By David M. Lampton

As president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations for nearly a decade, I had to deliver both welcome and unwelcome news to Chinese policy-makers. I again find myself needing to bring unwelcome truths to Beijing's attention.

The recent White Paper on Taiwan policy entitled "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue," and the People's Daily editorial released the same day (Feb. 21), are counterproductive. These documents will be seen in Taiwan, throughout East Asia, and in the United States as an awkward attempt to influence the Taiwan elections and a threat to the people of Taiwan to start negotiating reunification, or else. While there are some conciliatory components in the Beijing statements, most attention will be directed to the following. "[I]f the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die [indefinitely], the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits reunification through negotiations, then the Chinese government will only be forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force..." Procrastination will be punished. If this new precondition endures as a fixture of policy, which I suspect it will, it sets the stage for instability in East Asia, it makes any form of reunification between the mainland and Taiwan even less probable, and it adds fuel to an incipient arms race across the Strait and in the region.

The White Paper is just another step in what has been a worrisome tendency evident over the years. For Chairman Mao Zedong, resolution of the Taiwan problem was thought about in terms of a hundred years. For Deng Xiaoping, the period was fifty years. With the present statement out of Beijing, the time horizon has been further foreshortened, albeit indefinitely. At the same time, public opinion on Taiwan is nowhere near contemplating any form of reunification. This shortened time horizon increases anxieties on Taiwan. Mounting anxiety on the island, in turn, produces more calls for U.S. weapons sales to Taipei, justifies firmer security guarantees to Taiwan from Washington, and fosters more unpredictable political rhetoric in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington. Cumulatively, this increases the chances that the situation will careen out of control.

Further, Beijing's line makes it more likely that Washington will pursue policies to which the PRC is adamantly opposed. Beijing does not want Taiwan included in defensive missile systems under development by the United States--this statement increases the probability of that occurring. Beijing does not want Washington to increase the level of its security commitment to Taipei--Beijing's rhetoric increases the likelihood of precisely that. Beijing wants Congress to agree to permanent most-favored-nation (normal) tariff status for the PRC--this makes the environment for its consideration just that much more difficult, though I believe Congress should and will approve it under current circumstances. In short, while the White Paper has the earmarks of an ambivalent compromise coming out of Beijing, it will be perceived abroad as another ratchet up in pressure on Taiwan.

Most fundamentally, however, this statement reveals that Beijing sees the Taiwan problem as a combination of deterrence and compellance. Deter Taiwan from seeking anything that looks like independence or divided sovereignty and compel Taipei to move toward some form of negotiations. In the end, however, with Taiwan having a political system that is responsive to the people, Beijing's ultimate job is to attract the people of Taiwan to a reunified China. Deterrence may prevent independence, but it cannot achieve reunification, and this is where the White Paper is woefully inadequate.

As for American policy, the United States should credibly reiterate it commitment to a "peaceful resolution" of cross-Strait issues, wait for the people of Taiwan to elect their new leader in less than a month's time, get both the PRC and Taiwan into the World Trade Organization where they can establish new channels of communication, and not complicate matters further for the new administrations that are to come both in Taipei and Washington.

David M. Lampton, is Director of Chinese Studies at Johns Hopkins-SAIS and The Nixon Center and served as president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in New York from 1988-1997.