By Thomas J. Christensen and Philip Yang

Following is a transcript of the email exchange between Prof. Thomas Christensen and Prof. Philip Yang regarding Prof. Christensen's OpEd "Clarity on Taiwan" in the Washington Post on March 20:

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March 23, 2000, 11:59 AM

Dear Prof. Christensen,

I really enjoyed reading your March 20 column "Clarity on Taiwan" in the Washington Post, especially your argument on the moral ground of U.S. policy toward the Taiwan issue. However, as to a policy of clarity on Taiwan security, you argued that the policy of strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan issue should be replaced by a policy of clarity. In short, "Washington should tell Taiwan in no uncertain terms that Americans will not fight and die to defend a Taiwan that declares constitutional independence from the Chinese nation. At the same time, America should warn the mainland that a military attack on a Taiwan that is still legally Chinese will meet a U.S. military response."

But there are two major problems with a policy of clarity on the Taiwan issue. First, the burden of proof of the definition of Taiwan independence will fall on the U.S. side. Such a situation might introduce another major element of ambiguity and uncertainty into the cross-strait situation. The U.S. would have to provide criteria for U.S. involvement which would serve as the guidelines for all actors involved. However, it will be difficult for the U.S. to deal with the gray areas, for example, the U.S. will not be able to send an air-craft carrier to the Taiwan Straits as a deterrent measure if a situation similar to the 1996 missile exercise incident happens again. Second, by shifting to a policy of clarity, the U.S. will openly and legally become involved in the dispute between Taiwan and China, either as a third party or as a mediator. The U.S. will be expected to offer proposals for resolving cross-strait disputes, or at least to guarantee a peaceful status quo across the Taiwan Straits. I wonder whether the U.S. would be willing to commit itself to any situation like this in the post-Cold War era.

Best Regards,

Philip Yang

Associate Professor, National Taiwan University

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March 25, 2000, 5:23 PM

Dear Prof Yang (may I use Philip?):

Thanks for the thoughtful note. I agree that there will always be some ambiguity. But I would like the US to state clearly its principles and the reasons for them first. I also agree that the ultimate decision about what constitutes "provocation" will be in America's hands. But it must be if American troops will be put at risk. I think however that if we state our reasons for opposing Taiwan independence and the fact that we reserve the right to decide when Taipei has crossed the line, then Taipei may have to think harder about taking too many provocative steps. However, I think actions such as pushing for membership in WHO become safer and easier under my plan than under the more ambiguous policy in existence.

I disagree that my proposal would make it more difficult to repeat the 1996 carrier deployments, which I wholeheartedly supported (just as an aside the carriers appropriately went to the Philippine Sea, not to the Strait). My proposal would make it easier to do so because I call for a clear commitment to Taiwan's security if it has not moved toward independence. I think it was a mistake for Pres. Lee to go to Cornell but that is hardly a declaration of independence. The US was wise to send not one but two carrier battle groups and to keep them out of the Strait. I would support the same policy today if something similar occurred.

I also disagree that the US will become any more of a mediator than it currently is (I wish the US would reject all mediation and I believe that Washington was mistaken even to raise the issue of interim agreements). I am not sure I follow your logic there. My proposal is not a panacea, as you correctly point out. I just think it is a step in the right direction. I think Taiwan is a miraculous place with tremendous achievements. I would like to see it continue to prosper and remain free. I also would like it to have a slow and corrosive effect on mainland authoritarianism. Conflict with China, even if it occurs with full military backing of the United States, is not in Taiwan's interest. I would like to prevent that from occurring for America's sake and Taiwan's. Sorry to sound so philosophical, but I really have a warm spot in my heart for Taiwan and, though I am no pacifist, I really dread the consequences of war across the Strait and between the US and China. I am afraid that scenario is all too possible unless people in Beijing, Taipei and Washington think harder about current policy trends. Thanks again for the kind and thoughful note. I hope we will get to meet sometime soon.

Best regards,

Tom (if it is OK with you, please call me Tom).

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March 30, 2000, 8:09 AM

Dear Tom,

Thank you very much for the reply. I agree that a policy of clarity on the Taiwan issue can also serve as a preventive measure for maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Straits. The difference between the current policy of strategic ambiguity and a policy of clarity is indeed a matter of degree. It seems to me that the "three-noes" policy, which has become the backbone of Washington's policy toward Taiwan security and cross-strait issues, is a major step toward the policy of strategic clarity.

Having said this, I would like to explain my argument regarding why U.S. clarification would necessarily entail greater U.S. involvement in a mediating capacity. Increased involvement would result because a policy of clarity that you suggested on the Taiwan security issue would require the U.S. --including public opinion--to be willing to make a clear commitment to preserving the status quo. Such a commitment would necessarily entail that the U.S. become more deeply involved. Additionally some would argue that the combination of "Taiwan provocation, China over-reaction, and US bungling" is the major source of the tension across the Taiwan Straits. Facing a new cross-strait situation resulting from Taiwan's democratic development, the U.S. will increasingly now be called to play a more important role in maintaining peace and security in the Taiwan Straits. I hope the U.S. can provide consistency and coherence on maintaining the balance between its China policy and Taiwan security policy.

Finally, I discussed your article in my Asia-Pacific security class with my students (I also use your paper on the U.S.-Japan security alliance in my class), one American student, William Norris, a Luce Scholar from Princeton who is sitting in on my class, has some thoughts on your article:

"Prof. Christensen's statement that Taiwan act as a beacon to the PRC is a great point that is often overlooked when considering appropriate Taiwan policy. It represents a potentially powerful illustration of a transition from a party-dominated, authoritarian system to a thriving, democratic society. The best part, as Prof. Christensen points out, is that this has happened in a _Chinese_ context incorporating all of the unique cultural and social characteristics. However, a "Beacon Effect" would not just happen. For Taiwan to act as such a beacon would require 2 important pre-conditions: 1) Beijing would have to come to grips with the reality of what has happened on Taiwan to even begin to draw lessons for the Mainland's experience--right now precious few, if any, Communist Party leaders really understand what has happened on Taiwan (as demonstrated by Zhu Rongji's pre-election comments) and 2) The PRC's leadership would have to desire--at least at some level--to make a similar transition away from the current system. Neither of these preconditions to "the Beacon Effect" must be _explicitly_ recognized, although both must happen--even if not publicly--in order for the Beacon Effect to occur. So there is hope. Broader U.S. China policy ought to be designed, as much as possible, to encourage such a Beacon Effect. My second point, although somewhat obvious, nonetheless needs to be voiced in a discussion of clarifying U.S. policy on Taiwan.

A clarification that essentially draws lines regarding acceptable behavior on the part of both parties would almost certainly offer Beijing legitimacy in its complaints of excessive U.S. involvement in its internal affairs. Part of the reason the U.S. has opted for ambiguity is to give the U.S. the possibility to become involved in a future crisis while, in the interim, avoiding de jure violation of the current international consensus that--at least officially--acknowledges Taiwan as part of China. A move toward clarity would lay down the rules for both Taipei _and_ Beijing. Incidentally, such a move (I agree with Prof. Christensen) is a step in the right direction for many reasons politically, strategically, and morally. I would only point out that by making U.S. intentions explicit, there would be a price to be paid in the international community and obviously in Sino-U.S. cooperation. Having said this, I believe that the benefits gained from a clear articulation of U.S. policy would, over the medium to long term outweigh the shorter term costs. Clarification is preferable to continuing a policy of ambiguity which would defer short term diplomatic and political costs but set the stage for disastrous miscalculations in the medium term."

I wonder that whether I can put our emails (including your replying emails) on the Taiwan Security Research (TSR) website, so that more people can read our discussion.

Best Regards,

Philip

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March 30, 2000, 11:41 PM

Dear Philip

In response to the thoughtful comments by you and your student, I should say that I am even more interested in influencing future generations of CCP leaders than I am the current ones. That is why in the OpEd I said that the second liberalizing effect of Taiwan remaining Chinese and democratic---the effect on the politics surrounding the issue of gradual political reform on the mainland---was even more important than the beacon effect. I think my optimistic scenario will take a lot of time to come to fruition under the best of conditions. I know CCP members who want democracy badly, although many of them want gradual and stable reform rather than a revolutionary change. They are for the most part young by CCP standards and cosmopolitan, and are not currently in power. However, their futures may be bright under the right conditions. Current US policy can be one of the factors (but hardly the only one) that can help create the right conditions for pro-reform elites to rise to power down the road on the mainland. On this score and many others, I can't see anything but harm coming out of a cross-Strait conflict for China, Taiwan, or the US.

On your other comments, I have never been a fan of the "third no" in particular. The PRC may be able to block effectively Taiwan's entrance into the WHO, etc., but I don't see why the US needs to take a prinicipled position of "non-support." I think Beijing should rethink its own policies on this score, because it often simply appears silly and vindictive when Taiwan cannot get timely information on disease control, etc.. because it is not a member of the WHO. On mediation, as I said earlier, I think that the United States should limit its role as mediator as much as possible. Of equal importance, I think it should limit even the impression that it might be playing a mediator role. Misperceptions are too common in cross-Strait relations for the U.S. to play such a role safely. For example, there was a big difference between the original Interim Agreement proposal offered by Dr. Lieberthal while he was still a professor, and the less ambitious "interim agreements" idea floated later by the U.S. Still, many people in Taiwan seemed to conflate the two when I was there last Spring. These types of misperceptions are dangerous and can best be avoided by the United States simply refusing to play the role of mediator or facilitator. The one exception I think is that the US may want to say something negative about efforts on either side to scuttle talks that the two sides had previously arranged on their own. The difference is subtle but I think important. In the first instance the US is saying: "why don't you folks talk about x,y,or z." I don't like that. In the second instance, the U.S. is saying, we regret that one or both sides undermined the plan for talks that the two sides had previously set up on their own initiative. Even the latter makes me nervous, but I think it is much better than the former.

Tom C.