Colonel Larry M. Wortzel

While the debate over the advisability of fielding a limited national ballistic missile defense system has captured front stage, the problem posed by theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) also must be addressed. Regional hegemons will use their ballistic missile capabilities to intimidate and coerce regional states and, where necessary, to defeat a competitor or at least compel it to pursue a particular course of action. This modus operandi frequently will threaten U.S. interests in regions around the globe. Efforts to counter this threat currently take the form of theater ballistic missile defenses (TBMD). Some key advantages and disadvantages of TBMD can be examined by using the People's Republic of China situation as an example.

The People's Liberation Army and the leaders of China are concerned that theater missile defenses in Asia might undermine their ability to use missiles as regional threats. They are more concerned that national missile defenses in the United States (or Russia) will neutralize their more limited intercontinental ballistic missile second strike capability. But because of the way modern war is conducted, the greater threat to stability and peace in Asia is the fact that there are no TBMD. Without TBMD, the only answer to missiles is strike warfare.

With TBMD in Asia, whether in Taiwan, Korea or Japan, China will build more missiles in order to be assured that sufficient numbers will get through what would be an imperfect defense. But without TBMD, the PLA will build more missiles anyway because of the strike warfare threat. With no TBMD, in the event that Taiwan or one of the other countries perceived a missile attack was imminent or was under attack, the only way to limit the threat would be through massive, precision strike warfare. That is, as we saw in the Gulf War, the threatened country would have to penetrate the airspace and territory of the attacker with strong, deadly and numerous precision strikes intended to destroy the missile launchers, storage bases, logistic sites, and road or rail transport systems in China. This means that a very serious crisis or conflict that could be resolved with defensive systems would immediately escalate into a war.

A brief review of the coalition reaction against the Iraqi use of ballistic missiles in the Persian Gulf is useful to illustrate how precision strike warfare against missile launchers is conducted. First, the ability to locate mobile launchers, even before they launch missiles, requires a good intelligence and surveillance network. Reconnaissance aircraft, such as the J-Stars, satellites, or drones, locate moving targets by radar and vector strike aircraft or cruise missiles against the targets. Alternatively, and this was done during the Gulf War, clandestine teams of special operating forces might be inserted into the areas from which missiles could be launched or stored to direct strikes against targets. Finally, phased array radar systems in the country being attacked could be used to detect the launches. These systems, such as the AN/TPQ-37 artillery locating radar or the sort of phased-array radar on AEGIS cruisers, will calculate the exact launch point of a missile (or artillery round) in milliseconds and transmit highly accurate data to strike aircraft or cruise missile launch sites, bringing an immediate precision strike response. This is not idle speculation nor are these mere academic scenarios. This is the way that strike warfare is conducted.

China's response to the threat of strike warfare, like its response to the potential for TBMD, will be to build more missiles now. Thus, with or without TBMD, China will build more missiles, as many missiles as its budget permits. With TBMD, especially in Taiwan, the psychological impact of the threat to use missiles may be weaker. But without TBMD in Taiwan, the PLA could well precipitate exactly the sort of major, bloody war that China (and the rest of the region) would like to avoid. No TBMD means that in the case of a PRC missile attack on Taiwan, the only defense for the island is for its military forces to strike the mainland offensively. In a region without TBMD, the only defense is a very rigorous offense. The PLA, therefore, must think through very carefully the second and third order effects of its missile buildup. The law of unintended consequences is going to work, and it may upset Beijing's goals.

The necessity for offensive strike operations as a missile defense is also of great concern to the United States. The United States recognizes that there is one China, and that the government of the People's Republic of China is its head. But the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) commits the United States to maintain the capacity of Taiwan to defend itself, makes boycotts or embargoes a matter of "grave concern," and makes any conflict in the East Asia region "a matter of concern for the United States." There is some wisdom, in light of this law, in working to develop TMDs with Taiwan. TMDs are a stabilizing influence that provide an option other than offensive strikes in response to a very credible threat against Taiwan by China.

Of course, China's military planners know these things. The military literature published by China's defense intellectuals reflects a sophisticated analysis of the Gulf War and of how strike warfare is conducted. The PLA knows that it must develop missiles that will attack and destroy any enemy radar emitters that could be used to detect and respond to a missile attack. The PLA has assessed the need to develop its own robust anti-missile defenses. The PLA has also examined its need to develop and field anti-satellite weapons so that it can destroy space-based sensors and global positioning satellites that would be used to detect missile launch points on the Chinese mainland and vector an attack on them.

In summary, while China feels threatened by ballistic missiles and is concerned that its own ability to coerce would be reduced if ballistic missile defenses were introduced in East Asia, it should be more threatened by the near-certainty of war if no ballistic missile defenses are in the region. The Asia-Pacific region around China's periphery is a far more dangerous place without defenses, and China's use of missiles against Taiwan may well have the effect of destroying China's own strategy.