By Kenneth Allen

The formal military relationship the United States and China established twenty years ago is at its lowest point since the Tiananmen situation in June 1989. Based on differences between Washington and Beijing over NATO's accidental bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade, human rights, Taiwan, ballistic missile defense, and trade issues, as well as charges of Chinese nuclear espionage and illegal campaign contributions, Congress has sought to severely restrict military-to-military relations at all levels. These restrictions may, however, actually reduce the United States' ability to understand China's military at a critical time.

The FY2000 Defense Authorization Bill includes restrictions imposed by Congress on the Department of Defense's (DoD) contacts with China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The bill stipulates that the Secretary of Defense must provide a summary of topics discussed with the PLA since January 1993, and assess the benefits the PLA and U.S. military expect to gain from any future exchanges. The Secretary must also submit an annual report analyzing China's current and future military strength. In addition, the Secretary may not authorize any military contact with the PLA that would create a national security risk due to an inappropriate exposure to the following specified advanced U.S. military capabilities:

• Force projection operations;
• Nuclear operations;
• Advanced combined-arms and joint combat operations;
• Advanced logistical operations;
• Chemical and biological defense and other capabilities related to weapons of mass destruction;
• Surveillance and reconnaissance operations;
• Joint warfighting experiments and other activities related to a transformation in warfare;
• Military space operations;
• Other advanced capabilities of the Armed Forces;
• Arms sales or military-related technology transfers;
• Release of classified or restricted information;
• Access to a Department of Defense laboratory.

Why did Congress feel compelled to legislate micro-management of DoD's relationship with the PLA? Basically, two impression exist about US-China military relations. First, China is using information gained from its military exchanges with the United States to modernize the PLA, which could ultimately threaten the United States and its Asian friends and allies. Second, the U.S. military has not derived equal benefits from its exchanges with the PLA.

While there is some truth in these assumptions, US-China military relations are not, and have not been, a one-way street in China's favor. During the 1980s, Washington's policy was to help modernize the PLA against the Soviet threat through multi-level military exchanges and foreign military assistance programs. During the 1990s, the focus has shifted to concern about the PLA's modernization as a result of acquiring Russian and Israeli military equipment and technology. Throughout this process, US-China military relations have always been subordinate to changing political events, and there have been ardent proponents and opponents of military contacts in both countries.

While Congress' restrictions may seem like reasonable requirements to quantify the relationship and to reduce exposure to U.S. military capabilities, they could actually inhibit DoD's ability to learn more about China's military modernization efforts. Although Congress has mandated that the Secretary of Defense evaluate the Chinese military threat, Capitol Hill's stipulations could, in effect, hamstring the U.S. military from carrying out substantive discussions with the PLA about the very issues the U.S. military needs to understand better.

One particular Congressional concern is release of DoD material, either verbally or in written form, to the PLA. When the PLA requests copies of unclassified DoD documents through official channels in Beijing or Washington, the request is approved or disapproved within the Pentagon. DoD's restrictions on release of material has fluctuated depending upon the content and the state of the relations at the time. The PLA also has the opportunity to discuss specific issues with visiting delegations in China and abroad. Whereas PLA delegation members submit detailed trip reports that are distributed and analyzed within the PLA, U.S. military delegation members visiting China rarely submit trip reports, so the information they gain is not properly utilized within DoD. The PLA also has greater access to open source material about the U.S. military than does the U.S. military about the PLA.

Logistics exchanges provide a good example. During the 1990s, the PLA has made changes to its logistics structure based on information derived from logistics exchanges with countries around the world. Although DoD has had logistics exchanges with the PLA, detailed information about the U.S. military's logistics system and other warfighting capabilities is readily available through the Government Printing Office, the internet, and studies about events like the Gulf War and Kosovo crisis. The PLA has hundreds of translators, researchers, and analysts at organizations like the Academy of Military Science, National Defense University, and General Staff Department devoted to translating and analyzing this material.

Meanwhile, the U.S. military is hampered in its analysis of the PLA, because there are only a handful of government analysts, most of whom do not read Chinese, devoted to analyzing the PLA. Even though the PLA does not publish the same types of information about its capabilities, the amount of open source information on the PLA published in China has proliferated over the past decade. Very little of this information is translated into English, and organizations like the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which is a major contributor to the knowledge base on the PLA, barely scratch the surface.

It is not appropriate to expect complete reciprocity in US-China military exchanges, primarily because the two sides view the goals of the relationship differently. Over the course of twenty years, exchanges have allowed the U.S. military to learn much about the PLA's doctrine, strategy, organizational structure, equipment, logistics, maintenance, and warfighting capabilities. While the PLA has implemented limited organizational changes based on what it has learned directly from its exchanges with the United States and other modern Western militaries, the U.S. military has used the program to emphasize America's military power and to learn about the PLA.

Although space-based intelligence collection systems can provide information on defense production capabilities and the number of tanks, planes, and ships at PLA bases, the United States must also find out what China is doing and thinking on a broad range of issues by having direct dialogue among experts at multiple levels. This includes high-level discussions on strategic issues, as well as discussions on strategy, doctrine, and warfighting capabilities by military operators. Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, recognized this fact when he recently stated that he wants to discuss a wide range of issues with the PLA.

There is no doubt that the PLA has modernized its forces over the past decade. While this trend will continue, it is important to note that other militaries in the Asia-Pacific region are also modernizing their forces. The PLA has acquired several billions of dollars worth of sophisticated weapon systems and technology from Russia and Israel, and they are in the process of upgrading their logistics, communications, and reconnaissance systems, as well as their doctrine and strategy. Meanwhile, the PLA is also trying to cope with personnel issues caused by a massive downsizing of 1.5 million soldiers and decommissioning of old weapon systems. The current debate in the United States focuses on the degree to which the PLA is absorbing this influx of equipment and what China's military intentions are in the region. To adequately understand these changes, the U.S. military must have direct contact with the PLA to discuss all of these issues, rather than stand on the outside and try to analyze them based on limited access and information.

The United States needs to maintain communications links with the PLA, but not let China dictate the terms of military engagement. Through its high-level discussions with the PLA, the Department of Defense can continue to stress its goals for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, support for America's friends and allies, and a peaceful resolution of differences between Beijing and Taipei. Rather than cut off functional exchanges, we should tailor our delegations the same way the PLA tailors its delegations, so that we maximize what we learn about the PLA.

China's entire general officer corps has changed during the 1990s, and will be replaced again over the next decade. One-half of the entire enlisted corps changes every year. Cutting off or excessively restricting U.S. military contacts with this new generation of leaders and soldiers could eventually lead to further misperceptions and miscalculations on both sides. The two militaries must have face-to-face dialogue at multiple levels to better understand each other. The United States should encourage, rather than discourage, discussions with the PLA without helping the PLA increase its warfighting capabilities. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Kurt Campbell, recently returned from Beijing, where he discussed ways to reestablish the dialogue between the two militaries. Reports indicate that China's Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, may visit Washington in the near future. Now is the time to re-open the lines of communication.

Kenneth Allen is a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C., and a former Assistant U.S. Air Force Attaché in China. He is the co-author of a recent report on China's Foreign Military Relations, which can be found on the Stimson Center's website (www.stimson.org).