By Greg May and Paul Saunders

The growth of the Russia-China strategic partnership, first announced in 1996, is a testament to America's talent for simultaneously alienating both Moscow and Beijing. The "Beijing Declaration" signed by Presidents Jiang Zemin and Vladimir Putin July 18 is merely the latest demonstration of the fact that the United States is the primary force driving the two countries together.

In the statement, the two sides pledge to promote the "multi-polarization" of the world through the United Nations; reiterate their opposition to any amendment to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (the two leaders also signed a separate joint statement to this effect); and state that no "outside force" should interfere in the Taiwan issue. Nevertheless, while the "Beijing Declaration" contains many digs at the United States, it includes very little discussion of shared strategic interests beyond the usual platitudes about economic cooperation (still disappointing to both), stability, and "good neighborly friendship."

Of the two, China is more gung-ho about the strategic partnership. China is facing a possible clash with the United States over Taiwan, missile defense, and Japanese remilitarization and, aside from loopy North Korea, Beijing has few backers in Asia or elsewhere. Furthermore, with the U.S. cracking down on Israeli arms sales to China, Russia is more important than ever as a source of technology for the People's Liberation Army.

Though eager for Russian support, Chinese leaders worry that Putin will orient Russia more towards the West. The new Russian president passed up several opportunities to summit with Jiang and, in the end, stopped in Beijing for just 36 hours on his way to North Korea and the G-8 summit in Okinawa. In contrast, Putin has already had two meetings with Bill Clinton since being elected Russia's president. In February, Putin talked with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright about Russia's European "mentality" while describing his own connection to Asia as going little beyond his fondness for Chinese food and judo.

China was also caught flatfooted in June when the new Russian president proposed development of a pan-European missile defense system incooperation with NATO and the EU as an alternative to unilateral American anti-ballistic missile programs. Putin's proposal illustrates the degree to which Russia must balance its foreign policy between East and West.

While Moscow is genuinely concerned about U.S. unilateralism and sees multi-polarity as a way simultaneously to limit America's freedom of action and to increase its own influence, Russia is significantly constrained by its present economic circumstances and cannot afford to burn its bridges. In this context, Mr. Putin seems to have a clear grasp of his country's need for Western investment (though his understanding of how to obtain it appears less developed). His statements and actions suggest that he has taken a pragmatic decision not to rock the boat too much in relations with the U.S. and the West.

Moreover, unlike China, Russia has a credible option of working with Europeans skeptical of U.S. global leadership to further its international objectives. President Putin's remarkably favorable reception at Okinawa demonstrates this. Thus Beijing is dispensable to some extent as Moscow can attempt to work with Europe to limit American "hegemonism" and hardly need fear that China will give up the fight itself. When added to lingering Russian concerns about China's potential threat to the thinly populated Russian Far East and low levels of bilateral trade and investment, this makes it difficult to believe that the Moscow-Beijing "strategic partnership" will live up to its name.

More broadly, any alliance based so completely on mutual suspicion of a third party (as opposed to shared positive interests) is bound to be fragile. The Sino-American strategic partnership of the 1970s and 80s fell to pieces rapidly when the Soviet threat disappeared. The current Russia-China partnership will likely plateau as well unless the United States throws more fat on the fire by, for example, expanding NATO to the Baltic States.

At the same time, economic recovery in Russia may slow weapons sales to China driven by a desperate need for cash. A deal on missile defense that excludes China could also pull the rug out from under any Moscow-Beijing axis. In short, it would not take much to bring the natural repulsion between Russia and China back to the foreground. Only an irresponsible American foreign policy--one that, against all odds, insures that Eurasia's two giants enjoy better relations with each other than they do with the United States--could father a serious Sino-Russian partnership.

Mr. May is Assistant Director of The Nixon Center while Mr. Saunders is the Center's Director.