With the world’s attention once again focused on Taiwan because of its March 2000 presidential elections, there has been increased concern over the island’s security: specifically, whether China will use force against Taiwan and whether the United States will intervene to help defend the island. The following paper is the executive summary of an 80-page monograph considering this issue from a policy point of view. Individuals who wish to receive an email version of the complete work may contact the author at the following email address: mlasater@home.net.

The fundamental conclusion of this study is that, under most conditions, the United States will intervene militarily to prevent the PRC defeat of Taiwan.

Although forecasting such an important U.S. decision is problematic, it is possible to identify most of the variables that would play influential roles in that decision. These variables, none of which are solely determining of the U.S. response to a military crisis in the Taiwan Strait, can be grouped into five interrelated categories:

• the circumstances surrounding the crisis
• the personal inclinations of the President and his most important advisors, as well as the institutional preferences of key U.S. governmental departments and organizations
• assessments of the U.S. national interests involved in the crisis
• the political environment in the United States at the time of the crisis
• the availability of American military forces that could intervene effectively in the Taiwan area.

Circumstances. U.S. officials have said repeatedly that the American decision to intervene in a Taiwan Strait crisis would be based on circumstances surrounding the crisis. This is not totally true, since many more factors than circumstances would be considered. Nonetheless, it is possible to define a set of parameters for highly critical circumstantial factors that almost certainly would play an influential role in the U.S. decision. These parameters can be summarized as follows:

• If Washington believes that Beijing precipitated the crisis, then U.S. intervention is far more likely than if Washington thinks that Taipei provoked the PRC into using force.
• If there are no competing domestic or international crises facing the United States at the time of the PRC aggression, then the likelihood of American intervention is much higher than if competing crises place severe demands on U.S. attention and resources.
• The longer the crisis lasts, the more likely the U.S. intervention; the more quickly the crisis is over, the less likely the United States would have time to intervene or to do so effectively.
• The higher the level of force employed by the PRC, the more likely the U.S. intervention; the lower the level of force, the less likely the intervention. (Here, level of force means the number and quality of committed PLA forces.)
• The more intense the application of PLA force, the more likely the American intervention; the less intense the application of force, the less likely the intervention. (For example, invasion versus sabotage.)
• The more vital the ROC target of the PRC attack, the greater the likelihood of American intervention; less important targets are less likely to trigger direct U.S. military involvement.
• If Washington perceived PRC intentions to defeat Taiwan’s armed forces or to force the capitulation of Taiwan’s government, then American intervention would be more likely than if the mainland’s intentions were seen to be intimidation.
• If the government and people of Taiwan appear determined to resist the PRC use of force, then the likelihood of American intervention is higher than if the will to resist appears to be low.

Personal and Institutional Preferences. The personal preferences and inclinations of the President are very important factors in determining whether the United States will intervene on Taiwan’s behalf in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The President’s perceptions of Taiwan and mainland China, his view of cross-Strait relations, his belief in the legitimacy and utility of American intervention, his vision of the American role in the protection of the world’s market democracies, and his opinion of the importance of U.S. global and regional leadership—all will have a critical influence on presidential inclinations to assist Taiwan during times of military crisis.

Generally speaking, if the President knows and respects Taiwan, is critical of the PRC, believes in the right of self-determination, considers military intervention to be a useful instrument of American power, feels obliged to help the global community of market democracies, and firmly supports U.S. leadership and engagement in Asia—then he or she will be inclined to approve American military intervention in the event of a PRC attack on Taiwan. If answers to these questions fall on the opposite side of the spectrum, then the President would be less inclined to intervene.

National Interests. There are many U.S. interests involved with the Taiwan issue, but the most essential are strategic in nature. If the United States wishes to remain the dominant power in the Western Pacific, if it wants to maintain a favorable balance of power in the region to prevent the rise of a competing hegemon, if its strategy continues to be primarily an island-chain strategy centered around the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Australia alliances, and if its economy and political will remain sufficiently robust to defend American interests in Asia, then Washington will likely intervene on Taiwan’s behalf as long as Taiwan remains a democratic state, mainland China remains a communist state, and Beijing appears determined to challenge the international political-economic-security architecture created by the United States to ensure peace and stability in the Western Pacific.

Perception of America’s military and political leadership are very important to U.S. interests. To the extent that American leadership would be more enhanced by American intervention—if executed in a timely, proportionate, and reasoned manner—than it would by non-intervention (especially if that were seen as weakness on the part of Washington or a sign of retreat from global or regional commitments), then intervention would probably occur.

In general, while the economic, ideological, and humanitarian interests of the United States would be considered, they would not be as determining of the American response as U.S. security and political interests. Nonetheless, the role of ideology and human rights concerns in a U.S. decision might be decisive if there were strong public support for intervention or national outrage at the PRC attack against Taiwan.

Political Environment. The decisionmaking process in the United States over whether to intervene would be decentralized. If the public supports intervention on Taiwan’s behalf, if Congress supports intervention, if the President and the administration support intervention—then intervention is highly likely. The opposite is also true: if the public, the Congress, and the President are not in favor of supporting Taiwan, then the probability of intervention is very small.

While a consensus of support for Taiwan or a consensus against intervention are possible, there is a greater likelihood of division of opinion in the United States. In this case, the balance of political power in the country could be crucial. This balance would be reflected in such things as the level of popular support for the President and the Congress, their working relationship, which party controlled the legislative and/or executive branches of government, the proximity of the next elections, and so forth. In general, Taiwan enjoys broad support within the Congress and the public. This support might be sufficient to compel even a reluctant administration to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf. And, in fact, support for Taiwan’s legitimate security needs is high within the administrative bureaucracy as well.

In terms of law, if the Taiwan Relations Act continues in effect, and if the U.S. government interpreted the PRC action as constituting a threat to the people of Taiwan or their way of life, then intervention is likely. If the TRA is weakened or repealed, or if the PRC action was not deemed sufficiently threatening to Taiwan, then the probability of American intervention is considerably less.

Availability of U.S. Forces. It is doubtful the United States would want the final result of its intervention to be the total defeat of the PLA or the collapse of the PRC. Such a result would require massive American military intervention and probably lead to a full-scale war with China. Rather, the end-result sought by Washington would most likely be a return to the status quo ante bellum—with Beijing learning, once again, that the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue is not going to work. The U.S. goal in intervening would almost certainly not be the reestablishment of diplomatic ties with the Republic of China, the diplomatic recognition of a new Republic of Taiwan, or the rupture of Sino-American relations.

The scale of U.S. intervention would be commensurate with the political results Washington had in mind. If U.S. forces were available to achieve these results, then intervention would be far more likely than if American forces were unavailable due to other commitments or for some other reason. This is a highly determining factor in the U.S. response, but also an ambiguous one since the level of U.S. forces thought necessary to deter the PRC might not be sufficient to defeat the PLA, should Beijing decide to risk a high-intensity war with the United States over Taiwan. Because this possibility exists and carries great risks for the United States, American military planners would probably prefer to intervene only if they had sufficient resources available to ensure victory if war ensued. U.S. political leaders, however, would probably have a different calculus in mind, one more tied to American political objective(s).

Scenarios. There are many possible scenarios for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, some of which are more likely than others to draw in the United States. The factors comprising these scenarios are summarized in the following tables: 

 Basic Conclusions. Certain conclusions can be drawn from a detailed study of the probability of China’s use of force against Taiwan and the likely U.S. response. These can be summarized as follows:

1. China is willing to go to war over Taiwan. The PRC seems most likely to use force against Taiwan if: (a) Taiwan seeks to become an independent nation-state, separate from Chinese territory; or (b) Taiwan appears likely to become a base of military operations for a foreign power such as the United States. Of the two circumstances, the former is more credible.

2. The United States probably will defend Taiwan against PRC aggression. The security of Taiwan is linked to many important U.S. interests, including the maintenance of a favorable balance of power in the Western Pacific. The PRC’s increased power strengthens China’s deterrence against American intervention, but U.S. interests in preventing Chinese hegemony are more important than the risks to American forces.

3. The PLA, already quantitatively superior to ROC armed forces, is gaining qualitatively as well. The ROC probably can defeat a PRC attack until around 2005, at which time the PLA’s modernization—with Russian and other assistance—will pose a quantitative and qualitative threat difficult for Taiwan to match, even with purchases of American weapons and technology.

4. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are critical and likely will continue. Despite the many restrictions on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, enough flows through the pipeline to provide the ROC with defensive capabilities against most forms of PRC aggression. Although these sales might increase as the PLA modernizes and as the PRC exercises its growing national power, U.S. arms sales in themselves are no guarantee of Taiwan’s security.

5. The security of Taiwan is of international strategic concern. Taiwan’s geostrategic importance has increased, not decreased, as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. This is largely because of the rise in PRC power and the uncertainties resulting therefrom. The revised U.S.-Japan defense guidelines almost guarantee that, should Washington become involved in a future conflict in the Taiwan Strait, Tokyo will play a supportive role.

6. The military situation in the Taiwan Strait is increasingly volatile. There is no consensus on the duration of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait or the number of PLA troops and equipment necessary to defeat Taipei. Both sides have their strengths and weaknesses, but the overall trends point to both a quantitative and qualitative advantage accruing to the PRC no later than 2010.

7. PRC missiles pose the greatest threat to Taiwan, since they may suffice to break the will of the Taiwanese people. There are many scenarios by which the PLA may try to defeat Taiwan. In most conventional scenarios, the first priority for Taiwan’s defense is to establish control over the air and sea surrounding Taiwan. The second priority for Taiwan’s defense is to counter a blockade. A third priority for Taiwan’s defense is to counter PLA ground forces attempting to land on the island. However, a critical determinant in a war in the Taiwan Strait is probably the effectiveness of PLA missiles in breaking the will of the Taiwan people to resist, thus making the fourth priority for Taiwan the development of an effective local missile defense system.

8. The national and military strategies of the ROC are evolving but they have not yet solved the problem of long-term survival. Due to the nature of the modern PRC threat to Taiwan—unrelenting political confrontation and preparation for attack—the ROC must continually review and adjust its national strategy and its military strategy. Unfortunately, the restrictions under which Taiwan must operate make an effective defensive strategy difficult to conceptualize and implement.

9. Congress and the American public will likely continue to be supportive of Taiwan. Because Taiwan is a market democracy and friend of the United States, the American people and their representatives in Congress continue to favor a U.S. policy of friendship and support for Taiwan. Congress will act to ensure—through law if necessary—the continued implementation of the TRA’s arms sales requirements and act as a brake on possible administration efforts to move “strategic partnership” with China to a stage obviously harmful to Taiwan’s interests.

10. The principles on which Sino-American relations are built are under severe strain because of developments in China and Taiwan. Since the mid-1980s, but especially since the beginning of the 1990s, these principles have been challenged by a series of trends: (a) the growing national power of the PRC, accompanied by a stronger sense of Chinese nationalism, including a desire for early unification with Taiwan; (b) democratization and Taiwanization within the ROC, giving voice to stronger demands for Taiwan’s political separation from China; and (c) a dramatic shift in the international security environment for the United States, with China replacing Russia as the nation most likely to challenge U.S. global and regional interests in coming decades. As these principles erode, there will be increased calls within the American foreign policy community for a fundamental change in U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan.

11. The probability of a Sino-American confrontation over Taiwan is growing. Neither Beijing nor Washington wants such a confrontation, but the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis proved to both countries that war is possible if the Taiwan issue is not handled carefully. Among the lessons learned from the crisis were: (a) the PRC will use force to intimidate Taiwan if ROC leaders move the island toward greater political autonomy; (b) the United States will intervene on Taiwan’s behalf to prevent excessive PRC intimidation; and (c) actions by the Taiwan government can bring the United States and China to the brink of war. These lessons have resulted in renewed U.S. interest in trying to resolve the Taiwan issue sooner rather than later.

12. Taiwan will benefit from TMD, but its overall security will become more dependent on external factors in the early twenty-first century. In all likelihood, the ROC will acquire PAC-3 and Aegis-based systems for point and low-level missile defense over the next several years. This will increase Taiwan’s ability to defeat some, but not all, PRC cruise missiles and ballistic missiles that might be launched should war occur in the Taiwan Strait. The ability of China to produce large numbers of guided missiles and to acquire state-of-the-art conventional offensive weaponry from Russia and other sources means that Taiwan’s narrow technological advantage over the PRC will likely be overwhelmed in five to ten years (2005–2010). At that time, absent intervention by the United States, Taiwan probably could be defeated by a determined PLA attack.

13. To date, there is no peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue in sight, but the political situation is fluid. In the final analysis, a resolution of the Taiwan question must come from the Chinese themselves on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Thus far, however, neither side has been able to formulate a proposal acceptable to the other. As the security climate in the Taiwan Strait becomes more pressurized, various “wild cards” are emerging that might break through the political impasse and result in peaceful or nonpeaceful resolution. The change in ROC presidency in March 2000 ushers in a period of possible political movement on the Taiwan issue in both Beijing and Taipei.

14. Other than military preparedness, the most important contribution Taiwan can make to its own security is political astuteness. There is no reason to be unduly pessimistic about Taiwan’s future, unless the Taiwan people and their elected officials contribute to their society’s demise by alienating both their enemies and their friends, while at the same time weakening the island’s social cohesion.