Critical Questions in U.S. Taiwan Policy

Martin L. Lasater

March 1999

There are many factors comprising U.S. support for Taiwan. These include American values, the views of Congress, and Realpolitik considerations of U.S. interests, strategy, and policy. Given the decentralized nature of American foreign policymaking, all three factors will continue to have an important impact on the degree of support Taiwan receives from the United States. Generally speaking, there is reason to expect that U.S. support for Taiwan will remain strong when American values and the views of Congress are considered, but there are fewer reasons to expect strong support when Realpolitik calculations are taken into account.

1. To what extent is China a threat to U.S. interests in Asia? This is a question that will confront American strategists for years to come, and it centers around the issue of whether the United States and the PRC can accommodate each other as China modernizes and seeks to expand its sphere of influence in Asia, while the United States seeks to maintain its forward presence, its credibility among Asian Pacific allies, and a favorable balance of power, a corollary of which is that the United States will oppose the rise of a regional hegemon.

Over the past decade there have been a large number of issues between the United States and China which are symptomatic of the tension between the emerging power of the PRC and the status quo power of the United States. These include problems of imbalanced trade, nuclear weapons and ballistic missile proliferation, human rights abuses, the PLA's growing power projection capability, Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea, and the fact that China continues to be governed by a communist system at a time when democracy is in ascendancy elsewhere around the world. These differences between the United States and China will not be resolved by settling the Taiwan issue.

Some analysts point to these and other difficulties as evidence that the United States and China are on a collision course in East Asia, but evidence also exists that such a collision is not at all inevitable: the leadership of both countries seem committed to maintaining a strategic dialogue, trade and other economic linkages are growing rapidly between the two countries, economic and social trends in China suggest greater political openness in the future, and the United States and China are not natural enemies with common borders. These and similar factors hold out the very real possibility that the two countries will find ways to manage their relationship without military conflict. And it is certainly in the interests of both countries to do so, since the military forces of each are powerful in both a conventional and nuclear sense and since the costs of such a conflict would be enormous across a wide range of strategic, military, political, and economic interests for both sides.

Still, in truth, either confrontation or cooperation may exist in future Sino-American relations. Given this reality, a twofold approach for the United States seems most reasonable. Washington should, on the one hand, seek to engage China and increase areas of cooperation; on the other hand, the United States must be prepared to face a possible conflict with China. The United States can do much to ensure that the latter scenario does not occur, but China has responsibilities as well; and the best of intentions may not suffice to overcome the significant tensions that exist in Sino-American relations. Under the circumstances, it would be unwise for the United States to compromise either its values or interests in efforts to maintain friendly relations with China. To the extent that Taiwan has value for the United States and unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relations are in the American interest, the United States should not compromise its ties with Taiwan for the sake of cooperative engagement with Beijing; but neither should the United States sacrifice engagement with Beijing for the sake of ties with Taiwan. Taipei is unlikely to force this choice on Washington, but Beijing might; in which case the United States should refuse to play by PRC rules.

2. Would U.S. accommodation over Taiwan lead to improved U.S.-PRC ties? As long as the Taiwan issue remains unresolved, it likely will remain an obstacle in Sino-American relations. However, Taiwan is not the only obstacle in the relationship, nor is it the core problem. Even if the Taiwan issue did not exist, there are sufficient differences between the United States and China to cause Sino-American relations to be deeply troubled.

Nonetheless, it is worth pondering whether China would change its policies in the areas of security, trade, and democratic and free market values, the traditional American interests in Asia, if Washington changed its policies toward Taiwan, for example, by actively promoting Chinese unification under the one country, two systems formula. Judging from Beijing's past behavior, such a tit-for-tat seems unlikely on the part of CCP leaders. On the other hand, if China would make significant progress toward becoming more democratic, toward stopping its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, toward balancing its trade with the United States and ending unfair trading practices, toward respecting the human rights of its citizens, and toward joining the United States in a true partnership to ensure peace and prosperity in Asia, then perhaps the United States might consider adjusting its policies.

However, these conditions are unlikely to be met in the near future, despite Jiang Zemin's willingness to allow Bill Clinton to speak his mind publicly during the U.S. president's state visit. China remains under the control of a communist party dictatorship. Hence, there is no strategic imperative for the United States to make concessions over Taiwan. Furthermore, if the PRC introduces the above policy changes, then the ROC itself has promised to move toward unification with the mainland. This would effectively remove the Taiwan issue from Sino-American relations and be rightfully regarded as a success in U.S. foreign policy, two goals of which have been significant progress toward democratization in China and the peaceful resolution of Taiwan-mainland differences.

Thus, whereas it is true that U.S. concessions over Taiwan probably would lead to short-term improvement in Sino-American relations, it would not lead to substantive change in PRC policies which harm long-term U.S. interests. As long as the United States seeks to maintain a favorable balance of power in the Western Pacific by opposing the rise of a regional hegemon, and as long as the PRC seeks to expand its sphere of influence in Asia, then U.S. and Chinese interests will intersect and sometimes collide in the Western Pacific. Taiwan is a highly visible and sensitive issue in Sino-American relations, but its resolution cannot solve the more fundamental conflict of interests between the United States and China.

3. Are the forces of independence on Taiwan greater than the forces seeking to preserve the status quo or to unify with the mainland? There are both centripetal forces drawing Taiwan and the mainland closer together through economic ties and cultural affiliation and centrifugal forces of self-determination on Taiwan pushing the two sides apart.

Domestic politics on Taiwan have greatly complicated the Taiwan issue in Sino-American relations. The KMT and the ROC government adhere to a one-China policy, insisting that Taiwan would become part of a democratic China in the future. KMT and ROC leaders insist that Taiwan will never become part of the PRC, however, specifically saying that the mainland's democratization must come before unification. The DPP holds that Taiwan should be considered a nation-state separate from China, regardless of the form of government on the mainland. Most members of the DPP do not want to antagonize the PRC, however, and many moderate DPP are in favor of closer state-to-state ties with Beijing. Furthermore, DPP leaders have promised that if their party one day becomes the ruling party of Taiwan, they will not formally declare the independence of Taiwan because in their view Taiwan already is independent.

Regardless of whether Taiwan is ruled by the KMT or the DPP, Beijing insists that Taiwan is a part of the People's Republic of China. Virtually everyone on Taiwan rejects that notion. The people of Taiwan, as well as their present KMT-led government and possible future DPP government, are adamantly opposed to unification under any formula with the mainland as long as it is controlled by the communists. On the other hand, the vast majority of Taiwan's population and its political leaders favor closer substantive ties with the PRC, including trade, cultural exchanges, and high-level dialogue. Incremental progress toward eventual unification with the mainland remains a strong possibility as long as China moves toward greater economic and political liberalization, as long as Beijing resists the temptation of trying to resolve the Taiwan issue by force, and as long as the PRC does not push Taiwan into a corner by undermining completely its participation in the international community.

On balance, the forces of long-term integration with the mainland seem stronger than the forces dividing the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. However, the process of integration will take time. It cannot be forced on the people of Taiwan without severe repercussions in terms of their security and their social, economic, and political stability. In this sense, the preservation of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and the postponement of the sensitive political question of Taiwan's future relationship with the mainland are the best approaches. U.S. policy toward the Taiwan issue should remain centered around the principle that the future of Taiwan must be resolved peacefully by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Washington should not attempt to preempt the process or predetermine its course.

4. Should the United States support a particular outcome of the Taiwan issue? Despite the Clinton administration's public reaffirmation of the three no's, U.S. policy as of 1999 does not support a specific outcome of the Taiwan issue. The policy instead supports the process of peacefully resolving the issue. It is extremely unlikely, for example, that Washington would oppose independence for Taiwan if Beijing and Taipei agreed that Taiwan should be independent, or that Washington would oppose one China, one Taiwan if Beijing and Taipei agreed to that formula, or likewise if they agreed to a two-Chinas solution to the Taiwan issue. The United States probably would support whatever solution was agreed to by the two Chinese sides, whether it be unification, independence, or some other option.

It is not politically possible, morally correct, or sound policy for the United States to try to force the people of Taiwan to unify with a communist-controlled China. Nor is it possible, correct, or wise for Washington to try to force Beijing to accept Taiwan independence. What does seem reasonable is for the United States to continue supporting a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, an important corollary of which is that both sides of the Taiwan Strait must agree to a particular solution. If the two sides cannot agree, however, it is not the responsibility of the United States to compel their agreement, or to find a solution to their problems, or to pressure one side to accept the other's formula. It would remain in the U.S. interest to encourage their continued dialogue.

If the people of Taiwan, perhaps under a future DPP government, should elect in a referendum to found a new country, say the Republic of Taiwan, the PRC may well feel justified to use force to maintain the territorial integrity of China. This would be a nightmare scenario for the United States, and the U.S. reaction would be influenced by enormous surges of emotion in various directions. It would be difficult for the American people and their government to stand aside and watch a communist state attack a democratic society for the express purpose of compelling its absorption into the communist state. However, the United States should not support the division of China. Would it be possible for the United States to ensure that the PRC would be unsuccessful in militarily defeating Taiwan, while at the same time avoiding the diplomatic recognition of an independent Taiwan? It would seem so, but how the U.S. administration in office at the time would respond to this challenge is open to speculation. In truth, no one knows.

Assuming that the resolution of the Taiwan issue can be peaceful, how would the various scenarios for Taiwan's future affect U.S. interests? A great deal depends upon the nature of Sino-American relations.

If China were democratic, market-oriented, non-hegemonic, and wanted cooperative, friendly relations with the United States, then Taiwan's unification with the mainland would not adversely affect U.S. interests. In fact, U.S. relations with the Greater China would probably be quite friendly. If China were communist, socialist-oriented, hegemonic, and considered the United States an enemy, then Taiwan's unification with the mainland could adversely affect U.S. interests, Beijing certainly would be better positioned in the Western Pacific to project power in opposition to the United States. If Taiwan were independent, if there were two Chinas, or if the status quo in the Taiwan Strait were maintained indefinitely, U.S. interests would not be harmed if China were democratic and friendly. If China were hostile, U.S. interests would not be harmed by these scenarios for Taiwan's future since a divided China is a weakened China.

In short, assuming both sides were able to agree upon Taiwan's future relationship with the mainland, only under the circumstance of Taiwan unifying with a China hostile to the United States would American interests be seriously threatened.

If it is assumed that the two sides cannot agree on Taiwan's future, either the status quo would persist or the issue would be settled by military or other pressures exerted on Taiwan. U.S. interests would not be harmed by a continuation of the status quo (although some Americans would add the caveat: except insofar as it hinders better U.S.-PRC relations), but U.S. interests would definitely be harmed if the PRC used force to resolve the Taiwan issue. War between the two sides would disrupt regional peace and stability, and the outcome of the struggle would not be accepted easily by the losing party. Under conditions of forced unification, the government and people of Taiwan would be dissatisfied and possibly agitate for freedom. If the mainland were forced to accept Taiwan independence, two-Chinas, or one China, one Taiwan, then Beijing would be dissatisfied and work to overthrow the arrangement.

Thus, it is clear that U.S. interests are best served by a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, i.e., a resolution agreed to by both sides. Such a resolution is not yet in sight, but until that formula can be found, U.S. interests are served by ensuring that no war erupts in the Taiwan Strait and by encouraging both sides to continue their dialogue and exchanges.

5. Is it in the U.S. interest to more actively support Taiwan's reunification with China by pressuring Taipei to be more accommodating in cross-Strait negotiations? The main reason the ROC government and people on Taiwan do not support unification is their unwillingness to be part of a China controlled by a central government dominated by the Chinese Communist Party, which is the essence of Beijing's one country, two systems formula. The residents of Taiwan want to preserve their freedom, self-determination, and new democracy. They have no desire to become a subordinate unit in a China ruled by an authoritarian government.

As long as China is under the control of the CCP, the ROC government and Taiwan people will not accept, absent extreme duress, political unification with the mainland. To do so is to risk their freedom, way of life, and self-identity in exchange for a PRC promise of non-interference in their internal affairs for a certain period of time. But there is no guarantee the PRC promise will be kept. And if Taiwan already has joined the PRC, then the international community, including the United States, will have no recourse but to accept what Beijing decides in regards to Taiwan.

After years of dealing with the PRC, the United States should recognize Beijing's negotiating tactics and not allow itself to be manipulated into supporting unification schemes. The United States should not be pressuring, even indirectly, democratic societies to join communist states. Without a serious threat to U.S. security, the likelihood of the Congress and the American people accepting such a policy, even if some administration tried to adopt it as a means of furthering a strategic partnership with the PRC, is very small.

The best U.S. policy is to continue to insist that the two Chinese sides work out their own differences, but that they do so peacefully. It might yet prove to be a serious error for President Clinton to attempt in Shanghai to deny Taiwan the option of independence and to try to limit Taipei's efforts to be a full-fledged member of the international community. The option of greater international autonomy was one of the most important bargaining chips Taipei possessed to convince the PRC to continue its reforms so as to make the mainland more attractive to the Taiwan people. Clinton's three no's did not further the U.S. goal of a democratic China, but they may have weakened Taiwan's democracy. The lesson should be clear: the United States should avoid taking sides in the Taiwan-China dispute except to insist that the resolution of their differences be peaceful.

6. What guidelines should govern future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan? The fundamental U.S. interest in the Taiwan issue is that it be settled peacefully. This implies that Taiwan agree to any settlement with China. Until that occurs, Taiwan should have an adequate self-defense capability. This ensures that Beijing will be deterred from using force under most circumstances and that U.S. forces will not have to be deployed to the Taiwan area except under conditions of extreme provocation by the PRC. These guidelines exist in U.S. law under the Taiwan Relations Act, and the August 17 communiqué must be interpreted in ways consistent with that law since the TRA takes legal precedence over the communiqué. To date, the United States has sold Taiwan great quantities of defensive equipment, including many advanced systems such as air defense fighters, antisubmarine frigates, main battle tanks, air defense missiles, antiship missiles, a Patriot system, early warning radar, and so forth.

Arms sales to Taiwan are always a sensitive issue in Sino-American relations, because Beijing views such sales as encouraging Taiwan to resist PRC unification proposals. There is some truth to this, but to withhold defensive arms to Taiwan would in effect be pressuring Taipei to accept unwanted unification. Of the two options, continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is preferable since it serves U.S. interests in a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue and its corollary that Taiwan must agree to any resolution of its future status with China.

Future U.S. arms sales should be based on the needs of Taiwan for its self-defense, as determined by procedures outlined in the TRA. At present, Taiwan is very weak in the areas of missile defense and countering a submarine-enforced blockade of the island. These are areas which should be addressed in greater detail by the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government, despite protests from the PRC.

7. Should the United States become involved in a war between China and Taiwan, regardless of the circumstances precipitating the conflict? It is not possible nor is it wise for the United States to specify under what conditions it would intervene militarily in the Taiwan Strait. The possible types of conflict range from a surprise PRC missile attack against key Taiwan installations, to a blockade of the island followed by an amphibious invasion, to a campaign of assassination and sabotage carried out by PRC special operations forces, to an accidental exchange of fire in the Taiwan Strait during military exercises. Perhaps the key question under present circumstances is whether the United States would intervene if the PRC attacked Taiwan to prevent it from becoming an independent country.

It is not in the U.S. interest to support or encourage Taiwan to become a separate country from China. Nor is it in the U.S. interest to deny the people of Taiwan their right of self-determination or to compel them to accept a certain status in the world or relationship with China. The key U.S. interest is a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue, an interest which requires that the people of Taiwan have a voice in their own destiny.

If a freely elected government on Taiwan agrees to unify with the mainland, and there is civil disorder on Taiwan caused by those who disagree with that decision, the United States should not intervene to quell that disturbance. Nor should the PRC, unless invited to do so by the Taiwan authorities. If the people of Taiwan decide in a referendum to pursue separate statehood from China, and the democratically-elected government of Taiwan seeks to put that decision into effect, there is a strong possibility the PRC will attack Taiwan. Under those circumstances, what should the United States do?

This a policy conundrum of the first order, since the circumstances would pose serious contradictions between U.S. interests in preserving peace in the Taiwan Strait, in avoiding a major conflict with the PRC, in supporting the right of Taiwan's citizens to exercise self-determination, and in protecting market-democracies from communist attack. Without question, there would be strong voices heard in the United States in favor of military intervention, and there would be strong voices opposing involvement. These conditions probably would precipitate a bitter policy debate between an administration reluctant to be drawn into the conflict and a Congress insisting that Taiwan be protected.

The outcome of that debate is impossible to predict, but in my view U.S. intervention is probable because: (a) the United States has the means of intervening in militarily significant ways without great cost to American personnel; (b) intervention could be confined to the Taiwan area and not be allowed to escalate into a major war with China, although this may be more difficult due to the PLA's acquisition of advanced weaponry; (c) the U.S. goal would not necessarily be the defeat of China but rather cessation of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait; (d) U.S. intervention would not mean U.S. diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as an independent state; and (e) enough face-saving measures for the Chinese could be put into place to ensure that Sino-American relations would not be irreparably harmed.

8. Should the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan be more explicit? The U.S. policy of ambiguity toward the defense of Taiwan is designed to deter both Beijing and Taipei from adventurism in the Taiwan Strait: Taiwan cannot be certain of U.S. assistance if it provokes China into an attack, and the PRC cannot be certain the United States would fail to respond to a use of force against Taiwan. From the 1950s, uncertainty as to the U.S. response in case of a PRC threat or use of force against Taiwan was thought necessary because it introduced a high degree of caution in the policies of the PRC and ROC.

Ambiguity worked as long as the two Chinese sides were deterred, but many factors in the 1990s have worked to limit the effectiveness of ambiguity: perceptions of the increased possibility of Taiwan independence have raised the risks of a forceful PRC response; the resolution of the Hong Kong and Macau issues has increased the likelihood of PRC impatience with Taiwan; many Chinese analysts believe U.S. power and resolve to be weakening in the post-Cold War period; advanced arms sales have given Taipei greater confidence that it can defend itself; strong congressional and public support have convinced many in Taiwan that the United States will intervene on their behalf under any circumstance; a modernizing PLA has increased confidence in Beijing of its ability to successfully use force against Taiwan, even if the United States does intervene.

9. Is Taiwan defensible without U.S. military intervention? Most military analysts believe that Taiwan would not be able to withstand a concentrated PRC attack intent on defeating the ROC. On the other hand, the ROC has a formidable defense capability that would make an all-out war extremely expensive for China militarily, economically, and politically. If the United States were to intervene early and purposefully on Taiwan's behalf, the PLA would almost certainly be defeated in its efforts to seize Taiwan.

That being said, however, there are many complicating factors. For example, U.S. intervention could not prevent certain kinds of PRC attack, such as missile strikes or special operations such as terror campaigns on Taiwan. For political reasons, the United States might not want to defeat the PLA but merely cause Beijing to call off the attack and seek a negotiated settlement. The PRC may not deploy sufficient forces against Taiwan, since that would weaken China's defense in other border areas. The Chinese goal may not be heavy destruction on Taiwan but rather the political capitulation of Taipei to accept early unification. Taiwan's armed forces, while perhaps not able to defeat a fully committed PLA attack, could defend against a large array of PRC offensive operations, including amphibious assault and most forms of air and sea strikes against Taiwan island. The use of nuclear weapons by either Chinese side, or other weapons of mass destruction, seems very unlikely. Chinese leaders may not be entirely confident of the PLA's ability to attack Taiwan successfully until early in the 21^st century.

There is also a crucial time factor. Estimates for the duration of a conflict between Taiwan and China range from a few days of high-intensity warfare to several weeks of protracted struggle. Many analysts believe that a war in the Taiwan Strait would be a short, intensive conflict in which Beijing would have to win to avoid losing Taiwan and the ROC would have to win to avoid losing self-identity. Under these conditions, U.S. intervention would have to be quick if it were to have an impact on the outcome, although, in view of U.S. intelligence gathering capabilities, adequate warning of a pending PLA attack should be received by Washington. While all-or-nothing scenarios must be prepared for by all sides, the use of force in the Taiwan Strait is much more likely to be moderated by the political calculations of Beijing, Taipei, and Washington. Under these circumstances, political will and posturing may be as important as military capabilities.

10. To what extent should the United States support Taiwan's role in international organizations? This also is a difficult question since it has many political, legal, and moral dimensions. On the political level, the United States is not seeking to separate Taiwan from China. Washington cannot, therefore, be the champion of Taiwan's drive for wider membership in international organizations. The United States recognizes the PRC as the sole legal government of China. Therefore, Washington cannot support the ROC as a national Chinese government in the United Nations or Taiwan's full membership in organizations limited to nation-states. But there is a difference between not supporting Taipei in these international organizations and opposing Taiwan's participation. China may be opposed to Taiwan's participation, but the United States should be non-supportive. In other words, in consideration of Taiwan's long friendship with the United States, Washington should not oppose Taipei's efforts to gain entry into international political organizations.

Currently, Mr. Lasater is a non-resident fellow with the program on Atlantic and Pacific Interrelationships, The Atlantic Council of the United States, in Washington, DC. He has taught at Penn State, the Naval War College, and National Chengchi University. Mr. Lasater has also written numerous books on the Taiwan issue in Sino-American relations and U.S. strategy and policy toward the Asian Pacific.

The commentary is from a forthcoming book to be published by Westview Press in a couple of months, "The Taiwan Conundrum in U.S. China Policy."

Comments are welcome. Please email to: mlasater@home.net