stability.  In other words, states' balancing behaviors are not purely aimed at countering another state's increase in power, but should be seen as reactions in the face of a threat.<20>

 

According to balance of threat theory, therefore, a benevolent hegemon's demonstrated policy of maintaining the status quo, as opposed to an imperialist active expansion of power, will not bring about dissatisfaction or challenges from other status-quo countries.<21>  By the same logic, the hegemonic power in a unipolar system will take into account a regional power's foreign policy behavior and intentions when deciding its own.  Generally speaking, there are three different types of policies and attitudes that regional powers will display towards the international order imposed by the hegemon in a unipolar system: a status quo policy/status quo state; revisionist policies/revisionist state; and engagement policy/non-status quo or uncertain state.  Faced with the different policies of other countries, the hegemon's policies, in turn, can be distinguished as alliance, containment, and engagement. Non-status quo countries that have not yet displayed a definite attitude or policy towards the status quo system and order may in the medium term be swayed to becoming either status quo countries or revisionist countries.  According to balance of threat theory, the hegemon will on the one hand normally adopt policies of accommodation or engagement toward these countries, in the hopes that their policies will gradually become more clearly supportive of maintaining the status quo.  On the other hand, in order to prevent challenges by the non-status quo country to the existing stability, the hegemon will also construct appropriate preventive threat balancing mechanisms.

 

China is currently an important non-status quo country, and therefore the United States is in the process of carrying out engagement with China.  At the same time, however, the U.S. is maintaining a significant troop presence in East Asia region, strengthening the U.S.-Japan security system, beefing up bilateral military agreements and cooperative military relations with other status quo countries, developing a self-defensive anti-missile system, and selling defensive weapons to other countries in the East Asia region.  All of this is a way of maintaining an effective strategic framework and mechanism for balancing future challenges and threats, and makes clear the United States' strength and determination to maintain the status quo peace in the East Asia region. Nevertheless, whenever the focus turns to international and Asia-Pacific security strategy, many of China's recent behaviors show that it is still striving to strategically weaken the hegemonic position of the United States.  China has demonstrated a challenging and competitive posture, at times even moving toward direct opposition to the United States.

 

              In a report to the U.S. Air Force regarding American policy toward China, the RAND Corporation recommended that the United States revise its outdated and overly optimistic policy of comprehensive engagement of China, adopting instead a kind of hybrid engagement and containment “congagement” policy.<22>  Such a policy would place equal importance on engagement and prevention, constructing effective threat balancing preventive strategies and military deployments.  It is important to note that the RAND document recommends that until China has become a non-threatening democratic country, the United States should not pressure or encourage Taiwan and China to engage in reunification talks.  The reason for this recommendation is that if China should continue policies that challenge or try to change the status quo, the primary interest of the United States will be to see to it that the status quo is in fact maintained in the region.  This status quo includes Taiwan's status quo de facto independence and self-governance.<23>

 

3.  Influence on Taiwan's Security

 

The United States policy of engagement of China is closely interrelated with Taiwan's security and cross-straits relations.  In the 1950s and 1960s, American interests in Taiwan were primarily strategic in nature: Taiwan was a forward base for containing communism.  During the 1970s, when China and the Soviet Union parted company, the triangular relationship among the Washington, Taipei, and Beijing governments was influenced by American security interests in Taiwan.  At that time, Washington saw China as a strategically valuable partner in containing the Soviet Union, notwithstanding the fact that China was also a formidable enemy on the other side of the Taiwan Strait.<24>  The idea that China was a “strategically valuable partner” led to Washington's recognition in 1979 of the Beijing government, and its severing of defensive and other official ties with Taiwan.  From that point on, U.S. interests in Taiwan have primarily centered on trade, economics, and unofficial ties.  With the Taiwan Relations Act, Washington also recognized its strategic interests in Taiwan, but its primary concern still lies in maintaining peace and stability in the Western Pacific.

 

The United States' engagement policy leaves the choice up to China.  Regardless of whether China decides to accept the status quo or challenge U.S. hegemony, the United States will naturally want to use the lowest-cost engagement policy to lead China to accept international norms and the international organizational order, and eventually enmesh China into Asia-Pacific and international society.  China has thus far not actively attempted to construct an anti-U.S. strategic alliance, and on several international security issues, has even begun to accept the structure and practices of international norms and organizations.  Examples include China's signing in 1997 of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), its approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and its signing of a memorandum with the United Nations Secretariat on a standby arrangement for Chinese troops to join UN peacekeeping forces.  China has also adopted an attitude of conservative acceptance of U.S. viewpoints on certain issues.  Yet engagement cannot stop China from transferring missile technology to Pakistan, nor can it prevent China from using nationalism to create a tide of anti-U.S. sentiment.  Engagement effectively overlooks the fundamental character of China's government apparatus, while sacrificing the interests of America's true allies in the process.<25>

 

On the flip side, U.S. policy helps guarantee that if ever the U.S. needs to adopt a policy of containment toward China, everything is already in place, and the United States will be able to counter at any time a challenge from a dissatisfied China.  Therefore, if China adopts a revisionist policy, it will inevitably be met with shared resistance from U.S. hegemonic military strength and collective defense.  During the March 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, the United States dispatched two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Straits region as a display of the U.S. role as “balancer” in the struggle to maintain peace in the region.  This action emphasized the U.S. policy of maintaining the status quo through collective self-defense, based on bilateral military alliances and a continued military presence in the region.

 

Even though the national strength and military might of the United States and Japan is still far greater than that of North Korea and China, the ability of the latter two to create unrest and instability should not be underestimated.  It is no surprise, therefore, that the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits have always been seen as flashpoints for potential crises in East Asia.  Naturally, the best way to deal with these non-status quo countries is through carrot and stick tactics: on the one hand, engaging China and enticing it to adopt cooperative, open policies; on the other, demonstrating America's threat balancing defensive and deterrence abilities.  Both the United States and Japan have to varying degrees grasped the essence of this two-sided tactic, yet the two have also on occasion yielded too much diplomatically, leaving themselves in a bind and losing reliability in the eyes of other nations.

 

The "Three No's" policy is a prime example of how the United States should not yield too much despite its engagement policy.  The Clinton administration has tried hard to reduce any negative influence the Taiwan question might have on U.S.-China engagement.  During his 1999 stop in Shanghai, Clinton altered the strategic ambiguity of the past and clearly defined his opposition to a change in Taiwan's position or the level of Taiwan's international participation.  Even though he maintained the original strategic ambiguity with regards to guaranteeing Taiwan's security, such unnecessary clarification of the Three No's policy has so far received little support.  It did, however, allow China to move one step further towards isolating Taiwan, and forced Taiwan to offer the “Two States” theory in retaliation, bringing yet another shock to peace in the region.  The United States should learn from this mistake: not only is the Three No's policy detrimental to Taiwan and the region as a whole, it also left Japan, America's most important ally in East Asia, in an embarrassing position.

 

The U.S. Congress has shown a tendency to oppose the Clinton administration's China policy, which it sees as using Taiwan's interests to barter with China.  Following Clinton's clarification of the Three No's, a bipartisan committee on May 18, 1999 proposed the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA) to address the U.S. security policy toward Taiwan.  The Taiwan Security Enhancement is not a replacement of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which dictated that the United States must sell sufficient defensive arms to Taiwan.  On the contrary, TSEA seeks to ensure faithful implementation of the spirit of the TRA.  The new proposal asks to establish "direct secure communication" between Taiwan and the U.S. militaries, and it also requires the Executive Branch to make regular reports to Congress regarding arms sales to Taiwan.  In February 2000, the Department of Defense produced a report indicating that Taiwan was far more vulnerable to attack than previously recognized, and that the isolation of its military was causing further technological shortfalls.  It is a fact that Taiwan has become increasingly reliant on the U.S. to maintain its military defense and security.  The TSEA thus tries to make sure that Taiwan can maintain the "quantitative superiority" in the cross-strait military balance so that Taiwan has sufficient defensive capacity to deter military attack from the PRC.  Furthermore, the TSEA also can serve as a political reassurance of the U.S. commitment toward the maintenance of peace and security in both Taiwan Strait and East Asia, especially after its engaging China and Three No’s policies.  The TSEA bill was approved by the House International Relations Committee by a 32-6 vote on October 25, 1999, and it went to the floor of the House of Representatives on February 1, 2000. After debate, the bill was approved by a vote of 341-70, demonstrating cross-party support for a revised Taiwan Security Enhancement Act.  New York Republican Representative Benjamin Jilman, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, emphasized that the TSEA is a reaction to China's recent, repeated increases in the threat of force against Taiwan.  According to Jilman, the United States should continue to commit to providing sufficient defensive weapons to Taiwan in order to maintain the power balance across the Taiwan Straits.<26> 

 

The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, however, brought about a violent reaction from the U.S. Executive Branch and China.  The White House argued that the measure was unnecessary, that it would give China an excuse to step up the arms race and weapons development, and that it could cause difficulties in America's engagement policy with China.  According to Assistant Secretary of State Susan Shirk, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act would have serious and negative consequences, not only through its influence on American interests in East Asia, but also through negative effects precisely on Taiwan's security. <27>  Beijing's heated reaction and violent opposition to the passing of the Taiwan Security Enhancement was, of course, not a surprise: Chinese leaders claimed the bill infringed on China's sovereignty and represented an attempt to meddle in China's internal affairs.<28> The final result of the TSEA is far from being certain, but the bill has already served as a deterrent factor helping to maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait ever since its first appearance.  In the future, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act may also become a bone of contention in U.S. security policy debates, prompting effective discussion of U.S. policy toward Taiwan.  A close look at related conditions and developments in the future is well worth study and analysis.

 

Conclusion

 

This paper has attempted to make sense of three major U.S. regional security policies influencing East Asia security environment, while pointing out three current challenges and appropriate responses.  These three motivating structural factors presented were “hegemonic stability vs. struggle between maritime powers and continental powers”, “collective self-defense vs. challenging the status quo”, and “constructive engagement and balance of threat.”  This paper suggests that the formation and development of these three structures means that East Asian security environment is in the process of forming a new dynamic balance, of which Taiwan's security is one link, and therefore subject to changes in the overall environment and structure.  Naturally, changes in cross-straits relations and Taiwan's security situation will also affect the overall Asia-Pacific security environment.

 

Also, it is important to note that despite perceived consistency in the overall environment and structure of Asia-Pacific over the medium term, there are still numerous inconsistencies to be seen.  Many policies have not taken into consideration the whole strategic structure of the region; as mentioned above, U.S. engagement of China virtually overlooks the strategic relation and interests of Japan and Taiwan.  Another example is the strategic thinking of liberalism, which has basically been simplified to entry into the WTO.  Human rights issues, the strategic unity and dialogue of democratic countries, economic interdependence and interconnectedness – so far, none of these has become an important issue in dialogue regarding the current Asia-Pacific security environment, even though they will no doubt have an influence on the overall situation, as well as on cross-straits relations and the maintenance of Taiwan's security.  Therefore, when one attempts to understand the structure and dynamic factors of the East Asian security environment, one must also understand which issues are matters of deviant behavior with respect to policy implementation, so as not to immediately doubt or overreact.  Only through such a methodical approach can one truly grasp the security environment dynamic changes of East Asia, and its influence on Taiwan's security.

 

Maintaining Taiwan's security is a comprehensive task.  Non-military security strategies, tactics, and behaviors are just as important as military guarantees to protect the island, and may play an increasingly important role in the East Asia politico-economic environment of the 21st century.  United States policies, the regional security environment, and Japan's influence on issues in the region all affect, to varying degrees, Taiwan's security guarantee.  As a result, preserving the whole of Taiwan's national security means placing simultaneous emphasis on research, planning, dissemination, and implementation of non-military security strategies.  Without this kind of approach, no comprehensive security guarantee can be reached.

 

Given the ongoing conflict across the Taiwan Straits, and the security environment of the region as a whole, realism continues to lead the thinking of Asia-Pacific policy makers.  Accordingly, military balance, active defense, and effective deterrence should be the fundamental axes of Taiwan's national defense strategic planning at the present stage.  Yet on the other hand, the regional security environment also indicates the importance of diplomacy and security strategy, so international publicity, cross-straits relations, work on improving relations with China, economic security, and other related issues are all important issues for Taiwan's national security strategy.  The importance and influence of these issues on national security should be the subject of systematic research, design, planning, and implementation, in order to produce positive results in terms of non-military national security strategy.

 

By showing that Taiwan's security problems are a structural and strategic issue, then it becomes clear that American interests are consistent with those of Taiwan.  The decision to maintain the current peace and security is not simply a default decision due to lack of a better policy; rather, it is the most suitable option for both parties in terms of security and development.  Therefore, infringing on Taiwan's interests and breathing space is nothing more than an effective bargaining chip in the game of U.S.-China relations, used by each in turn to get the other's attention.  Perhaps Taiwan should also temporarily make a distinction between participation in substance and participation in title.  Doing so would also allow Taiwan a greater chance for appeals of a tactical and policy-based nature, so that cross-straits relations and regional security would no longer be related solely to structural and strategic considerations. 

 

Finally, Taiwan should forge ahead with integrated work to develop a national security strategy.  Integrating the various aspects of national security strategy work that are currently going in various directions would help increase the overall benefits of national security strategy.  The focus, rather, should be on strengthening the integration of planning, coordination, implementation, and debate on all work related to national security strategy.  Such integration will hopefully lead to an improved ability of Taiwan to respond to changes in the overall regional security environment, and to use integrated methods to preserve Taiwan's security and peace.

 

 

Notes

 

<1> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Strategy for East Asia and the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance,” Defense Issue, Vol. 10, No. 35, March 29, 1995.

<2> For a discussion of the theory of hegemonic stability, please see Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).  See also Robert O. Keohane, “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977,” in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson and Alexander L. George, eds., Change in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980).

<3> The Assessment was presented by the Department of Defense to the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 6, 1997.  See A DIA Global Security Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1997).

<4> “Anti-U.S. Axis? Not Too Likely,” LA Times, Editorial, October 4, 1999.

<5> Ross is optimistic, however, that Asia under such a bipolar arrangement would eventually be more peaceful. See Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4, Spring 1999, pp. 81-119.

<6> Defense White Paper, State Council, Beijing, July 1998.  See http://www.china.org.cn

<7> Thomas M. Molino, “Pacific Security Today: Overcoming the Hurdles,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 24, 1999, at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs99/pacific/pacific.htm

<8> However, in the past twenty years, there were some notable retreats from the TRA framework by the U.S. government: (1) the August 17, 1982, Sino-American Communiqué; (2) the 1994 policy review to ban visits to the United States by Taiwan's top leadership; and (3) the recent "three no's" pledge made by President Clinton. See Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, "Lessons from the Taiwan Relations Act," Orbis, Winter 2000, pp. 63-77.

<9> See Secretary of Defense Report to the Congress, Select Military Capabilities of the People's Republic of China (Report to Congress Pursuant to FY99 Appropriations Bill, 1 February 1999).

<10> See Andrew J. Nathan, "What's Wrong with American Taiwan Policy," The Washington Quarterly, 23:2, Spring 2000, pp. 93-106, at 99.

<11> Andrew J. Nathan, “What’s Wrong with American Taiwan Policy,” The Washington Quarterly, 23:2, Spring 2000, pp. 93-106, at p. 99.

<12> Susan V. Lawrence, “Doctrine of Deterrence,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 14, 1999, at http://taiwansecurity.org/News/FEER-Doctrine-of-Deterrence.htm.

<13> For a discussion of offensive and defensive weapons and the roles they play in bringing about war, see Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War”; and L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufman, “What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4, Spring 1998, pp. 44-82.

<14> Ross H. Munro, “Taiwan: What China Really Wants,” National Review, October 11, 1999.

<15> For a discussion of U.S. engagement policy toward China, see United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 1995); James R. Sasser, Engaging China, Address to the Asia Society, Washington, DC, March 4, 1997; Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3, (Winter 1993-94), pp. 35-77; Aaron L Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993-94), pp. 5-33.

<16> See Bates Gill, "Limited Engagement," Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 4, July-August 1999, pp. 65-76.

<17> David Shambaugh, "Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors," Survival, vol. 42, no. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 97-115.

<18> See James H. Nolt, “U.S.-China-Taiwan Military Relations,” Foreign Policy in Focus, vol. 5, no. 11, April 2000, at http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol5/v5n11china.html, Aug. 21, 2000.

<19> Robert Burms, “Cohen Steadies China Relations,” Associated Press, July 15, 2000.

<20> Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).

<21> For a discussion of status quo policy and imperialist policy, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1993), chaps 4 & 5.

<22> The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications, RAND, September 10, 1999, at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1082.

<23> Ibid.

<24> Robert G. Sutter, East Asia and the Pacific: Challenges for U.S. Policy (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1992), p. 72.

<25> For news and debates on the engagement policy, please see the Taiwan Security Research website, maintained by the author, at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/TSR-Engagement.htm.

<26> Christopher Wilson, “U.S. House Panel Votes to Boost Taiwan Military Ties,” Reuters, October 26, 1999.

<27> “White House Opposes Bill Aimed to Boost Taiwan Security,” Agence France Presse, September 16, 1999.

<28> “China Opposes U.S. Bill to Strengthen Military Ties with Taiwan,” Agence France Presse, October 28, 1999.