By Denny Roy

Dept. of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, USA

Note: This paper appears in slightly revised form in the Spring 2000 issue of Survival.( www.survival.oupjournals.org") Used here by permission from Survival and Oxford University Press.

As tensions across the Taiwan Strait rose yet again in July 1999 with Republic of China (ROC) President Lee Denghui's public statements suggesting he considered Taiwan a state separate from China, the Taiwan problem strengthened its claim as the most enduring and dangerous of the East Asian “flashpoints.” A decade from now, North Korea might well be under a reform-minded regime, or perhaps gone altogether; there is hope that Indonesia and Cambodia will be rebuilding under more liberal governments; and China might have offered a permanent settlement over the Spratly Islands issue to the other claimant states. But on the eve of the new millennium, the Chinese government exhibits no slackening of its desire to incorporate Taiwan, while most of Taiwan’s people show no interest in political union with the mainland.

The Taiwan Strait problem deserves serious attention because this is the issue with the greatest potential for bringing China and the USA into military confrontation, and thus for ruining Sino-U.S. relations. A working relationship with a reasonable degree of cooperation between China and the United States is necessary for the continuation of peace and prosperity on the Western rim of the Pacific Ocean. Billions of people owe their livelihoods and hopes for improved living standards on free economic interchange throughout this region, and vibrant trade and investment are premised upon a stable, relaxed political environment. China and the USA share considerable common ground, including commitment to a global economic system that encourages the flow of goods, services and investment across national boundaries; robust and mutually-beneficial bilateral trade; an interest in preventing hostilities on the Korean Peninsula and in promoting economic reform in North Korea; a preference that Japan not become a major, independent military power; and a desire to forestall several “non-traditional” security threats, such as degradation of the natural environment, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration.<1> A more serious dispute over the Taiwan issue, however, could instantly overwhelm the incentives for continued cooperative Sino-U.S. relations created by all these areas of common interest. Important though they are, issues such as human rights in China, the conditions for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, and even China's exports of ballistic missile and nuclear weapons technology pale in intensity when compared with the Taiwan issue. On the aforementioned issues, the United States and Chinese governments can easily agree on fundamental principles (even if application and enforcement of these principles give rise to quarreling). None of these issues has severely damaged the basic U.S.-China relationship—i.e., made the two countries “enemies” in the sense of threatening the use of force against each other—or prevented Beijing and Washington from cooperating in other areas. But as the world saw in 1996, tensions over Taiwan automatically raise the prospect of a military clash that could involve the U.S. armed forces and that would turn American and China from limited partners into open adversaries. Thus Taiwan’s security problem is Asia’s security problem, as a cross-Strait conflict would disrupt regional trade and force other Asian states to side with or against the People's Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan’s security problem is also America’s, as a likely consequence of such a conflict would be unambiguous Chinese opposition to, and corresponding action against, the U.S. military presence in Asia.

This article addresses Taiwan's security problem by examining five closely-related issues: (1) the PRC's motivation for threatening Taiwan; (2) the potential impact of economic interchange across the Strait on Taiwan's security; (3) the possible forms a PRC-Taiwan conflict might take; (4) the role the USA plays in Taiwan's security; and (5) approaches to alleviating the PRC threat to Taiwan.

My analysis will include support for several arguments. First, the PRC's warning that it will use force to prevent Taiwan's permanent political separation from mainland China is a threat, not a bluff. Second, although in theory its deepening economic connections with the mainland create potential vulnerabilities for Taiwan, in practice Beijing cannot easily exploit these economic links for political purposes. Third, the PRC is presently incapable of capturing Taiwan; China is, however, capable of seriously harassing Taiwan and undermining its economic well-being through military operations short of invasion, which are the more likely response to Taiwan independence. Fourth, the possibility of U.S. intervention has an important deterrent effect on the PRC, but in the event of actual hostilities in the Strait, American influence would probably not be decisive. Fifth, under present political conditions, a diplomatic solution to the Strait’s war proneness based on a “no force, no independence” deal is not possible. Finally, I argue that in the medium term, Taiwan will be most secure by steering a middle course between negotiated capitulation to Beijing, which is premature, and further steps toward independent statehood, which has become a counterproductive policy. If Taiwan's policies help maintain a stable status quo, there will be sufficient time for the development of a long-term solution to the Taiwan Strait security problem, which would involve the Chinese leadership redefining China’s relationship with Taiwan.

The CCP government has defined Taiwan as an integral part of China’s territory, a Chinese province presently occupied by a rebel government with a secessionist agenda. The fact that most residents of Taiwan do not accept this interpretation is, from the mainland’s point of view, irrelevant; China’s ownership of the land is not diminished by the opinions of its current inhabitants. In contrast to American “strategic ambiguity,” China has publicly spelled out a set of conditions under which it would use force against Taiwan. The most well-known of these conditions is a declaration of independence from China by Taiwan's government. Others explicated by various PRC officials over the years include: serious political instability on Taiwan; interference by foreigners in cross-Strait relations; occupation of Taiwan by foreign forces; Taiwan’s government coming under the control of a foreign power; refusal by Taiwan's government to participate in negotiations with Beijing for reunification; acquisition of nuclear weapons by Taiwan; and weak ROC armed forces. In recent years, PRC statements have focused mostly on formal Taiwanese independence and foreign intervention as triggers for a Chinese military response.<2>

Would the PRC carry out its threats to use military force against Taiwan if any of these circumstances occurred? Several top Chinese leaders have correctly noted that absent the threat of force, Taiwan would have declared itself an independent state already. One might assert, therefore, that given the high deterrent value of the threat to use force, the PRC has sufficient incentive to maintain this posture even if there is no actual intention to attack Taiwan. China’s warning to Taiwan, in other words, might be a bluff rather than a threat. Such a tactic would not be inconsistent with the heritage of Chinese politico-military thinking, which emphasizes the importance of stratagem and psychological warfare. Moreover, the CCP government has established a pattern of proclaiming the principles that will govern its foreign relations, only to engage in flexible interpretation to justify conduct that seemingly violates one of these principles.

My argument, nevertheless, is that China’s menacing stance toward Taiwan is a threat, not a bluff. Support for this view is found in the historical and political meaning Taiwan embodies in the worldview of the Chinese Communist Party leadership.

The Taiwan issue invokes among the Chinese several extremely powerful and deep-seated attitudes heavily influenced by historical events. China’s long history yields no lesson more clearly than this: the principal responsibility of the government, and the basis of judging its success or failure, is keeping the empire united. Interpretations of more recent Chinese history are dominated by the profound bitterness of the “Century of Shame,” the effect of which on present-day China’s perceptions of international affairs can scarcely be overstated. For centuries, the Chinese believed their society was the pinnacle of civilization. This inevitably bred an arrogance and complacency that ill-prepared the Chinese government for the challenge posed by early-industrializing Western powers (and, later, Japan). The dating of the Century begins in 1842 with the infamous Opium War, when the British government dispatched warships to punish Chinese authorities who tried to prevent British traders from smuggling in the banned narcotic opium, and ends in 1949 with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China after CCP forces prevailed over the Guomintang (Kuomintang; "Nationalist Party") armies in the Chinese Civil War. During this period, what for centuries had been the known world’s most accomplished civilization lay prostrate before a combination of imperialist exploitation and internal disorder, largely because of the ineffectiveness, corruption and unpatriotism of China’s own rulers. These included the Qing Dynasty’s Empress Dowager Ci Xi, who often appeared more concerned with maintaining her lifestyle and privileges than building a capability to stand up to Western pressures; Yuan Shikai, the general who forced the Qing regime to abdicate to clear the way for a “republic” but soon thereafter had himself proclaimed emperor; the “warlords” who ruled various parts of China with their private armies when no effective central government existed; and Chiang Kaishek’s Guomindang government, which the CCP has styled as quick to give up Chinese territory in order to appease the invading Japanese.

A key pillar of the CCP’s legitimacy is its performance on the important historical criterion of holding together the empire. As Alastair Iain Johnston writes, modern Chinese leaders “institutionalized China’s history of weakness in domestic socialization processes and adopted the Westphalian model of a sovereign major power . . . as the solution to this weakness.”<3> This helps explain why Beijing pays such a high political and material cost to sustain its rule over Tibet and why Beijing opted to recover Hong Kong in 1997 rather than give the British a new lease. As long as Taiwan is understood as rightfully belonging within the Chinese empire, the ruling regime will view reclamation of Taiwan as a huge political victory and the “loss” of Taiwan as a devastating defeat. In the minds of mainland Chinese, Taiwan is also closely bound up with the Century of Shame. It represents the incompleteness of the CCP’s victory over the Guomindang, the last of the CCP’s unworthy predecessors. An estranged Taiwan also prevents the CCP from accomplishing the unification of China. As Zhu De, founder of the PLA, put it, "As long as Taiwan is not liberated, the Chinese people's historical humiliation is not washed away; as long as the motherland is not reunited, our people's armed forces' responsibility is not fulfilled." Zhu’s statement has been quoted often, including by Defense Minister Chi Haotian during the PLA exercises of March 1996.<4>

Re-establishing control over Taiwan is thus perceived on the mainland as a vital national interest: preserving the ownership of national territory. It is also a vital regime interest: fulfilling the historical expectation of any Chinese government, and in particular, safeguarding the mandate of the CCP and of the individuals filling the top leadership positions against challenges from both the Chinese public and rival politicians. For these reasons, while Beijing could perhaps tolerate a stalemate as long as Taipei’s position provided some semblance of progress toward eventual reunification, the CCP leadership would have no choice but to use military force if Taiwan declared itself an independent state, which Beijing understands as tantamount to permanent political separation from China. Beijing might well try to exhaust other possible means of persuading Taipei to retract such a declaration, including negotiations, threats, and economic sanctions, before unleashing the PLA. But under today’s political conditions, the PRC government could not acquiesce to Taiwanese independence without putting up a fight. A majority of the mainland Chinese public would support the ultimate resort to force—if not demand it.<5> Furthermore, in a conflict over such a fundamental value as national territory, potential opponents could not expect that Beijing would be deterred by an unfavorable order of battle.

Some observers may have interpreted the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis as proof that China is a “paper dragon”: the Chinese threatened to invade, but backed down after the USA sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area. This interpretation, however, is misplaced. China never intended to invade Taiwan, as is clear from the fact that the PLA mobilized forces only a fraction of the size that would have been necessary for an actual attack. The PLA’s cancellation of the latter phase of its military exercises in March 1996 had more to do with bad weather in the Strait than intimidation by the U.S. Navy. Beijing's goal in the last Strait crisis was to signal disapproval, not start a war. Taipei did not declare independence, and thus did not cross the line Beijing had drawn in the sand, but Lee was moving dangerously close to it. The corollary reaction, therefore, was an ominous military gesture that would foreshadow what might occur if Lee went any further. Beijing’s response, which included both missile firings and amphibious exercises but was far smaller in scale than an actual invasion force, was proportional to Lee’s perceived provocation. For several reasons, further steps by Taipei toward formal independence are likely to bring stronger PRC reactions than those in 1995-96. First, the principle of proportionality would suggest that the closer Taiwan moves toward statehood, the more intense will be China’s demonstration of disapproval. Second, Chinese leaders will likely interpret new diplomatic probes by Taipei as evidence that previous PRC signals were not strong enough to “teach Taiwan a lesson,” and that the next signal must therefore be even stronger. Finally, to avoid the credibility of its threats being undermined by the “boy who cried `wolf’” effect, the PLA’s future actions will have to be more threatening than those in 1995-96 to achieve the same level of results.<6>

The cross-Strait economic relationship seems to justify the metaphor of Taiwan being inexorably drawn into reunification with the mainland by the “gravitational pull” of its huge neighbor. It is perfectly understandable that Taiwan businesspeople should be interested in the China market, given its close proximity and the advantages of cultural and linguistic ties. The business community, however, tends to be strategically short-sighted; for the ROC government, the fear is that the mainland market holds a "fatal attraction" for Taiwan.<7> If market forces were given free rein, Taiwan would quickly develop a deep economic dependence on China that Beijing could exploit for political purposes, the argument goes. The Chinese government could impose economic sanctions on Taiwan, or perhaps detain Taiwanese businesspeople on the mainland as hostages, in an effort to force Taipei to make political concessions or even compel Taipei to submit to reunification under Beijing’s conditions. Indeed, during Lee's visit to the United States in 1995, several Taiwan firms operating in the mainland were reportedly "harassed" by PRC auditors, inspectors, and police.<8> Hence the Taipei government’s long, losing battle to restrict and channel Taiwan’s economic exchanges with the mainland.

Taiwanese investment on the mainland was banned through the 1980s, but this law was commonly circumvented, often by using then-British-controlled Hong Kong as a go-between. While Taipei has tried to put the breaks on cross-Strait business, China has encouraged it by offering Taiwanese investors preferential treatment and various financial incentives. Unable to enforce the ban, Taipei lifted it in 1991, allowing certain kinds of investment conditioned on prior government approval. Since then ROC officials have tried to slow the rush to the mainland through a program of persuasion and counter-incentives. Lee has appealed to the Taiwan business community’s patriotism, asking them to be "cautious and self-restrained" (jieji yongren) in their establishment of economic links with China in view of the implications for Taiwan’s national security.<9> Part of the purpose behind the "vacation diplomacy" by Lee and his Premier Lien Chan in Southeast Asia in 1994 was to secure more favorable terms for Taiwanese businesses that traded with and invested in the subregion. Shortly after these high-level but unofficial visits, Lee's government announced additional incentives for Taiwanese firms to "go south" into Southeast Asia instead of west to mainland China.

The ROC government still forbids Taiwanese investment in mainland infrastructure projects (railroads, power plants, etc.), hi-tech ventures and service industries, and limits investment in any single project to a maximum of $50 million. Enforcement of even these relaxed restrictions remains problematic; in 1996, for example, the ROC government approved 383 applications for investment on the mainland worth a total of $1.2 billion; PRC statistics for the same period list 3,200 Taiwanese projects worth $7.1 billion.<10>

Consequently, Taiwan’s economic dependence on the mainland is substantial, and still growing. Taiwan’s investment in China through the end of 1998 was estimated at $30 billion, comprising 43 percent of the ROC’s total overseas investment.<11> The PRC is Taiwan’s third largest trade partner (after the USA and Japan). Some 30,000 Taiwanese companies do business with the mainland. There were nearly two million visits to China by Taiwanese in 1998, and as many as 200,000 ROC nationals reside in China.<12> Taiwan's exports to the mainland as a percentage of Taiwan's total exports have grown steadily over the last decade, and the figure now stands at about 20 percent. Like those throughout the world, international business managers from Taiwan realize that potential political instability puts profits at risk. But for the many thousands who choose to do business on the mainland, the appeal of China's large domestic market, natural resources, low labor costs and familiar culture simply overwhelms the substantial dangers posed by a possible downturn in cross-Strait relations.

The vulnerability to Taiwan created by these cross-Strait economic ties, however, may not be as great as it appears at first glance. If the economic relationship opens an avenue for Beijing to influence Taiwan's mainland policy, it also gives the ROC government an opportunity to promote some of its own national goals. In particular, Taipei seeks to sustain the island's prosperity and economic development by encouraging domestic industries to move from labor-intensive manufacturing into the higher-tech "knowledge intensive" sector. Accordingly, the ROC's Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) is more likely to allow proposed investment on the mainland by Taiwan nationals if the project involves an industry that is labor-intensive or comparatively uncompetitive on the world market. In this sense, the mainland provides an overseas dumping ground for Taiwan's less profitable industries.

There are two reasons why China cannot easily exploit the cross-Strait economic relationship through an imposition of economic sanctions. First, although consistent with China's political agenda, doing business with Taiwan also brings the PRC direct economic benefits. Taiwanese investment creates jobs and disseminates a variety of skills in the PRC. Thus, a strategy of purposefully restricting or discouraging Taiwan's access to the PRC market in the hope of forcing concessions would have significant economic costs for Beijing as well as Taiwan. A second reason involves globalization. Many Taiwan businesses have forged partnerships with foreign companies that are also interested in the China market. These connections make it more difficult for Chinese authorities to isolate Taiwan firms as targets of potential sanctions. Punishing a Taiwanese business might also directly affect an American or European multinational corporation, raising both the economic and political costs of using economic coercion to shape Taiwan's China policy. In sum, tying its economic well-being too tightly to the PRC is certainly a cause for Taiwan's concern, but China's capability to extract political benefits from this relationship at Taiwan's expense should not be overestimated.

If the danger to Taiwan of cross-Strait economic exchange is often exaggerated, so too is the danger of a PLA invasion. When the difficulties of invading Taiwan are thoroughly considered, it is hard to imagine Beijing deciding to make the attempt, let alone successfully conquering the mountainous island. The first problem is geography. Taiwan's western coastline is about 1,000 km long, but the approaches to most of it are covered by shallow mud flats. Only a few small areas are suitable for regular amphibious landings, and Taiwan's armed forces are well-prepared to defend these areas. The island's east coast is no easier to assault, mostly lined with mountains and cliffs rising directly out of the sea. Chinese attackers would also have to travel an additional distance to reach the east coast, increasing both the vulnerability of the assault troops and the difficulty of coordinating the landing. Bad weather is a major factor in planning an amphibious assault across the Strait. During much of the year, the Strait is subject to rough seas or fog severe enough to preclude a challenging naval operation. As mentioned earlier, inclement weather forced the PLA to cancel the latter portion of the March 1996 exercise.

A second problem is logistical. Around the time of the last Strait crisis, the PLA Navy (PLAN) had enough sea lift to transport only one or two divisions at any given time.<13> Since then, although China has continued to build transport vessels, it has not built them quickly enough or in large enough numbers to suggest a commitment to an amphibious invasion capability.<14> Were such a decision taken, and a serious effort made to expand sea lift capability, China's shipyards would probably require two years to produce the required vessels.<15> Analysts have postulated that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) could immediately acquire an almost unlimited sea lift capability by commandeering China's civilian fleets of cargo ships and fishing boats. Civilian vessels transported Chinese soldiers during the capture of Hainan Island in 1949, albeit under easier circumstances: the boats had to travel only 25 kilometers across the Qiongzhou Strait, and Hainan was already partly controlled by communist guerrillas. This "Dunkirk in reverse" tactic, it could be argued, might also create a strategic deception that could increase the invasion's chances of success. Taiwan’s defenders might not recognize that the fishing boats were ferrying an invasion force until the boats were well across the Strait. The PRC has frequently mobilized fleets of fishing boats to harass Taiwanese fishermen, setting a precedent invaders could exploit. With minimal effort, the Chinese could make it difficult for Taiwanese observers to determine the boats were carrying soldiers and weapons. Thus the Chinese vessels would likely not come under Taiwanese fire until they were close to Taiwan’s coast, perhaps guaranteeing that many of them would make it to the shore to discharge their cargoes.<16> All factors considered, however, the fishing boat assault would be far more likely to fail than succeed. Fishing boats are "excruciatingly slow . . . especially in any but ideal sea states," writes retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon, former defense attache at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. "It is one thing to keep fishing boats afloat in such seas, and yet another for diverse fully laden boats to make a good course and speed, remain together, and end up in the right place and on time." Furthermore, while fishing boats might be able to carry soldiers, they are less suitable for transporting tanks and other heavy weapons and equipment the soldiers would need to win their battle with Taiwan's defenders. Finally, since they are not built for amphibious landings, those fishing boats that reached the coast of Taiwan would have to either attempt to dock in enemy ports, intentionally run aground, or stop in shallow waters and leave their passengers to wade or swim ashore with their equipment. Needless to say, each of these options would leave the assaulting troops so vulnerable that a large percentage would almost certainly be lost during the landing.<17>

A third problem is that the chances of success of such an attack would be greatly diminished by the PLA's inability to preserve the element of surprise. PLA planning and mobilization for an attempted invasion of Taiwan could be expected to take four to six months. Taiwanese intelligence would certainly detect a large movement of PLA personnel and assets into staging areas or firing positions in or near the Strait. In addition, the United States government, with its unparalleled network of surveillance satellites, could be expected to warn Taipei of a threatening mobilization by the PLA.

It is safe to assume that in the event of a crisis created by Taiwan's independence or virtual independence, Beijing would prefer to resolve the crisis with as little actual use of force as possible. This would call for a strategy of gradual escalation, beginning with a threatening show of force. As PLA military pressure moved in steps from lower to higher levels, Beijing would give Taipei ample opportunities to relent. The overwhelming advantage of such a strategy to China is that it holds out the prospect Beijing could achieve its objective without the huge costs and risks of an attempted invasion. Unfortunately for the PRC, however, this strategy would also ensure that if invasion became necessary as the final step in a long campaign of escalating aggression, Taiwan's defenders would already have been fully mobilized in response to previous engagements with the PLA, the United States would have had sufficient time to send assistance, and the ROC would know when to expect the attack. Thus, Beijing’s preferred strategy of gradual escalation, while implying the ultimate possibility of invasion, might so compromise the chances of success of an actual invasion as to preclude it.<18>

The most serious obstacle to a PLA invasion of Taiwan is the vulnerability of troop transports crossing the Strait to attacks from ROC aircraft and ships. The distance across the Strait ranges from 70 to 150 miles. At a speed of 16 knots, PLA transport ships would need five to six hours to cross the Strait. To protect the invasion force while it was exposed and vulnerable, the PLA would need to control the Strait and the skies above it. But for the foreseeable future, the PLA will not achieve a realistic expectation of the capability to dominate ROC forces defending the Strait. The PLA and ROC Navies have comparable numbers of modern warships. The PLAN boasts a small number of very capable Luhu, Luhai and Russian-built Sovremennyy-class destroyers and Jiangwei-class frigates. Taiwan answers with French-built Lafayette and U.S.-built Knox class frigates, plus plans to build Cheng Kung class frigates, modeled on the U.S. Perry class. China has produced sophisticated anti-ship missiles, but these are matched by the U.S.-made Harpoon missiles deployed on ROC warships. Although Chinese anti-ship missiles have superior range, this advantage is practically negated by the PLA’s lack of over-the-horizon targeting capability. Taiwan's missiles can target ships at greater range. ROC warships can also defend themselves better against anti-ship missiles than Chinese ships. Analysts believe the PLA Air Force hopes to deploy a total of 400 to 500 of its advanced fighter aircraft, the indigenous J-10 and the Russian Su-27, over the next decade (assuming the J-10, which may still be undergoing testing, meets its development schedule). Even this formidable force would not outclass the ROC Air Force, which will soon add 130 modern Ching Kuo fighters alongside its large fleets of F-16s and French Mirages. Although Taiwan has fewer aircraft, their effectiveness is multiplied by better trained pilots and greater proximity to the combat zone. Taiwan also has four E-2T AWACS aircraft that can track enemy planes up to 640 km away.

The PLA might circumvent the problems associated with sailing across the Strait and establishing a beachhead on a well-defended coastline by attempting to capture Taiwanese airfields or ports. In Harlan Jencks' "sudden onslaught" scenario, the PRC launches a surprise assault without giving Taiwan the advance warning of unusually large troop movements. First the Chinese detonate a nuclear weapon in the atmosphere over Taiwan to create a massive electro-magnetic pulse that disables the island's electronic systems. Then PLA paratroopers capture a few airfields in a bold commando operation. The PLA Air Force's limited transport aircraft fly several thousand troops from rapid reaction units into the captured airfields from their peacetime bases on the mainland. At the same time, pre-positioned "fifth columnists" conduct sabotage and spread disinformation, with the primary objective of exaggerating the perceived number of mainland soldiers already on the island. Under the combined weight of the electronic blackout, the successful insertion of PLA rapid reaction units, and the activities of the fifth columnists, Taiwan's will and capability to defend itself temporarily collapse, allowing the PRC to fly in huge numbers of reinforcements via civilian jetliners. PLA troops avoid the dangers of crossing the Strait by sea, and the success of the assault is assured before the United States military has a chance to intervene.<19> Alternatively, infiltrated commandos or paratroopers seize a Taiwanese port in a surprise, lightning assault, after which PLAN transport ships plus a variety of commandeered vessels safely offload large numbers of troops and equipment at dockside.

These operations, however, risk playing into the hands of the defenders. Port facilities are not "hardened" and would therefore be easily destroyed either in the initial battle to seize the port or in subsequent ROC counterattacks. With these facilities damaged, the unloading of Chinese ships would bog down, and arriving PLA reinforcements would be trapped in a bottleneck. Furthermore, ROC forces could focus their efforts on the seized port, turning it into a killing zone while blocking or destroying roads and rail links leading inland. The same principle applies to the idea of the PLA capturing an airfield: even if this first stage was successful, ROC forces could concentrate their firepower on a relatively small area.<20>

For at least the near to medium term, during which the physical conquest of Taiwan will remain a daunting prospect for the PLA, China is far more likely to respond to formal Taiwanese independence not with an invasion, with rather by exercising coercion designed to force Taipei to retract its claim of separate statehood. Beijing has a range of coercive options short of invasion to choose from, many of which are considered below. These options may be grouped into four general categories: hostile acts against Taiwan that do not involve traditional military means; and military activities representing low, medium, high and very high levels of aggression. There is of course room for disagreement about whether a specific act on the following list should be located in one category or another. The important point is that there are a variety of means China can employ to menace Taiwan, and these means vary in intensity. This would potentially allow China to control the degree and tempo of escalation of a Taiwan Strait conflict.

Beijing has the option of stepping up non-military activities designed to destabilize the ROC, including smuggling arms and narcotics onto the island, infiltrating "fifth columnists," or perhaps dispatching a large number of refugees to Taiwan. China reportedly has several thousand agents placed in Taiwan who are prepared carry out destabilizing activities at Beijing's command, including disseminating disinformation calculated to increase fear of the PLA, decrease confidence in Taiwan's economy, and exacerbate strife between different social and political groupings. The PRC government keeps reserves of the New Taiwan Dollar that can be dumped on the market to suddenly reduce the ROC currency's value. Another means of destabilization the ROC worries about is assassination of Taiwan politicians by gangsters hired by Beijing. Some 50 suspected members of criminal organizations reportedly entered Taiwan during the 1996 presidential election campaign and were seen at public appearances by presidential vice-presidential candidates.<21>

The movement of large numbers of aircraft, missiles and troops from other areas inside China to the coast opposite Taiwan is a gesture Taiwan must take seriously, whether or not Beijing offers an explanation for it. Any PRC military exercises conducted in or near the Taiwan Strait apply pressure to Taiwan, as these are closely linked to the overall political relationship and the ROC must be prepared for the possibility that exercises may actually be a smokescreen for an attack on Taiwan's territory. As the 1995-96 Strait crisis demonstrated, live-fire military exercises or missile launches near air and shipping routes can also be used as a "cold blockade," effectively shutting down commercial transportation in and out of the island's major hubs without engaging in an unambiguous act of war. Chinese fishing boats plying waters close to Taiwan predictably generate a reaction by the ROC. If the Chinese wanted to raise tensions, they could use such an incident at sea as an excuse to send in warships to confront ROC civilian or naval ships in the Strait. Alternatively, armed Chinese fishing boats could be employed to harass Taiwan's fishing fleet or commercial shipping traffic in and out of Taiwan.

Launching one or more missiles on a flight path that passed directly over the main island and into the sea off Taiwan’s east coast would be viewed as more than an ordinary PLA exercise, as would firing a missile into uninhabited ROC territory, such as one of the smaller Taiwan-owned islands in the Strait. Both Beijing and Taipei recognize that an unofficial political boundary runs through the middle of the Taiwan Strait parallel to the two opposite coastlines. PRC ships or aircraft crossing this line would be understood by both sides as a belligerent gesture. The PLA's 1996 exercises came close to this line but did not breach it. The PLAN might impose a mini-blockade by interfering with the passage of supply ships from Taiwan to Jinmen (Quemoy) or Mazu (Matsu), Taiwan-held islands close to the mainland coast. Similarly, a "quarantine" of Taiwan's two main ports would exert Chinese pressure without committing the PRC to war with Taiwan. Under this scenario, China would announce that the PLAN would stop and search ships entering Taiwan's two main ports. Some ships might be refused permission to dock or have their cargo confiscated.

PLA attacks on ROC assets or territory outside of the main island would be clear acts of war, but would imply a modicum of restraint, leaving an additional escalatory step not yet taken. Small ROC-held islands close to the mainland were frequently shelled during the Cold War, and this tactic could be revived. PLA aircraft and warships might attack ROC planes and ships in and over the Strait. More passively, the PLAN might destroy ships by laying mines near Taiwan's ports. Another option is a PLAN blockade of all shipping traffic attempting to enter or leave Taiwan's major ports, a more assertive act than a quarantine. Even if ships in designated areas were turned back rather than sunk, an effective blockade would quickly put Taiwan under heavy strain because of the island's dependence on foreign imports and markets. About 70 percent of Taiwan's trade transits the ports of Keelung and Kaohsiung alone.<22> This fact, combined with the large size of China's submarine force and the limitations on Taiwan's anti-submarine warfare capabilities, makes the blockade an attractive strategy from the PRC's point of view.

Chinese missile or bomber strikes against the main island of Taiwan would constitute a full-scale Taiwan Strait war, even if the PRC did not plan to attempt an invasion. Instead of softening up the island for invasion, this effort might be aimed at terrorizing the population and ruining the island's economic life, creating domestic demands for the ROC government to change its policy and reopen reunification negotiations with Beijing. As ROC Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Su Chi pointed out, the physical damage that can be wreaked by a Chinese missile, which “can only cause a hole about the size of half of a basketball court,” is probably outweighed by the potential psychological effects of a missile attack.<23> PLA attacks might target government buildings as well as key parts of Taiwan's infrastructure.

China’s most compelling threat to Taiwan, then, is not that of recapture through invasion, but rather the PLA’s ability to severely damage the island’s economic viability. This capability not only endangers the well being of ROC citizens and their assets, but might also lead to the destruction of the ROC as a political entity, as the Chinese would use force as a tool for coercing Taiwan to accept reunification under the status of a province of the PRC. There is little doubt that the vast majority of Taiwan’s citizens prefer their present economic and political system to that of the PRC, and opinion polls show that in general, pro-independence sentiment increases when China makes a provocative military gesture. Still, Taiwan’s ability to withstand a PRC campaign of military pressure is not above suspicion. An interruption of air and sea traffic would quickly devastate the ROC’s economy. The 1995-96 crisis was marked by panic in the Taiwanese stock market and the flight of capital from the island. The mere announcement of the 1995 missile tests caused stock market to drop 4.2 percent in one day. During 1996, an estimated $5 to $15 billion in capital fled Taiwan and the stock market dropped a total of 1,000 points. A similar phenomenon followed Lee’s open challenge of the “one China” principle in July 1999. Within a week after the press reported Lee’s statements, the Taiwan stock market fell 13 percent, despite heavy buying by the government in an attempt to limit the damage.<24> Many mainland strategists consider Taiwan a “soft” society with no stomach for war. One asserts, “The Taiwanese masses are unwilling to lose their wealth and security in a war, let alone lose their lives.”<25> Andrew Yang, general secretary of the Center for Advanced Policy Studies in Taipei, admits to “our vulnerability to psychological warfare from Beijing. Right now, we are weak in civil defense. We are weak in a sense of forthcoming danger.” An apt example, perhaps, is the fact that Taiwan’s emergency oil reserves have been reduced from a 120-day supply to an 18-day supply because environmental protection groups complained about the government’s policy of anchoring a large number of oil tankers off Taiwan’s shore.<26> In a survey conducted among first-year and second-year college students in the Taichung area in 1995, only 33 percent of respondents said they were willing to fight to defend Taiwan.<27>

America has economic, strategic and political interests in defending Taiwan. Taiwan is the seventh largest importer of U.S. products, and the fifth largest buyer of American agricultural exports. U.S. failure to stand up to PRC aggression against Taiwan would raise doubts about Washington’s willingness to continue to enforce the Pax Americana under which many Asia-Pacific countries have prospered and progressed. Taiwan’s conquest by the Chinese Communist Party would also diminish the “zone of peace,” or the global community of democratic states. This would be a negative development in light of the Clinton Administration’s commitment to fostering democracy worldwide as a means of preventing war, based on the assumption that democratic regimes tend not to go to war against each other. Finally, many Americans would feel their core values had been betrayed if the USA declined to support a democratic (de facto) country threatened with aggression from a larger authoritarian state.

Years of political craftsmanship have produced an official U.S.-Taiwan relationship that epitomizes the term “strategic ambiguity.” On the one hand, every U.S. administration of the last three decades has professed support for the principle of “one China,” which implies Taiwan’s eventual reunification with the mainland. The 20-year-old Taiwan Relations Act, on the other hand, codifies America’s interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan-China dispute, and provides for U.S. arms sales to help Taiwan defend itself. The 1995-96 Strait crisis yielded explicit statements from the U.S. Department of State that U.S. adherence to the “one China” principle was predicated upon Chinese adherence to the principle of peaceful resolution.<28> The dispatch of two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan during the crisis underlined the point that a PLA attack on Taiwan could invoke American military intervention. The implications of these developments were later balanced, however, by U.S. fears that pro-independence politicians on Taiwan were taking advantage of American protection to push an agenda that was not in America’s best interests. Thus, the Clinton Administration made minor concessions on Taiwan to Beijing in 1998, with Clinton publicly stating he did not support Taiwanese independence or ROC membership in organizations for which statehood is a requirement. Clinton and his State Department also sided with China rather than Taiwan when Lee suggested in July 1999 that the cross-Strait relationship should be understood as “special state-to-state relations.” The guideline that seems to emerge from this collection of probes and reactions is that U.S. military forces would probably intervene in the event of what was perceived as an unprovoked PLA attack on Taiwan, but probably would not defend Taiwan if its leaders appeared to bring on such an attack by attempting to change the status quo in defiance of American advice.

The capabilities of U.S. air and naval forces far outstrip those of the PLA, and the possibility of American intervention is an important factor in deterring Chinese military action against Taiwan. The relevance of the U.S. factor, nevertheless, should not be overestimated. Under present circumstances, and probably through the next decade, Taiwan could successfully defend itself against an attempted PLA invasion, even without U.S. military intervention. In the more likely event of a protracted campaign of lower-level military pressure against Taiwan, effective U.S. intervention would be difficult for political and economic reasons. The PLA could adjust the nature and intensity of its operations to avoid clashing directing with U.S. forces and invoking an unfettered U.S. counterattack on Chinese assets. American ships and aircraft would likely be forced to operate under restricted rules of engagement, of which the PLA would quickly learn to take advantage. With a higher level of commitment and lower operating costs, China could sustain this campaign indefinitely, while Americans would soon grow weary of maintaining a large force on station far from home. For the USA, the scenario might begin to resemble a Vietnam at sea. In sum, American intervention would not be needed in the case of an invasion of Taiwan, and unless U.S. forces received a mandate to go on the offensive, they would have only limited effectiveness against a campaign of military coercion short of invasion.

Possible Solutions to Taiwan’s Security Problem

There are four distinct approaches Taiwan might pursue to make itself more secure vis-à-vis the PRC. The first is a diplomatic solution based on a “no force, no independence” agreement. The second is for Taipei to agree to reunification under the most favorable terms it can negotiate. Third, Taiwan might take the opposite route and move decisively toward independent statehood. Finally, Taiwan might strive to sustain and stabilize the status quo. I will argue that this last approach is the most promising.

Taiwan wants Beijing to renounce the use of force. Beijing wants Taiwan to renounce the possibility of independence. Many observers have thus proposed a peace accord in which the PRC renounces its claimed “right” to use force against Taiwan in exchange for a commitment from Taiwan not to formally declare independence. Unfortunately, this seemingly neat solution is politically impossible. The proposed bargain would require both Taipei and Beijing to compromise their perceived sovereignty to a degree both find unacceptable. Taiwan under Lee's leadership has challenged the status quo and incurred the risks of PRC retaliation precisely because Taiwan's people aspire to the privileges of statehood. There is no chance Taiwan politicians will publicly forswear this aspiration anytime soon. Similarly, under the present PRC government's interpretations of the Taiwan issue and of national sovereignty, a renunciation of the right to use force against Taiwan could only be understood as a weakening of Beijing's claim that Taiwan belongs to China. The ruling regime would expect such a move to result in political disaster: severe criticism from "patriotic" Party nationalists, exacerbated pressure from separatist groups within China, and encouragement of the perception of Chinese weakness among foreigners. Thus neither side of the Strait would agree to a "no peace, no independence" deal.

Even if Beijing and Taipei officials managed to reach such an agreement, it would probably not solve Taiwan's security problem. However the accord was phrased, the wording would be subject reinterpretation by both sides based on their respective political agenda. One could foresee that Taiwan would still seek to secure maximum political privileges without actually declaring independence from China (exactly as it does today), and that Beijing would retaliate by suspending its no-force pledge until Taiwan kept to what Beijing understood as the spirit of the agreement. China might also argue that its promise not to use force against Taiwan did not refer to lower level forms of military coercion. It is not clear that such an accord would have precluded the 1995-96 crisis, and the same can be said of potential future crises.

If China's military and economic strength are destined to grow stronger relative to Taiwan, many observers argue, not only is China's eventual victory assured, but also the ROC's bargaining position with China will weaken over time. Taiwan can therefore make the best of a losing situation by negotiating now, before its relative position slips further, for the most favorable reunification deal it can get. This approach is made more attractive by the fact that Beijing has indicated it is willing to consider seemingly generous terms for Taiwan's reunification with the mainland under the "one country, two systems" principle. Past statements by high-ranking Chinese officials have included the provisos that a reintegrated Taiwan could keep its own armed forces and that Taiwan would be ruled by local leaders rather than by representatives sent from Beijing. This suggests Taiwan could retain almost all the important elements of its present de facto independence and greatly reduce the PRC military threat for the price of accepting de jure reunification. Such a solution is also attractive from the standpoint of the USA and many other foreign countries: they would presumably be allowed to maintain their economic links with a Taiwan under the "one country, two systems" arrangement, they would be spared the tradeoffs now associated with the diplomatic row between Beijing and Taipei, and they would see a major impediment to regional stability and cooperation removed.

Admittedly, the case supporting this approach is strong,<29> especially in the eyes of observers outside Taiwan, who have the luxury of a detached view of the implications of living under PRC rule. I argue, nonetheless, that this approach is objectionable on two counts. First, it is premature for Taiwan to begin negotiating the terms of its surrender to the mainland. The notion of Taiwan being drawn irresistibly into reunification by China's overwhelming size and influence is based on the assumption that the PRC will maintain political stability and healthy economic growth, which is far from certain. China fared well during the decade of the 1990s, averaging around 10 percent annual economic growth and keeping potentially serious political, financial and social problems contained. It is easy but unreflective to presume this state of affairs will continue for another decade and beyond. China faces several gigantic challenges blocking the road to superpower status. These include an environmental crisis worsened by rapid economic development; the need to privatize unproductive state-owned enterprises without creating massive unemployment; social unrest over a variety of issues; persistent ethnic separatism; a weak banking system that, until it is reformed and recapitalized, leaves the country vulnerable to a serious financial crisis; a diminution of the central government's power, which some analysts say make it inevitable China will devolve into a federal system; and continuous attacks on the CCP's monopoly over political power and the organization of labor. Some of these challenges will become more difficult or costly to overcome as the economy grows larger. China may turn out poorer, less stable and/or less powerful than expected in the early part of the 21st century, leaving it both less influential over and less appealing to Taiwan. Thus, the presumed gravitational pull over Taiwan might never develop. The ROC can afford to be patient and need not rush into a settlement.

The second objection to the bargained-surrender approach is that it is unjust. The island of Taiwan has never in its history been under the control of the People's Republic of China regime. Taiwan was effectively administered by the mainland government, then under the ethnic Manchu Qing Dynasty monarchy, for only 10 years before being shifted into imperial Japan's sphere of influence from 1895 to 1945. After Japan was defeated and stripped of colonies, Taiwan was again briefly ruled from the mainland from 1945 to 1949, but in this case the ruling regime was the Guomindang, which was soon exiled from the mainland and became Taiwan's dominant party. Thus Beijing's claims that the CCP is the rightful ruler of Taiwan and that Taiwan is politically an integral part of the mainland are weak. However deeply the mainland Chinese have been taught to believe in their ownership of Taiwan, the demand that Taiwan must adjust to accommodate the mainland's self-image disrespects the wishes of the island's inhabitants, who overwhelmingly oppose being ruled by the present government in Beijing. PRC officials have invoked the analogy of the U.S. Civil War, in which the northern states warred against the southern states to prevent them from seceding from the Union, to justify their policy toward Taiwan. The comparison is dubious; the history and depth of political integration between the northern and southern United States were much greater than in the China-Taiwan case.<30> Even if the right of self determination by a territory's inhabitants is not an absolute entitlement, in Taiwan's case this consideration clearly outweighs Beijing's claims to ownership. >From an ethical standpoint, therefore, capitulation by Taiwan is not the proper solution.

The case could be made that Taiwan would be more secure in the long run if it declared itself an independent state sooner rather than later. Beijing's rationale for threatening force against Taiwan is based on the premise that Taiwan is not a state, but a province of China, and therefore subject to the principle that a state has the right to use force within its own territory. Taiwan is caught in a paradox reminiscent of Catch-22: Taiwan would not be attacked if it was an independent state, but it cannot become an independent state without being attacked. A way out of this predicament might be to make the commitment to independence at a time when Beijing's capacity to retaliate is relatively low, and then ride out the storm with the expectation that time would eventually legitimize the new status quo. After Taiwan had survived several years as an avowedly independent country, observers—perhaps including the Communist Chinese Party leadership and the mainland Chinese people as well as the international community as a whole—would grow accustomed to the idea, and it would be increasingly difficult for China to attempt to turn back the clock. If China undertook coercive action years after Taiwan declared independence, Beijing rather than Taiwan would be seen as the provocateur. If Taipei accepts this strategy, and if the PRC's military strength relative to Taiwan is expected to increase over time, it is logical for Taipei to hasten its evolution toward independent statehood while China is comparatively weak and support for Taiwan among American politicians is strong.

This approach, however, is unacceptably risky. China may well be militarily stronger in the future, but it is already committed today to a military response if Taiwan declares independence, and already able to wreak daunting punishment. Furthermore, as Lee discovered in July 1999, Taiwan could not count on U.S. support if it pursued this strategy. In the summer of 1999, fueled by the recent scandals involving alleged Chinese nuclear espionage and donations to Democratic Party politicians, combined with the American perception that Beijing had attempted to politically exploit Chinese anger over the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, anti-PRC sentiment in the USA was at its highest level since the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. Even in this environment, however, Washington reacted to Lee's intimations of Taiwanese statehood by reaffirming the U.S. commitment to the one China principle, leaving Taiwan politically isolated. The danger, in short, is that Taiwan might not survive its newly-professed statehood long enough for this status to become legitimized.

The Taiwan government's policy of pushing for greater "international space" has reached the limits of its utility and now threatens to become counterproductive. Lee's initiatives evidently convinced most CCP elites that Taiwan would drift toward independence unless China intervened; hence the 1995-96 crisis. Many PRC elites already believe Taiwan has moved too far toward statehood and that Beijing's responses have been too weak. Jiang Zemin's regime is under pressure to make a strong gesture that will intimidate Taiwan into changing its course away from statehood and toward serious reunification negotiations. This pressure will increase if Taiwan takes what are perceived in Beijing as additional steps toward independence. At some point this pressure will result in a decision to take military action against Taiwan. The PRC government has shown it can be patient if it believes time is on its side. If Taiwan takes no further steps toward statehood, Beijing's fears might be assuaged, and the pressure for a military response reduced. Rather than further probing the limits of Beijing's tolerance, the Taiwanese people's interests would be best served by protecting the gains they have made thus far and maintaining the status quo. This might require the abandonment of certain ROC aspirations that imply statehood, such as meetings between high-ranking ROC leaders and foreign officials, a seat for Taiwan in the United Nations, and membership in certain other international organizations. It would not, however, rule out Taiwan's continued purchase of weapons systems clearly intended to defend against improving PLA capabilities.

Taiwan's people will support a policy that protects their de facto independence but strives to avoid antagonizing Beijing further. Recent opinion polls consistently show most people on Taiwan favor the status quo and oppose an official declaration of independence, which they fear would provoke Beijing. A powerful coalition of pro-independence groups, the Democratic Progressive Party (Minjindang, DPP), has considerably moderated its previous position in recent years. Prominent DPP figure and former Party chairman Hsu Hsin-liang recently backed away from the proposal for a plebiscite on Taiwanese independence, saying it would “bring disaster” upon the country. During the DPP convention in May 1999, the party discontinued its call for a plebiscite and moved closer to accepting Taiwan’s official title “Republic of China,” which the party has previously refused to recognize.

The PRC's Taiwan policy is the result of political choices, not geographical or tribal imperatives. There are many cases worldwide of contented multi-state nations that do not insist on political integration. Although it would probably take at least a generation, the PRC might eventually join this group if mainlanders come to accept that a politically independent Taiwan does not so seriously undermine the security, prestige or historical significance of "China" that the matter is worth going to war over. Beijing's current Taiwan policy does not represent the preferences of the entire PRC elite. Rather, it represents the ascendance of the "hard-line" position, championed by most high-ranking PLA officers and other influential figures with conservative and highly nationalistic views about China's foreign relations. Other Chinese elites, including many of those with a background in diplomacy or economics, many of those with experience traveling or living abroad, and many CCP cadres from commerce-oriented southern China, favor a more conciliatory policy toward Taiwan.<31> If the status quo persisted long enough, absent other complicating developments, it is reasonable to conjecture that the more conciliatory position would tend to increase relative to the hard-line position. This would be the beginning of a permanent solution. While this solution develops, a careful management of the status quo is needed to buy time.

My analysis does not support alarmist views regarding a PLA invasion of Taiwan or China’s ability to force reunification through economic sanctions. Taiwan is, however, vulnerable to PLA military action that could disrupt the island’s economic life, particularly missile bombardment or naval blockade. The solution to Taiwan’s security problem in the medium term is deterring Chinese military action. On the strength of Taiwan’s own efforts to build a robust defense combined with the strong possibility of U.S. assistance, China will be relatively easy to deter if Taipei takes no additional steps toward independence. If Taiwan does take such steps, China will be hard to deter. If Taiwan declares itself an independent state, deterring a Chinese attack will be nearly impossible. While the ROC need not succumb to defeatism, the people of Taiwan would best contribute to their own security by halting their movement toward independence.

The USA has strong interests in maintaining its relationships with both the ROC and China, and the best means of doing this is to continue cautioning both Beijing and Taipei against provocation. Some U.S. politicians criticize the “one China” policy as an absurd word game stemming from a desire to appease the PRC. Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) calls it a “puzzling fiction” that has “imprisoned U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan for years.”<32> But this arrangement is far more liberating than it is “imprisoning”; for the small price of playing this word game, the United States is able to have a working relationship with China, while Taiwan enjoys most of the benefits of statehood. Instead of fighting out the Taiwan problem to immediate resolution, Beijing has been willing to shelve the issue indefinitely as long as Taipei and Washington cooperate in maintaining the small scrap of face-saving respect represented by the “one China” principle.

My conclusions rely heavily on the assumption that the status quo prior to the 1995-96 Strait crisis—i.e., Beijing’s acceptance of a de facto but not de jure independent Taiwan provided Taipei gave due recognition to the possibility of eventual reunification, and Taiwan’s acceptance of certain restraints on its international diplomatic and political status—can be regained and sustained despite the changes taking place within China, within Taiwan, and in Asia-Pacific international security relations as a whole. In support of the assumption that the status quo can remain stable, I would point out that many of the changes taking place within the region are supportive of peace and stability, including signs that China is evolving toward a less rigid political system, greater international acceptance of the norm of peaceful resolution of disputes (putting greater pressure on China to change its stance toward Taiwan), and increasing international acclimation to the notion of Taiwan as an independent state. Both stability and the passage of time will be needed to realize the optimum long term solution, which is for the PRC government to reinterpret its relationship with Taiwan so that preventing Taiwan’s official political independence from China is no longer considered a vital PRC interest.

1. Even the expansion of democracy and human rights in China is an objective with which many Chinese elites are sympathetic, and Americans have offered the PRC considerable advice and assistance in reforming the Chinese legal system, despite the generally hostile atmosphere surrounding this bilateral issue. This area, too, could potentially be an area of cooperation rather than confrontation.

2. Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, "Taiwan's View of Military Balance and the Challenge it Presents," in James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs (eds.), Crisis in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997), p. 299.

3. Alastair Iain Johnston, “International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy,” in Samuel S. Kim (ed.), China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium, 4th edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), p. 74.

4. Wenhui Bao, Mar. 5, 1996; FBIS-CHI, Mar. 11, 1996, p. 15.

5. A recent opinion poll of nearly 2,000 Chinese respondents, for example, showed 87 percent would approve of the government’s decision to invade Taiwan if the ROC declared independence. Reuters report, July 20, 1999; uschina@listbox.com, July 20, 1999.

6. John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States and Taiwan’s Democratization (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 162.

7. Tse-Kang Leng, "A Political Analysis of Taiwan's Economic Dependence on Mainland China," Issues & Studies, vol. 34, no. 8 (August 1998), p. 152.

8. "Harassed Business," Far Eastern Economic Review, Aug. 17, 1995, p. 12.

9. Leng, pp. 134-135.

10. Tse-Kang Leng, "Dynamics of Taiwan-Mainland China Economic Relations: The Role of Private Firms," Asian Survey, vol. 38, no. 5 (May 1998), p. 501.

11. Christopher Bodeen, Associated Press, Apr. 2, 1999; from uschina@listbox.com, Apr. 3, 1999.

12. Susan L. Shirk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “The Taiwan Relations Act at Twenty,” address to the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, Apr. 14, 1999, p. 3; from uschina@listbox.com, Apr. 26, 1999.

13. "Will the Chinese Communist Armed Forces Encroach on Taiwan?" Chung Kuo Shih Pao, Aug. 27, 1995, p. 3; FBIS-CHI, Aug. 27, 1995; Harlan W. Jencks, "Wild Speculations on the Military Balance in the Taiwan Straits," in Lilley and Downs (eds.), p. 149.

14. John Culver, "Defense Policy and Posture II," in Hans Binnendijk and Ronald N. Montaperto (eds.), Strategic Trends in China (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1998), p. 72.

15. Tai Ming Cheung, "Chinese Military Preparations Against Taiwan Over the Next Ten Years," in Lilley and Downs (eds.), p. 66.

16. Jencks, in Lilley and Downs (eds.), p. 147.

17. Eric A. McVadon, "PRC Exercises, Doctrine and Tactics Toward Taiwan: The Naval Dimension," in Lilley and Downs (eds.), pp. 254-255.

18. Denny Roy, “To Bark or Bite? The Problem of Deception,” in Peter Kien-hong Yu (ed.), The Chinese PLA’s Perception of an Invasion of Taiwan (New York: Contemporary U.S.-Asia Research Institute, 1996), pp. 105-131.

19. Jencks, in Lilley and Downs, pp. 154-156.

20. McVadon, in Lilley and Downs (eds.), p. 255.

21. Garver, p. 125.

22. Peter Mantangnon et al., "Missiles put Taiwan shipping under threat," The Financial Times, Mar. 7, 1996, p. 6.

23. Oxford Analytica, “Taiwan Missile Defenses,” Feb. 17, 1999, http://taiwansecurity.org/Reu/Reu-990218.htm, p. 2.

24. Mark Landler, “Feud Hits Taipei Stocks,” International Herald Tribune, July 17-18, 1999, p. 1.

25. Zhu Xianlong, Zhongguo Pinglun (Hong Kong), Mar. 5, 1999, p. 88.

26. John Pomfret, “Chinese Threat Tests Taiwan’s Preparedness,” Washington Post, July 27, 1999, p. A13.

27. Lien Ho Pao (Taipei), Aug. 10, 1995, p. 11.

28. While appearing on the television program Meet the Press on Mar. 10, 1996, Secretary of State Warren Christopher said America's one-China policy was contingent on Beijing's willingness to "deal peacefully with the issue of Taiwan." In May 1996, Christopher said, "our `one China' policy is predicated on the PRC's pursuit of a peaceful resolution of issues between Taiwan and Beijing." Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kent Wiedemann told the House International Relations Committee in August 1995 that American "adherence to the three communiques depends on peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue." Garver, p. 81; William T. Pendley, “Taiwan: Getting It Right,” Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Pac Net No. 21, May 24, 1996.

29. The best articulation of this case I have seen is Lynn T. White's "Taiwan's China Problem: After a Decade Or Two, Can There Be A Solution?" SAIS Policy Forum Series, Report No. 6, Johns Hopkins University, December 1998.

30. I am indebted to Gerrit Gong for this insight.

31. George W. Tsai, "The Making of Taiwan Policy in Mainland China: Structure and Process," Issues & Studies, vol. 33, no. 9 (September 1997), p. 30.

32. “Senator Lambastes Clinton, China Policy Over Taiwan,” Agence France Presse, Jul. 22, 1999; uschina@listbox.com, Jul. 22, 1999.