China’s New War Fighting Skills:

Emerging threats to the U.S., India, Taiwan and the Asia/Pacific Region

By Al Santoli

An American Foreign Policy Council investigation in Southeast Asia

August 14-26, 2000

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

During July and August, China’s People’s Liberation Army [PLA] conducted large-scale joint military exercises in the Nanjing Military Region on the coast of the Taiwan Strait, demonstrating significant new fire power coordination and command-and-control capabilities. Al Santoli, a best-selling author of military history, editor of the American Foreign Policy Council’s China Reform Monitor and national security advisor to Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, visited Southeast Asia from August 14 to 26, 2000 to investigate China’s new war fighting skills.

The PLA’s modernization and joint war fighting capabilities are developing at a rate far more rapidly than the Pentagon’s previous predictions. The Nanjing Region exercises have showcased the PLA’s new high-tech capabilities, based on U.S. military tactics with information technology and weapons systems purchased or stolen from the U.S., Russia and Israel. The PLA’s growing ballistic and cruise missile inventory, recently acquired advanced Russian fighter aircraft and supersonic anti-ship missiles, and Information and Electronic warfare pose an immediate potent threat to Taiwan’s military, whose leaders feel increasingly isolated from the West, and to U.S. military forces. Increasingly, the PLA boasts of “assymetrical” 21^st Century weapons systems, such as anti-satellite and electromagnetic pulse weapons being developed with Russian assistance, which will be used to attack U.S. dependency on high-tech military systems.

In the Golden Triangle region of Southeast Asia, Santoli investigated events in Burma. During August, Chinese military advisory teams oversaw air-land-sea-communications exercises by forces of the SLORC [or SPDC] military junta, along the coast of the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal, some 300 nautical miles from India, and within 350 miles of the strategic Straits of Malacca. Joining the PLA teams were observers from Pakistan’s military, which along with China, supplies fighter aircraft and other military supplies to Burma.

These sum of these exercises demonstrates not only significant progress in the PLA’s hi-tech military modernization, but Beijing’s growing alliances with non-democratic anti-Western nations along its massive border, from Central Asia to the Pacific. In addition, in late July the PLA’s main newspaper openly published a description of its warship patrols and ultra-modern network of “fortresses of the sea” being built in the Spratley Islands, which are contested by neighboring countries. At an August diplomatic conference in China, ASEAN diplomats tried to convince Beijing to sign a “code of conduct” to demilitarize the South China Sea, but failed to make progress.

The “assymetrical” multi-dimensional threat posed by the Beijing-Islamabad-SLORC alliance to Asian democracies, such as India, Thailand and the Philippines is further demonstrated by their direct or indirect support for military aggression, terrorism and narcotics trafficking across southern Asia. Thailand’s main national security threat at present is the rapid expansion of meth-amphetamine narcotics trafficking by the PLA-backed 25,000 soldier Wa tribal army[UWSA] in Burma, who are expanding trafficking routes to the central and southern Burma-Thai border with the support of the SLORC. In addition, the Wa have moved members of its army to the India border, where they are trafficking PLA weapons to rebel tribal groups, such as the Nagas.

In Afghanistan, the success or failure of the current military offensive by the Pakistan-supported and supplied Taliban militants and Osama bin Laden’s internationalist shock troops will determine whether a safe-haven and training base for Muslim terrorists and separatists from throughout southeast Asia will be expanded. The resurgent Islamic terrorism and kidnappings in the Philippines are being conducted by the Abu Sayyaf group, whose commanders reportedly were trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Military and police officials in Manila claim that Thailand, which has a large Muslim population in its southern region, has become a mid-way haven and communications link for extremists traveling between Central Asian training centers and the Philippines.

China’s “double-edged” diplomacy:

Beijiing is conducting a “double-edged” diplomatic strategy to further its strategic goals in the region. As demonstrated in China’s political/military pursuit to control the South China Sea, w hen pressured internationally, Beijing uses negotiation tactics to keep neighboring governments hopeful of peaceful compromise while the PLA continues its determined military build-up of permanent “fortresses” in the Spratley Islands.

In recent months, Thailand has been increasingly vocal about the sale of weapons by Beijing to the SLORC and the inter-relationship of SLORC and Chinese elements with the Wa drug-trafficking armies. On September 1, the Thai Foreign Ministry optimistically reported to the media that its diplomats had reached an agreement to work with China on a counter-narcotics policy in the Golden Triangle. However, this agreement should be viewed with scepticism. Although Beijing is concerned about the spread of drug abuse in southern China, the recent military exercises on the Burma coast indicate that the PLA cooperation with the SLORC is growing. Thai security experts believe that Beijing is determined to control Burma’s strategic waterways to the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean, for both economic and strategic purposes. There are numerous reports of the increased presence of Chinese migrants, who now dominate the banks of the strategic Irrawaddy and Salween Rivers.

Beijing feels most comfortable with non-democratic regimes as its allies. While democratic Thailand is not in that category, SLORC intelligence chief General Khin Nyunt is the closest Burmese ally of Beijing. Nhunt is dependent on the Wa and the drug trade to fuel his campaign to succeed General Tan Shwe as junta supreme leader against the challenge of SLORC rivals who are not as close to Beijing or the Wa. In addition, the Wa army, which was formerly the militant arm of the Beijing-backed Burmese Communist Party, has been commanded by Han Chinese PLA military officers since the 1950s.

In addition, as in the Beijing’s military partnership with Pakistan, the creators and still chief weapons supplier and military advisor to the Taliban, Beijing seeks to keep narcotics and Muslim fundamentalism out of its territory, while tolerating campaigns by such fanatics to destabilize or terrorize rival nations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY:

The mid- to long-term effect of Beijing’s increasing military, political and economic prowess may create a situation that would leave the United States without stable or reliable allies in this vital region, which is essential to America’s economic stability and national security. In addition, Beijing has become increasingly active – economically, politically, and incorporating Triad organized crime networks – in the South Pacific and in the Pacific rim nations of Latin America and the Carribean.

A Comprehensive U.S. Security Policy for the Asia-Pacific Region:

It is imperative that America develop a comprehensive Asia –Pacific security policy that would:

1) Support and strengthen democratic movements to replace dictatorial regimes such as the SLORC and the Taliban;

2) Provide humanitarian and other forms of assistance to U.S. allies and indigenous forces to defeat narcotics traffickers and terrorists such as the Wa and Abu Sayyaf;

3) Encourage an end to systematic and high-level corruption in allied countries such as the Philippines and Thailand;

4) Cease access for PLA officials to U.S. doctrinal, tactical and logistical centers; and

5) Encourage and strengthen pro-freedom and democratic groups within China.

6) Provide Taiwan with long-range radars and software links for early warning against missile attack, and assist Taiwan’s military to develop secure information systems.

7) Persuade Russian political and military officials to reconsider Moscow’s military cooperation and weapons transfers to Beijing, and to cooperate with the U.S. in joint-development of anti-ballistic missile defense systems.

Executive and Legislative Branch National Security Cooperation:

The U.S. Government must counter the aggressive “assymetrical” doctrine of Beijing and its allies, by creating a Task Force that would fully integrate: 1) America’s conventional military; 2) information and electronic warfare systems; 3) missile defense agencies; 4) counter-narcotics, customs, immigration and law enforcement agencies; 5) human, Sigint and aerial intelligence agencies; 6) US information and surrogate radio networks; and 7) economic and diplomatic agencies, into a pro-active national security team, under the direction of the White House. Democracy-building programs of the National Endowment for Democracy, the IRI and the NDI for the Asia/Pacific region should be expanded. In addition, Congress should create a pro-active bi-partisan national security oversight team to interact with the Executive Task Force.

AUGUST 2000 SOUTHEAST ASIA SECURITY INVESTIGATION

OVERVIEW:

Al Santoli, a best-selling author of military history, editor of the weekly China Reform Monitor and senior national security advisor to Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, conducted an investigation in Southeast Asia, sponsored by the non-profit American Foreign Policy Council, from August 14 though 26, 2000. In Bangkok and in the infamous Golden Triangle area of the Thai-Burma frontier, he visited with Thai military and national intelligence officials and international security experts. Mr. Santoli investigated national security, drug proliferation and trans-national crime and human rights issues originating in China and Burma that threaten stability in Thailand, India and the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, he held discussions with intelligence analysts related to recent Chinese-backed military exercises in Burma. In Taipei and at the CCK air defense base in Taechung, Taiwan, Santoli met with senior military, political and intelligence officials, as well as with independent experts on China’s military. In addition, he was in steady contact with law enforcement and security experts in the Philippines and anti-Taliban political leaders from Afghanistan. Formal meetings included:

In Taiwan: Lt. General Abe Lin, Director, Communication, Electronics and Information (Warfare) Bureau, Ministry of Defense; Maj.General Ronny Lin, Director, International Intelligence Division, Ministry of Defense; Maj. General Tyson Fu, Director, Institute of Strategic Studies, National Defense University; Navy Captain Damon Te-Men Chen, Director, Research and Publishing, National Defense University; Col. Chang Hui-Tzo, Commander, 427^th Tactical Fighter Wing and his three Squadron Commanders; former-Congressman Albert Lin, Chairman, Taiwan Research Association of National Peace and Security; Senator Parris Chang; Taiwan Vice-President Annette Lu.

In Thailand: Mr. Bhumarat Taksadipong, Director, National Intelligence Agency; General Sanan Kajornklam, Special Expert, Office of Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defense; Lt. General Ronachuk Swasdikiati, Royal Thai Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence; Lt. General. Wathanachai Chaimuangwong, Commander, 3^rd Army Region [Golden Triangle]; Maj. General Anu Sumitra, Commander, Intelligence Coordination Detachment, 3^rd Army Region; Maj. General (ret.) Schlitt Arthayukti; the Prime Minister’s Counter-Narcotics Office in Chiang Mai; Ms. Laxanachorntorn Laohaphan , Director-General, Dept. of International Operations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Akradid Amatayakul, Dep. Director- General, Department of American and South Pacific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr. Chatawed Chartsuwan, Dep. Director-General, Dept. of East Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

TAIWAN

The preservation of Taiwan’s freedom is essential for democratic evolution in China and to further democratization and peace throughout the Asia-Pacific region. To the contrary, the fall of Taiwan would be a potential death knell for demoicracy in the region. Governments in the region are closely monitoring the U.S. relationship with Taiwan. If the United States abandones Taiwan, or if the island republic militarily conquered by Beijing, it will cause Southeast Asian nations to switch their alliance from the United States to non-democratic China.

Taiwan is undergoing a remarkable and perilous democratic transition. The island has become the first Chinese society to reject authoritarian government in favor of elected leaders and a free society. However, both the KMT and DPP parties are fragmented and appear to be drifting without clear policy directions. This has been caused, in part, by pressure from the Clinton Administration on Taiwan’s new elected leaders. Seemingly abandoned by its primary ally and protector, and shunned politically by much of the international community, some prominent Taiwan business leaders and politicians appear to be trying to fatalistically, or opportunistically, “cut the best deal they can get” with Beijing. The transfer of key industries to China, strips away an important layer of Taiwan’s economic defense against military attack. The current emphasis on developing government-financed social programs while cutting-back on military spending may also be denigrating Taiwan’s vigilance against a determined dictatorship just 100 miles from its shore. This is also affecting the morale within Taiwan’s military.

During ongoing large-scale military exercises, China has demonstrated significant new joint-service war-fighting skills “under high-tech conditions” that are steadily altering the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. The PLA is applying U.S. military doctrine to integrate its relentlessly expanding strategic missile forces, high-performance Su-27 and Su-30 jet fighters purchased from Russia, blue-water navy ships -- including a Sovremenny –class destroyer with deadly SS-N-22 anti-ship missiles – and state-of-the-art secure communications systems purchased from U.S. and other Western companies, in addition to developing advanced Information and Electronic Warfare capabilities.

PLA modernization gains:

Taiwan’s senior military intelligence analysts observe that in current large-scale exercises, PLA is showing surprising rapid advances in joint maneuvers between naval, air force, marine infantry, paratroop, armored, and missile units. The PLA is developing a radar information network that includes some 68 radars interconnected for the Chinese Air Force. With new generations of jet fighters, the PLA air force has ben notably more aggressive in flying missions over the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, with a 2 to 10 minute response time to a PLA air or missile strike across the Strait, Taiwan has repeatedly requested that the United States help upgrade its early-warning radar systems and to transfer software that integrate its disparate early warning systems.

Taiwan is particularly impressed with the PLA’s rapid advances in utilizing a national “plug-and-play” fiber-optic civilian telecom network to thoroughly secure its military communications. At the same time, Taiwan believes its current military information system is relatively easy for the PLA to monitor Taiwan believes its forces have fallen behind the PLA in that important command-and-control area, which could lead to their defeat.

The PLA’s doctrine of “assymetrical” warfare emphasizes paralyzing the high-tech strength of the U.S. and our allies, through attacks on military, economic and governmental computerized information systems. Since mid-1999, some of the first incidents of 21^st Century Internet warfare have been conducted across the Strait, with the PLA now openly recruiting an, “army of hackers,” in civilian newspapers. Taiwan’s military planners believe it is significant that Beijing is psychologically preparing the civilian population for a potential war. This includes activities such as a highly publicized mid-August air raid drill in the Shanghai area – the first such drill in 50 years.

The PLA has an aggressive new program to develop exotic high-tech weapons, titled Project 1-26, which was initiated in January, 2000. This programs involves dual-use space and information technology, and exotic weapons such as miniaturized nanno weapons. Unfortunately, China is using technology from the U.S., Europe and Israel in aspects of this project. In addition, the PLA is developing deception tactics to protect its missiles and other forces from detection by U.S. satellites.

These activities may not mean that Beijing is ready to immediately launch a war to conquer Taiwan. However, the PLA’s rapid advances do show that China is serious in its professed claims to dominate the Asia-Pacific region during the 21^st Century. This is underscored by Beijing’s steadily increasing military budget and relentless pursuit to develop a blue water navy, state-of the-art anti-satellite and Information and Electronic warfare capabilities and, especially, medium- and long-range ballistic missile forces capable of hitting American bases anywhere in the Pacific and all regions of the continental United States.

Taiwan’s Military:

The rapid modernization of the PLA, while Taiwan is prohibited by the Clinton Administration from purchasing essential defense equipment to ward off missile or Information and Electronic warfare attack or a naval blockade, is deteriorating the morale of Taiwan’s military. In addition, there are other destabilizing factors, such as the uncertainty of the new government’s policies, insufficient interaction and training with the United States and regional militaries, inter- and intra-service rivalries and corruption, and an inadequate defense budget that save sent shock waves through Taiwan’s military system. The perception of cross-Strait military advantage in Beijing, and confident of a militant alliance with Russia against U.S. intervention, will increase the possibility of an act of aggression by the PLA. It is significant that the PLA navy war games have included Jiangsu province and the East China Sea, adjacent to U.S. bases in Japan and Okinawa. It is essential, for the security of Taiwan and regional stability, that the United States cease its “ambiguity” and immediately assist Taiwan’s military in addressing the above-mentioned challenges.

The Taiwanese air force understands that defense of Taiwan from missile attack by Beijing is nearly impossible, and defense against the new generation PLA jet fighters, with superior on-board radars and air-to-air missile systems is increasingly difficult. . Fighter pilots say that Electronic Warfare is the “weakest link” of Taiwan’s air force. In addition, the Taiwan air-force needs upgraded radar and counter-measure systems to defend against the PLA’s SA-10 ground-to-air missiles, with a range of some 51 miles that covers the mid-line area of the Taiwan Strait.

TAIWAN RECOMMENDATIONS

1) Increase cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan militaries: In the event of a military crisis in the Taiwan Strait, inter-operability between Taiwanese and U.S. forces is essential to assure victory and to prevent needless loss of life. Interaction would also help to further professionalize the Taiwan military and boost morale. Cooperation and interaction between U.S. and Taiwan military could begin with the exchange of U.S. and Taiwanese officers and NCO’s to attend training sessions on a more frequent basis. It is absurd for the PLA to be permitted to send observers to U.S. Pacific Command military exercises, while Taiwanese are forbidden.

2) Expand Intelligence cooperation: Both Taiwan and the United States have strengths and weaknesses in their respective intelligence collection on China. Under current U.S. policy, Taiwan is permitted to send only one intelligence delegation to the United States per year and there is an intelligence exchange conference in Taiwan. As the PLA continues to modernize its ability to deceive satellite reconnaissance and secure its communications, there should be unlimited interaction and an increase in the frequency of bilateral intelligence cooperation. Taiwan needs regular real-time satellite imagery on the PLA. And more full-time and active-duty U.S. Intel personnel should be stationed in Taiwan.

3) Provide Aegis systems: Taiwan seeks the Aegis system for naval early warning and as a backup system for its land-based national missile and air defense system. All military leaders in Taiwan stated that acquiring an Aegis system is their foremost national defense priority. There are not nearly enough patriot missiles to protect Taiwan from a saturation attack of the PLA’s 400 ballistic missiles. Taiwan’s current Patriot Pac 2-Plus system has a range of only 80 miles, which does not cover the 100 mile distance to the PRC coast. The Patriot radar system can only detect the downward trajectory of a ballistic missile. However, Aegis radar can detect the launch of a ballistic missile, which would provide vital additional time to prepare anti-missile or anti-aircraft defense.

4) Provide early-warning radars: The United States should rapidly provide much-needed early warning radar systems and components necessary to upgrade Taiwan’s defensive systems during the first half of 2000. Radar systems requested by Taiwan include the AN/TPS 45, the AN/TPS 59 or the AN/TPS 75 systems.

5) Upgrade airborne early-warning assets: The USG should provide Taiwan with an upgrade to its E-2T early warning aircraft. The Link 16 software would help the E2-T communicate with fighter aircraft and land and sea based defense systems and vastly improve Taiwan’s air defense capability.

6) Assist the Taiwan air force to upgrade on-board radar systems, and counter-measure systems and deliver Amraams: The new generation of PLA jet fighters has made major steps to control the skies with upgraded on-board avionics, EW and radar systems. Amraam air-to-air missiles should also be delivered to Taiwan immediately, because the 5 day delivery period after a conflict begins would be too late.

THAILAND AND THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE

The “low tech” aspects of China’s “assymetrical warfare” is conducted by the PLA and its Burmese SLORC junta and fierce narcotics trafficking tribal allies in the Golden Triangle of China-Burma-Laos-Thailand, where trans-national crime and support for brutal dictatorship furthers Beijing’s strategic aims. Two important Asian democracies surrounded by a sea of military dictatorships, India and Thailand, are in direct peril.

Some U.S. policy makers believe that Thailand is already under the influence of China. However, Santoli found that although some politicians and businessmen and foreign affairs bureaucratic “pragmatists” may be leaning toward Beijing, there are a substantial number of Thai national security professionals who are wary of China’s militant alliance with Burma and still prefer an alliance with the West. The Thai government is very concerned about PRC weapons sales to the SLORC, which could be used against Thais. PLA has told the Thais, “Don’t worry, the weapons aren’t sophisticated. They are just for use against insurgents.” But the Thais know that the PLA and SLORC are allied with the Wa United Army, who are the region’s fiercest fighters. They have been under PLA influence, to some extent, for 50 years. Assistance by the United States, albeit discreet in some instances, to the Thais and anti-SLORC Burmese tribes would solidify a close bilateral alliance among pro-freedom forces.

Burmese-PLA military exercises:

In August, the Burmese SLORC [or SPDC] conducted military naval and army exercises overseen by Chinese military advisory teams along the coast of the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal, some 300 nautical miles from India, and within 450 miles of the strategic Straits of Malacca, which is vital to international shipping between the Persian Gulf and the South China Sea/Pacific Ocean. Joining the PLA teams were military observers from India’s rival Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistan was supplying a major military offensive by the fanatical Taliban to destroy its opponents in Afghanistan. This demonstrates Beijing’s strategic alliances with non-democratic anti-Western nations along its massive border, to assert anti-Western dominance from Central Asia to the Pacific.

Thailand’s intelligence sources report that joint air-land-sea exercises were conducted August 1 – 25, around the Burma coastal area of Tavoy, which is some 150 miles west of Bangkok, adjacent the Coco Isalnds where the PLA reputed has set up elecronic surveillance to monitor the Indian Ocean and some 400 miles north of the Straits of Malacca. PLA training teams were seen participating in substantial numbers, will a smaller number of Pakistan military observers present. The Indian press reports that a third round of Burmese and Chinese naval exercise is to be conducted during the last quarter of 2000 in the Bay of Bengal.

At the same time, PLA advisory teams were in Wa territory, along the Thai border teaching military communications skills to United Wa Army [UWSA]. There is speculation by regional analysts that the PLA teams are also manning PLA signal intelligence bases the Golden Triangle to monitor Indian and U.S. activities. The Wa and the SLORC are reported to have sophisticated telecom systems purchased from Israel through Singapore middle-men.

It is no coincidence that China and Pakistan, while seeking to keep narcotics from their own territory, are both supporting ruthless neighboring tribal groups – the traliban and the Wa -- who are engaged in massive drug trafficking that is destabilizing their neighboring regions.

The Wa and narcotics trafficking:

Thailand’s main national security threat at present is the rapid expansion of meth-amphetamine narcotics trafficking by the PLA-backed 25,000 soldier Wa tribal army [UWSA] in Burma, who are expanding trafficking routes into Laos and Cambodia and down the central and southern Burma-Thai border to areas opposite Mae Hong Son and Mae Sot, with the support of the SLORC. The base-chemical ephedrine used to make the meth comes largely from mainland China. This year, between 600 million and 1 billion meth-amphetamine pills – at a street value of over $1 billion – are expected to be trafficked into Thailand, and largely consumed by Thai youth. The drug trade, as Thailand has not fully recovered from its economic crash of 1997, threatens to erode the fabric of Thai society and corrupt the development of a democratic process.

Significantly, the Wa army’s southern movement into areas opposite Mae Hong Son and Mae Sot that were previously inhabited by the anti-SLORC and primarily Christian Karen and Karenni tribes. These areas follow along the strategic Salween River, which flows from China through Burma to the Andaman Sea. There are numerous reports of the increased presence of Chinese migrants who now dominate the banks of both the Irrawaddy and Salween Rivers. In addition, the Wa have moved members of its army to the India border, where they are trafficking PLA weapons to anti-government tribes, such as the Nagas.

There are divisions within the Wa that could possibly be exploited. The Wa are divided into two or three groups – all are bad. Some 800,000 northern Wa straddling the Burma-China border, while 30,000 southern Wa – including some 5,000 soldiers -- have moved, with the support of the SLORC, to create new towns opposite of Thailand’s Chiang Rai province. The southern Wa leader is a Han Chinese named Wei Hsueh-kang, who does not speak the Wa language. Previously, Wei was the accountant for Khun Sa’s massive opium business.

Thai officials report that Rangoon-based opium king Khun Sa is making a comeback in the narcotics trade under the patronage of the SLORC. Although his son, Charm Herng is reportedly playing a more active role in the drug business, as are elements of Khun Sa’s disbanded Shan army. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency believes that Burma will produce 3,000 tons of opium this year, second only to Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan.

Wei Shueh-kang’s two brothers are also involved in the drug trade, but he is apparently not on cordial terms with them. Further complicating matters, Wei was born a member of the pro-Taiwan KMT members who found refuge in Thailand after the communist takeover in China. Some Thai officials believe that Wei and some of his Wa cater to and play-off elements in both Beijing and Taipei for their own interests. Although the tough and professional soldiers of the northern Wa [with many PLA leaders] are believed to be more closely tied to Beijing.

Most leaders of Wa are Yunnan Chinese, many associated with PLA. Reportedly, northern Wa and southern Wa factions don’t trust each other because of competition over narcotics profits. In addition, the Burmese Kokang and Shan tribes, who are also heavily involved in meth-amphetamine trafficking, are rivals of the Wa. The Lahu and Shan tribes are angry at the Wa for moving into their territory in Thai border area. The Lahu are much better educated than Wa, but cannot match the Wa in brute force. The Thais believe the Shan would stay out of a conflict between the Lahu and Wa.

The Wa, the SLORC and the PLA:

The Wa are involved in the leadership power struggle within the SLORC to succeed General Tan Shwe that is being conducted between SLORC intelligence chief General Khin Nyunt and SLORC army chief General Maung Aye. Wei Shueh-kang is getting many privileges from Khin Nyunt, who has also developed ties to northern Wa. In 1999, Khin Nyunt attended the anniversary of the United Wa State Army [UWSA] near the Thai border at Bang San. SLORC strong man Ne Win is Khin Nyunt’s father in law.

China reportedly will support Khin Nyunt over Muang Aye, who fought many tough battles against the Wa before 1989, when the Wa opposed the Burmese government as the military arm of the Beijing-backed Burmese Communist party. The Kokang and Shan State Army will probably support Muang Aye. If Muang Aye wins the power struggle he may try to neutralize the Wa. However, that could be difficult because he also seeks Beijing’s support. The SLORC is beholden to China because of their reliance on PLA weapons to remain in power. The Thais believe neither SLORC general will be friendly toward Thailand. The current crackdown on Aung San Suu Kyi and her democratic allies in Rangoon demonstrates the ruthlessness of the entire junta. And Gen. Maung Aye is believed to despise Thailand, almost as much as he loathes the Wa.

The cash-strapped SLORC pays China for the weapons partly in agriculture and the rest over a period of time through long-term loans. The PRC puts pressure on the SLORC for strategic and commercial access for the sea coasts and islands, as well as the flow of goods down the Salween River.

Thai experts on Burma do not believe that there is little chance for positive change within the SLORC at this time. Because the younger Colonels are beholden to the junta’s ”old guard” for promotion. There are no identifiable “young Turks” in the Burmese army. Regional military commanders give colonels a chance to earn their own living – in Burma’s economy this probably involves the drug trade. Khin Nyunt is not directly involved in the drug trade, but the entire SLORC collects taxes from drug manufacturers and traffickers. Army commanders get no funds from the SLORC, so they rely on drug “taxes” to pay their soldiers. However, commanders must send a percentage of the tax to the junta leadership. Recently, a regional commander was sacked by the SLORC for not sending adequate drug tax revenues to Rangoon.

GOLDEN TRIANGLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1) Assist pro-freedom forces in Burma: The Wa and other Burmese narcotics traffickers are supported by the SLORC military junta. Their trafficking routes now encompass areas where other tribal groups have been driven out. It would benefit the counter-narcotics effort to provide humanitarian and other assistance, albeit quietly, to pro-Western tribes such as the Karens and Karennis. In addition, the notion by some U.S. officials that there are moderate persons within the SLORC with whom, “we can do business,” should be dispelled. Until the non-democratic and criminal forces are defeated there will not be peace in the region and democratic allies, such as Thailand, will remain in peril of being destabilized by drug trade-related corruption.

2) Assist Thai army counter-narcotics forces with improved communications equipment: Thai 3^rd Army Region counter-narcotics forces are hindered by the lack of adequate communication equipment to match the narcotics traffickers. The U.S. Government should assist Thai counter-narcotics forces with either excess military equipment or aid to purchase adequate communications gear.

4) Provide Thai army counter-narcotics forces with sufficient night vision devices: Most narcotics trafficking activities are night operations in mountain and forested terrain. Thai counter narcotics ground forces and helicopters need adequate night vision devices to conduct effective operations.

5) Encourage Japan and Australia to politically pressure the SLORC to end heir despotic rule: The SLORC is looking to Japan and Australia to be the primary sources of capital investment into their regime in Burma. Both governments have been less than assertive in using their leverage to influence the junta. The United States should urge Tokyo and Canberra to use all available pressure to encourage the SLORC to end their despotic rule and support for drug trafficking, release Aung San Suu Kyi from confinement, and abide by democratic elections.

6) Provide direct humanitarian assistance to anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan: The solution to the haven for international terrorists, such as Osama bin Laden, and the world’s largest opium production conducted in Afghanistan, which has been supported by the military regime of Pakistan and its Inter-service Intelligence Agency, can be resolved only by a military defeat of the Taliban and bin Laden on the battlefield. The U.S. should: a) provide direct humanitarian and other assistance to Afghan anti-Taliban forces, such as those of Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, b) encourage Pashtun tribal leaders in the Kandahar area to remove the fanatical Taliban leadership and join the inter-Afghan peace initiative of King Zahir Shah; and c) pressure Pakistan leaders to end their assistance to rogue regimes such as the Taliban and the SLORC.