The Significance and Contribution of the “One China, Different Interpretations” Consensus

Translated from the Introduction to 「一個中國，各自表述」共識的史實，“yigezhongguo, gezibiaoshu”：gongshi de shishi（“One China, Different Interpretations”— A Historical Account of the Consensus of 1992）, ed. SU Chi and Cheng An-kuo (Taipei: National Policy Foundation, 2002), pp.I-VIII.

By SU Chi

Convener

National Security Division

National Policy Foundation

Too many disputes in post-democratized Taiwan have attracted attention, yet few have remained for long in the public arena to be discussed and verified. Too many policies, measures or norms have been overturned in Taiwan following the transition of power from the KMT to DPP, yet most people no longer bother to delve into them deeply to discern right from wrong, important from trivial, or beneficial from harmful. The consensus on “one China, different interpretations” is a prime example of this.

Today, only a few people in Taiwan can appreciate the facts that:

1. The “one China, different interpretations” consensus was the first political compromise of profound historic significance in more than forty years of armed conflict and ideological struggle between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait since they came under separate administrations in 1949.

2. The issue that this compromise addressed was the most central, crucial and sensitive question of “one China.” In legal parlance, it is a question of sovereignty; in common parlance, it is a question of identity. It involves the two sides’ self identities and mutual identities of each other. Precisely because of this, this compromise was very precious.

3. Because both sides were able to reach an ambiguous consensus on the most difficult question of “one China”, it was possible to hold the Koo-Wang talks of April 1993 in Singapore and continue to hold substantive talks over the following two years. Without the 1992 consensus, how could there have been the thaw between the two sides of the Strait in 1993, 1994 and 1995? In larger perspective, without this basic compromise, how could there have been the four years of “win-win” amidst 53 years of “zero sum” standoff between Taiwan and the mainland? Therefore, the “1992 Consensus ” contributed greatly to creating and maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Most regrettably, the historic significance and contribution of the “one China, different interpretations” consensus was intentionally or unintentionally ignored in the political wrangling following the transition of power between the KMT and DPP. On the eve of last year’s municipal/county/national legislative elections in November 2001, President Chen Shui-bian directly announced the abandonment of this consensus to lay the groundwork for his “one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait” formulation of August 2002. That President Chen and his DPP administration wanted to come up with a different formulation is completely understandable. However, whether creating a new future necessarily required completely negating the past is worthy of discussion. Just as the tracks remain where we have gone, so the historical facts are there for all to see.

The purpose of publishing this book is purely to look back at where we have been and to bear historical witness on this at the tenth anniversary of the consensus reached by Taiwan and the mainland in November 1992. In addition to a number of important documents of a historic nature, this book also features important remarks made by major officials from both sides over the decade. Some individual officials have talked about this consensus on many occasions. But owing to space limitation, only a few are excerpted here. This book also collects a number of analytical articles written by practitioners who took part in cross-strait matters, as well as some media reports and scholarly papers. This book cannot address the entirety of the 1992 consensus, but it should suffice to demonstrate what it was really about.

To understand the “one China, different interpretations” consensus ten years after its birth, one must grasp its contemporary context and background. At the start of the 1990s, Taiwan and the mainland had endured four decades of acrimonious struggle. Each had policies and a public mindset locked into regarding the other side as traitors with whom coexistence was intolerable. However, the micro and macro environments on each side were undergoing sea changes at the time. On the Taiwan side, after several decades of accumulating energy, the public aspired to step out of Taiwan, travel to the mainland and head out into the entire world. When former President Lee Teng-hui took office in 1988, he wanted to expand his power base through a creative mainland policy. Furthermore, the assent of the United States in August of 1992 to sell Taiwan high-capability F-16 jet fighters boosted confidence in the public and private sectors of the Republic of China. Meanwhile, the PRC leadership was facing an international boycott following the Tiananmen Incident of 1989 and so hoped to bring Taiwan to the negotiating table to set in motion the process of peaceful unification on the one hand, and attract foreign capital investment and improve its international image, on the other. Therefore, put simply, both sides had sufficient incentives to promote a defrosting of relations.

Given this situation, both sides first undertook exploratory contact via secret envoys. From the end of 1990 through August of 1992, then President Lee dispatched his secret envoy Su Chih-cheng to hold secret talks on many occasions with the mainland’s former head of the Taiwan Office, Yang Side, and Wang Zhaoguo, as well as the head of ARATS, Wang Daohan. The topics of discussion reportedly included the National Unification Guidelines and the subsequent Singapore talks. These secret talks established an initial basic trust between the two sides that was sufficient to allow both sides to go public and begin open talks between the Straits Exchange Foundation and ARATS. However, mutual hostility was deep-rooted after 70 years of enmity between the political parties ruling each side of the Strait, and so the “one China” problem encountered at the outset proved to be the most central and difficult problem internally and mutually for both sides. Therefore, after two sessions held in Beijing from November 1991 to March 1992 (the principal interlocutors for Taiwan side being Chen Charng-ven and Shi Hwei-yow; and for the mainland, Tang Shubei and Zhou Ning) produced no results despite all the effort involved. At the end of October, both sides held a third session in Hong Kong, again to no avail. The ARATS delegation had already packed their bags and headed home when, through the initiative of our side, both parties reached the consensus ultimately in November via an exchange of fax messages to shelve their differences and move toward a substantive accord for the Koo-Wang talks.

There were four crucial aspects to this consensus. First, the bilateral consensus was in the form of an exchange of messages rather than a jointly signed single document. Hence, in terms of international law, it ranked below a treaty or agreement since it was not a single document, nor was it jointly signed. However, it cannot be denied that an exchange of messages was still an “exchange of notes or letters,” which had been regularly used in recent years internationally to express a meeting of minds on certain issues, so it naturally had a certain politically binding force. Therefore, critics may fault it for having no single document, but cannot claim it had no documents, or there had not been a consensus at all.

The second crucial aspect is the term “consensus.” The Chinese word gong-shi is likely a foreign borrowing translated from the English word “consensus.” The term gradually became popular as Taiwan became pluralistic and democratic in the 1980s, and found its way into the mainland in the 1990s. Strictly speaking, it is not a legal term, however it neatly captures the meeting of minds forged on both sides that was expressed in the aforementioned exchange of messages. The ARATS used the term “consensus” for the first time on April 28, 1995, the third anniversary of the Koo-Wang talks. This indicates that both sides not only had reached a consensus, they even agreed on using the term “consensus.”

The third crucial aspect was the phrase of “one China, different interpretations” itself. As its critics point out, this phrase never appeared in any of the wording of messages exchanged between the representatives of the two sides in 1992. However, anyone who has carefully examined these original documents can see that this phrase in fact represents the essence of the consensus reached by both sides in 1992. The media reports included in this book indicate that from 1992 to 1995, the Taiwan media made extensive use of similar wording to describe this consensus. In August of 1995 the then head of the Straits Exchange Foundation, Mr. Chiao Jen-ho, first used the term “one China, different interpretations” （yi-ge-zhong-guo-ge-zi-biao-shu）.The PRC did not disavow the phrase at the outset. They began to do so only in November 1996 after President Lee’s trip to Cornell University in the U.S. and the subsequent Taiwan Strait missile “test-firing” crisis, and in the context of blaming Taiwan for violating the “one China” principle. For the four years thereafter, ROC officials at every level frequently used this phrase to indicate that we had not violated the “one China” or “one China, different interpretations” consensus but were merely unwilling to accept the PRC’s one-sided definition of “one China.” Before the change of power in Taiwan, one official cleverly likened the consensus to “plain water, which is conducive to health.”

The fourth crucial aspect is the core meaning of the consensus. This has two components. First is a procedural one wherein each side expresses its stance verbally. The other is a substantive one, and is extremely important. The National Unification Council on August 1, 1992 passed a resolution on “the meaning of one China,” stressing that “both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhere to the ‘one China’ principle, but the two sides have given it different interpretations.” Beijing, however, stressed “adherence to the ‘one China’ principle” and refused to discuss the meaning of “one China.” Thus, the two sides had a common point as well as differences. The common point was that both sides of the Strait held to the “one China” principle. The main difference was that Taipei meant ‘one China’ to say, “Taiwan and the mainland are both parts of China,” while Beijing only meant: “Taiwan is a part of China.” In other words, we held out for parity, while Beijing demanded hegemony. Because of this common point, Beijing was confident that “Taiwan would not mess with independence,” and the existence of the National Unification Guidelines and the continued operation of the secret channel of communication buttressed Beijing’s confidence. Thus, despite major differences in the stances of the two sides, and the remaining profound hostility, Taiwan and the Mainland had 1) a point in common, 2) basic trust, and 3) their own needs. Thus they agreed to shelve their differences and to proceed with functional talks, hence the inception of the Koo-Wang talks and subsequent accords.

Former President Lee Teng -hui’s trip to Cornell in June of 1995 destroyed Beijing’ basic trust and led to the closing down of public and secret channels. Correspondingly, Beijing severely dented Taiwan’s basic trust with its overblown excoriation and saber-rattling. This knocked away one of three afore-mentioned pillars underpinning the consensus, namely, basic trust. At the same time, having mastered a grip on power through a democratic election in 1996, former President Lee Teng-hui changed his priorities from opening up to the outside to “internal reform.” Beijing also decided to strategically downgrade the importance of cross-strait relations and improve ties with the U.S., stressing “big-power diplomacy.” Thereupon, the second of three pillars, namely, each side having its own needs, was also undermined. This left only the National Unification Guidelines as the only pillar maintaining a basic point in common between the two sides. Since Beijing was in no mood to continue the talks, it began disavowing the 1992 consensus in 1996. And only after Jiang Zemin’s 1997 visit to the United States and Bill Clinton’s 1998 visit to the mainland when Beijing had secured a strategic highpoint did it grudgingly agree for SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu to visit the Chinese mainland.

The “special state-to-state” formulation of July 1999 decimated the remaining point in common. The authors of this formulation originally recommended that former President Lee Teng-hui renounce the “one China, different interpretations” consensus. The adverse reaction to the first utterance of the “special state-to-state” formulation in July 1999 led to its quick retraction. During the initial period following the transfer of ruling parties, the issue was kept on the back burner out of concern at taking any precipitate action during the instability of transition. Only during the campaigning for last year’s municipal/county/national legislative elections did President Chen direct the Mainland Affairs Council and Straits Exchange Foundation to unilaterally overturn the 1992 consensus.

It is especially noteworthy that the decision by the Chen Administration to overturn the 1992 consensus, like Beijing’s decision in 1996 to disavow the consensus, was a political decision and not the result of academic research. Since the materials in this book amply attest to the existence of the consensus and the crucial original documents and VIP’s remarks therein were long ago publicized, so why wait until now to make the startling ‘discovery’ that there was in fact no such consensus at the time? Beijing’s disavowal came first because its political motive was to put pressure on Taiwan after 1995 by denying the consensus given that two of the three pillars had already been knocked away. The Chen Administration’s subsequent overturning of the consensus however was motivated by a desire to destroy the existing foundation in order to construct a new “one country on each side of the Strait” framework. Furthermore, there is a difference in severity of attitude by the two sides toward the consensus at the time. Although Beijing disavowed the 1992 consensus, its denial left some room for maneuver because the Taiwan side still kept to “one China” (although it had a different interpretation of what that meant). Otherwise, the 1998 Koo-Wang meeting in Shanghai would have been impossible. However, in November 2001, the Chen Administration completely overturned the 1992 consensus (even criticizing it as “selling out Taiwan”), rather than just disavowing it. And more importantly, while the Administration appeared to be overturning the 1992 consensus, in fact it was overturning “one China,” regardless of how that term might be defined (in November 2001, Beijing’s definition switched to “Taiwan and the mainland both belong to China.” By then, the Chen Administration publicly advocated that “Taiwan is a sovereign country.” What is implied in this statement is that “Taiwan is not a part of China.” However, with the exception of Vice President Annette Lu on July 3, 2000, most officials in the Chen Administration have dared not utter this sentence so far, because it directly clashes with Beijing’s “one China” principle and runs counter to Washington’s one China policy. In any case, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have virtually no common points in their respective fundamental stances, nor is there any basic trust or parallel needs for rapprochement. Thus, none of the internal/external conditions of 1992 for spurring the two sides toward consensus exist today. This situation provides little basis for optimism.

Concerned about the prospects for cross-strait ties and hoping to come up with a certain ambiguous concept that would allow the two sides to resolve the “one China” issue, I coined the new term, “1992 consensus” shortly before I stepped down from public office in April 2000. The term could conceivably sidestep the term “one China” and encompass the formulations of various political parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Perhaps based on the same consideration, veteran journalist Mr. Wang Ming-yi offered the term, “Hong Kong consensus.” Recently Chairman Koo Chen-fu suggested to regard the 1992 Consensus as “consent” or “accord” is likely also based on concern for the distress of the nation and public. When President Chen first took office, he said to foreign visitors that he accepted “one China, different interpretations,” but the Mainland Affairs Council immediately denied this. He later accepted the suggestion of an American friend to call it “the spirit of 1992.” Regrettably, however, this term has proven long on “spirit” but short on substance. Even President Chen himself has not brought it up in quite a while, so no one else knows what it means.

When all is said and done, these well-intentioned suggestions are still secondary. The key point is that the two sides of the Strait lack, 1) the parallel needs, 2) basic points in common, and 3) the fundamental trust to reach a “consensus” (or some other term) like that of 1992. Regardless of how ambiguous the content of the “one China, different interpretations” consensus might have been and no matter how unconventional it might have been in form, it apparently had sufficient political weight to break the solid ice of cross-strait ties at the time. Now that official ties between the two sides have returned to the deep freeze, the action of Chen’s overturning of the 1992 consensus may also be secondary. What matters most is that the two sides have virtually no points in common, no mutual needs and no basic trust.

After more than two years since the transfer of ruling power, the national economy of the Republic of China is in an unprecedented slump, with a mood of pessimism and disappointment widespread throughout our society. This is absolutely connected to the continuing intensification of the cross-strait stalemate. With the publication of this book we naturally hope to look back at the original historical facts to clarify the historic significance and contribution of the “one China, different interpretations” consensus. However, we hope even more that the governments on both sides will once more heed this rare experience with reconciliation and modify their respective policies, rebuild mutual trust and seek common points in order to return to a “win-win” situation.

Much of the compilation of materials for this book was the result of meticulous planning by Mr. Cheng An-kuo of the National Policy Foundation and the unremitting assistance of Assistant Research Fellow Hu Chuan-wei. I would like to extend my thanks also to the China Times, United Daily News, and Central Daily News, and a special word of gratitude to all scholars and specialists who authorized publication of their manuscripts to enrich and enliven its content.

History Revisited

Important Statements regarding the Consensus of 1992

Translated from “A List of Important Statements on the Consensus of ‘One China, Different Interpretations,’” in “One China, Different Interpretations”— A Historical Account of the Consensus of 1992, ed. Dr. SU Chi and Cheng An-kuo (Taipei: National Policy Foundation, 2002), 61-84.

National Unification Council (August 1, 1992)

“The meaning of one China”: Both sides of the Taiwan Strait uphold the principle that there is but one China. However, the two sides hold different interpretations on that principle.

Straits Exchange Foundation (October 30, 1992)

Authorized by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) responded to the “one China” statement proposed by the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). The third counterproposal made by the SEF was: “In the process of realizing national unification by joint efforts across the Strait, both sides are entitled to interpret the meaning of ‘one China’ as they see fit, even though both sides insist on the one China principle.”

Straits Exchange Foundation (November 3, 1992)

The SEF held a press conference and issued a news release stating: “In the Hong Kong talks, the ARATS insisted that both parties should make ‘public statements’ on the issue of ‘one China’. With the authorization from the MAC, the SEF is agreeable to an oral statement of their respective interpretations. As to the content of this oral statement, we will express it in line with the Guidelines for National Unification and the resolution on the meaning of ‘one China’ adopted by the National Unification Council on August 1, 1992.”

Sun Yafu, deputy secretary-general of the ARATS (November 3, 1992; China Times)

Sun informed the secretary-general of the SEF of the following in a telephone conversation: The ARATS respects and accepts the SEF’s suggestion that both sides separately issue oral statements to express the one China principle.

Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (November 16, 1992)

In a formal letter to the SEF, the ARATS stated in part: “The SEF officially has notified the ARATS that it received consent from the authorities concerned in Taiwan to ‘an oral statement of their respective interpretations.’ The ARATS fully respects and accepts the SEF’s suggestion…Now the ARATS wishes to inform the SEF of the salient points of its oral statement: Both sides of the Taiwan Strait insist on the one China principle and strive for national unification; however, the meaning of ‘one China’ shall not be involved in cross-Strait talks of functional nature.”

Koo Chen-fu, chairman of the SEF (May 1, 1994; China Times)

Both the SEF and ARATS had contested the political implications of “one China’ for quite some time before; they finally reached a consensus, agreeing to issue their respective oral statements on this issue. As a result, Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan met and held talks in Singapore in 1993.

A Leader of the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (April 29, 1995; Wen Wei Po, HK)

The consensus reached between the SEF and ARATS that ‘both sides of the Strait insist on one China’ shall be adhered to. While political divergence still exists across the Strait, the two non-governmental bodies with due authorization should shelve politically sensitive issues and adopt a pragmatic attitude to seek a workable compromise without settling their differences in order to do first what is doable and to continue discussion on matters of divergent views.

Vincent Siew, chairman of the MAC (August 8, 1995; Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News)

Siew said the SEF and ARATS had discussed the matter when the two organizations worked on the “Agreement on the Use and Verification of Certificates of Authentication across the Taiwan Strait” in 1992. At the time, both parties reached a tacit agreement; i.e., allowing each side to express its own interpretation on ‘one China’ while cognizant of their different understandings of the issue. For the past two years, all the consultations across the Taiwan Strait have been held on that basis. Within that framework, Siew hoped that the SEF will maintain this channel of exchange and consultation with the ARATS and that such exchanges and consultations will be held regularly and institutionalized.

Chiao Jen-ho, secretary-general of the SEF (August 8, 1995; Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News)

The mainland authorities pointed out yesterday that the spirit of “one China, different interpretations” still applies to the cross-Strait consultations. If this statement implies that the ARATS would return to the consensus [of 1992], it would be a positive sign.

Mainland Affairs Council (November 1, 1995; “A Chronology of Events Involving Taiwan’s Sovereignty and One China”)

[The MAC] reiterated the statement of “one China, different interpretations” and expressed willingness to resume immediately cross-Strait consultations if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would return to its previous position.

Koo Chen-fu, chairman of the SEF (December 22, 1995; Central Daily News)

The consensus that each side of the Taiwan Strait could interpret the “one China” principle respectively was reached at the first Koo-Wang talks.

Lien Chan, premier (February 1, 1996; “A Chronology of Events Involving Taiwan’s Sovereignty and One China”)

Premier Lien Chan urged the PRC to respect the consensus on “one China, different interpretations” reached between the SEF and ARATS in 1992.

King-yuh Chang (April 28, 1996; China Times)

In fact, the SEF and ARATS already established in the past the consensus on “one China, different interpretations.” Although Taipei and Beijing insist on “one China”, each differs on its meaning from the other. The basic position of the government of the Republic of China (ROC) is to promote cross-Strait interactions under the premise of “one China, different interpretations”.

A Leader of the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (April 28, 1996; Xinhua News Agency)

On the third anniversary of the Koo-Wang talks, the ARATS leader issued a public statement: “Prior to the Koo-Wang talks, the two organizations had reached an oral consensus that both sides of the Strait insist on the one China principle. This consensus laid the foundation for the successful Koo-Wang talks.”

Koo Chen-fu, chairman of the SEF (April 30, 1996; Central Daily News)

I was authorized by the ROC government three years ago to meet with Mr. Wang Daohan, chairman of the ARATS, in Singapore to tackle issues resulting from the various aspects of cross-Strait interactions and signed, in full accordance with the consensus on “one China, different interpretations” and the principle of “negotiation on an equal footing and mutual respect,” four agreements, thereby establishing a channel as well as an institution for consultations and liaison across the Strait.

Tang Shubei, vice chairman of the ARATS (November 1, 1996; China News Agency)

The ARATS and SEF, following consultations, reached a consensus in 1992: Both sides of the Strait adhere to the one China principle and each expresses this sentence verbally. The meaning of ‘one China’ should not be dealt with during talks of functional nature. The Taiwan authorities have since turned this consensus into “one China, different interpretations”. It is their business. It has nothing to do with the consensus arrived at in 1992.

Mainland Affairs Council (December 1996; “A Preliminary Analysis of the PRC’s Strategy Concerning ‘One China’”)

In the course of cross-Strait interactions in recent years, both sides, starting in 1991, began contacts and talks through non-governmental intermediary bodies. At that time, the PRC demanded that the one China principle be laid down prior to any talks of functional nature between the SEF and ARATS. After rounds of rhetorical wrestling, the SEF and ARATS reached in November 1992 a consensus that “both parties insist upon the ‘one China’ principle and their interpretations of ‘one China’ may be presented separately and orally.” That facilitated the ensuing consultations across the Strait.

Government Information Office, ROC (February 22, 1997; “Mainland Affairs Reference Materials, Vol. I”)

With regard to the “one China” issue, the representatives from the SEF and ARATS had negotiated for eleven months in 1992 and finally agreed to shelve the contention over “one China” and to issue oral statements on their respective interpretations of “one China”. Consequently, Mr. Koo Chen-fu of the SEF and Mr. Wang Daohan of the ARATS were able to hold their meeting in Singapore and signed four agreements in April 1993.

Lien Chan, vice president and premier (July 31, 1997; Central Daily News)

Our side also accepts “one China” and agrees that “Taiwan is part of China.” However, our ‘one China’ signifies the Republic of China, of which Taiwan is a part. Both Taiwan and the Chinese mainland are parts of China. Both parties should affirm ‘one China’. Each side of the Taiwan Strait is free to interpret “one China”.

King-yuh Chang, chairman of the MAC (December 6, 1997; “Report before the National Unification Council”)

After rounds of consultations, the SEF and ARATS finally reached a consensus that “both sides uphold the one China principle but issue oral statements on their respective interpretations of one China.”

Straits Exchange Foundation (April 29, 1998; “A Review of the Implementation of the Four Agreements Signed during the Koo-Wang Talks”)

Five years ago, the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, resorting to reason and wisdom, adopted a position allowing each side to interpret differently the contentious “one China” issue. As a result, the Koo-Wang talks were held and four agreements signed, thus laying the foundation for expanding cross-Strait interactions and consultations on an equal footing.

Mainland Affairs Council (June 1998; “Mainland China Policy and Cross-Strait Relations at Present Stage－the ROC’s Position and Measures”)

In order to resolve the major divergence between Beijing and Taipei on the issue of “one China”, the representatives from the SEF and ARATS reached a consensus of “one China, different interpretations” in November 1992. That means both parties agreed to disagree on this particular subject, which correctly reflected the reality across the Taiwan Strait. Under this consensus, both sides held the Koo-Wang talks in Singapore in April 1993 and signed agreements, establishing an institution for regular cross-Strait consultations.

SU Chi, chairman of the MAC (May 27, 1999; United Daily News)

Two categories of issues exist across the Taiwan Strait. The first concerns issues of symbolism; the second, issues of substance. Should the mainland authorities only focus on issues of symbolism, such as “one China”, then there would be endless semantic entanglements between Taipei and Beijing, and cross-Strait relations could hardly be improved. According to past experiences, the consensus reached by both sides to express their oral statements respectively with regard to the meaning of “one China” led to the consummation of the first Koo-Wang talks in 1993.

Koo Chen-fu, chairman of the SEF (July 30, 1999; China Times)

In the course of pursuing unification across the Taiwan Strait, we never deviated from the framework of “one China, different interpretations”. It is imperative to clarify the political status of both entities across the Strait in order to be prepared for future political negotiations. Such a clarification should not jeopardize the foundation of cross-Strait dialogues and interactions, which still exists.

Mainland Affairs Council (August 1, 1999; “Parity, Peace, and Win-Win－the ROC’s Position on the Special State-to-state Relationship)

Both sides of the Taiwan Strait have maintained different understandings on the issue of “one China”; therefore, during the first year of their consultations, the SEF and ARATS focused solely on the controversial issue of “one China”. Following rounds of negotiations, both sides reached in November 1992 a consensus of “one China, different interpretations”, i.e., allowing both parties to interpret “one China” in their own ways.

Hwei-yow Shi, secretary-general of the SEF (August 1, 1999; United Daily News)

I hope the mainland authorities will calmly review our recent statements, especially the one issued by Mr. Koo Chen-fu, Chairman of the SEF. We still adhere to the framework of “one China, different interpretations”.

Jyh-horng Jan, deputy secretary-general of the SEF (August 1, 1999; United Daily News)

The consensus of “one China, different interpretations” was reached between the SEF and ARATS in 1992. The first Koo-Wang talks of 1993 were held based on this consensus. Since then, however, the PRC has deliberately omitted the “different interpretations” part and only emphasized “one China”, stating publicly that the whole phrase was not the consensus reached by both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Had the consensus not been “one China, different interpretations”, there would not have been the Koo-Wang talks. Why did the ARATS not raise the argument in the past? Why now?

SU Chi, chairman of the MAC (September 11, 1999; China Times)

“One China, different interpretations” was the consensus between the SEF and ARATS. Both parties should respect this consensus. “One China belongs to the future,” because both the mainland and Taiwan share the aspirations for the re-unification of China; however, re-unification lies in the future, not now.

Lee Teng-hui, president (October 10, 1999; China Times)

Currently, China is not yet a unified country. Both sides of the Strait have different views on the issue of “one China”. However, it is a historical and legal reality that cross-Strait relations should be regarded as a special state-to-state relationship. Both sides should face this reality and promote constructive dialogues on this basis, pursuing peaceful reunification in the future via divided rule on an equal footing and peaceful competition. The Republic of China has created in Taiwan a democracy unprecedented in China’s history, and has been serving as a role model in China’s modernization process. We hope the authorities in China will proceed with democratic reforms to create favorable conditions for gradual integration across the Strait.

Mainland Affairs Council (February 22, 2000; “Our Views Concerning the PRC’s White Paper on ‘One China Principle and the Taiwan Question’”)

In our view, China has been divided since 1949. Before the day of unification arrives, each of the two sides should be entitled to different interpretations of “one China”. The consensus that “the definition of one China should be subject to different interpretations” reached by the two sides in 1992 is a consensus circumventing the issue of political identity. It is therefore the best way to promote cross-Strait relations. For the purposes of pursuing greater interests of the people across the Strait, and acquiring an early resolution of the cross-Strait issue, the ROC government urges the PRC to sensibly return to the consensus of “one China, different interpretations”.

Lee Teng-hui, president (March 1, 2000; China Times)

We used to claim that the ROC is China. The leaders in Beijing have also asserted that the PRC is China. This coincides with the formula of “one China, different interpretations”. The PRC is not the only one that represents China. The ROC is a state, too. And the ROC was established much earlier. Now, Beijing intends to downgrade the government of the ROC into a local government. Should we agree to Beijing’s position, all the citizens of Taiwan would become stateless.

Rong-jye Chen, former secretary-general of the SEF (April 6, 2000; China Times)

Chen recommends that new inspirations for cross-Strait policies should still be extracted from the consensus of “one China, different interpretations”. There is no better conclusion than the consensus of “one China, different interpretations” under the framework of the Guidelines for National Unification. The Chen [Shui-bian] Administration should first exercise rational thinking in the logic of decision-making if it intends to make any changes.

Hwei-yow Shi, secretary-general of the SEF (April 9, 2000; Liberty Times)

The first Koo-Wang talks were held after 1992, which proves the feasibility of the “one China, different interpretations” formula…. The best solution to the cross-Strait impasse is to abide by the consensus [of “one China, different interpretations”]. “One China, different interpretations” is like a glass of water. It’s good for one’s health.

Koo Chen-fu, chairman of the SEF (April 2000; Exchange Monthly)

Statement on the “Seventh Anniversary of Koo-Wang Talks”:

It was the consensus of “one China, different interpretations” reached earlier by both sides that made the first Koo-Wang talks possible. To be more specific, the foreseeable contention of the status of both political entities during the talks had been handled in a way acceptable to both sides. In other words, there was no need to discuss the meaning of “one China” as it would inevitably produce different viewpoints. Both parties could shelve this contention and focus on the pragmatic resolution of issues resulting from the people-to-people interactions. The four agreements, reached in talks on an equal footing, were signed in a public ceremony witnessed by hundreds of journalists from around the world.

SU Chi, chairman of the MAC (April 29, 2000; United Daily News)

During an international academic conference held yesterday, Su proposed the use of the term “the consensus of 1992” to incorporate the various stances of “one China” held by the KMT, DPP, and CCP.

Huang Kuen-hui, senior advisor to the president, former MAC chairman (May 3, 2000; China Times)

“One China, different interpretations” was the consensus reached in 1992 between the SEF and ARATS. Representatives from both organizations conducted negotiations in Hong Kong. Finally, the ARARTS responded to the SEF’s proposal and agreed to separately issue oral statements on the issue of “one China”.

Chen Shui-bian, president (June 20, 2000; Verbatim Record of “Q&As” in the Presidential Press Conference of June 2000)

The other side of the Taiwan Strait says that a consensus was reached on “the one China principle” in 1992. However, we don’t think that was the case. The “one China” issue was discussed, but no consensus was reached. We proposed that, if there was to be a “consensus”, it should be that “each side could have its own interpretation of one China”. But the other side does not think that such a consensus was reached. If we are to say that there was an agreement, then it was that we agreed to disagree. We agreed that the two sides could have their own opinions. I think this is excellent. As long as we have the sincerity, goodwill, and willingness to take this historic step forward and shake hands in reconciliation, then why can’t we continue our efforts to find the genuine meaning of one China that is acceptable to both sides? I hope that the two sides can reach a conclusion on a basis that is mutually acceptable.

Chen Shui-bian, president (June 28, 2000; China Times)

My Administration is willing to accept the consensus of “one China, different interpretations” hammered out by the SEF and ARATS years ago. But the mainland authorities refuse to recognize that consensus and propose its own “one China” policy.

Ing-wen Tsai, chairperson of the MAC (June 29, 2000; China Times)

President Chen Shui-bian stated on June 27, 2000, that the new Administration is willing to accept the consensus of “one China, different interpretations” reached by the SEF and ARATS. President Chen’s remarks signify a “clearer and more straightforward statement” on the consensus of 1992. However, the consensus of “one China, different interpretations” was merely the phraseology the ROC government used to depict the negotiation process in Hong Kong. The Chen Administration accepts such a description, but it by no means implies this Administration accepts Beijing’s “one China principle”.

In October 1992, when representatives appointed by both sides held talks in Hong Kong, they did indeed proceed with substantive discussions on how to resolve the “one China” issue, but no conclusion was reached. Therefore, our representative proposed to shelve this contention by “making oral statements with respective interpretations”. Later, the Beijing authorities telephoned to express that it “respects and accepts our proposal”. This is the actual process in which both parties agreed to separately issue oral statements to handle the one China contention, making respective statements that eventually became the consensus across the Strait. The so-called “one China, different interpretations” was the phraseology Taipei used to depict this negotiation process.

Wang Daohan, chairman of the ARATS (July 14, 2000; China Times)

The following is the key to resume cross-Strait dialogue: Taiwan should promise in a clear-cut fashion not to promote the “state-to-state relationship”, and should honor the consensus reached by the SEF and ARATS in 1992, i.e., both sides agree to separately issue oral statements that “both sides of the Taiwan Strait uphold the one China principle”. In this manner, it will be easy for the SEF and ARATS to conduct business, and contact and dialogue can be resumed immediately.

Annette Hsiu-lien Lu, vice president (July 23, 2000; United Evening News)

Taiwan is not part of China. If the mainland insists on “one China”, Taiwan’s government will be shut down. Then Taiwan’s citizens need to go to the mainland to render military service and pay taxes. Lu insists not to accept Beijing’s one China principle.

Chen Shui-bian, president (July 31, 2000; Verbatim Record of “Q&As” during Presidential Press Conference of July 31, 2000)

Today, I would like to urge the Beijing authorities again that we join hands in a common effort to work together. On the existing foundation and under the spirit of 1992, we should jointly create positive cross-Strait interactions. Of course, the “spirit of 1992” corresponds with “dialogue, exchange, and shelving disputes”. We firmly believe that as long as there is dialogue, there is exchange; as long as there is exchange, there can be consensus. If there cannot be any consensus, then we would rather put aside the disputes temporarily.

Ying-jeou Ma, mayor of Taipei, former vice chairman of the MAC (September 17, 2000; China Times)

Based on circumstantial evidence, Ma contends that there was certainly a consensus reached in 1992. “Given the stubbornness of the PRC, if there had been no consensus, how could Koo and Wang have met later in Singapore?” “I must say that the four agreements signed at the Koo-Wang talks are beneficial to Taiwan and its citizens tremendously. If both sides could utilize the consensus of 1992 as a basis, then it would be helpful for the resumption of cross-Strait consultations.” Ma, who has said that his life-long aspiration is cross-Strait relations, points out that, “Currently, both the mainland and Taiwan negate the consensus of 1992. Beijing only admits ‘one China’, and Taipei only admits ’different interpretations’. However, the only way to resume the suspended cross-Strait negotiations is to return to the original point.”

Yuan T. Lee, president of Academia Sinica (October 17, 2000; China Times)

There was indeed a consensus of “one China, different interpretations” reached in 1992 between the SEF and ARATS. But it was an oral, instead of a written, statement. He emphasized, “This is a historical fact. Though the new Administration does not admit the consensus, I believe President Chen Shui-bian will respect our view eventually. Everything is possible, as long as we have patience.”

Cheyne Chiu, former secretary-general of the SEF (October 28, 2000; United Daily News)

The consensus reached in 1992 was the one China principle. Both sides in the Koo-Wang talks shared the same view on the one China principle but held different perspectives on the meaning of “one China”. In our view, “one China” means the Republic of China. From Beijing’s slant, “one China” denotes the People’s Republic of China. However, the consensus on the one China principle by no means implies that Taiwan has to accept Beijing’s claim that one China refers to the PRC. Neither does it indicate that Beijing has to agree to Taipei’s stance that one China refers to the ROC.

Lien Chan, chairman of the KMT, James Soong, chairman of the People First Party, Lung-bin Hau, chairman of the New Party (November 11, 2000)

Leaders from the three major political parties held a roundtable meeting and issued a joint declaration, presenting six points, including the return to the normal Constitutional rule and the return to the consensus of 1992.

Poh-hsiung Wu, vice chairman of the KMT (November 24, 2000; China Times)

In a meeting with Qian Qichen, Vice Premier of the PRC, in Beijing, Wu states that the KMT’s “one China” position is based on the Guidelines for National Unification and the 1992 consensus of “one China, different interpretations”.

Lien Chan, chairman of the KMT (February 24, 2001; Central Daily News)

On the tenth anniversary of the promulgation of the Guidelines for National Unification, Lien urges the Chen Administration to pay more attention to the Guidelines and resume cross-Strait consultations based on the 1992 consensus of “one China, different interpretations.”

Zhang Mingqing, spokesman of the Taiwan Affairs Office, State Council, PRC (April 27, 2001)

The consensus of 1992 is an objective reality. Not only did the participants of the 1992 negotiations in Hong Kong, representatives from the SEF and ARATS, admit that fact; moreover, Koo Chen-fu, Chairman of the SEF, himself also admits it. Therefore, when the current leadership in Taiwan states that the “consensus of 1992” is “agree to disagree”, it is completely untrue.

Koo Chen-fu, chairman of the SEF (April 28, 2001; China Times)

When the SEF and ARATS held meetings in Hong Kong in 1992, both parties did discuss how to properly handle the “one China” issue during negotiations for practical and technical issues. However, both sides held different understandings with regard to the meaning of the one China principle; hence the SEF proposed that both sides issue oral statements respectively. Thus, the consensus of “one China with oral statements expressing respective interpretations” was reached back in 1992. The current key issue is whether or not the parties involved choose to honor the consensus.

Vincent Siew, vice chairman of the KMT, former Premier (May 9, 2001)

“The cross-Strait common market” has to adapt to the unique situation between the mainland and Taiwan, with reasonable modifications. The political basis for the common market is the return to the 1992 consensus of “one China, different interpretations”.

Chen Shui-bian, president (October 26, 2001; China Times)

The so-called consensus of 1992 means Beijing’s “one country, two systems”, in which only China exists and the Republic of China does not.

Chen Shui-bian, president (November 5, 2001; China Times)

In fact, there was no consensus of 1992, not to mention the “one China, different interpretations”. We can neither accept nor concur with either “the consensus of 1992” or “one China”. Should Taiwan become another Hong Kong, the Republic of China would cease to exist and Taiwan would perish as a state.

Lien Chan, chairman of the KMT (November 6, 2001; China Times)

“One China, different interpretations” provides a foundation for thawing cross-Strait relations; it is completely different from the expedient “one country, two systems” formula. Our side believes “one China” means the Republic of China. Though Beijing interprets “one China” as the People’s Republic of China, the people of Taiwan will never accept that view. Which side has the right to represent “one China” and the issue concerning sovereignty in “one China” may both be temporarily shelved. To issue oral statements expressing respective interpretations is one way of “shelving”.

Jung-kung Chang, director-general, Department of Mainland Affairs, Central Comm., KMT (November 16, 2001; China Times)

The true meaning of the 1992 consensus is that both sides of the Strait “do not recognize each other but have reached a consensus.” Taiwan would benefit the most from such a “creative ambiguity”. Chang points out that Premier Siew’s statement in the Legislative Yuan on February 20, 1998, was the key to Chairman Koo’s trip to the mainland later that year. Premier Siew stated then that, “both sides reached a consensus to express their views on the one China principle respectively in 1992.” Additionally, Chairman Koo said in a speech delivered on May 20, 1998, during a trip to Washington, that “both parties reached a consensus in 1992 to express respectively the meaning of the one China principle.”

Koo Chen-fu, chairman of the SEF (November 15, 2001; China Times)

Queried by journalists to comment on President Chen Shui-bian’s remarks that “accepting the consensus of 1992 would be equal to the demise of the Republic of China”, Chairman Koo did not make any direct comments but politely retorted, asking, “Isn’t the Republic of China still in existence?” Koo emphasizes that even though all parties involved may have different viewpoints with regard to the consensus reached in 1992, it is imperative that both sides shelve the contention and clarify the fundamental framework for cross-Strait consultations.

Wang Daohan, chairman of the ARATS (December 16, 2001; China News Net)

We strive to preserve the consensus of 1992 in the hope that both sides may soon resume cross-Strait dialogue on the existing basis. In the final analysis, to admit or not to admit the consensus of 1992 is tantamount to whether or not to recognize “the mainland and Taiwan both belong to one China.”

Koo Chen-fu, chairman of the SEF (December 29, 2001; China Times)

The ambiguity and room created at the 1992 consultations ought to have shelved political contentions. However, distinct viewpoints on “the consensus of 1992” have emerged since last year. Therefore, one-sided interpretation or unilateral prerequisite cannot dissolve divergence. With regard to future cross-Strait relations, Koo suggests both parties return to the premise of mutual accommodation that prevailed at the time of “the consensus of 1992” and find common ground in the course of expressing respective interpretations in order to create again a new phase for cross-Strait interactions.

Qian Qichen, vice premier (January 25, 2002; China Times)

On the seventh anniversary of the declaration of “Jiang’s Eight Points”:

The fact that Taiwan’s leaders do not accept the one China principle nor admit “the consensus of 1992” is the main problem that leads cross-Strait relations to a stalemate.

Annette Hsiu-lien Lu, vice president (February 16, 2002; China Times)

Beijing has often said that the SEF and ARATS reached a consensus on the so-called “one China principle”. But, in reality, that is not so. On the subject of one China, both sides did discuss about it but there was no consensus. In our view, if there had been any “consensus”, it should have been “one China, different interpretations”. If that were a consensus, it should have been “a consensus without consensus.” In other words, “agree to disagree”. In fact, the Beijing authorities issued a White Paper on Taiwan in October 1993. In that document, Beijing officially proposed the so-called “three-sentence formula”, insisting that one China means the People’s Republic of China. If Beijing itself could overrule the consensus of 1992, i.e., “one China, different interpretations”, why should Taipei accept it?

Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (April 26, 2002; Central News Agency)

“The consensus of 1992” still bears important significance in terms of current cross-Strait relations. Therefore, the consensus should be preserved and both sides should resume dialogue on that basis.

Koo Chen-fu, chairman of the SEF (September 19, 2002; Central Daily News)One can argue there was no consensus in “the consensus of 1992”. If someone asks him, he believes that there was “consent” or “accord”.