From Strategic Competitor to Security Collaborator?

New U.S.-China Tri-level Strategic Relations and

Taiwan Security in a Post-9/11 World

By Philip Yang

Issues & Studies, 39, no. 4 (December 2003): 182-193.

U.S. international security policy has been deeply affected by both the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the Iraq war, and is now focusing on anti-terrorism and effective control of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) proliferation as the top priorities.  The major tasks for the new U.S. international security strategy will be to contain the outbreak of further terrorist attacks, or at least to prevent such attacks from happening outside the Middle East, and also to contain further proliferation of WMD.  In order to contain these two new security threats, the United States needs to form a new security and military alliance.  China, due to its ideological and political institutions, will not be included as a member of this new alliance.  However, China’s policy of cooperation—be it in both international containment of terrorism and WMD proliferation or the current regional security crisis (i.e., North Korea)—is a crucial part of Washington’s new strategy.  Under the new security environment, Taiwan is facing challenges from the changing structures of both the Asia-Pacific and Sino-U.S. security environments.

Facing such new security threats as terrorism and proliferation of WMD, the United States needs cooperation and collaborative action from the Beijing government.  Balancing against the rising power of China will not be a high priority of U.S. security policy design in the foreseeable future.  The major reason for Beijing’s change of strategic thinking is the need to maintain stable external relationships so that China can focus on internal economic development.  For that reason, the Beijing government certainly wants to maintain cordial relations with great powers and friendly conditions in the region.

I argue that the new Sino-U.S. strategic relationship is one of security cooperation on three levels: the international, the East Asian regional, and the bilateral.  The impact of September 11 and the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis have provided great opportunities for Beijing and Washington to cooperate on international and regional security, a circumstance which led to a temporary change of policy attitude in bilateral security relations.  However, I argue that these shifts do not mean that China’s position has changed from “strategic competitor” to “security collaborator” vis-à-vis the United States, even though security cooperation between the two governments seems to have led the bilateral strategic relationship into a new era of engagement and cooperation.

New Tri-level Structure of U.S.-China Security Cooperation

International Security Cooperation

The current international security structure is based on two major international security issues that now dominate the international strategic relationship between these two major powers.  These two issues are cooperation in counter-terrorism and confrontation over proliferation of WMD.  Due to September 11, U.S. foreign policy has changed priorities away from conventional power politics and toward this new type of security menace.  After September 11, Washington has realized that currently the real threat does not come from rising states, but from failing states and terrorist groups.  The war against terrorism has therefore become a turning point in Sino-U.S. ties.  Because of the importance of China and its past records in arms sales and weapons proliferation, Beijing’s cooperation is vital for Washington’s efforts in counter-terrorism and control of WMD proliferation.  For Washington the threat of “Communist China” is therefore less important than the need for a helping hand from China in combating these new security threats.

After the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, China responded quickly to show its support and willingness to cooperate with the United States.  President Jiang Zemin (江澤民) immediately made a personal pledge to President George W. Bush on September 12, saying that “China is ready to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with the United States and the international community in combating all manner of terrorist violence.”<1>  Within a period of four months, President Bush not only telephoned Jiang but also visited China twice, setting a historic precedent in U.S.-China relations.  In order to seek cooperation from the Beijing government, President Bush personally attended the Shanghai APEC summit meeting in October 2001, where he mentioned “a new spirit of partnership and amity with Beijing.” <2>  In addition, Washington invited Jiang and Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) to visit the United States.

Beijing thus has provided assistance to the United States in the war against terrorism in such areas as intelligence-sharing and money laundering.  China is motivated partly by the hope of enhancing Sino-U.S. cooperation in international security issues, and partly out of the fear of terrorist activities in the Middle East, Central Asia, and its own northwest territories.  Although not at the core of the coalition, Beijing’s security cooperation was vital to Washington’s strategy of forming an international coalition to combat terrorism.  By early 2002, the bilateral relationship appeared to be in a good shape.

With regard to the non-proliferation issue, Washington has repeatedly expressed concern over China's policies toward weapons proliferation and has imposed sanctions on a series of Chinese firms for allegedly breaking international accords on weapons proliferation.  However, on August 25, 2002—hours before U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage visited Beijing—the Beijing government published an unprecedented list of regulations aimed at limiting the export of its missile technology, a move designed to satisfy a U.S. condition for the improvement of ties with Washington.  Beijing pledged that China will “exercise strict control of the export of missiles and missile-related items and technologies.” <3>  Whether the pledge will be upheld is another issue, but China clearly intends to improve its strategic relationship with the United States.  On international arms control and disarmament issues, Beijing has also expressed its support of: early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), early negotiation and conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty, negotiation of the protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the full implementation of the thirteen nuclear disarmament steps as contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review. <4>

Beijing’s cooperation with Washington on other international security matters, however, is rather limited.  For instance, on such issues as Baghdad’s development of WMD, Beijing’s efforts on behalf of the United States were restricted largely to  restraining from vetoing Iraq-related initiatives on the U.N. Security Council.  Another security issue is the U.S.-backed Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) designed to develop new means to disrupt weapons trading at sea, in the air, and on land.  Even though not opposing this initiative, Beijing questions the legality and effectiveness of some of the measures and their implications for international and regional security. <5>

Regional Security Cooperation

As a result of international security cooperation between the two governments, Beijing and Washington have so far managed to deal with their differences through a pragmatic and flexible approach.  After the war in Iraq was officially declared ended by President Bush, Washington and Beijing turned their attention to the North Korean nuclear crisis.  Washington was preoccupied by both the war on terror and events in Iraq, thus the Bush administration decided to push Beijing to play a major role in dealing with the North Korean problem.

Beijing’s geopolitical bargaining chips have increased as nations—including the United States, Japan, and South Korea—have turned to the Chinese leadership for help.  Of particular significance is the call for assistance from the United States, with many high-ranking U.S. officials visiting China to press the Beijing government to take the lead in keeping Pyongyang from pursuing its nuclear weapons programs.  The China News Service reported that “[O]n the question of the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. hopes China will play a positive and constructive role, and the Chinese side has clearly indicated its wish to see the peninsula de-nuclearized.” <6>  Beijing shares Washington’s concerns about weapons proliferation in North Korea.  For Beijing, the costs of a nuclear-armed North Korea are sufficiently high—and the convergence of China’s economic and strategic interests with those of the United States sufficiently strong—that Beijing’s efforts to mediate the crisis and host talks to resolve disputes serve China’s long-term self-interest.

From the three-party talk to the six-party talk, Beijing has played a major role in helping Washington in trying to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis.  Regardless of the outcome, Beijing’s involvement is a signal that Zhongnanhai (中南海) regards regional stability as a higher priority than noninterference.  In addition, the leaders in Beijing will be able to maintain that China is a responsible and indispensable diplomatic partner in Asian regional affairs.  U.S. consideration in this area will also make Beijing more willing to play hardball with Pyongyang over the WMD issue.  President Bush has recently praised Beijing’s “constructive role” in major global issues including the North Korean crisis.  Bush stated that “U.S.-China relations are full of energy, and this is important for both sides.” <7>

From a long-term perspective, the North Korean issue could provide an opportunity for the new leadership under Hu Jintao to show the West that China is not only an emerging world factory but a responsible, pro-active member of the global community.  At the very least, China’s diplomatic status in the region will have been elevated.  Even beyond the North Korean issue, Beijing has been endeavoring to promote in a general sense a benign external image of China to its neighbors in the region.  Beijing’s leaders seem committed to the principle that China’s own interest is best served by maintaining a stable and friendly periphery and by integrating into the regional and global economy.  Therefore, for Beijing, cooperating with the United States on regional issues remains appealing.  However, China strongly opposes any military means in resolving the North Korean crisis, and still believes that the problem should be settled only through direct talks between Washington and Pyongyang.  The North Korean nuclear issue thus could still be a source of tension between Beijing and Washington.

Bilateral Security Engagement:

From Strategic Competitor to Security Collaborator?

During his presidential election campaign, George W. Bush vehemently denounced Bill Clinton’s policy of engagement with China.  He argued that it was inappropriate for the United States to regard China as a strategic partner; instead, Bush viewed China as a “strategic competitor.” <8>  There was also some heated rhetoric in the early months of the Bush administration as well as increased arms sales to Taiwan for self-defense purposes, both of which seemed to indicate a revised U.S.-China strategic relationship.  The Bush administration essentially stopped all contacts between the Pentagon and the Chinese military.  The President also reversed a twenty-year U.S. policy by agreeing to sell submarines to Taiwan and allowed high-profile visits to the United States by Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). <9>  The EP-3 spy plane incident in April 2001 further highlighted the degree of mistrust and tension between the two nations. 

The September 11 terrorist attacks in America forced Washington to muster its resources to fight terrorists while paying less attention to East Asian security policy in general and the China question in particular.  The impact of September 11 also created a common terrorist threat for both Washington and Beijing, leading the two countries to recognize that working together to combat common threats should supercede both distrust of the other’s policy intentions and bilateral disputes on trade, human rights, or the Taiwan issue.  The United States needs China’s cooperation on continuous counter-terrorism measures, both in such policy areas as the Middle East and in such key institutions as the U.N. Security Council.

Under the new U.S. international security strategy and regional crisis management policies, Beijing and Washington try to maintain the positive development of their security relations.  Bilateral discussions about trade, human rights, and weapons proliferation will continue.  Both governments will, however, likely seek to avoid any appearance of deteriorating relations.  Some scholars therefore argue that Beijing is no longer Washington’s strategic competitor, but is rather now a major trade and investment partner as well as “security collaborator.” <10>  Military contacts and exchanges have finally resumed in an effort to build trust and reduce misunderstandings between the two governments. <11>

I argue, however, that it is premature to assert that Beijing has changed from Washington’s “strategic competitor” to “security collaborator” despite the apparent new era of engagement and cooperation between the two governments.  Even though the impact of September 11 on international and East Asian security environments continues, the attack has not fundamentally altered the structure of the Sino-U.S. strategic relationship. Cooperative efforts in international and regional security issues are still limited, and all are based on both nations’ realist considerations of their own self-interests.  Cooperative behavior from Beijing is not yet significant enough to overcome common problems, which are deeply embedded in the political leadership of both countries and in their bilateral relationship.  In short, we have witnessed a change of policy priorities in both Beijing and Washington, but this does not mean that the two governments have reached a common long-term agenda.

A recent example of America’s distrust of the PRC’s military power and ambitions was the “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China” issued by the Pentagon in July 2003.  This report stated that “Beijing is pursuing its long-term political goals of developing its comprehensive national power and ensuring a favorable ‘strategic configuration of power’.”  The report emphasized that “[w]hile seeing opportunity and benefit in interactions with the United States—primarily in terms of trade and technology—Beijing apparently believes that the United States poses a significant long-term challenge.” <12>  In fact, differing in tone from the mainstream development of Sino-U.S. relations over the past few years, this document reaffirmed the Pentagon’s long-held position that China is a potential challenger to U.S. strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Many in the United States hope that the current trend of security cooperation between Beijing and Washington can present a new opportunity for the two nations to work together toward a common agenda.  However, it is still very difficult to predict whether and how long these positive changes in the relationship between Beijing and Washington will last.  For the short term, bilateral security cooperation on the war against terrorism and the North Korean issue is essential for the United States.    Nevertheless, the threat of terrorism and WMD proliferation are perceived differently by these two nations.  Cooperation between the two countries, therefore, may have the short-term effect of creating a cooperative atmosphere, yet will unlikely lead to sincere and long-term cooperation toward a common agenda.  International, regional, and bilateral security cooperation between Beijing and Washington is still limited because strong skepticism of the other’s long-term strategy and intentions lingers in both countries.

Taiwan Security and the Future of Asia-Pacific Security

China has to some extent successfully employed a mixed strategy of coercive diplomacy against Taiwan in order to prevent Taiwan from moving toward de jure independence.  This strategy includes military modernization, missile deployment, and international isolation.  On the other hand, China also seeks to enhance the integration of Taiwan’s economy with—if not outright dependence on—that of the mainland.  David Lampton has argued that “[a]s long as Beijing continues to believe that a Taiwanese declaration of independence is unlikely, and that current policy makes eventual reunification at least plausible, China’s current leaders are unlikely to use force against the island.” <13>  Having emphasized its preference for resolving the so-called Taiwan issue peacefully, the major goal of Beijing would, however, likely be to compel a quickly negotiated solution on terms favorable to Beijing.

Although some scholars in the West have argued that East Asia was “ripe for rivalry” after the end of the Cold War, the reality is that countries in the region do not appear to be balancing out the PRC’s rising influence. <14>  Recently, some have asserted that in the past decade countries of the region have in fact been bandwagoning with the PRC. <15>  With the PRC’s continuing progress on the path of economic growth and military modernization, as well as the new security cooperation and engagement between Beijing and Washington, China may soon resume its place atop the Asian regional hierarchy.  Neither the United States nor Japan is forming a balancing coalition against the rising China, for such an attempt would not receive strong support from countries in the region.

Tensions across the Taiwan Strait over the past few years have made the issues of Taiwan security and cross-Strait relations the focal point of concern that could alter the Asia-Pacific political landscape.  One could therefore reasonably argue that conflict in the Taiwan Strait may have the potential to redefine major power politics and redistribute power relations in the region or even throughout international society as a whole.  What happens across the Taiwan Strait could lead to conflict involving the major powers; that is, China, Japan, and the United States could end up in military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait.  Taiwan issue is a symbol for contemporary dilemmas on several levels.  First, Taiwan-China relations crystallize the two tensions that will most shape the future of Taiwan: those between globalization and nationalism, and those between geopolitics and geoeconomics.  Second, China’s approach to resolving the Taiwan issue will indicate whether the emerging China is a status quo power or a revisionist state. <16> 

Taiwan itself can be seen as a special type of non-status quo country, dissatisfied with the existing limits placed on it by international society.  A truly sovereign, independent, democratic, and economically vibrant country, Taiwan is nevertheless not recognized by a single country in East Asia.  Yet Taiwan's self-identity and democratization grow stronger day by day, and the Taiwanese government is stepping up efforts to enlarge the island’s international role and increase its participation in international organizations.  The United States and other countries feel that a free and democratic Taiwan should be able to understand and accept the arrangement, given the lack of alternatives presently available.

Naturally, there are significant differences in the degree and nature of demands made by Taiwan and other non-status quo countries; yet countries in East Asia should understand that appropriate engagement of Taiwan and gradual integration are also necessary for improving not only the regional and international security situation, but also the ability of the 23 million citizens of Taiwan to take an active part in the global political and economic system.  Allowing Taiwanese participation in regional security dialogues and discussions will be useful in integrating the Taiwanese perspective into regional security concerns.  Regional accommodation and engagement can thus be seen as confidence-building measures (CBMs) to reduce cross-Strait tensions.

All countries in East Asia have an interest in reducing the risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.  So far, however, no form of preventive diplomacy or CBMs has been instituted across the Taiwan Strait.  In terms of crisis management in the region, bilateral cross-Strait military CBMs so far are still blocked by the cross-Strait political stalemate and distrust.  However, since the mid-1980s, informal cross-Strait links have developed rapidly.  These common understandings and consultative mechanisms on related issues, restraint and notification of military exercises, and the development of wider economic and social ties can contribute to the maintenance of a peaceful cross-Strait environment.

Governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait must come to the realization that cross-Strait interaction is not a zero-sum game.  The gain of one side is not necessarily the loss of the other.  This logic is true for other countries in the region—enhancing relations with one side of the Taiwan Strait does not necessarily mean that relations with the other side will be downgraded.  Regional concern about China’s potential power for destabilization only enhances Beijing’s leverage.  Taiwan’s role is to keep China in check, however, and other countries need to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.  Therefore, the maintenance of a balanced relationship with both Beijing and Taipei has become one of the major challenges for countries in the region.

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*Philip Yang (楊永明) is a professor in the Department of Political Science of the National Taiwan University. He has published extensively in Chinese, English and Japanese on topics such as Taiwan and Asia-Pacific security issues. Prof. Yang is also the founder and administrator of the Taiwan Security Research website: www.taiwansecurity.org.

<1> Reuters, September 13, 2003.

<2> “Terror Throws Us Together, For Now,” Far Eastern Economic Review, November 1, 2001, 36.

<3> “U.S. Envoy in China as Beijing Announces New Missile Rules,” Agence France Presse, August 26, 2002.

<4> Li Genxin, “Recent Developments on the Arms Control Agenda and China’s Position” (Paper presented at the CSCAP 20^th Meeting of the Working Group on CSBMs, Singapore, August 10-12, 2003).

<5> Ibid.

<6> Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Beijing’s North Korea Conundrum,” CNN.com, December 24, 2002.

<7> “Bush Heaps Praise on China,” CNN.com, September 24, 2003.

<8> In what is perhaps the best-known foreign policy speech of his campaign, Bush told an audience at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, on November 19, 1999, that “China is a competitor, not a strategic partner.” See “China and Russia –Powers in Transition,” Speech of Republican Presidential Nominee George W. Bush, at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0900/ijpe/pj52bush.htm.

<9> Robert S. Ross, “The Stability of Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait,” The National Interest, Fall 2001, 67-68.

<10> Morton Abramowitz and Stephen Bosworth, “Adjusting to the New Asia,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 4 (July/August 2003): 119-31.

<11> “U.S. Ships Make Port Visit to China to ‘Reduce Misunderstandings’,” Agence France Presse, September 23, 2003.

<12> “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China” (U.S. Department of Defense, July 30, 2003), at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/20030730chinaex.pdf.

<13> David Lampton, “Small Mercies: China and America after 9/11,” The National Interest, No. 66 (Winter 2001/2002), 106-13.

<14> For examples of the former view, see Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multi-polar Asia,” International Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993): 5-33; Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, “Rethinking East Asian Security,” Survival 36, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 3-21; and Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 5-40.

<15> David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 57-85.

<16> Robert A. Manning, “Taiwan and the Future of Asian Security,” Politique Internationale, Summer 2000, at http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/Manning-0700.htm.