By Professor June Teufel Dreyer

Department of Political Science University of Miami Coral Gables Florida 33124

jdreyer@miami.edu

 Prepared for presentation at the International Conference on United States-Taiwan Relations: Twenty Years After the Taiwan Relations Act sponsored by Academia Sinica, April 9-10 1999, Taipei, Republic of China. The author welcomes suggestions for improvement. Please direct them to her at the above address.

  Mainland China has consistently been hostile toward the Taiwan Relations Act. It has interpreted the TRA as the effort of pro-Taiwan forces in the U.S. Congress to subvert the intent if not the actual implementation of the Sino-American normalization agreement and create "two China" or "one Taiwan and one China." A particular irritant to the PRC has been the TRA's pledge to make defensive weapons available to the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Another matter of concern to the Beijing leadership has been the level of the unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan.

  Ever since its enactment in April 1979, Beijing has contended that the Taiwan Relations Act, especially its provisions for arms sales, runs counter to the spirit of both the Shanghai Communiqué of February 1972 and the normalization agreement of December 1978. This view is consistent with recently declassified U.S. materials concerning conversations between then-U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. These, Kissinger suggests, could be reviewed after some interval. In essence, this review occurred in the form of a third communiqué, in August 1982, in which the United States promised to gradually reduce the quantity and quality of its arms sales to Taiwan. The 1982 communiqué, though never formally repudiated by the American side, has frequently been ignored or circumvented.

  The government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has argued that, since the TRA is a domestic decision of the United States, it can have no relevance to China. In addition to regular and vigorous protests against U.S. actions consonant with the TRA, it has

1. used U.S. desire for certain international arrangements and for commercial advantage as leverage to gain concessions from Washington
2. argued that international agreements outweigh domestic legislation
3. sought to obtain a fourth communiqué or other official statements which more clearly undermine or vitiate the intent of the TRA.

 Since the enactment of the TRA, every American administration has affirmed its intention to abide by it. However, as with all legislation, much depends on the interpretation of its clauses. What constitutes a defensive weapon and when there is a military imbalance in the Taiwan Strait are matters on which persons with different ideological proclivities have disagreed, often heatedly. The general trend has been for U.S. presidents to take small steps to placate Beijing and erode the intent of the TRA, hoping to avoid a deterioration of relations with the PRC while not going so far as to inflame domestic opposition. However, to date, these steps have tended to solidify domestic opposition, as was most recently exemplified by the strong congressional reaction to President Clinton's public iteration of the "three noes" during his June 1998 visit to Beijing.

 Background of the Taiwan Relations Act

  The Sino-American rapprochement began in the late 1960s, born of leaders of both countries' fear of the Soviet Union as well as a growing acceptance in the United States that Beijing rather than Taipei represented the de facto government of China. What to do about the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, which had been a loyal ally of the United States, had been a vexing question in the minds of many Americans for some years. While civil rights in the ROC at that time left much to be desired, conditions there were unequivocally far superior to those in the People's Republic of China (PRC). And, whereas by 1971 the PRC's economy had recovered from the disasters caused by the Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, it was nonetheless mired in poverty and making little progress. This, too, contrasted sharply with the vibrant and growing economy of Taiwan.

U.S. National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made several secret trips to Beijing to discuss a formula for unification<1> which would be acceptable to the PRC while yet maintaining the status quo on Taiwan. The compromise finally arrived at, the Shanghai Communiqué, which was signed by U.S. President Richard Nixon and Chinese Communist Party head Mao Zedong, stated that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States does not challenge that position." While this phraseology was a clever diplomatic fiction, it ignored the views of substantial numbers of native-born Taiwanese<2> who, though publicly voiceless at that time, were known to hold contrary views. <3>

Also in the communiqué, the Chinese side stated that "Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; <4> the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere…the Chinese government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creating of 'one China, one Taiwan,' 'one China, two governments,' 'two China,' an 'independent Taiwan,' or advocate that the status of Taiwan remains to be determined." <5>

It was made clear that the Shanghai Communiqué represented only the beginning of the Sino-American rapprochement, with the difficult question of what to do about Taiwan the major obstacle. Washington declared its interest in a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question; Beijing agreed that this would be best, but did not rule out the use of force. Hence, the matter of arms for Taiwan became the crucial issue. As revealed in recently declassified materials dating from 1974, Henry Kissinger noted the absurdity of a defense arrangement with part of a country, which is what Taiwan would become after American recognition of the Beijing government. However, he expressed concern that abandoning the defense of Taiwan would cause Sino-American relations to become a contentious issue in the United States. Conservative resistance was apt to be strong. It was in neither country's best interest, Kissinger argued, to have a senator or senatorial group do to Sino-American relations what Senator Henry Jackson had attempted to do to U.S.-Soviet relations. Hence, he told Deng, the American government needed a formula that enabled it to say that, at least for some period of time, there are assurances of peaceful reintegration. <6>

Kissinger's statements can be interpreted in several different ways, including

1. he was tacitly agreeing that at some point in the future the PRC could take over the ROC by whatever means it chose, peaceful or otherwise
2. he was using the threat of a conservative backlash in his country as leverage against the Chinese to obtain a commitment for Taiwan that he actually favored
3. he was genuinely afraid of being the target of an angry congressional coalition
4. he was suggesting an interim arrangement for a US defense commitment to Taiwan in order to get an agreement with the PRC, in full knowledge of the fact that interim arrangements frequently become permanent
5. he simply wished to reach an agreement on full diplomatic recognition; how to deal with phasing out the US commitment to Taiwan could be deferred to an indeterminate date, and would be the responsibility of his successors

Kissinger's true intent is perhaps known only to Kissinger. However, these revelations do give credence to later Chinese claims that a U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan ran counter to the spirit of the negotiations between the PRC and the United States.

How to deal with the "one China" concept was another contentious point, particularly given the fact that the governments of both the PRC and ROC agreed with the concept. John King Fairbank, the acknowledged dean of China studies in the United States from the 1950s through the 1970s, was neither a conservative nor a friend of the Taiwan's ruling Kuomintang government. Writing in 1976, Fairbank expressed contempt for the "ostensible agreement" that "there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." "Any teen-ager," he observed," can see that this is a nonfactual statement." <7>The "one China doctrine is one of those hoary Chinese devices for manipulating the unsophisticated barbarian." <8> However, Fairbank continued, having once acknowledged a patent untruth, the United States needed to find a way to work around it. Correctly predicting that "the hardest bargaining with Peking…may come over the question of military supply to Taiwan's armed forces," Fairbank suggested that there could be a "considerable growth of legal fictions," including using third parties.

Kissinger failed to obtain an acceptable follow-on agreement to the Shanghai Communiqué, and the problem was passed to a Democratic administration under President Jimmy Carter. Although Carter, unlike Nixon and Ford, had a majority of his own party in congress, his own electoral experience was confined to the state of Georgia, and he was often at loggerheads with both conservatives and liberals in both houses. <9> Although many were surprised when, in mid-December 1978, the normalization agreement was announced, the signs seem clear in hindsight. The precise terms of normalization and how to maintain the security of Taiwan were regular feature of newspapers and journals in the preceding year; several advocated that Washington assure Taipei that it would be protected against "violent takeover." <10>In February, the administration was reportedly leery of conservative reaction in congress if it were to break relations with the ROC; <11>Leonard Woodcock, head of the US liaison office in Beijing was quoted as saying he had no quarrel with President Carter's decision to postpone further moves on recognition to avoid further alienating conservatives by severing relations with Taiwan. <12> In June 1978, Carter decided to permit Western nations to sell military equipment to Beijing; <13> in July, he vetoed a plan to sell 50 F-4 fighter-bombers to the ROC in what was interpreted as a move to gain favor with Beijing. <14> Four months later, Carter rejected Taiwan's request for F-5G fighter planes, leaving Taiwan no way to upgrade its airforce. A New York Times editorial supported Carter's decision, assuming that a peaceful solution could be reached to disagreements across the strait. <15>

The joint communiqué, announced on 15 December, was short and direct. The two parties affirmed the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué and stated their desire to reduce the danger of international conflict. The United States "acknowledged" China's position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. <16> More insight into the problems facing the negotiators can be gleaned by examining the accompanying statements issued by each side.

The U.S. statement said that the United States recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China; would terminate its diplomatic relations with the ROC; abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty between them; withdraw its remaining personnel within four months; and adjust its laws and regulations to permit the maintenance of commercial, cultural, and other non-governmental relationships under the new circumstances. The statement averred that "the United States is confident that the people of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future. The United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves." <17>

The Chinese statement was more blunt, stating inter alia that "As is known to all, the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China and Taiwan is part of China…As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and reunifying the country, it is entirely China's internal affair." <18>

As was noted by critics at the time, the United States had conceded much; the PRC, nothing at all. However, according to unnamed diplomats in Hong Kong, the "vital breakthrough" had been Beijing's "willingness to ignore future arms sales to Taiwan." <19> This putative concession was not, however, expressed either in the communiqué or in either side's accompanying statement.

The normalization announcement was made just after congress had adjourned for the Christmas holiday, though it was later revealed that the text had been agreed upon in October. As noted above, the administration had earlier expressed concerns about a conservative backlash. However, the timing of the normalization announcement plus the fact that, contrary to both established practice and prudent regard for inter-branch relationships within government, there had been no consultation with congress, angered both liberals and conservatives. <20> Only a week before, both houses of congress had voted overwhelmingly that any formula for recognition of the PRC should not be detrimental to Taiwan. This began a pattern which continues to this day: congress as the guarantor of the ROC's security and the executive branch as the dispenser of concessions to Beijing.

Public opinion polls also indicated dissatisfaction. A Gallup poll reported that the majority of Americans thought it wrong to sever ties with Taiwan; <21> a New York Times/ CBS News survey found that 46 percent of those contacted, and a majority of those who held opinions, opposed the establishment of relations with China at Taiwan's expense. <22>

Carter's belated admission that he had agreed that he would not, during 1979, sell arms to what was now officially referred to as Taiwan further inflamed feelings and complicated his dealings with congress. <23> So as well did Ambassador Woodcock when, questioned by members of congress, he admitted that he had never raised the issue of sovereignty for Taiwan. <24> While Woodcock explained that he had not done so because he was sure that the Chinese side would not agree, many legislators were loath to believe that the former head of a major labor union<25> would not know how to stake out a stronger bargaining position than he believed the other side might agree to. Legislators also pointed out that Deng Xiaoping had on several occasions, most recently on 5 January 1979, emphasized that the PRC had not and would not commit itself to "use no other means than peaceful means to achieve the reunification of the motherland. We cannot tie our hands in this matter. If we tied our hands, we would obstruct the realization of the good intention to solve the matter peacefully." <26> Several resentful senators urged selling advanced fighters to the ROC. <27>

On the very day that the New York Times published an article on the bipartisan nature of dissatisfaction, the PRC invaded Vietnam. This undermined Carter's contention that the normalization represented a major step toward peace in Asia. The president had stated only a few days before that he had obtained China's "maximum commitment" on the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. <28> The PRC's actions with regard to Vietnam indicated to many that this "maximum commitment" was woefully inadequate. <29> Morever, Deng Xiaoping had only just concluded a visit to the United States during which the administration had extravagantly praised his vision of benign communism. <30>

Nor, as it turned out, were the unnamed Hong Kong diplomats' statement about China agreeing to ignore arms sales quite accurate. PRC Party Secretary and Premier Hua Guofeng, in a widely disseminated press conference, stated that

In the course of negotiations, the U.S. side mentioned that it would continue to sell arms to Taiwan for defense purposes after the normalization. We can absolutely not agree to this. During the discussions, we made our position clearly [sic] on many occasions. On this question, continued sale of arms to Taiwan after normalization does not conform to the principles of normalization, is detrimental to a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question and will exercise unfavorable influence on peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the rest of the world. The two sides had differing views, but nevertheless, the joint communiqué was reached. <31>

Since the normalization negotiations had been conducted in secrecy and without congressional input, the recognition communiqué left many questions unanswered. The mechanisms for the carrying out of the informal contacts between the U.S. and Taiwan and the disposition of existing treaties, defense ties, and commercial arrangements, was yet to be determined. Since the communiqué specified that normal U.S.-China relations were to begin on 1 March, haste was imperative. The administration presented its effort to deal with these issues, called the Omnibus Bill. The legislative branch quickly

rejected it as inadequate and set to work on its own document. Areas that were felt to be particularly deficient were

1. there was no definition of the phrase "people of Taiwan", although it appeared several times in the administration bill.
2. several matters such as the legal standing of the people of Taiwan to sue and be sued in U.S. courts, and the protection of property rights of entities and persons in both countries were implicit; congressional critics felt that they should be made explicit
3. the bill contained no provisions for congressional oversight of the American Institute in Taiwan, the private entity established to conduct U.S. relations with the people of Taiwan.
4. it had no provisions for granting privileges and immunities to members of Taiwan's counterpart organization in the United States
5. the bill did not mention any American interest in the security of Taiwan, nor authorize the sale of defensive weapons to Taiwan. <32>

Administration officials warned that Carter would veto any plan that he felt jeopardized newly-developing relations with Beijing. <33> Extensive discussions took place over the exact wording of the language necessary to reassure Taiwan without undoing the recognition agreement. These involved discussions within congress; between members of congress and representatives of the administration; and with ROC officials. As for the last-named, according to the then-first secretary of the ROC embassy in Washington, there were 17 formal meetings, numerous public hearings, and informal negotiations to discuss the content of the TRA. <34> While it would seem obvious that there were consultations with the PRC as well, any consultations that may have been held have not been made public.

Most lawmakers did not want to undo normalization, believing that it had been the right thing to do, even if done in the wrong fashion. They were persuaded that good relations with the world's largest power were important, and that a Sino-American partnership would help to deter Soviet expansionism. Questions of how far they could go to protect the U.S.-Taiwan relationship without jeopardizing normalization were hotly debated. One representative noted that if the language of the TRA did not establish America's right to deal with Taiwan now, the time would have passed forever and any altercation between the mainland and Taiwan would have to be regarded as an internal matter. <35> Another congressperson, however, opposed a defensive commitment on grounds that it would force the United States to send troops to defend the island which was"against, in my opinion, the public policy of this country and against the feeling of the majority of the American people." <36>

Beijing watched the congressional debate carefully. Xinhua, the country's official news agency, reported highlights of the deliberation that were favorable to the mainland's position; diplomatic protests were lodged at several junctures. For example, Xinhua publicized a press conference in which Carter stated "I could not accept any resolution or amendment to the legislation that would contradict the commitment that we made to the government of China, on which is predicated our new normal relationship. I think that any resolution or amendment that would go as far or further with the defense commitments to Taiwan would be unacceptable." It also cited Carter's response to a question on why he felt a congressional resolution on the security of Taiwan was unnecessary: "… because the legislation we proposed to the congress, in my opinion, is adequate." Also cited with evident approval was Carter's response to

whether he would go to war to protect Taiwan [a few days before, Carter had said that a future president had the option of going to war over Taiwan]. The president replied that he had "no intention of going to war…I wanted to point out that no future decisions by myself or my successor is prevented…and I have no anticipation that there will be any requirement for war in the western Pacific." <37>

All sides were constrained to some degree. Carter had to placate the PRC without further annoying his vocal bipartisan opposition in congress. Congressional leaders were aware that it would be difficult to get the two-thirds majority necessary to override a presidential veto of any bill. The PRC did not wish to present too belligerent an image with regard to Taiwan, lest it undermine the thesis that peaceful unification was its ultimate goal. The ROC, in the weakest position of the three, could do little but appeal to moral and ethical beliefs.

In the end, the language decided upon established that the policy of the United States rested upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan would be determined by peaceful means; considered that any effort to determine it by other than peaceful means, including boycotts or embargoes, to be a threat to peace and security and "of grave concern" to the U.S.; promised to provide Taiwan with defensive arms, and asserted the right to resist any resort to force that would jeopardize the security or social and economic system of the people of Taiwan." <38>

On March 16, then-Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua met with Ambassador Woodcock to protest that on a number of points the bill passed three days before contravened the normalization communiqué. He argued that at the time of normalization, the U.S. side explicitly recognized the PRC as the sole government of China, acknowledged that Taiwan is part of China, agreed that only unofficial relations would be conducted between the American people and the people of Taiwan, and concurred that the return of Taiwan to the motherland was a matter within the scope of Taiwan's sovereignty. However, the congressional bill was "in essence, an attempt to maintain to a certain extent the U.S.-Chiang joint defense treaty." This, Huang continued, was interference in China's internal affairs and gave official status to future U.S.-Taiwan relations. As such, it was unacceptable to the Chinese government. If signed into law, great harm would be done to the new relationship that had just been established between China and the United States. <39>

Two days later, the pro-PRC Hong Kong newspaper Hsin Wan Pao ran an angry commentary in its "New Talk" column. Hsin Wan Pao, along with other pro-PRC Hong Kong newspapers, was believed to serve as a conduit for conveying official views in a less formal [and therefore, if the need should arise deniable] manner than direct communication from Beijing. The unsigned column observed that "After the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations, Washington is still dragging a tail. Moreover, it seems as if the tail will not fall off."

Essentially reiterating the points made by Huang Hua, Hsin Wan Pao's columnist noted that while the normalization communiqué spoke of "the people in Taiwan", the TRA spoke of "the governing authorities on Taiwan." <40> This, he implied, amounted to verbal smuggling. As for the TRA's provisions for the sale of defensive arms to Taiwan and its assertion of a U.S. interest in the peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue, the American government had no right to take such positions. The decision of whether to attack or blockade belongs to the Chinese alone.

That Taiwan should be allowed to maintain its consulates and embassy, and that its staff members be allowed to occupy seats in congress reserved for diplomats was unspeakable. Twin Oaks, property of the erstwhile ROC embassy, must be turned over to the PRC immediately. <41> However, these were "minor concerns": the acknowledgement that Taiwan's return to the motherland is an internal affair of China was of major significance. Now was the time for President Carter to exercise his influence and power to ensure that this ugly tail to normalization was cut off: "the tail is by no means allowed to wag the dog." <42>

Li Tieh-cheng, a reporter for Ta Kung Pao, another pro-PRC Hong Kong newspaper that foreign analysts believed to speak for official Beijing, opined that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States did not mean that relations between the two had been normalized. He expressed outrage that the U.S. congress wanted to apply legislative measures to restrain China from using force against Taiwan to preserve its "so-called security." Li concluded that "everyone said that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the U.S. on New Year's Day opened a new era. But I want to ask what is so new about it." <43>

Radio Ba Yi (August 1^st; the date of the founding of the People's Liberation Army), a Chinese-language clandestine broadcasting station, denounced the TRA as U.S. imperialism's "barbarous interference in our [i.e. Chinese] internal affairs." How, the commentator continued, could this have happened?

As American, and doubtless mainland Chinese, officials, were aware, Ba Yi was funded by the Soviet Union. The USSR correctly perceived that an important impetus for the Sino-American rapprochement was opposition to Moscow; it therefore wished to undermine the relationship. How many Chinese listened to its anti-Deng polemics and were influenced by them is not known.

Deng himself appeared to rise above this controversy. In the course of a two-hour meeting with a delegation from the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he expressed "dissatisfaction" with U.S. plans to maintain relations with Taiwan, but said that he was even more concerned about the international situation. As reported by delegation leader Frank Church, Deng said he did not want his remarks quoted. Although the TRA included "elements of interference in relations between Washington and Beijing," Deng urged the United States to sell arms to China and stressed the new strategic importance of strengthening China so as to make the USSR act "more prudently." <45>The vice-premier and paramount leader thus indicated that, at least at that particular time, he had higher priorities than Taiwan.

The TRA was signed into law on 20 April, the day after Deng made these statements. For some time thereafter, Chinese officials and media essentially ignored the TRA. Deng paid a well-publicized two-week visit to Japan in mid-April. Other press coverage concerned the abrogation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty---which had been in practice defunct for two decades. Vietnam, with whom the PRC had fought a brief but bitter border war in February, was regularly pilloried by the Chinese media. Worries about the deteriorating regime of the Shah and Soviet intentions in Iran should he fall were strongly voiced. The discovery of a Soviet brigade in Cuba was cited as yet another instance of Soviet expansionism.

Domestic matters also seemed more pressing than the Taiwan matter. The successes and setbacks of Deng's Four Modernization program were reported in detail, as were the sentencings of Wei Jingsheng and other democracy activists. Deng met with numerous congressional groups. Judging from the published transcripts, he confined his remarks to generalities on the bright future of relations between the two countries. The official announcement of a late-April 1979 meeting with Henry Kissinger said only that "their talk concerned issues in the present international situation." <46>

Meanwhile, the mainland set about courting Taiwan. As of 1 January 1979, it ceased its two-decades-long bombardment of the ROC's offshore islands. Deng Xiaoping told a delegation of American senators led by Sam Nunn that there would be no requirement that Taiwan disarm in order to achieve reunification, and reaffirmed Beijing's desire to avoid the use of force unless the island refused indefinitely to enter into negotiations or if the Soviet Union tried to interfere in cross-strait relations. He promised Taiwan would retain full autonomy within China for as long as the people of Taiwan desired, and that Taiwan authorities would possess the same powers they now enjoy. Apparently impressed, the senators construed these remarks as meaning that mainland leaders viewed reunification as "basically a matter of sovereignty and flag." <47>

The mainland's ministry of foreign trade announced that no customs duties would be imposed on good moving between the mainland and Taiwan. <48> Japanese sources reported that Beijing's leaders were debating whether to commemorate the 2-28 incident, a popular uprising against the KMT government that had occurred on 28 February 1947. Heretofore, the mainland government had remembered the incident each year with speeches urging Taiwan compatriots to liberate themselves from the reactionary Chiang brigade. After consultation with Taiwanese living in Beijing, they decided to ignore the date in 1979. <49>

In May, Hsin Wan Pao reported Liao Chengzhi, president of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Society, as remarking that it was "presumptuous conceit" that "some countries" had, for the sake of their own selfish interest, armed Taiwan with guns and artillery. This, Liao stated, had made Taiwan's government presumptuous and conceited, to the extent that they were ignoring the heartfelt desire of the people of Taiwan for the return to the motherland. They were even attempting to argue that Japan and other countries should adopt the American model in dealing with Taiwan. Should the thus-emboldened "Taiwan authorities" continue to ignore the wishes of their own people, "we cannot guarantee that we will not adopt means other than peaceful ones." Liao made these remarks during a visit to Shimonoseki, <50>where the treaty ending the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 and ceding Taiwan to Japan had been signed. Hence, his remarks may have been designed primarily to warn other countries not to supply arms to the ROC and secondarily to prod the Taipei government to initiate negotiations.

Since only a few days before, Liao had stressed Beijing's desire to reach a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue, and since his warning had come through a non-official source, it raised no particular concern. The TRA issue surfaced again in the fall, and this time by the official media. The impetus was a suit brought against the Carter administration by conservative senator Barry Goldwater. Goldwater charged that, since the U.S. constitution stipulates that no treaty shall become law unless agreed to by two-thirds vote of the Senate, the same procedure must be used to abrogate a treaty.

Realizing that there was a significant possibility that two-thirds of the Senate would not agree to this, Beijing was concerned. Anxieties were heightened when, on 17 October, U.S. District Court Judge Robert Gasch ruled in favor of Goldwater's contention. [The Supreme Court eventually vacated the issue, allowing Carter's decision to stand]. PRC media complained that the "old tune of 'two Chinas' was being played up again by a few people on Capitol Hill." Shortly thereafter, testimony at House Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the implementation of the TRA by Robert P. Parker, a lawyer and president of the American Chamber of Commerce in the ROC, caused a fresh outburst. Beijing Review complained

For over a year after this outburst, both Beijing and its Hong Kong media surrogates maintained silence on the Taiwan Relations Act. The Chinese leadership was surely aware that it had effected normalization of relations with the United States on terms that were extremely favorable to the PRC. While clearly stating its dissatisfaction with certain provisions of the TRA that it felt contravened the spirit of normalization, Beijing did not wish to jeopardize those gains by taking too hard a line with regard to the U.S., whose arms and support it sought as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism. It is likely, therefore, that the leadership decided to mute its criticism of the TRA unless it felt that the gains achieved by the normalization agreement were being endangered, as exemplified by the issues presented above:

• Barry Goldwater's suit
• the use of the term "ROC" by members of congress and other persons with international standing
• the possibility that provisions of the TRA such as its provision for the sale of defensive arms could be adopted by other countries.

The Deng leadership had many other challenges, both foreign and domestic, to address. When the time was favorable, the TRA could be dealt with again. Since a frontal attack at that point was unlikely to induce congress to revoke the act, an easier and potentially more effective strategy would be to modify its offensive clauses, either by concluding new agreements with the U.S. or by persuading the American executive branch to re-interpret the TRA.

By 1981, conditions appeared favorable for a new démarche. Deng Xiaoping had eclipsed Hua Guofeng, whom the dying Mao had allegedly designated as his heir. Deng had as well sidelined most of his other rivals for power. A consensus had been achieved on the legacy of the Great Helmsman; the ambitious Four Modernizations program had been launched. And relations with the Soviet Union had begun to improve. Across the Taiwan Strait, Beijing saw a popular but aging president and the rapid Taiwanization of the island's politics. Chiang Ching-kuo, it realized, was apt to be the last mainlander to govern Taiwan. Unification would be much harder to achieve with native Taiwanese, most of whom felt little affinity with the mainland, in charge of the island's administration.

Moreover, there were worrisome developments in the United States that called for strong action by Beijing. Ronald Reagan, who had been critical of Carter's China policy, had been elected president. At one point in the campaign, Reagan had advocated re-recognition of the ROC, although an aide later said Reagan had been misquoted. Conservatives also advocated that the Republican party platform include a plank urging restoration of ties with the ROC. Beijing was irate.

There was disarray at the top level of the Republican party, with Reagan's vice-presidential choice, George Bush, opposed to bettering ties with Taiwan. ROC leaders quietly advised their conservative Republican friends that they did not wish their country to become an issue in the American election. <52> In the end, the party platform committee decided to accept the status quo on the PRC and ROC while pledging priority for Taiwan's defense needs. <53>Reagan's advisers explained that their candidate had meant only that he intended to tilt as far toward the ROC as was allowed by the Taiwan Relations Act. <54> Chinese newspapers pointed out that the TRA, as domestic US legislation, could not be imposed on China, <55> and representatives to its National People's Congress declared Reagan's remarks "intolerable and insulting." <56>

Campaign rhetoric notwithstanding, Reagan appointed a Kissinger protégé, Alexander Haig, to be his secretary of state. Kissinger regarded the opening to China as one of the pinnacles of his career, and did not wish to see relations with the PRC harmed. Haig was primarily concerned with containing Soviet aggression, and considered a strategic partnership with the PRC to be an essential component of his containment policy. Beijing quickly seized the opportunity to advance its interests with regard to Taiwan.

Then-premier Zhao Ziyang approached Reagan at a gathering of international leaders held in Cancun in October 1981. Foreign minister and concurrently vice-premier Huang Hua then held discussions with Haig in Washington; vice-president Bush visited Beijing in May for further talks. These formal interchanges were conducted against a chorus of invective on the Taiwan Relations Act and a backdrop of threats to suspend Sino-American relations.

A representative example of the invective was Zhongguo Xinwen She's warning that "the TRA is a serious obstacle to the development of Sino-U.S. relations. If the United States does not revise the act and continues to sell arms to Taiwan, grave consequences for Sino-U.S. relations will follow…the TRA seriously infringes upon international law and seriously violates the principle of the agreement on the establishment of Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations. The act simply prepares so-called legal grounds for creating two Chinas." <57>

A spate of articles in the mainland press and in its Hong Kong surrogates, the latter taking a far more combative tone, called for the amendment of the TRA and a cessation of all arms sales to Taiwan. <58> Senator Henry Jackson's question as to what the U.S. would do if someone were to sell arms to Texas [stunningly inappropriate, considering that Texas has been under U.S. administration for more than a century and has expressed no desire to leave] and those of a mid-western U.S.-China Friendship Association received favorable mention, <59> opposing views were castigated as "few and limited in influence…but they are stirring up trouble with all their might." <60>The TRA was declared to be contrary to international law. <61>

The author, visiting the acting National Security Council advisor for Asia in his office in spring 1982, found the adviser in a gloomy mood, his muscular six-foot-plus frame slumped in his chair. On asking the reason, she was told that the PRC had threatened to withdraw its ambassador if its demands to essentially supersede the Taiwan Relations Act were not complied with. He seemed nonplussed at her rejoinder that the Chinese ambassador was due to return for consultations soon in any case, and that the United States, having managed to function nicely for several decades without a PRC ambassador in residence, could conceivably adjust to doing so again.

The PRC also used its American friends as conduits, hinting that were its conditions not accepted, Deng Xiaoping would be vulnerable to his domestic enemies and might be replaced with someone unfriendly to the United States. <62> Others warned that Beijing might turn to Moscow. <63> Subtly, the debate had changed from whether to sell arms to China to how to get the PRC to take them. <64>Haig considered it important to build the Chinese military into a bulwark against the Soviet arms forces.

In June 1982, Haig resigned under fire. His China policy was one, but not the only, factor in his undoing. PRC sources reacted with anger when, at confirmation hearings, his successor vowed to uphold the Taiwan Relations Act. <65>The long-negotiated Sino-American communiqué, announced in mid-August, went far toward meeting the PRC's conditions. <66>Many members of Congress reacted angrily. Of particular concern was the section in which

As with the recognition issue, opposition to the administration's action was bipartisan. Several senators blamed the "perfidy" of the U.S. State Department, with one charging that as soon as "China threatened to downgrade relations if the question of arms sales were not resolved, we rushed to the negotiation table." <68>Several others pointed out that nothing in the TRA says arms sales should be reduced either in quantity or in quality, and that the communiqué that constituted a violation of section 3 of the TRA. The same section 3 gives the president and congress<69> together the duty to determine the nature and quantity of defensive sales, based on their judgment of Taiwan's needs. The communiqué, in contrast, says the president alone shall make that judgment. Moreover, the legislative branch was not consulted, as further stipulated in the TRA. <70>

Yet another pointed out that, in negotiating the text of the communiqué with the PRC, the American side tried very hard to achieve agreement to include explicit reference to the US-PRC strategic partnership [against the USSR]. The PRC not only refused, but after the communiqué was signed, its media began to attack the United States as being "as great a threat to world peace as the USSR. <71> Since concern with Soviet aggression had been Haig's motivation for negotiation, this undermined the basis for the agreement.

Assistant Secretary of State Holdridge argued that refusal to negotiate "would clearly have been the beginning of a process of deterioration in our relations" and that the Chinese had given assurances that their peaceful policy on the resolution of the Taiwan question was "fundamental", and also that the US had not agreed to a termination date for arms sales. He said there had been "no change in our long-standing position on the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan," and that, despite Chinese demands that had been reported in the press, there were no plans to seek revisions to the TRA. The new agreement was, he and other administration officials insisted, was "completely consistent" with the Taiwan Relations Act. <72>

Holdridge appears to have been one of the few who was satisfied with the communiqué. Although an editorial in the pro-Chinese Hong Kong Wen Wei Pao hailed the communiqué as "a victory for the Chinese people" that had eased the tension in Sino-U.S. relations, <73> its equally pro-China counterpart Ta Kung Pao's editorial on the same day said that the relaxation was "temporary," and that there could no concession on the Taiwan Relations Act. <74> Ta Kung Pao had more correctly interpreted the party line. Beijing denied it had ever agreed to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem, which was China's affair alone, and objected strenuously that the agreement was consistent with the TRA:

And Chinese ambassador to the PRC Chai Zemin, in an interview with CBS-TV, said that the publication of the communiqué had been "a good thing…but only the first time…we are not to make any commitment to any country on the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem." <76>

The U.S. State Department's legal adviser testified that the communiqué was not binding. <77> It was subsequently revealed that on 14 July 1982, a month before the communiqué was announced, let the ROC know "through appropriate channels" that it

1. had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to the ROC
2. had not agreed to hold prior consultations with the Chinese communists on arms sales to the ROC
3. would not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing
4. had not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act
5. had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan
6. would not exert pressure on the ROC to enter negotiations with the Chinese communists. <78>

It may fairly be asked why the two sides agreed to a communiqué that each side felt was so flawed. A likely explanation is that each had gone so far with the process that to come out with no agreement would have been regarded as a loss of face; an imperfect agreement, even if not strictly adhered to, was better than nothing at all. While an immediate crisis in Sino-American relations may have been averted, the manner in which this was done must have increased the level of distrust between the two sides. The "considerable growth of legal fictions" envisioned by Fairbank had been substantially, and substantively, enlarged.

Weapons continued to be sold to the ROC within the strictures of the lessening quantity stipulated in the August 17 Communiqué. However, since this was calculated by total price, the unit cost of weapons could be reduced and/or adjusted for inflation, allowing more to be sold for less cost. Sometimes more advanced weapons were sold, despite the promise not to, it being explained that new copies of the original weapons sold were no longer available. The communiqué did not mention restrictions on the transfer of technology, and the designs for weapons and delivery systems were made available. The PRC protested each sale, though not especially vociferously, and relations across the Taiwan Strait were improving.

Although cross-strait relations were relatively cordial and trade between the two sides increased rapidly, the mainland made little progress toward democracy. By contrast, the pace of democratization on Taiwan picked up markedly after 1986. After Chiang Ching-kuo's death in January 1988, Lee Teng-hui, a Taiwanese who evinced little interest in unification, became president. Nor did the ROC's newly unfettered media and well-informed electorate wish to surrender the island's de facto independence. These factors complicated the cross-strait equation.

There was a jolt in U.S.-China relation in 1992, when then-president George Bush announced an agreement to sell 150 F-16 fighter planes to the ROC, but the reaction was not sharp. Sources close to the administration alleged that the Chinese had been warned that if they bought Su-27s from Russia, Bush would have to agree to the sales under the terms of the TRA. This turned out to be yet another fiction. As the aides later admitted, the real reason had little to do with the TRA: Bush was running behind his Democrat rival, Bill Clinton, in two electorally crucial states, Texas and California. The economies of both contain important aerospace contractors, where unemployment was high. The muted nature of the Chinese protest may be attributed to their shrewd reading of the PRC's long term interests: Bush, a former envoy to Beijing, had treated the Beijing government leniently after Tiananmen. Clinton, meanwhile, had attacked Bush for "coddling dictators from Beijing to Baghdad."

It has been argued that the TRA was responsible for Clinton's 1996 decision to send two aircraft battle groups into the area near the Taiwan Strait to deter mainland aggression against Taiwan. This is a debatable point. Washington sources point out that Clinton's decision was taken to prevent congress from taking much more decisive action. However, the TRA definitely provides the legal basis for such an action, whether taken by a willing chief executive or by a reluctant one who is being prodded by a concerned congress. In a country such as the United States, which attaches great significance to acting on the basis of laws, the existence of the TRA is of no small importance.

Clinton's seeming reluctance to act became the topic of much speculation, given the large campaign donations, many of them illegal, he received from sources associated with the Chinese government. Despite being enmeshed in scandals of various sorts from the time he assumed office and accused of coddling the very same leaders in Beijing and Baghdad he had criticized his Republican opponent for, Clinton easily won re-election later in 1996. It was expected that he would visit Beijing in the fall of 1998, exactly a year after Chinese leader Jiang Zemin had visited Washington.

Rather suddenly, the date was moved up to June. There were suspicions that this was because Clinton's deposition in a lawsuit against him had been scheduled for late May. The motivation behind undertaking a high-profile foreign trip was, the skeptics believed, to divert attention from the extensive publicity surrounding Clinton's legal problems.

Again, Beijing sought to press its advantage. News media reported that the PRC was seeking a "fourth communiqué." While the contents thereof were not known, it presumably sought to build on the incremental gains the PRC had made in the first three communiqués, and to further weaken and undermine the TRA. China had done Clinton a favor by allowing him to move up the date of his trip. Some thought that the campaign contributions he had received from mainland sources<79> predisposed him to favor the PRC. The sanctions against China for the sale of nuclear components to Pakistan had struck some as unusually mild. There were charges that both the State Department and the White House had ignored for over a year evidence of these sales supplied to them by intelligence agencies. <80> And an FBI sting operation against a mainland arms conglomerate seeking to smuggle large quantities of weapons into the U.S. had gone awry at the last moment. Newspapers and the well-regarded television program "60 Minutes" raised suspicions that American government sources had given prior warning to the Chinese. <81>

In the event, there was no fourth communiqué, though Clinton did enunciate the "three noes": no support for Taiwan independence, no support for two Chinas or one Taiwan and one China, no support for Taiwan's entry into international organizations whose members are sovereign states. Administration supporters explained, as administration supporters typically do, that there had been no change in policy. <82>The "three noes" had been privately conveyed to Beijing after the dispatch of the carrier battle groups in 1997. Administration detractors argued that if there had been no change in policy, then it should not have been necessary to state the three noes. Others felt that there is a significant difference between privately conveying something and stating it publicly.

As in the past, there was sharp reaction from the congress. The senate by a vote of 92 to zero and the house by 390-1, passed resolutions reaffirming American support of Taiwan and to the Taiwan Relations Act, with senate majority leader Trent Lott stating unequivocally that he believed Clinton had changed American policy.

Other sources pointed out that the third "no" was actually only one-third of what had been said before: although Washington would not support Taipei's entry into international organizations for which sovereign status was a criterion, it had said it would support entry to organizations where sovereignty was not a prerequisite, and also that it would support the ROC's right to have its voice heard in the international community. Critics also faulted Clinton for not having added a fourth "no": no use of force.

The next PRC move would presumably be to have the three noes put into writing. Interestingly, when the PRC, seeking to build on Clinton's public endorsement of the "three noes", pressed Japan to do the same, Tokyo flatly refused. <83>

Beijing has been consistent in claiming sovereignty over Taiwan, and in refusing to foreswear the use of force in settling the Taiwan issue. To do so would seriously weaken its chances of ever recovering the island. The contentions of spokespersons for various U.S. administrations aside, it is inconceivable that the PRC would ever agree not to use force.

The mainland seeks to gain agreement on broad general principles relating to the Taiwan question, and then to press onward with its definition of these general principles. When unable to obtain precisely what it wants, China reserves the right to raise the issue at some future date. When it deems conditions appropriate---for example, U.S. desire for economic benefit, America's need for an ally in some international dispute, or in the event that its president is in electoral difficulty---the PRC will press forward. It is generally successful in making some advance. This has been true whether Democrats or Republicans are in charge of the U.S. administration. While congress has typically been supportive of continued de facto independence for Taiwan, it has at best been able to modify a fait accompli by the administration.

The Taiwan Relations Act has served the ROC well, though much depends on any U.S. administration's interpretation of clauses such as "maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system of the people of Taiwan" and "the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." Additionally, an administration confronted with a crisis and not prodded by an angry congress can delay until it is too late to do anything. Indeed, the most recent scenarios for a PRC attack on Taiwan involve precisely a lightning strike that could achieve victory in a very short time.

While ambiguity has the advantage of giving Washington flexibility, it also introduces an element of uncertainty about American behavior that the PRC might be tempted to test the limits of. This point was made in the aftermath of the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96. When critics of the administration complained that "strategic ambiguity" had tempted the PRC to behave aggressively, its spokesperson replied that in fact there was "strategic clarity but tactical ambiguity." Understandably, Washington does not want to run the risk of declaring it will defend Taiwan under any and all circumstances, lest this tempt Taipei into provocative actions that could pull the United States into a dangerous conflict. Just what constitutes provocative behavior is, however, difficult to operationalize. Clearly a declaration of independence would be provocative, but such a declaration is most unlikely.

Under more plausible scenarios, Beijing's behavior is less easy to predict. Although one might have expected that China would react sharply and even aggressively in 1992 in response to the sale of F-16 and Mirage fighter planes to Taiwan by the United States and France, this did not occur. On the other hand, the mainland did indulge in such behavior in 1995-96 in response to Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell University. Knowing that the Taiwan government seeks to ensure the nation's continued existence by taking small steps---just below the threshold of what might be considered provocative---to reinforce awareness of the ROC's international persona, Beijing may see fit to react sharply to what might appear to outside observers as very minor actions. The accretion of legal fictions, as in the Shanghai and August 1982 joint communiqués, also complicates policymaking.

In short, there is no cause for complacency about the future. There are limitations to what the Taiwan Relations Act can do to protect the ROC. Efforts on the part of the ROC's friends to amend the TRA run the risk of opening a Pandora's box of conflicting motives which might result in diluting its provisions. They would also provide a precedent that the TRA could be modified further, perhaps in ways that would suit the PRC better.

Since 1982, the PRC has not publicly sought to amend the TRA and, from Taiwan's point of view, it might be safest not to raise the possibility. There has been virtually nothing openly said by Beijing about the TRA for at least ten years. <84>Even its Hong Kong surrogates have done so only rarely. A recent exception, a February 1999 Wen Wei Po article, was occasioned by a U.S. Defense Department annual report on weapons sales which showed Taiwan as America's fourth largest buyer of weapons. Wen Wei Po's reporter began with a lengthy reiteration of previously-stated claims: these sales should not have occurred. Three Sino-U.S. joint declarations outweigh the TRA, which is "indeed too insignificant to mention…the TRA is nothing but a framework for the unofficial US-Taiwan relationship after Sino-US relations were established…the Taiwan question is the most important and sensitive core issue in Sino-U.S. relations and therefore it is reasonable to demand that the U.S. abide by the principles of the three Sino-U.S. declarations and see to it that the Taiwan question will not adversely affect Sino-U.S. relations." The author closed, however, with something slightly different and obviously intended to capitalize on the latest concession the PRC had won from the United States:

The PRC's words and actions indicate that it intends to progressively reduce the ROC's international living space through such measures as persuading the relatively few countries who recognize Taipei to switch recognition to Beijing, and to exert pressure to keep Taiwan out of international organizations. Efforts to break out of this isolation, such as President Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell, result in diplomatic ire and hostile military maneuvers. For the ROC to do nothing, however, would be to risk slow strangulation. The best hope for the peaceful solution of the Taiwan question lies in peaceful change on the mainland itself. Noble as its intent is, this is not an issue that the Taiwan Relations Act can address.

 <1>In recognition of the fact that the People's Republic of China has never exercised jurisdiction over Taiwan, the author will use the term "unification" rather than "reunification" unless directly quoting a source that uses the latter.

<2>The original version said "all people"; according to a Kissinger aide and later Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, John Holdridge, it was changed to "all Chinese", presumably to exclude those who identified more with their Taiwanese ancestry than their Chinese ethnicity. Personal communication from Shelley Rigger based on interview data, 11 March 1999.

<3>The Emergency Decrees, often misleadingly translated into English as "Martial Law", prohibited the public assertion of such views at this time.

<4>The phrase "Long been returned" implies that Taiwan was part of the motherland for a period of time, then was not, but came back at some point in the distant past. This presumably refers to Japan's returning the sovereignty of Taiwan to China after World War II, though Japan did not say which China, Nationalist or Communist, it was being returned to. Taiwan has not been administered by the mainland during this period.

<5>Text of the communiqué can be found in U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 66 (1972), p. 435.

<6>William Burr, The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks With Beijing and Moscow. (New York, 1999, New Press), pp. 294-98.

<7>John King Fairbank, "Our One-China Problem," Atlantic Monthly. September 1976, p. 4.

<8>Ibid., p. 6.

<9>And even with the people of his home state. Billboards erected along the major traffic arteries through that state announced in huge letters "The people of Georgia apologize to the people of the United States for Jimmy Carter."

<10>See, e.g., New York Times (hereafter cited as NYT), 14 February 1978, p. 18; 27 February , p. 18; 9 March, p. 20.

<11>NYT 5 February Sec. IV, p.2.

<12>NYT 3 February 1978, p. 6. This is a peculiar statement; envoys are expected to confine to private discourse any policy preferences between themselves and the president they serve.

<13>NYT, 25 June 1978, p. 1.

<14>NYT, 1 July 1978, p. 2.

<15>NYT, 20 November 1978, p. 26:1

<16>U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 79 (1979), p. 2022.

<17>U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. 79 (1979), p. 2022.

 <18>text in Beijing Review 3 January 1979, p. 14.

<19>NYT, 18 December 1978, p. 1.

<20>NYT, 17 February 1979, p.3.

<21>NYT, 14 January 1979, p. 7.

<22>NYT, 29 January, p. 8.

<23>NYT, 13 January 1979, p. 3.

<24>U.S. Code, Congressional and Administrative News. 96^th Congress, 1^st Session, 1979: Legislative History. Public Law 96-8, p. 88. Hereafter cited as "Code."

<25>Woodcock had served as head of the United Auto Workers for many years before being appointed head of the U.S. Liaison Office (after normalization, the U.S. Embassy) in Beijing. While at the UAW, he was regarded as a tough and capable bargainer.

<26>Xinhua, 5 January 1979, in National Technical Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Vol I: China [hereafter, FBIS-CHI], 8 January 1979, p. C1. A slightly shortened version of this quote appears in Code, p. 86.

<27>NYT, 5 February, p. 8.

<28>NYT, 13 February 1979, p. 6.

<29>NYT 20 February, 1.

<30>Or, as the media often referred to it, "cuddly communism," perhaps in recognition of the panda bears that the PRC had given to the US, where they became instant crowd-drawers at any zoo fortunate enough to have obtained them.

<31>For example, the slightly different translations reported by Xinhua (English), 16 December 1978 in FBIS-CHI, 18 December 1978, pp. A4-A5, and on Guangzhou Television, 16 December, in FBIS-CHI, 20 December 1978, pp. A2-A3.

<32>"Taiwan Relations Act," conference report accompanying House of Representatives (hereafter, HR) 2479, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979 (96^th congress, 1^st Session, House Report no. 96-71), pp. 7-8. Hereafter cited as "Conference Report."

<33>NYT 6 February, p. 1.

<34>Huang Chao-ping and Victor Lai, "GIO Chief Speaks of TRA's Importance To ROC-US Relations (I), Central News Agency (hereafter, CNA), Taipei, 15 March 1999.

<35>Congressional Record, H. 1197, 8 March 1979.

<36>Rep. Marks, Congressional Record, H. 1177, 8 March 1979.

<37>Xinhua (English), 18 January 1979, in FBIS-CHI, 14 February 1979, p. A2.

<38>Taiwan Relations Act, Public law 96-9, 96^th Congress, H.R. 2479, 10 April 1979.

<39>Xinhua (English), 23 March 1979, in FBIS-CHI, 23 March 1979, p. K1.

<40>Both section 12 (b) and section (2) of the TRA refer to "the governing authorities on Taiwan."

<41>This did not happen. The ROC sold Twin Oaks to a private entity, the Friends of Free China for a nominal sum. In 1982, the Friends of Free China transferred the 18-acre property in northwest District of Columbia back to the "unofficial" successor to the embassy. (NYT 25 October 1982, p. 16). The ROC government built a large new "non-embassy" on Wisconsin Avenue; Taiwan's representative in Washington uses Twin Oaks for "unofficial" entertaining."

<42> (no author), "Washington Has An Ugly Big Tail," Hsin Wan Pao (Hong Kong), 25 March 1979, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI, 30 March 1979, p. U1.

<43>Li Tieh-cheng, "On Future Prospects For the Normalization of Sino-U.S. Relations," Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), 31 March, 1979, p.2, in FBIS-CHI, 10 April 1979, p. U2.

<44>Radio Ba Yi, 15 April 1979, in FBIS-CHI, 17 April 1979, p. L19.

<45>AFP (Paris), 19 April 1979, in FBIS-CHI, 20 April 1979, p. B1.

<46>Xinhua (English), 27 April 1979, in FBIS-CHI, 30 April 1979, p. B1.

<47>Francis Deron, "Remarks On Taiwan," AFP (Paris), 9 January 1979, in FBIS-CHI, 9 January 1979, p. A4.

<48>Xinhua (English), 11 January 1979, in FBIS-CHI, 12 January 1979, p. C1.

<49>Kyodo (Tokyo), 20 January 1979, in FBIS-CHI, 22 January 1979, p. E2.

<50>"New Talk," Hsin Wan Pao, 16 May 1979, in FBIS-CHI, 17 May 1979, p. U2.

<51>"Round the World: Spectre of Two Chinas," Beijing Review, vol. 44, 2 November 1979, pp. 27-28.

<52>Dr. Ray S. Cline, personal communication to the author, June 1981. According to Cline, a former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency and long-time personal friend of ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo, the message was conveyed through himself and Dr. Richard L. Walker, University of South Carolina.

<53>NYT 12 July 1980, p. A4.

<54>NYT 12 July 1980, p. A6.

<55> NYT, 24 August 1980, p. A1

<56>NYT 1 September 1980, p. A7

<57>Zhongguo Xinwen She 8 July 1982, in FBIS-CHI, 8 July 1982, p. B1.

<58>For a representative example, see Kuan Chien-tzu, "The 'Taiwan Relations Act' Must Be Amended," Wen Wei Po 12 July 1982, in FBIS-CHI 13 July 1982, p. W3.

<59>See, e.g. "U.S. Amity Group Opposes Arms Sales To Taiwan," Xinhua. 10 July 1982, in FBIS-CHI, 12 July 1982, p. B4.

<60>See, e.g. "The Wheel of History Must Not Be Turned Back," Renmin ribao 11 July 1982, in FBIS-CHI, 12 July 1982, pp. B1-B2.

<61> (no author) "U.S. Arms Sale To Taiwan Violates International Law," Beijing Review no. 6, 8 February 1982, pp. 11-12.

<62>See, for example, Kenneth Lieberthal, "Deng Vulnerable," op-ed, NYT, 22 January 1982, p. A 27.

<63>Leslie Gelb, NYT 18 January 1981, VI, p. 58.

<64>The author testified at 1981 senate hearings on whether to sell arms sales to China. Her contention that this could prove the slippery slope to creating a dangerous situation for the PRC's neighbors, including Taiwan, was refuted by a witness from the State Department's Policy Planning Bureau, Roger Sullivan, who argued that the problem was not worrying about whether to sell US arms to China, but getting China to take them. The slope, he contended, was "uphill all the way." Contrast this with Deng's 1979 statement, quoted above, that he hoped the U.S. would sell China arms.

<65> (unsigned "Short Commentary") "A Question That Must Be answered in A Serious Manner," Renmin ribao 18 July 1982, p. 6, in FBIS-CHI, 19 July 1982, p. B 1-B2. Shih Chun-yu, "Shultz Utters Absurdities Even Before Taking Office," Ta Kung Pao. 15 July 1982. p.2, in FBIS-CHI 15 July 1982, p. W 1.

<66>The author asked then-National Security Council advisor for Asia Gaston Sigur how this could happen in a post-Haig Reagan administration. He assured her that the original had been much more detrimental to Taiwan, and was modified after Haig's resignation. Sigur did not elaborate. A definite date for cessation of arms sales would be one possibility that would fall under the "much worse" category from Sigur's and Taiwan's point of view. Another would be for the United States to agree to consult with Beijing before deciding what arms to sell.

<67>"China, U.S. Issue Joint Communiqué," Beijing Review, no. 34, 23 August 1982, pp. 15-16.

<68>Senator Robert Kasten, Wisconsin. These and subsequent references in this section are contained in United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The Future of Taiwan: Hearings Before the Committee On Foreign Relations. U.S. Senate, 98^th Congress, 1^st Session, 9 November 1983, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984.

<69>Although, as Dr. Michael Pillsbury's contribution to this volume makes clear, Congress has not until recently sought to exercise this right. Nonetheless, Congress was concerned to maintain its prerogative.

<70>Senator Barry Goldwater, Arizona, among others.

<71>Senator Steven Symms, Idaho.

<72>United States Congress, House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, China-Taiwan: United States Policy: Hearings Before the Committee On Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 97^th Congress, 2^nd Session, August 19, 1982, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982.

<73> (unsigned editorial), "Victory For the Chinese People's Diplomacy: Commenting On the Sino-U.S. 'Joint Communiqué',"Wen Wei Pao, 18 August 1982, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI, 18 August 1982, pp. W2-W3.

<74> (unsigned editorial), "A Temporary Relaxation in Sino-U.S. Relations," Ta Kung Pao, 18 August 1982, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI, 18 August 1982, pp. W2-W3.

<75> (unsigned commentary), "How Can the Sino-U.S. Communiqué Be 'Completely Consistent' With the 'Taiwan Relations Act'?" Zhongguo xinwen she (Beijing) 20 August 1982, in FBIS-CHI, 23 August 1982, p. B3.

<76> (no author) "Envoy To U.S. Interviewed On Joint Communiqué," 25 August 1982, in FBIS-CHI, 26 August 1982, B1.

<77> (no author) "Statement On Taiwan Arms Not Binding, U.S. Contends," Miami Herald, 28 September 1982, p. A12. The adviser, Davis Robinson, was replying to a question from Senator John East (Republican, North Carolina), chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers.

<78>Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROC Regarding the U.S.-PRC Communiqué of 18 August 1982, in Lester L. Wolff and David L. Simon, Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act. Jamaica, New York, 1982, American Association for Chinese Studies, pp. 323-324.

<79>See, e.g. Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett, II, Year of the Rat: How Bill Clinton Compromised U.S. Security For Chinese Cash. (Washington, D.C., Regnery Press, 1998) passim.

<80>Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Won't Push China Over Sale of Nuclear Gear," NYT 11 May 1996, pp. A1; A4.

<81>David E. Sanger, "Chinese Arms Seized in Undercover Inquiry: Raids Raise Questions On Officials' Knowledge and Trade Status," NYT, 24 May 1996, p. A7.

<82>Nelson Chung, "No Change In Policy, Washington Reassures Taiwan," Central News Agency (Taipei) 6 July 1998.

<83>Associated Press, "Japan Flatly Rebuffs Pressure Over Taiwan, War Apology, " Hong Kong Standard, 29 October 1998.

<84>And perhaps longer. The U.S. government internet data base consulted extends only as far back as 1989.

<85>Pu Huang, "U.S. Should Not Continue Arms Sales To Taiwan," Wen Wei Po, 27 February 1999, p. 6, in FBIS-CHI 12 March 1999.