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Japan’s Response to
Terrorism By Tomohito Shinoda Japan-Taiwan Research Forum, Jan. 22, 2002 On
September 19, 2001, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi announced his plan to
actively support American reprisals for the terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington. In his statement, Koizumi emphasized that Japan regards terrorism
as “its own security issue.” His plan
included the dispatch of Self Defense Force’s ships to help the United States
in intelligence collection, shipment of supplies, medical services and humanitarian
relief. He also pledged to strengthen
protective measures for U.S. bases in Japan.
As for non-military measures, Koizumi announced an offer of $10
million to help fund the rescue and cleanup work from the attacks in the
United States, a plan to provide emergency economic aid to Pakistan and India
as part of efforts to solicit their cooperation, and economic measures to
avoid confusion in the international economic system. Also, immediately after the first
U.S. air attack against Afghanistan, Koizumi expressed full support for U.S.
and British military action and said Japan would do everything it could
within the framework of the Constitution to help. These
statements were a sharp break from Japan’s pacifism and slow, unclear
response in the past. The
international community expressed its appreciation for Koizumi’s plan. It was more than many experts in Japan and
the United States had expected, and was presented in a timely manner. There are several factors that contributed
to this quick response. New
Environment One
obvious factor was that Japan learned lessons from the Persian Gulf War in
which Japan’s financial contribution was criticized as “too little, too
late.” Although Japan provided as
much as $13 billion in financial help by raising taxes, it was not highly
appreciated as all other major allies of the United States took part directly
in one way or another. Koizumi
recognized that financial contribution alone would not be welcomed by the
international community, and that due to Japan’s current economic situation,
a large tax hike to fund such monetary contributions would not be
possible. Another
lesson Japan learned from the Gulf War was the importance of quickly labeling
this situation as a crisis.
Then-Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu failed to identify the Gulf Crisis
of August 1990 as a “significant emergency.”
As a result, the issue was handled by the Foreign Ministry under
normal diplomatic channels and not by the Cabinet Security Affairs Office
(within the Cabinet Secretariat) which was designed to operate interagency
coordination in an emergency. This
significantly delayed Japan’s crisis response. This time, Koizumi’s action was quick. Forty-five minutes after the incident, he
established a liaison office at the Crisis Management Center of the Prime
Minister’s Residence（later it was upgraded to the Emergency
Anti-Terrorism Headquarters headed by the Prime Minister）. By
identifying this tragedy as an “emergency,” he called upon a cabinet level
meeting of the National Security Council the next morning for the first time
since the 1998 Taepodon missile incident.
At the press conference after the meeting, Koizumi announced the
initial action plan of the government, and described the terrorist attacks as
“grave challenges not only to the United States, but also to the
entire democratic society.” The
second important reason was a personnel factor. During the Gulf War, Japan’s government was headed by a
wishy-washy leader who complained that there was no textbook for the prime
minister on how to handle a crisis.
Although LDP’s headquarter was headed by strong rightists, such as
Ichiro Ozawa (Secretary General), Takeo Nishioka (Chaiman of the Policy
Affairs Council) and Mutsuki Kato (Chairman of the General Council), they
were not familiar with details of national security issues. On the other hand, Koizumi is a very
decisive leader. He quickly
instructed LDP Secretary General Taku Yamazaki to seek a concrete plan to
support U.S. efforts against terrorism, which was acceptable to the LDP. Koizumi believed that bureaucratic decision-making
alone would not be able to deliver in a timely manner. Yamazaki is one of the leading experts on
national security issues within the LDP.
It
is further important to point out that Prime Minister Koizumi has competent
assistants in his office. Chief
Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda knows how the office works as he served as
personal assistant to his father, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, in the
mid-1970s. His deputy, Shinzo Abe
also served as assistant to his father, Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe in the
early 1980s, and is very familiar with foreign policy issues. These two politicians have provided
necessary and political advice and made competent decisions when needed. Another deputy, Teijiro Furukawa is one of
the most powerful bureaucrats in the government. He quickly organized a task force (headed by Assistant Cabinet
Secretary Keiji Omori) to design Koizumi’s plan. The third factor was public
support for strong leadership. The
lack of leadership has been a focal point in Japanese politics. Specifically, leadership in crisis
situations became a top priority in administrative reform efforts in the late
1990s after the Hanshin earthquake and the sarin gas terrorist attack on the
Tokyo subway system in 1995, the hostage crisis in Peru in 1996-97, and the
oil spill disaster in the Japan Sea in 1997.
With the reforms, crisis management by the Cabinet Secretariat was
reinforced to enable a quick response and strong display of leadership. Due to lack of discussion and consultation
in a traditional manner, the swift announcement of the Koizumi plan was
strongly criticized by the opposition parties and some LDP members. However, the public support of the Koizumi
Cabinet after the announcement was even stronger. According to a Kyodo News poll (September 29-30), the approval
rate increased to 82.8% up from 79.5% in August 2001. Fourth,
the new institutional arrangement of the Cabinet Secretariat enabled the
smooth creation of the ad hoc task force.
Along with the central government streamlining in January 2001, the
Secretariat was reorganized with the formal abolition of three policy offices
(Internal Affairs, External Affairs, and National Security Affairs and Crisis
Management), and the newly created position of three Assistant Cabinet
Secretaries (vice-minister level) to oversee the policy areas. This new arrangement was designed to
provide institutional flexibility by not separating policy issues, “thus enabling
them to respond to situations in a timely manner,” according to the official
explanation of the government. While
Office on External Affairs headed by a foreign ministry official was totally
removed, the element of the old Office of Security Affairs and Crisis
Management still exists separately from the rest of the Cabinet’s policy
unit. It is headed by Director for
the Crisis Management (slightly above vice-minister level, currently served
by Kazuhiro Sugita, a former Police Agency official who had served at Cabinet
Information and Research Office) with the assistance of Assistant Cabinet
Secretary Omori from the Japan Defense Agency. The room with some 30 staffers served as a central assisting
body for the task force. The
fifth factor was that Koizumi was surrounded by a different legal environment
from what Prime Minister
Kaifu had to face. After the Gulf
War, the Government of Japan sought to establish a legal framework under
which Japan could make a human contribution in an international crisis. Step by step, Japan has showed its contribution. In the aftermath of the Gulf War in April
1991, Japan sent its SDF vessels for minesweeping. In August 1992, the Diet passed the International Peace
Cooperation Law (PKO Law). In
October, Japan sent the first PKO unit to the United Nations Transition
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), including 600 combat engineers, 75 civilian
policemen, 41 election monitors and eight cease-fire observers. Japan’s participation in the successful
Cambodia mission gave the Japanese government confidence that Japan could
ably perform the role of an objective and non-combat participant, which would
be helpful in Afganistan as well. As
Japanese participation in the operation was generally supported in Japan and
applauded around the globe, in May 1993 Japan sent PKO unit to Mozambique
expanding its activity areas outside of Asia. North Korea’s withdrawal from the International Atomic Energy Agency in June 1994 increased Japanese and American feeling of a threat and the need for a higher level of bilateral defense cooperation in the region. This notion eventually led to the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, which initiated the revision of the guideline for bilateral defense cooperation. In September 1997, the two governments reached an agreement for the revised guideline, and in April 1998 the Diet passed guideline-related legislation. Especially the newly created “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security in Situations Surrounding Japan ( Regional
Crisis Law)” allowed for the provision of logistical and direct rear-area
support to U.S. forces in times of crisis in the region. In the process of deliberation, Japanese
policymakers explored what they were allowed to do within the constitutional
framework. Although
Koizumi’s plan required new legislation, it was an extension of the existing
defense guidelines. This helped save
deliberation time for enactment of the anti-terrorism legislation. It took only three weeks for the Diet
passage. The total time for
deliberation in the committees of both the houses was only 62 hours, compared
with 179 hours for the 1992 PKO Law and 154 hours for the 1998 Regional
Crisis Law. Debates The
Koizumi government came up with three pieces of legislation. Revisions of the two exiting laws were
needed. One was to revise the Self
Defense Force Law to authorize the SDF to defend U.S. bases in Japan against
terrorist attacks. The existing law
authorized the deployment of the SDF only when a situation has already
happened and that could not be handled by the police. Another revision was needed for the Japan
Coast Guard Law to allow the coast guard to open fire on suspicious ships in
Japanese waters if they try to escape or resist the order to stop. With the exception of self-defense, the
existing law only permitted warning shots, and had allowed North Korean spy
boats to escape off Niigata coast in March 1999. A
new law was needed to provide rear-end support for the U.S. Forces in the
Indian Ocean area and humanitarian assistance to refugees. The 1999 Regional Crisis Law only allowed
such support in “areas surrounding” Japan.
As the government has officially interpreted that the areas are not
geographically defined, it would have been technically possible to apply the
existing law for this case. However,
the Koizumi government chose a more legitimate way by passing new legislation
in the Diet. In
order to avoid political turmoil and delay, the Koizumi government decided
not to provoke constitutional arguments.
Although the ｔhree
pieces of legislation will be closely related to the argument of collective
self-defense which would require reinterpretation of the Constitution, Prime
Minister Koizumi repeatedly stated that Japan’s measure would be limited
within the constitutional framework.
LDP Secretary General Yamazaki, who recently published a book on
constitutional revisions, supported Koizumi that the right of collective
defense must be authorized only by constitutional revision. Japan’s
pacifism still exists. The Social
Democratic Party denounced U.S. intentions of retaliation, and portrayed the
Koizumi plan as a step toward Japan’s remilitarization. Even the coalition partners of the LDP
quickly stated that rear-end support should not include provision and
transportation of arms and ammunitions.
Former Ambassador to the U.S. Takakazu Kuriyama in a newspaper
interview criticized this decision as “unacceptable to the international
community.” Kuriyama further stated,
“The same logic of not allowing arms and munitions can be applied to food and
oil. Everything should be
allowed. We are still ambivalent
because we have not identified Japan’s pacifism.” In order to secure more support in the Diet, the Koizumi
government limited sea transportation of arms and munitions in the
anti-terrorism legislation. A more obvious political
compromise was the role of the Diet.
The first government draft presented to the LDP’s Defense panel was to
require approval by the Diet before dispatching the SDF. In the final draft, however, this was
changed to allow for a report to the Diet after the SDF is dispatched. Democratic leader, Yukio Hatoyama,
requested the condition of prior Diet approval for “stronger civilian
control” in return for support of his party.
This point was apparently reserved for political maneuvering to save
face for the opposition parties. It
was indicated that the government would offer a compromise bill which would
in normal cases require prior approval, but in emergency allow approval
granted in the afterwards. However,
Komeito strongly opposed to offer a compromise to the Democratic Party. As a result, the government’s final
proposal only required reporting of the basic plan and Diet approval within
20 days after the implementation of the plan. On the rightist front, Ichiro
Ozawa of the Liberal Party refused to cooperate with the Koizumi
government. Ozawa did not even show
up to the September 20th meeting of party leaders that Koizumi called upon to
ask for their cooperation. On the
same day, Ozawa’s party announced their position paper which heavily
criticized Koizumi’s plan as “ad hoc, spur-of-the-moment half-measures.” The Liberal Party maintains the position
that the use of armed forces must be approved by the United Nations as in the
case of the Gulf War in order for Japan to send its troop to participate in
an international dispute. Ozawa also
criticized Koizumi for avoiding discussions of collective self-defense and
constitutional reinterpretation. But
despite these voices of opposition, Koizumi and his government are ready to
pass the new plan through the Diet. After the cabinet approval of October 5, the three legislative bills were introduced to the Diet, and political negotiations continued even after the passage in the lower house on October 18. On October 29, the upper house passed the anti-terrorism bill with majority support by the three-coalition parties of the LDP, Komeito and the Conservative Party. The revision of the SDF Law which would authorize the SDF to protect the U.S. bases was supported by the three parties plus the Democratic Party which wanted show their support to America’s fight against terrorism. The Japan Coast Guard Law was revised with the support of the four parties plus the Liberal Party and the Communist Party. These two opposition parties did not support the SDF participation, but did support reinforcement of the police activities on ground and in the sea. New Developments
The newly created Anti-terrorism
Law was a major step for further contribution in security cooperation with
the United States. First, the range
of where Japan can be active was significantly expanded. The 1999 Regional Crisis Law strictly
limited the area to Japan’s territory and the high seas (and its airspace)
surrounding Japan. The new law
includes the territory of foreign countries if permission is given from their
government. More concretely, the
basic plan describes the activity areas as territories and sea areas between
the Indian Ocean and Japan or Australia.
Second, the new law increased the possible measures that SDF can take. Under the earlier Regional Crisis Law, many possible services were not clear if they would be excluded from combat-related activities. In an extreme case, some argued medical assistance for combatants should be considered combat-related as those receiving treatment would go back to the battle. After the debate within the government and the Diet, the government concluded that medical assistance as well as transportation of weapon and ammunitions to the rear-end areas should not be regarded as combat-related. The new law also clearly allows the SDF to initiate search and rescue activities upon the request of the U.S. or other forces. Further, assistance to refugees was newly added in this law. The SDF can provide humanitarian assistance to refugees in Japan, Pakistan and non-combat areas between the Indian Ocean and Japan. Figure 1.
Measures taken under the Anti-terrorism Law 1.
Cooperation and Support Activities
1) Provision
of water, fuel, food, other materials and service 2) Transportation of personnel and
materials 3) Repair and maintenance 4) Medical services 5) Communications 6) Airport and seaport services 7) Base support But excludes 1) the supply and ground transportation
in foreign territories of weapons and ammunitions （Sea
transportation is allowed.） 2) the supply of fuel or maintenance of
aircraft preparing to take off on military sorties 2. Search and Rescue Activities 1) finding combatants in distress
during other activities 2) upon request of U.S. or others
3. Assistance to Affected People
Humanitarian
assistance in Japan, Pakistan, and non-combat areas between Indian Ocean and
Japan Third, restriction on use of weapons were significantly eased. The 1993 PKO Law only allowed the use for the defense of lives and bodies of SDF members and other members in the same mission. Members were not allowed to use weapons to protect their property. Under the law, they had to stand by and watch their weapons, ammunitions and vehicles being stolen without taking action. In the 1999 Regional Crisis Law, protection of their property was allowed, but the protection of lives was limited within the same mission. In other words, SDF could not protect with arms refugees or medical patients in their camps. The new law extended protection to those under SDF’s control. Public
Opinion The Japanese public showed
ambivalence to approve American military retaliation. According to a Yomiuri Shimbun poll (conducted
on September 24-25), 44% of the Japanese approved U.S. military action, and
27% opposed it. In a poll by Asahi
Shimbun (September 28-29), the approval rate was slightly lower than
disapproval (42% and 45% respectively).
Later, Kyodo News Service announced their polls (September 29-30) with
approval rate for US military action as high as 66% with 23% opposing. On the other hand, there is a general
consensus that Japan needs to cooperate with the U.S. in the case of military
actions against terrorism. According
to the Yomiuri poll, 87% of the Japanese supported such cooperation. Only 12% expressed their opposition (In
the Asahi poll, 62% supported while 25% opposed). But opinion were split on the degree and the
measures of cooperation. In the same
Kyodo poll, only 24.7% supported Japan to cooperate “actively” while 62.4
responded “to some extent.” Another
poll conducted by Nippon Television on September 14-16 shows a split on
Japan’s cooperation measures when requested by the United States. Only 8.0% supported Japan’s use of armed
force, while 48.3% responded that it should be limited to rear-end support,
30.9% believed that financial contribution alone should be enough, and 5.5%
refused any cooperation. September 11th significantly influenced on Japan’s public opinion on security issues. In the October 20-21 poll by Yomiuri Shinbun, 42.9% of respondents regarded international terrorism as the most important security issue, the highest score among other policy issues (environment as the close second with 42.8% and relations with Asian nations as third with 38.4%). In spite of the danger of terrorist attacks due to its security ties with the United States, the ratio of those who believe that security ties with America is beneficial increased to 66% compared with 57%. Increasingly people began to support a more active role for Japan as 44% of the Japanese responded that Japan should expand its Peace Keeping Operation activities to participate in U.N. Peace Keeping Forces, which had been temporarily frozen – 26% were opposed. Two years ago, the support rate was reverse. In the July 1999 Yomiuri poll, support for PKF was 26% compared with opposition at 42%. The change of public opinion enabled the smooth passage on December 7 of the revised PKO Law to allow PKF and to ease the restriction on use of weapons to the international standard. Implications for Taiwan
The public support for Japan’s participation in regional security and the experience of actual participation in the Indian Ocean has significant implications on the issue of the Taiwan Strait. First, Japan’s recent cooperation with the United States made the bilateral security relations stronger, scraping away the bad image of unwilling ally who would not take a risk. The lessons learned from the Gulf War makes many policy makers in the Japanese government aware that another failure could deteriorate American public (and congressional) support for the security arrangement. Many policy makers and experts in Washington were impressed with the promptness and the degree of Japan’s cooperation, and see Japan as a more reliable ally. The reinforced alliance would discourage Peking’s usual attempt to create a gap between Tokyo and Washington. Second, over the event Prime Minister Koizumi and
President George W. Bush established strong personal ties. Good chemistry exchanged between the two
is as strong as Nakasone-Reagan and Kaifu-Bush Sr. relationship. This would enable close and quick
communications between the two national leaders in the case of
emergency. Third, this set precedence for
SDF’s participation in regional security in the time of emergency. The fact that the public supported the
dispatch of SDF to the Indian Ocean make it easier for the future administrations
to cooperate with the United States in the Far East. Especially, the escort of U.S.
aircraft carriesr and nuclear submarines by SDF vessels off Yokosuka and
Sasebo could have significant implication to the situation in the Taiwan
Strait. The operation was conducted
under the Defense Agency Establishment Law which allows Japan’s forces to
conduct security-related research activities. Without any new legislation, SDFs would be able to escort U.S.
vessels to Taiwan Strait. Even if
Japan limits the escort activities within its territorial water, Tokyo can
dispatch Aegis and other vessels or P-3Cs to protect U.S. aircraft carriers
and nuclear submarines along Okinawan islands. This would greatly deter Peking’s military ambition over the
Strait. But the fact remains that Japan
would not act independently, and that its action would be limited within the
framework of U.S.-Japan security relations.
Unless Washington decides to take action, these developments are
meaningless to the situation in Taiwan Strait. Many Taiwanese after September 11th expressed
concern over U.S. efforts to gain support from Peking for anti-terrorist
action. As some even warned
Washington not to use Taiwan as a negotiation tool, especially regarding arms
sales to Taiwan, Secretary of State Colin Powel had to publicly announce that
Chinese support would not affect their relations with Taipei. Immediately after September 11th,
Washington received Chinese support to pass the UN Resolution 1368, adopted
by the Security Council on September 12 to condemn terrorist actions. It continued to seek Chinese backing to
assist a U.S.-led coalition to fight against terrorism. In the earlier stage of the fight, U.S.
forces wanted Chinese intelligence on the Afghanistan front. U.S. diplomatic efforts to include China
in the anti-terrorism coalition was very active until the October APEC
meeting in Shanghai, where President Bush successfully received support from
nations in the Asia-Pacific region. However, since the APEC meeting
American attitude toward China has been different for several reasons. First, although China did not strongly
criticize U.S. war in Afghanistan, it repeatedly emphasized the importance of
the U.N.’s roles in the campaign.
Chinese intent was obvious: As the only Asian permanent member of the
Security Council with veto power, they could exert more influence. On the other hand, Washington did not seek
Chinese support for another resolution to have military action approved by
the U.N. Security Council. U.S.
Congress instead quickly legislated a resolution to give authority to the
president to fight against a non-state actor based on American domestic
laws. The Chinese claim was no less
than a nuisance to the U.S. government. Second, over the event,
U.S.-Russia relations significantly improved. President Bush has established personal ties with Russian
President Putin. Russia has been very
cooperative and supportive of the American campaign in Afghanistan. Once, Russia and China enjoyed their
“Strategic Partnership” which was proudly declared in the late 1990s. In July 2001, the two countries signed a
Treaty for Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation which partly aims
at joint actions to offset a perceived U.S. hegemonism. As Russia became close to U.S.
government, however, China no longer can use this “Russia card.” Third, there is a forthcoming
conflict over missile defense. The
defense plan is still the top priority issue for Defense Secretary Rumsfeld
just next to the current campaign in Afghanistan. In his first several months at the Pentagon, Rumsfeld worked to
streamline the Defense organ in order to save money for missile defense. On December 13, President Bush announced
U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to pursue further
test on missile defense and future deployment. While Russia might start negotiating for a new framework, such
an American move would be seen by China as hostile development against them. Fourth, another conflict is
expected over natural gas in the Caspian region. Over the last decade, China’s oil consumption doubled. In 2000, with their daily consumption
level of 4.8 million barrels, China almost caught up with Japan (5.5 million
barrels). As China became a net
importer of oil, one of the main reasons for China’s naval expansion became
to secure supply of energy source.
China needs to diversify its energy source, and is desperately seeking
a secure, in-land supply. A natural
gas pipeline from the Caspian region would be the perfect answer to their
problem. However, American companies
holds the title of most of the existing wells in the region. The control over areas surrounding
Afghanistan is likely to be a major battle field between China and the United
States. In short, international relations in Asia after the Afghanistan campaign will not be so favorable for Peking. U.S.-China relations did not show much improvement. On contrary, there are new sources for future conflicts in the region. Over the Taiwan Strait, China would not be able to expect as strong a level of support from Russia as before. U.S.-Japan security ties have become stronger than ever. Japan would not hesitate to side with the United States if Washington take any action to intervene in cross-Strait relations. Japan’s response to the September 11th terrorist attack was a major step for Japan’s involvement in the security environment in Asia as a whole, and including possible future situations surrounding Taiwan. CHRONOLOGY
OF EVENTS
Sept 11 45 minutes after WTC attack, Koizumi forms liaison office Sept.12 National Security Council held by identifying as emergency Sept.19 Koizumi announces his seven-point package Sept 21 50 ships of JMSDF and JCG guards Kittyhawk off Yokosuka Sept.25 Koizumi meets with President Bush Oct. 1 JMSDF ships guards the dispatch of nuclear submarine Bremerton Oct 6 C-130s depart for Pakistan to offer humanitarian aid Oct 18 Anti-terrorism legislation passes in the lower house. Oct. 29 Anti-terrorism legislation passes in the upper house. Nov. 9 Two destroyers and a supply ship depart for the Indian Ocean based on the currently effective JDA Establishment law. Nov. 16 The Basic Plan based on the new law approved by the cabinet. Nov. 20 The Implementation Plan based on the BP approved by Koizumi. (approved by the lower house on 11/27, the upper house on 11/30) Nov. 25 One destroyer and another supply ship depart for the Indian Ocean, and one minesweeper tender departs for Karachi Nov.
29 C-130s transport
supplies between U.S. bases in Japan Dec. 2 JMSDF ships begins provision of fuel to U.S. vessels Dec. 7 Revision of PKO Law enacted Dr.
Tomohito Shinoda is an associate professor in the International University of
Japan. The paper was presented in the Japan-Taiwan Research Forum, Keio
University and Taiwan Security Research Center, Taipei, Jan. 22, 2002. |