Cross-Strait Military Balance and the Security of Taiwan

 By Cheng-yi Lin

Japan-Taiwan Research Forum, Jan. 22, 2002

Introduction

  Since Leng Teng-hui initiated the so-called special state-to-state relationship and Chen Shui-bian took office as president, the PRC has decided not to conduct direct dialogue with Taipei. Beijing has been at loggerheads with Taipei over the principle of one China. Although cross-strait economic and human exchanges have soured since the Chen government was inaugurated, both Beijing and Taipei have prepared for the worst scenario across the Taiwan Strait. Neither has hesitated to build up the military in order to deter the other side from taking unilateral actions to change the status quo.

  The issue of Taiwan is not purely a domestic affair of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that brooks no international intervention. The U.S. has never officially recognized the position that Taiwan is a part of the PRC and Washington reserves the right to provide Taiwan with defensive weapons, according to not only the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), but also the August 17^th Communiqué of 1982. Although Taipei and Washington have no diplomatic relations nor an alliance treaty, Beijing has to calculate what the reaction from the U.S. would be to any PRC coercive actions against Taiwan.  The U.S. has helped to maintain the military balance in the Taiwan Strait since it severed diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC). However, the U.S. alone cannot guarantee the security of Taiwan and the leaders in Taiwan need to formulate and implement a sound security strategy. 

I. PRC Military Threat

 As its comprehensive national power has increased, China has sought to replace the US-led hegemonic order with a multi-polar system in the Asia-Pacific, and is actively seeking to bring about the re-unification of Taiwan with China. Beijing has tried to build a united front with other countries surrounding Taiwan in order to criticize the U.S.’s missile defense plan, and has advocated Asian consciousness and opposition to Western-led globalization. Meanwhile, the PRC has increased its military threat to Taiwan by stepping up military preparations and refusing to engage in dialogue with President Chen Shui-bian. As the U.S. has been occupied with counter-terrorism efforts since the September 11^th events, the PRC might find it easier to strike a deal with the U.S. regarding the Taiwan issue. In addition, Beijing may detect an opportune time for intimidating Taiwan while the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific is diverted to other regions in a time of crisis.

  On February 21, 2000, Beijing issued a new white paper entitled “The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” which threatens the use of force against Taiwan under three conditions.  They include: (1) if a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any name; (2) if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries; and (3) if the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-strait reunification through negotiations. <1>  Taipei was concerned but not alarmed, as were other members of international community about the third condition,  which Taipei had concluded was an excuse for possible PRC use of force against Taiwan.  Taipei has noticed that Beijing also threatened to use force against Taiwan if domestic chaos erupts on the island and if Taiwan develops nuclear weapons. <2> In addition to these conditions outlined by Beijing, the ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND) believes that the PRC might use force against Taiwan under several conditions.  Beijing could attack Taiwan in order to divert attention from China’s social, economic, and political upheavals.  Beijing might consider coercing Taiwan if it can ensure that Taiwan’s armed forces are relatively weaker in the Taiwan Strait, and particularly if the U.S. is preoccupied with other major theater conflicts (MTCs).  The ROC MND boldly judges that the PRC’s use of force against Taiwan might come during a long holiday season, an election period, a favorable weather season (March to May), or a recess in the U.S. Congress. <3> 

There are several options that Beijing may apply if it decides to use force against Taiwan.  Taiwan is engaging in an asymmetrical campaign against a giant. The PRC is 60 times bigger in terms of population, 260 times in land size, and 10 times larger in number of military personnel than Taiwan. It is a big challenge for Taiwan to survive a military attack from the PRC.  An amphibious invasion of Taiwan under high-tech warfare conditions is one extreme on the spectrum, but the PRC might also initiate para-military actions, such as sending special agents to infiltrate and sabotage Taiwan, dispatching naval and air forces to challenge the median line of the Taiwan Strait, using military exercises to intimidate Taiwan, and launching missiles against Taiwan-controlled unhabitated offshore islands or mountain tops.  In between, the PRC might adopt the following options: attacking but not occupying an offshore island, a naval blockade to force Taiwan back to unification, or occupying Penghu (Pescadores) or other offshore islands to destroy incoming rescue forces. Among the options, many military experts in Taiwan and the U.S. regard naval blockade as the most likely approach for Beijing to take.  The PRC could launch a long distance blockade of Taiwan in waters near the Tungsha (Pratas) island. Approximately 70 percent of Taiwan’s imports of oil and other raw materials pass through the South China Sea. Taiwan’s economy could be easily choked if the PRC decided to take such an action.

  In addition to the missile and blockade threats, the ROC MND indicates that the PRC air force has deployed about 1,000 fighter planes “within 600 nautical miles of Taiwan proper” with the capability to ship “two airborne regiments once a [one at a] time.” Once the PLA secures the command of the air and sea, it can “ship one reinforced division over in successive groups at a time,” and “about 400,000 light equipped troops can be used for regular and irregular landing operations” with the help of motorized fishing boats. <4> In the meantime, China has set up a strategic information warfare unit, or the so-called Net force, trying to neutralize Taiwan’s command and control system.  China’s military buildup in areas of information warfare, ballistic missiles, and forces of rapid assault has given Taiwan and the U.S. serious concerns.  It is widely believed that by 2005 the PLA will “possess the capability to attack Taiwan with air and missile strikes which would degrade key military facilities and damage the island’s [Taiwan’s] economic infrastructure.” <5>

Since the PRC conducted missile testing in July 1995 to the North of Taiwan in response to Lee Teng-hui’s trip to the U.S., Beijing has steadily increased the number of missiles deployed opposite Taiwan. It is believed that the PRC adds 50 M-9s or M11s targeting Taiwan annually. These missile sites sit in the Fujian Province and include Yongan (M-9s) and Xianyou (M11), the latter within the 150-kilometer range of Taiwan’s West Coast. <6>  The United States estimates that the number of PLA short-range ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan may reach 650 by 2005. <7> Beijing might use a missile threat to force Taiwan to enter political talks for unification or to launch a missile counter-force strike at about 200 targets, including harbors, airports, and various military facilities on the island, to pave the way for an amphibious invasion. <8> The missile crisis in 1995-1996 indicates that “using missiles as its primary weapon against Taiwan plays to China’s strength,” and Taipei admits that missile attack “will be the most seriously threatening form of PRC military invasion.” <9> The above-mentioned ROC threat scenarios are not quite different from those of the U.S. (see Table 1).

Table 1: U.S. Perceptions of PRC Taiwan Invasion Scenarios

1.   An initial PRC attack with missiles, aircraft, and special forces; a PRC amphibious assault; a PRC airborne assault to seize a port and an airfield; a combined airborne /amphibious assault; seizing Quemoy and Matsu.

2.   Cyber-warfare; missile firings and naval demonstrations; a porous quarantine and limited blockade; full blockade and mining; invade Quemoy and threaten Peng-hu (the Pescadores); missile and air attacks on Taiwan’s command, control, communication, and intelligence facilities (C3I) and on its national command authority. Full-scale invasion; naval blockade; air operations.

3.   Air superiority; maritime control; invasion preparation; landing operations.

4.   Blockade; missile strikes; air superiority; amphibious invasion; information dominance.

Sources: 1. Michael O’Hanlon, “Can China Conquer Taiwan,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2000); 2. Nicholas Berry, “The Potential Use of Armed Force Across the Taiwan Strait,” cited inhttp://www. cdi.org/asia; 3.1997 Strategic Assessment: Flashpoints and Force Structure (Washington, D.C.: National defense University, 1997), pp.51-52;4. David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry A. Wilson, Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), p.10; 5. “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, 1999, cited in http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/twstrait-02261999.html.

II. U.S. Security Commitment to Taiwan

In the first hundred days after President Bush took office, the incident involving the forced landing of a U.S. spy plan on Hainan Island after a mid-air collision with a China fighter aircraft encouraged Bush to abandon the view that the U.S.’s relationship with China is one of “strategic partnership,” and instead to treat China as a “strategic competitor.” During his election campaign in 2000, Bush promised to limit overseas military intervention by the U.S., to implement the plans for a missile defense system as early as possible, and to help Taiwan defend itself and secure more room for participation in international affairs. <10>

The Bush administration’s decision in April 2001 to sell more arms to Taiwan, and Bush’s remarks that if necessary the US would provide military assistance to help defend Taiwan, constituted a change in the doctrine of maintaining “strategic ambiguity” with respect to whether the U.S. would intervene in an attack on Taiwan by China. Beijing, Taipei and the other countries of the Asia-Pacific region will all be affected by this change in policy. Beijing’s reaction has not yet become fully apparent; Taiwan and the U.S. should not be too quick to assume that this reaction will be muted.

Before President Bush’s decision on arms sales to Taiwan, the U.S. was gradually coming to view its relationship with China as that of “strategic competitors” rather than “strategic partners,” The PRC was increasingly confrontational with regard to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, in an attempt to feel out how far the new U.S. administration would go. The main focus of Beijing’s objections was on those weapons systems that could be considered to be related to the missile defense system such as the Aegis destroyers. Besides expressing its opposition to the arms sales, China increased its deployment of surface-to-surface missiles opposite Taiwan and its defense budget by 18 percent. As a result, U.S. Members of Congress signed a joint petition asking the president to sell Aegis-class destroyers to Taiwan. The U.S. had originally hoped that China would refrain from deploying more missiles, in exchange for excluding Taiwan from the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system. However, rather than making concessions, China  actually became more aggressive. China Vice Premier Qian Qichen even threatened that if the U.S. were to sell Aegis-class destroyers to Taiwan, China would not rule out launching a pre-emptive strike against Taiwan. <11> The PRC has criticized the arms sales as threatening China’s security, destroying peace and stability, delaying the resumption of negotiations between Taiwan and China, and being harmful to the interests of US corporations. The PRC also threatened to cease to comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Before Bush’s decision, the quantity of articles in China’s media relating to US arms sales to Taiwan had reached unprecedented levels. <12>

   While indicating its appreciation to the U.S. for arms transfers, Taipei often has complained about the arms delivered to Taiwan’s military. The U.S. sold Taiwan two World War Two-vintage Guppy-class submarines in the early 1970s, without torpedoes. The Clinton administration agreed to sell Taiwan Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs), but insisted that they be stored in Arizona, and not in Taiwan. The U.S. provided Taiwan with E-2Ts (early warning aircraft), but they are not connected with F16s and Perry-class frigates. The F16s were delivered to Taiwan without combat manuals.  Even worse, no major military hardware except AMRAAMs and a long-range early warning radar system, were approved to sell to Taiwan during the Clinton administration. During these eight years, the PRC obtained Su-27s, Su-30s, Sovremenny-class destroyers, Kilo-class submarines, etc. from Russia, while ambitiously increasing the number of short-range ground-to-ground missiles right opposite Taiwan.

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan had a breakthrough after the collision of the EP3C reconnaissance plane near the Hainan island. In April 2001, President Bush announced that the U.S. would sell Taiwan four Kidd-class destroyers, eight submarines, 12 P-3 anti-submarine aircraft, and MH53E mine clearance helicopters. Bush did not agree to sell several weapons that Taiwan wanted, including four Aegis-class destroyers, the High-speed Anti Radiation Missile (HARM), Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and M1A1 Abrams tanks. Bush also decided to end the annual review (taking place in April each year) of which weapons should be sold to Taiwan. <13>

  The decision on weapons that were likely to provoke a particularly strong reaction from Beijing (such as the Aegis-class destroyers) was put on hold, in a deliberate attempt to reduce the level of antagonism over arms sales to Taiwan. The threat to Taiwan posed by China’s surface-to-surface missiles has not been reduced, but Taiwan’s ability to counter a blockade has been significantly increased. What is particularly noteworthy is that President Bush has broken the long-standing taboo against selling submarines to Taiwan. His explanation that submarines can be used both offensively and defensively is in accordance with the spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act. It is still not sure how the U.S. will deliver on its commitment to Taiwan, after Germany and the Netherlands turned down requests to collaborate with the U.S. on the submarine deal. Nevertheless, Bush’s decision was a brave and difficult one to make.  Even if Taiwan finally acquires some submarines, former President Lee still expressed doubt that “the number of submarines Taiwan could purchase would be adequate to defend Taiwan on a submarine-to-submarine basis.” <14>

Following the Bush administration’s announcement regarding the arms that will be sold to Taiwan, the statement that the U.S. would take all measures necessary to help defend Taiwan, and the decision to implement the missile defense system as soon as possible, there is likely to be a major adjustment in China’s strategy. Beijing’s desire to hold the 2008 Olympics and its holding of the APEC summit conference in 2001 have forced it to contain its frustration for the time being, for fear of causing a major upset.  However, China’s leadership cannot afford not to respond to the U.S. decisions, otherwise, with the Sixteenth Party Congress drawing near, they are likely to face fierce criticism for not taking sufficiently hard-line action against the U.S. and Taiwan.

There is a long-standing dispute as to whether the U.S. should pursue “strategic ambiguity” or “strategic clarity” with respect to the question of whether it would intervene to help Taiwan defend itself in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Congress, the Republican Party and friends of Taiwan favor “strategic clarity”; the executive, the Democratic Party and friends of China favor “strategic ambiguity.” For example, during the Clinton administration, on a visit to Shanghai in March 1997, House Chairman Newt Gingrich stated that it was the U.S.’s commitment to protect Taiwan, giving a clear message that the U.S. would in fact help to defend Taiwan, which prevented China from making a misjudgment. In 1996, the Republican Party’s presidential candidate, Robert Dole, openly criticized the policy of “strategic ambiguity.” President Clinton, Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord and Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, Jr. all favored “strategic uncertainty.” While answering a question from a People’s Liberation Army officer in 1995, Nye said that no one knew how the U.S. would react in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait; this was a classic “strategic ambiguity” answer. <15>

On April 25, 2001, while being interviewed on ABC’s “Good Morning America” program, when asked whether the US had an “obligation to defend the Taiwanese” in the event of an attack on Taiwan by the PRC, and whether the US would make an all-out effort to do so, President Bush said that the US did have an obligation to defend the Taiwanese, and would do whatever it took to help Taiwan defend itself. <16>  These remarks, based on “strategic clarity,” provoked criticism from Senators Joseph R. Biden (Democrat, Delaware) and John F. Kerry (Democrat, Massachusetts), on the grounds that President Bush had abandoned the deliberate vagueness adopted by previous U.S. presidents without first consulting with either Congress or the U.S.’s allies in the Asia Pacific region. Later the same day, in an interview with CNN, Bush clarified his remarks, saying that U.S. policy had not changed, and that he would be continuing to hold to the same position, but that the U.S. would adhere to the “one China” policy, and hoped that all disputes between Taiwan and China would be settled peacefully.

   President Bush’s remarks about helping Taiwan to defend itself were not that contentious; every previous president had made similar remarks, and they were in accordance with the spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act. However, on the question of whether the full might of the U.S. armed forces should be used, and whether the U.S. should do “whatever it took” to help Taiwan defend itself, President Bush had without doubt adopted a posture of “strategic clarity.” President Carter once stated that if China were to attack Taiwan, the U.S. would be willing to go to war to defend Taiwan; however, he subsequently retracted this statement. <17>  Bush’s statements appear more consistent, however, it remains unclear whether the U.S. military would help defend Taiwan directly or indirectly.  The tone of Bush’s remarks suggest the latter. In addition, President Bush’s “strategic clarity” is based on the precondition that Taiwan not make a de jure declaration of independence. This precondition is of equal importance to the statement made by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in May 1996 that a precondition for the U.S.’s acceptance of the “one China” principle was that China not attack Taiwan. <18>

III. Taiwan’s Defense Strategy

  For a long time, the defense of Taiwan was the sole responsibility of the ROC armed forces.  Former President Lee Teng-hui proposed the idea of a total defense strategy for Taiwan after the Chinese missile tests in 1996.  In this total defense strategy, Lee stated that “cooperation between the military and civilian sectors will increase public awareness and support of national defense and bring about national defense development, thereby assuring national security.” <19> President Lee believed that psychological defense is the bedrock of a total defense strategy and he successfully combined the concept of common community with the consciousness of new Taiwanese to foster Taiwan identity. The ROC National Defense Law adopted this total defense strategy in January 2000, stipulating that “the national defense of the Republic of China is an all-out defense, involving military, political, economic, psychological, technological and other affairs that may directly or indirectly contribute to the protection of the nation.” <20> Taiwan’s acquisition of the most advanced weapons and President Bush’s remarks about using “whatever it takes” to help Taiwan defend itself cannot guarantee the security of Taiwan if the island is divided among its internal political forces.  Beijing doesn't need to attack cities when it can attack people's minds, let Taiwan divide itself and wear down the will to resist.

   The total defense strategy integrates the MND with other government agencies to assure Taiwan could be defended through an all-out defense of military, civil, social, economic, and psychological sectors. Different government agencies are instructed to draw spiritual, manpower, material, economic, financial, transportation, technology and public health Mobilization Preparatory Programs (MPP). <21>  In October 2001, the Legislative Yuan passed the Law on Preparation of All-out Defense Mobilization and assigned the premier responsibility for administrative and military mobilizations.  The total defense strategy calls for a joint effort of government and private sectors, a combination of military and civil defense.  Active transformation of private sector strength into defense power through various programs of mobilization and civilian participation in defense affairs had long been overlooked by the government. However, private institutions carrying  titles related to strategy have flourished and Taiwan Defense Affairs, the first bi-lingual national defense quarterly was materialized by Michael M. Tsai, a legislator, in 2000. This shift in Taiwan’s strategic culture came into being only in the second half of the 1990s. 

              The ROC military also has undergone a tremendous transformation, starting from the early 1990s. The number of total armed forces is being reduced, while the firepower is improving. Taiwan began implementing an “elite troop plan” in 1993 and the armed forces has been restructured, command levels streamlined, and logistic systems renovated. It is estimated that the size of Taiwan’s armed forces stood at around 300,000 when the Armed Forces Refining Program was completed in 2001.  This number might be further reduced to 280,000, with the Army at 160,000, Navy at 40,000 and Air Force at 50,000 by 2005. <22>

   Overwhelmed quantitatively by the PRC, Taipei has made efforts to maintain its military supremacy by acquiring more advanced weapons and improving the quality of human resources. It has actively built up second-generation armed forces by acquiring advanced weapons from abroad, in particular from the U.S. and France.  Naval and air force buildups, which have been priorities, took a lion’s share of the ROC defense budget for acquiring weapons. <23>  Under the plan to build up second generation naval and air forces, twenty-two new missile frigates, twelve 500-ton patrol boats, about ten to twelve 1000-1500 ton corvettes, fifty fast missile boats, and 340 new jet fighters have joined these two services (see Table 2 and 3).

Table 2: The ROC’s Second-generation Navy and

Air Force Buildup Plan

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, “Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill,” cited in http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/twstrait-02261999.html.

 Table 3-1. Chinese Naval Order of Battle

Class            Type        Qty         SSM         SAM

Sovremenny     DDG         2       8*SS-N-22     48*SA-N-7

Luhai           D           2       16*C-802       8*Crotale

Luhu            DDG        2       8*C-802       8*Crotale

Luda III         DDG        1       8*C-801        -----

Ludaa II          DDG       11      8*C-201       8*Crotale

Luda I           DDG        14      6*C-201       8*Crotale

Jiangwei         FFG         6       6*C-802       6*HQ-61

Jianghu          FF          27      4*C-201        -----

Han             SSN         2       ----           ----

Type93          SSN         2       ----           ----

Song             SS           3      ----           ----

Kilo             SS           10      ----           ----

Ming            SS            4      ----           ----

Romeo           SS            3      ----           ----

Source: David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry A. Wilson, Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), p. 21.

Table 3-2    PLAAF Forces Committed to Taiwan Contingency

Type             Base Case                    Advanced Force

Su-27 Flanker        72                             144

Q-5 Fantan          120                              0

JH-7                48                             72

J-7 Fishbed          168                            144

J-8 Finback          144                            144

J-10                 24                             48

Su-30 Flanker          0                             24

H-6 Badger           48                             48

AWACS              6                              6

Miscellaneous         49                             49

* The Base case-- the number of aircraft that could be operated in the vicinity of Taiwan; advanced--the pace of PLAAF modernization

Source: David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry A. Wilson, Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), p. 14.

In 1999, the U.S. Pentagon warned that “exclusive Taiwan reliance on active missile defenses and associated BM /C3I (Battle Management/ Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence), however, will not sufficiently offset the overwhelming advantage in offensive missiles which Beijing is projected to possess in 2005.”  Since Taiwan is vulnerable to missile attacks and naval blockade from the PRC, its acquisition list thus falls into these two categories, including the TMD and anti-submarine warfare (ASW).  In addition to beefed up ASW capabilities, Taiwan has developed and built several types of tactical missiles: the Tien-chien (Sky Sword) I and II AAMs, the Hsiung-feng (Gallant Wind) I and II antiship missiles, the Tien-kung (Sky Bow) I and II SAMs, the Ching-feng (Green Bee) antiship guided missile, and the Kung-feng 6A rocket. The China Shipbuilding Corporation in Kaohsiung is able to build fast attack missile craft. Under the Kuang-hua I (or Glorious China I) program, the first of eight domestically-made Cheng-kung missile frigates (4,100 tons), which were modeled on the U.S. Perry-class guided missile frigate, entered service in May 1993. The Kuang-hua III program is another indigenous project which aims at building twelve 580-ton Jinn Chiang-class guided missile patrol combatants. Another significant achievement is the production of the Ching-kuo Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF). In 1994, the first indigenous fighter was delivered to the air force and a total of 130 IDFs had joined the service by 1999. It is said that the IDF is in many respects superior to the PRC’s Jian-8II. <24> However, many experts are puzzled by the gross inadequacy of Taiwan’s limited mine hunting and sweeping capabilities. <25>

Taiwan is vulnerable to PRC missile attacks and has only deployed 200 PAC-II version Patriot missiles in the Taipei city metropolitan area, leaving Taichung and Kasohsiung, two other major cities on the island, unguarded.  The book Taiwan’s Foreign and Defense Policies published by the Rand Corporation states that Taiwan is presently developing medium range guided missile with a range of 1000 kilometers, as well as an improved second-generation ground–attack Hsiung Feng cruise missile. <26> Defense Minister Wu Shih-wen and other high-level Taiwan officials have issued no denials in response to this report.  Taiwan’s possession of medium-range missiles will pose a greater threat to China, but ironically Beijing might even be less tolerant of Taiwan’s inclusion in the U.S.-led missile defense system. In addition to active offensive counter-missile strategy, Taiwan lags behind in its passive defense capabilities, for example, by dispersing military forces in Taiwan, improving C4ISR, and hardening fighter-plane bunkers, etc.

   During the 2000 presidential campaign, Chen shui-bian argued for waging a decisive battle in the Taiwan Strait and its airspace, and even within the territory of mainland China, but not on the beachhead of Taiwan’s west coast. <27> Chen also argued for surface-to-surface missiles for Taiwan’s best defense.  After President Chen was inaugurated, he instructed the ROC Air Force to a plan future generation of fighter jets for 2010-2020. <28>  More controversial, Chen delivered a speech at the Army Academy on June 16, saying that “We must develop our military readiness in the direction of ‘precision deep strike, early warning capabilities, and information superiority,’ with the concept of ‘decisive battle outside the territory.’” <29> This later remark stirred a serious debate within and outside the island.

    Hau Pei-tsun, former ROC premier, criticized President Chen’s remark on waging “decisive battle outside the territory,” by arguing that the decisive battle should be waged only after a People’s Liberation Army landing on Taiwan’s beachhead, while not consolidating its power bases. <30>  Tang Fei, first premier in Chen’s government, did have reservations about the term but he agreed that any defensive war should be kept away from the island. <31> Defense Minister Wu Shih-wen and Chief of General Staff Tang Yao-ming defended the concept, which they believed is consistent with the goal of the ROC armed forces, and said that Taiwan will not fire the first shot in any clash with China.  Wu went on to explain that the concept is “to deter the People’s Liberation Army from trying to cross the Taiwan Strait in the first place or to defeat enemy forces as soon as they cross the center line of the Taiwan Strait, or at least defeat enemy forces on the beachhead.” <32>  Tang clarified that the concept does not mean to wage war on Mainland China, but to aim to solve the issue in the Taiwan Strait rather than bring it to the island, preventing any PRC amphibious invasion from reaching the beachhead of Taiwan. <33>   

    Even with some modifications and toning down of the concept, one should not overlook the sentiment for a more active defense posture among Taiwan civilian and military leaders. For example, KMT presidential candidate Lien Chan proposed developing reliable deterrence and beefing up second-strike capability and that “the naval and air force must be strengthened and long-range ground-to-ground missiles developed.” <34> An editorial in Qingnian ribao (Youth Daily News), a mouthpiece of the ROC Armed Forces, echoed that to fight beyond the border is the goal of a deterrence strategy. <35>  In 2000, The ROC armed forces decided to switch the top priority of strategic guidance from “strong defense posture” to “effective deterrence.”

    By fighting beyond the border, Taiwan needs to acquire sufficient numbers of surface-to-surface missiles or cruise missiles and to quickly ride the wave of RMAs, particularly in the areas of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The information warfare might provide Taiwan with more warning time of any irregular military activities and with force multipliers to counterbalance the PRC’s electronics warfare against Taiwan. The Taiwan military also endeavored to upgrade its computer virus capability at its war-gaming in August 2000 and the end of 2000 established the first information warfare unit. <36>  President Chen is concerned with China’s military buildup, so he urges evaluating the PRC’s threat to Taiwan and preparing short (2005), intermediate (2010), and long (2020) term forces restructuring programs to meet that threat.  He believes that “future warfare will require the effective joint combat capabilities of three services as well as integration of traditional and modern precision technology weapons.” <37>  However, Taiwan’s military is undergoing a dwindling defense budget owing to an increase of appropriations to social welfare planning.  The ROC defense budget for FY2001 is around NT$250 billion, which is NT$70 billion short of the Ministry of National Defense’s expectation. <38> Defense Minister Wu Shih-wen argues that to maintain the minimum deterrence capability, “the defense budget should be kept at the reasonable position of three percent of the GNP.”<39>

  In January 2000, President Lee Teng-hui promulgated the National Defense Law and ended several decades of law formulating efforts. The new National Defense Law combines the military administration and military command systems into one and designates the minister of national defense as responsible for both systems.  The president is now able to exercise his authority as commander-in-chief of the armed forces by direct orders to the minister of national defense, who transmits them to the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) (Article 8). <40>  The MND is responsible for formulating military strategy and the primary locus of control of the armed forces has been shifted from the uniformed General Staff Headquarters to the civilian-led MND.<41>  While the Armed Forces Refining Program has been implemented since July 1997, the MND organization is also under the process of reengineering and should be finished by 2003.

   Although President Chen is inclined to taking a pro-active national defense strategy, he is also enthusiastic about adopting confidence-building measures (CBMs) to defuse misunderstanding and misperceptions between the sides of the Taiwan Strait.  He declared that the arms purchases did not mean that Taiwan was involved in an arms race, and that weapons were “not the only means of ensuring Taiwan’s security.” Nevertheless, he also said that the arms purchases would “definitely help to maintain the military balance of power between Taiwan and Mainland China, and to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and would help to re-open the door for negotiation between Taiwan and Mainland China.”  He expressed the hope that the money which Taiwan and China have been spending on arms “could be used to improve the standard of living of their people, improve the quality of medical care and education on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, improve social welfare provisions, promote public construction and spur economic development.”<42>

Conclusion

The U.S. spy plane incident, the U.S. decision to sell submarines to Taiwan, and President Bush’s statements on May 1 regarding the missile defense plan were serious blows to Sino-U.S. relations. Whether Beijing undertakes a comprehensive overhaul of its strategic planning and begins an arms race with the U.S., or makes Taiwan its main priority and refrains from retaliating against the U.S. for the time being, or refuses to allow its strategy to be dominated by the Taiwan issue, will become a litmus test of the political stance of China’s leadership as the Sixteenth Party Congress draws near.

   President Bush’s decision to sell arms to Taiwan and his remarks on helping Taiwan to defend itself are directly related to the fact that China has continued to deploy more missiles targeting Taiwan. Without US arms sales, Taiwan would not be able to counter the military threat from Beijing. President Bush’s strategic adjustment of U.S. strategy towards Taiwan has effectively demonstrated the U.S.’s determination and its bottom line. However, this alone will not be enough to bring genuine peace to the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan and the U.S. can make China pay a bigger military and political price for its military invasion of Taiwan, but the maintenance of peace and stability still depends on Taipei and Beijing finding a framework and a form of words that is acceptable to both sides. Submarines and P3 anti-submarine aircraft will give Taiwan the means to counter a blockade by China, but they do not solve the problem of the threat posed by China’s surface-to-surface missiles. Taiwan needs to strengthen its strategy and tactics for both active and passive defense against missile attack, combining this with the psychological, civil, social and economic defense advocated by the total defense strategy, to enable the weapons received from the U.S. to provide real protection for Taiwan.

Notes

<1> “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” a white paper released by the Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China.

<2> Ministry of National Defense, 1993-94 National Defense Report, Republic of China (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise Co., 1994), p. 62.

<3> “PRC’s Invasion Scenarios and Restructuring of ROC Armed Forces,” A Ministry of National Defense report to National Defense Committee of the Legislative Yuan, November 25, 1999.

<4> 2000 National Defense Report, Republic of China (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, 2000), pp. 56-57.

<5> “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, 1999, cited in http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/twstrait-02261999.html.

<6> Clarence Oxford, “Taiwan Taps into Private US Spy Satellites,” cited in http://www.fas.org/ eye/ 000430.taiwan.htm.; “Toe-to-Toe Over Taiwan, “ Newsweek, June 18, 2001.

<7> “Taipei on TMD: Will the Republic of China Participate in the Theater Missile Defense,” Mainland Affairs Council. Executive Yuan, Republic of China, March 1999.

<8> Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), August 13, 1999, p. A1.

<9> 2000 National Defense Report, Republic of China, p. 57; Andrew Scobell, “Show of Force: The PLA and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” U.S. Army War College, January 1999.

<10> “Principled American Leadership,” cited in http://mc.org/2000/2000platform8aa.

<11> “U.S.-China Ties Face Setback,” CNN, March 21, 2001; Steven Mufson and Robert G. Kaiser, “China Warns U.S. on Warship Sale to Taiwan,” Washington Post, March 21, 2001.

<12> Gu Ping, “Relying on Help From Foreigners Is the Road to Self-destruction,” People’s Daily, April 27, 2001, p. 3; She Yinan, “Western Weapons Cannot Save the Cause of Taiwanese Independence,” People’s Liberation Army Daily, April 25, 2001, p. 5.

<13> “Weapons for Taiwan,” New York Times, April 19, 2001; “The Right Touch on Taiwan Arms,” Los Angeles Times, April 25, 2001; “Policy Adjustments on Taiwan,” New York Times, April 27, 2001.

<14> “President Lee’s Interview with German Radio,” cited in <http:www.taiwaninformation.org/view/ world/lee070999.html>; see also David Shambaugh, “A Matter of Time: Taiwan’s Eroding Military Advantage,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 2000), p. 119-133.

<15> John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p.96.

<16> Steve Mufson, “President Pledges Defense of Taiwan,” Washington Post, April 26, 2001, p. A1.

<17> Public Paper of the Presidents of the Unite States, Jimmy Carter, 1979, Vol. 1, pp. 248-49, 257.

<18> Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 435.

<19> President Lee Teng-hui’s Selected Addresses and Messages, 1997 (Taipei: Government Printing Office, 1998), p. 98.

<20> 2000 National Defense Report, Republic of China, p. 60.

<21> Ibid., pp.73-74.

<22> Ibid., p. 77, Zhongguo shibao (China Times), November 30, 2001, p. 1.

<23> Ibid., p. 113.

<24> David Shambaugh, “Taiwan’s Security: Maintaining Deterrence amid Political Accountability,” The China Quarterly, No. 148 (December 1996), p. 1303.

<25> Damon Bristow, “The Military Balance Across the Taiwan Strait: Does China Have the Edge?,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Winter 2000/2001), p. 119; Eric Grove, “Taiwan’s Sea Power: A Comprehensive Assessment,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January 2002), forthcoming.

<26> Michael D. Swaine and James C. Mulvenon, Taiwan’s Foreign and Defense Policies: Features and Determinants (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), p. 171.

<27> Chen Shui-bian’s National Blueprint: National Security (in Chinese)(Taipei: Chen Shui-bian Campaign Headquarters, 1999), pp. 49-53, 69.

<28> Qingnian ribao, August 4, 2000, p. 1.

<29> “Suggesting ‘Decisive Battle Outside the Territory’: Abstract of President Chen’s Address at Army Academy,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 2000), p. 130.

<30> Hau Pei-tsun’s comment, see Zhongguo shibao (Taipei), July 5, 2000, p. 4. 

<31> Zhongyang ribao (Central Daily News), July 15, 2000, p. 5.

<32> “Defense Minister Denies ROC-U.S. Joint Naval Drill,” China Post, June 20, 2000, p. 19.

<33> Tang Yao-ming’s interview, see Qingnian ribao (Youth Daily News), July 8, 2000, p. 3.

<34> “ROC Will Not Fire First in any Clash with Mainland China, Defense Minister Say,” China Post, July 3, 2000, p. 19.

<35> Qingnian ribao, July 8, 2000, p. 2.

<36> “Military to Show off Computer Virus Capability,” China Post, August 8, 2000, p. 19; Qingnian ribao, November 23, 2000, p. 1; Parris H. Chang, “On Taiwan’s National Security Priorities,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 2000), p.59.

<37> “Suggesting `Decisive Battle Outside the Territory,’” p. 131.

<38> Ziyou shibao (Liberty Times), July 19, 2000. p. 5.

<39> 2000 National Defense Report, ROC, p. 101; Qingnian ribao, September 18, 2000, p. 3.

<40> Swaine, Taiwan’s National Security, p. 38.

<41> Hu Chen-ya, “The National Defense Law and the Adjustments of the Ministry of National Defense,” cited in http://www.dsis.org.tw/peaceforum/papers/2000-02/ TM0001001e.htm.

<42> “An Interview With Chen Shui-bian Regarding US Arms Sales to Taiwan,” Hsin Pao (Hong Kong), April 26, 2001, p. 1.

Dr. Cheng-yi Lin is the director of the Institute of European and American Studies of Academia Sinica.  The paper was presented in the Japan-Taiwan Research Forum, Keio University and Taiwan Security Research Center, Taipei, Jan. 22, 2002.