By Dennis Van Vanken Hickey

Associate Professor & University Fellow in Research Political Science Department, Southwest Southwest Missouri State University, Springfield, Missouri

This paper was prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 2-5, 1999. This project was support with a grant from the Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange. Copyright 1999.

During 1997 and 1998, relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) showed modest improvements. In October, 1998, the two sides resumed high-level contacts after a four year hiatus. Additional negotiations were planned for late 1999. Moreover, cross-strait trade and investment continued to expand at a rapid pace. These developments contributed to perceptions that Beijing and Taipei might ultimately be able to resolve their differences peacefully. However, the potential for conflict still exists. PRC authorities have outlined a number of conditions that might lead the mainland to take up arms against Taiwan. Chief among these is the island's independence from China.

This paper provides a brief overview of the ROC and PRC approaches to the thorny unification question and shows how each government's position toward this issue has changed over time. It also examines recent developments in Taiwan that had led the PRC to charge that the island is moving closer to independence. In conclusion, the author suggests that, while Taiwan has not declared its de jure independence from China and is unlikely to do so in the short to medium-term future, it is indeed inching closer to it. This development holds important implications for the United States and for peace and stability in the Western Pacific.

Both Taipei and Beijing profess to be committed to the eventual unification of China. However, their respective approaches to the issue differ substantially. The discussion below examines each government's unification policy and shows how they have evolved over the past several decades.

Prior to the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders referred to Taiwan as being separate from China. Even Mao Tse-tung indicated that the territory did not belong to China.<1> He placed Taiwan "in the same category as Korea and other would-be `friendly territories' on China's periphery. . . . [and] apparently perceived that Taiwan was not part of China historically or legally." <2>

After gaining power, the CCP reversed its position. Beijing now contends that "Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times." <3> According to this interpretation, "Chinese governments of differing periods set up administrative bodies to exercise jurisdiction over Taiwan" and China always strived to "ward off foreign invaders" until the Ching government was "forced" to give Taiwan to Japan. <4> This act is described officially as a "wanton betrayal and humiliation [that] shocked the whole nation and touched off a storm of protests." <5>

When discussing the "origin of the Taiwan question," PRC authorities claim that, after the ROC government in Nanjing was "finally overthrown by the Chinese people" in 1949, the PRC became the sole, legal government of all China (including Taiwan). At that moment, however, "a group of military and political officials of the Kuomintang (KMT) clique took refuge in Taiwan and, with the support of the then US administration, created the division between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits." <6>

According to Beijing, the authorities on Taiwan are not a government. Rather, they should be considered as local officials. As Dr. Ding Kuisong, Director of North American Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing, explained, "the ROC doesn't exist." <7>

Beijing attempted initially to resolve the Taiwan question by force. In the late 1970s, however, it began to call for the "peaceful unification" of China under the banner of the so-called "one country-two systems" reunification formula. According to this arrangement, Taiwan would be allowed to "maintain a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region." <8> It also would be permitted to maintain its present socio-economic system and its own armed forces. Furthermore, both private property rights and foreign investment in Taiwan would be protected. Finally, Taiwan authorities would be allowed to "take up posts of leadership in the PRC government." <9>

Since making the initial "one country, two systems" proposal, PRC officials have elaborated on some points. For example, Jiang Zemin, PRC President and Head of the CCP, has promised that Beijing "would not send troops or administrative staff to be stationed in Taiwan." <10> Moreover, he claims that unification is "not a scenario whereby the mainland would swallow up Taiwan or Taiwan swallow the mainland." <11> Dr. Xu Shiquan, President of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at China's Academy of Social Sciences, has suggested that many matters relating to China's unification are negotiable:

When asked if China might even consider adopting the flag presently used by the authorities in Taiwan, Xu replied, "well, if that's what the majority wants." <13>

It is clear that many points in Beijing's unification proposal are negotiable. But some points are not. All unification negotiations must be held on a party-to-party basis or, more recently, a party-to-parties basis. As described, the central government in Beijing refuses to negotiate with the central government in Taipei because it contends that the ROC ceased to exist in 1949. Furthermore, Beijing will not tolerate any unification formula that violates its interpretation of the "one China" principle or leads to the creation of "two Chinas" or "one China-one Taiwan." Taiwan's independence will never be tolerated. In July, 1999, Chi Haotian, PRC Defense Minister, reiterated this position:

Authorities also warn that "with Hong Kong returned and Macau to come back on December 20, the Taiwan problem cannot be drawn out indefinitely." <15>

Finally, PRC authorities emphasize that Taiwan's democratization and other changes in the island's political system will have no effect on the unification process. During the run-up to Taiwan's first direct presidential election in 1996, Li Peng, then PRC Premier, declared that "whatever changes might occur in the way in which the leadership in Taiwan is chosen, they cannot change the fact that Taiwan is a part of China and its leaders only leaders of a region in China." <16> When Taiwan moved to abolish its provincial government the following year, Vice Premier Qian Qichen also declared that "the use of a change in the form of choosing Taiwan's leaders can in no way alter the fact that Taiwan is a region of China and leaders of Taiwan are only leaders of a region of China. <17>

In sum, Beijing argues that "there is only one China in the world . . .Taiwan is an inalienable part of China." <18> Although China remains committed to peaceful unification, it will not rule out the use of force to take Taiwan. PRC officials fear that "if we do that, Taiwan will be split forever from the motherland." <19>

Unlike the CCP, the KMT claimed that Taiwan was part of China prior to the 1940s. In fact, the wartime accords that "returned" the territory to the mainland may be traced, in part, to pressures exerted by Chiang Kai-shek and other KMT leaders. Like the PRC, however, the ROC's position toward the unification issue has evolved significantly since the 1940s.

 After suffering a series of humiliating defeats at the hands of the Chinese Communists, the ROC government fled to Taiwan in 1949. During the early 1950s, the people were told that the island would serve as a staging area to retake mainland China. As Kao Ching-lien, an 89 year old veteran, recalled, "at that time we thought we could go back immediately." <20>

The growing power of the PRC eventually led Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to conclude that the means of returning would have to be "70 percent political." However, he never abandoned his dream of "national recovery and national reconstruction." <21> Chiang's successor, the late President Chiang Ching-kuo, also vowed that the "anti-Communist struggle will never cease until Communism is eliminated from Chinese territory and until the Chinese Communist regime has been destroyed." <22>

For roughly three decades, the ultimate goal of the ROC military was to take back by force the Chinese mainland. Negotiations with Beijing were out of the question. Rather, military planners concentrated on building an army capable of fielding forty or more divisions. The structure of the armed forces reflected this mission: The ROC maintained one of the world's largest land armies.

In addition to pledging to retake the mainland, the ROC did not tolerate calls for Taiwanese independence. For several decades, the government's position toward this issue was uncompromising—Taiwan was part of China and the ROC was the legitimate government of all China. Calls for independence were deemed seditious and those who challenged this conviction were jailed, forced into exile or otherwise silenced.

In the realm of international relations, the ROC viewed diplomatic ties as a "zero-sum" game. In keeping with the "one-China" policy, Taipei severed relations with foreign governments that recognized the Beijing regime. During an interview with the author, Fredrick Chien, then Taiwan's Foreign Minister, described the ROC's position during the Chiang era:

The ROC also refused to negotiate or otherwise establish meaningful linkages (travel, communications, mail, etc.) with mainland China. Interestingly, however, the late General Chiang Wego (retired), the Generalissimo's son, revealed that his father did maintain contact clandestinely with some leading PRC figures—including Lin Biao and Chou En-lai—during the 1950s. <24>

For over three decades Taipei adhered to the rigid position outlined above. However, changes in the government's approach toward the unification question accompanied the sweeping political changes that occurred in Taiwan during the late 1980s. The ROC now acknowledges that the PRC exercises "de facto authority" over mainland China. <25> Again, Fredrick Chien outlines the ROC's position:

Taiwan no longer competes with the PRC for the right to represent China in the international arena. It also has signalled its willingness to accept the principle of "dual recognition" and to participate in international forums by using titles other than its official designation—the ROC. Perhaps equally significant, Taipei has "formally and unilaterally renounced military force as a means of national unification." <27> This has led to significant changes in the ROC's military strategy:

According to Taiwan's official 1998 National Defense Report, the current strategy might best be described as "strong defense and effective deterrence." <29>

Public opinion polls show that almost no one in Taiwan supports the PRC’s “one country, two system” unification scheme (see Figure One). Taiwan has advanced its own unification formula, the Guidelines for National Unification. The Guidelines state that China's unification must be achieved in three stages: (1) a short-term phase of exchanges and reciprocity; (2) a medium-term phase of mutual trust and cooperation and (3) a long-term phase of consultation and unification. <30> Since the early 1990s, Taipei has attempted to persuade Beijing to respond positively to specific elements in the first phase—namely, to treat the ROC as an equal. ROC officials argue that, although the territory of the ROC has shrunk, it has existed as an independent sovereign state since its establishment in 1912. <31> Taipei also has called on Beijing to renounce the use of force and emphasizes that the mainland must meet certain pre-conditions prior to unification. As Lin Chong-pin, vice chairman of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, explained, "we want unification, but we must unify under the system of democracy, freedom and equal distribution of wealth." <32>

Chart One: Is the “One Country, Two Systems” Formula Applicable To Solving the Problems Across the Straits?

Source: Information Division, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, New York City on the World Wide Web at http://www.taipei.org/mainland/8804e8.htm.

Throughout most of the 1990s, official ROC policy held that both sides of the Taiwan Strait should be considered as "political entities" and that "while relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are not those between two separate countries, neither are they purely domestic in nature." <33> In July, 1999, however, President Lee Teng-hui stunned the world when he abandoned this vague terminology and declared instead that "the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China are state-to-state relations or at least special state-to-state" relations. Prior to this proclamation, Taipei also had claimed to adhere to the "one-China" principle despite the fact that officials never could agree on the meaning of the term (other than to say it did not mean the PRC). <34>Following Lee's remarks, Su Chi, Director-General of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, said that "we feel there is no need to continue using the `one-China' term." <35> At the same time, however, ROC officials emphasized that "our determination to pursue a win-win game remains unchanged, as does our goal to pursue eventual re-unification with a democratic new China." <36> Officials also pledged to hold meaningful "political talks" with Beijing if it would agree to treat the ROC as an equal state. <37>

Beijing and Taipei hold different views toward the so-called unification question. But these positions are not static. The policy of each government has shifted significantly since the ROC lost the Chinese civil war and moved to Taiwan in 1949.

The PRC, whose leaders once claimed that Taiwan was a foreign territory, now declares that it is an "inalienable" part of China. It threatens to take the island by force if necessary. On the other hand, the ROC has ruled out the use of force to retake the mainland, no longer competes with Beijing for the right to represent China and tolerates calls for de jure separation from China. Although Taipei still pays lip-service to unification, it has junked the "one-China" framework as the basis for cross-strait negotiations.

These changes hold important consequences for the future of both mainland China and Taiwan. They also could have a major impact on peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

Following the death of the Chiangs and the end of "mainlander" rule in Taiwan, things have changed in the ROC. Ironically, these transformations have contributed to a PRC reassessment of Chiang Kai-shek. The late Generalissimo's ancestral home in Xikuo, a small town in the east of Zhejiang province, has been turned into a tourist attraction and he is no longer completely demonized in the PRC press. As one local PRC official conceded, "he (Chiang) agreed to a unified front against the Japanese and, until his dying day, he supported a single China. Such people are harder and harder to find in Taiwan." <40>

Today, it is Lee Teng-hui who is vilified by the PRC. Beijing contends that high ranking KMT authorities—particularly President Lee Teng-hui—are orchestrating the independence movement. Even Taiwanese politicians have accused Lee of favoring "crystal-clear separatism." <41>

PRC authorities cite a long list of interviews with the media as evidence that Lee Teng-hui favors Taiwan's separation from China. Perhaps foremost among these is his 1994 interview with Ryotaro Shiba, a Japanese journalist. <42> During the meeting, the President described the KMT as an "alien" regime, claimed that talking about unification was like talking in his sleep, compared himself to Moses leading the Israelites out of Egypt and spoke of "the grief of being born a Taiwanese." <43> In this and other later discussions, Lee suggested that the meaning of the term, "China," was ambiguous and/or that it was a "culture" rather than a country. <44> In a 1997 interview with Western journalists, he even went so far as to claim that "Taiwan is an independent country, like Britain or France." <45>

Lee Teng-hui's 1995 visit to Cornell University served as a major milestone in shaping PRC perceptions of the Taiwanese President and contributed to China's decision to stage a series of provocative missile tests off Taiwan's coastline in 1995 and 1996. Officials scoffed at Taipei's insistence that the journey was a private visit to his alma matter. The trip was described by Beijing as evidence that Lee was attempting to present his island as a "sovereign state" to the international community. <46>. It was at this time that Lee began to be characterized routinely as an individual with a propensity toward treason:

Lee also was accused of betraying "the aims and principles on which Sun Yat-sen founded the Nationalist Party," intentionally restructuring the KMT "into a mess" and being in "total complicity with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and their independent Taiwan policy." <48>

In recent months, Lee Teng-hui has infuriated the PRC with the publication of his book, Taiwan's Viewpoint, and his bold declaration that relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should be considered as "state-to-state" relations. In a review of Lee's book, The China Daily claimed that "Lee thoroughly vents his hatred of the Chinese nation in this book" and that "it looks as if only the elimination of China from the planet could satisfy him." <49> The reviewer was especially irked by Lee's suggestion that China should be divided into several autonomous regions and speculated that "he published this book in haste to instruct Taiwan people to vote for pro-independence candidates . . . [and] to win military support from the US and Japan for Taiwan independence." <50> With respect to Lee's move to redefine relations across the Strait, The People's Daily, the PRC's leading newspaper, claimed that "this time Lee Teng-hui has shed his mask and let his separatism show clearly." <51> The PLA's newspaper, Liberation Army Daily, was even more direct. It speculated that "he will certainly be reduced to a criminal of the nation who will leave a stink for a thousand years . . . he will certainly be spat on by all Chinese, including Taiwan compatriots." <52>

As described, calls for independence were deemed seditious during the Chiang era. During the "white terror" of the 1950s, an unknown number of activists were jailed. Some were executed. With the lifting of martial law, however, individuals and political parties are allowed to promote Taiwan's de jure separation from the mainland. Ironically, they also are permitted advocate communism. <53>

PRC authorities contend that tolerating calls for independence is tantamount to supporting independence. According to this interpretation, changes in Taiwan's legal code encouraged pro-independence forces to return to the island where they now are "connived in and shielded by Li Denghui." <54> In 1997, Chang Shallyen, then Taiwan's Foreign Minister, attempted to explain Beijing's reasoning:

Two of the island's four largest political parties, the DPP and the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP),have strong links to the independence movement.

The KMT claims that it does not share the DPP's plans for an independent Republic of Taiwan. During the late 1990s, however, the two parties appeared to reach a consensus on the explosive issue. Both parties now claim that there is no need for Taiwan to declare independence because the Republic of China already exists as an independent, sovereign state. As Luo Wen-jia, a top adviser to DPP leader Chen Shui-bian, observed, both parties have "moved to the center on the independence issue. <56> This development is not viewed as a tilt toward the middle of the political spectrum by the PRC. Rather, PRC officials cite it as conclusive proof that both of the island's chief political parties have now joined together to promote the permanent division of China.

Taiwan adopted a diplomatic strategy described as "pragmatic diplomacy" shortly after Lee Teng-hui was sworn in as President of the Republic of China in January, 1988. This new approach to international relations calls for:

In order to achieve these objectives, Taipei is willing to use titles other than its official designation, accept dual recognition from foreign governments and no longer insist on the PRC's expulsion from international organizations as a condition of its membership. As part of this campaign to reintegrate into the global community, it has launched a strong drive to return to the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and other international organizations.

The PRC describes pragmatic diplomacy variously as "black market diplomacy," "money diplomacy" and "gimmick diplomacy." It claims that "the true meaning behind their use of the word `pragmatic' is an independent Taiwan." <58>

The PRC will not accept the principle of dual recognition and, while it has agreed grudgingly to Taipei's membership in some international intergovernmental economic institutions, Beijing still insists that Taiwan's participation is subject to terms and conditions approved by Beijing. Officials contend that only "the PRC, as the sole, legal government of China, has the right and obligation to exercise state sovereignty and represent the whole of China in international organizations." <59> Not surprisingly, the PRC is determined to bar Taipei's return to the UN.

Key elements of pragmatic diplomacy—particularly Taipei's acceptance of dual recognition and the campaign to return to the UN—are viewed as evidence that it has abandoned the "one China principle" and is now attempting to split the motherland. During an interview with the author, Xu Shiquan outlined Beijing's reasoning:

PRC officials dispute Taipei's insistence it had no choice other than to adopt a new approach to global affairs in order to survive. Authorities claim that "we squeezed Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo harder" and point out that since adopting pragmatic diplomacy Taiwan has lost the diplomatic recognition of all important countries. <61> Xu Shiquan predicted that "if they continue their policy of so-called pragmatic diplomacy, I expect they are going to lose more . . . we have to take up the challenge and respond. <62>

In July, 1997, KMT and DPP lawmakers formed a coalition designed to push a controversial constitutional reform package through Taiwan's National Assembly. In addition to enhancing the powers of the President and Legislative Yuan, the reforms included measures that abolished Taiwan's provincial government in all but name. Future elections for the Provincial Governor and Provincial Assembly were canceled and thousands of bureaucrats in local government lost their positions.

Taiwan authorities defend such changes by arguing that the provincial government was superfluous and that the reforms promote government efficiency. Some also hint that the downsizing of the provincial government enhances political stability by eliminating the possibility of a "Yeltsin effect." However, not everyone on the island supported the package. Members of the pro-unification New Party described it as "diabolical." <63> In contrast to the DPP lawmakers who celebrated their victory by holding up a banner reading, "long-live Taiwan Independence," some NP deputies hoisted a banner reading, "Taiwanese Uprising, Jiang Zemin, Help!" <64>

The PRC considers the elimination of Taiwan's provincial government as yet another step "on the dangerous road" toward separating the island from China. <65> Like many other changes occurring in Taiwan, this conspiracy purportedly was engineered by Lee Teng-hui:

PRC officials emphasize that these reforms "cannot change this fact—Taiwan is a part of China, it is a province of China." <67>

Holding a plebiscite to determine Taiwan's international status is not a new idea. The proposal was considered (and rejected) by US officials shortly after the ROC retreated to Taiwan in 1949. However, an increasing number of Taiwanese now embrace the concept of conducting an island-wide referendum to determine their future.

The DPP, Taiwan's chief opposition party, has been particularly vocal in its support for a plebiscite. The party's new platform stresses that any change to the status quo (unification or independence) should be decided by a referendum. <68> The KMT opposes the idea. Like so many other DDP positions, however, there is always the chance that the concept ultimately will be co-opted and embraced by the ruling party. Indeed, in January, 1999, Vice President Lien Chan said that the government would study the feasibility of holding referendums on important issues. <69> Tsao Hsing-cheng, an advisor to President Lee, has claimed that it is inevitable that a referendum will be held on unification. <70>

Thus far, only one referendum on Taiwan's future has been conducted on the island. During the so-called "Three in One" elections in December, 1998, voters in Tainan were asked if they wanted to be ruled by the PRC. George T. Chang, the city's Mayor, exclaimed that "this plebiscite is the first step in determining the will of Taiwan's people . . . we've got to show the world what we think." <71> As might be expected, roughly 78% of the voters opposed being ruled by the PRC. <72>

Shortly before the Tainan vote, one KMT official predicted that "these guys want to shove mustard up the mainland's nose. In the end, this kind of game could backfire very, very badly." <73> As expected, the referendum enraged the PRC and prompted the CCP to release a statement demanding that Taiwan prohibit the practice:

With Taiwan's reversion to China after World War II, the pro-Japanese curriculum in the island's school system was scrapped. In its stead, students were instructed in Mandarin Chinese about Chinese history, culture and society (communicating in the local dialect was forbidden). School children spent countless hours memorizing the most minute details about Chinese emperors and dynasties. A heavy dose of pro-KMT propaganda and anti-communism also was included in the daily lesson plan. However, as Lee Teng-hui complained, students learned little or nothing about the island on which they happened to live—Taiwan. <76>

During the mid-1990s, Taiwan began to shift away from this Sino-Centric focus in the classroom. Today, both students and teachers may communicate in the Taiwanese dialect without fear of retribution. Moreover, courses in history, geography and culture tend to concentrate more on Taiwan and less on the mainland. Educators defend these changes by claiming that there exists a need to familiarize Taiwan's school children with the island and its people.

These changes in Taiwan's educational system have not gone unnoticed in the PRC. Textbooks focusing on Taiwan have been singled out and attacked officially as having a "disgusting effect on students" and designed to promote independence. <77> Authorities also charge that, "with the connivance of Li Denghui, the `Taiwan independence faction' has occupied the departments of many universities in Taiwan." <78> Those university students who favor unification are alleged to become victims of discrimination—they fail to pass their classes or graduate and "are isolated and attacked and not even given a chance to argue." <79>

In short, the PRC considers the new emphasis on Taiwan in the educational system as part of the plot to promote independence and prove that "Taiwan existed in history as a country." <80>Moreover, mainlander academics on both sides of the Taiwan Strait contend the new curriculum is ridiculous. During interviews with the author, both PRC and ROC scholars agreed that "Taiwan has no culture apart from China" and that any class in Taiwan's history would be a very short and easy one. <81>

Today's Taiwan holds little resemblance to the KMT stronghold of the Chiang-era. Opposition parties openly advocate the establishment of a new country—a Republic of Taiwan—and independence activists occupy key positions in national and local politics. Moreover, communities have passed plebiscites supporting independence, the government is attempting to return to the UN, most of the provincial government has been abolished and the island's educational system no longer emphasizes links to the mainland. But these are only a small number of the changes that have occurred in modern Taiwan. Others range from Lee Teng-hui's promotion of the concept of a "New Taiwanese" person to the government's new regulations enabling national organizations register as "Taiwanese" entities. All of these moves have been carefully monitored and chronicled by the PRC.

PRC officials fear that, while Taipei still talks about unification, it actually is accelerating a campaign for independence from China. Taiwanese officials, however, dispute these charges. They argue that the ROC has never wavered in its support for the unification and that Beijing is merely "scaring itself." <82> Even after proclaiming that cross-strait relations should be viewed as "state-to-state" relations, Lee Teng-hui claimed that "our mainland policy has not changed." <83>

Are the PRC's fears founded in reality? Is Taiwan moving closer to independence or is the leadership cohort in Beijing suffering from a severe case of paranoia? The answer to these question depends, to a considerable extent, upon the meaning of the term, "independence." As Munakata Takayuki, a member of the separatist World United Formosans for Independence, noted, "Taiwan Independence means different things to China, to Taiwan's Kuomintang regime and to the Taiwanese in favor of independence." <84> Richard Bush, Chairman and Managing Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (America's "unofficial" embassy), appears to concur with Takayuki's assessment. Bush observed that, "I think people use the word `independence' in a variety of ways." <85>

Like many other words and concepts commonly employed in international relations, independence does mean different things to different people. But the term, "Taiwan independence" is especially slippery. In fact, the meaning of the phrase is dynamic—it changes with time. Xu Shiquan explains:

There is evidence to support Xu's assessment. Hardcore Taidu activists claim that independence means discarding the present ROC Constitution and "changing the state's name to Taiwan." <87> But polls conducted by the Taiwan-based Chinese Association for Euro-Asian Studies in April, 1998, have found that over 94% percent of respondents regard the ROC as a country (77% regard the PRC as a country). <88> This could help explain why, as Xu suggests, a vast majority of the Taiwan population support the status quo (see Chart Two). But is this independence?

Chart Two: Reunification or Independence?

Source: Information Division, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, New York City, on the world wide web at http://www.taipei.org/mainland/8804e1.htm.

A brief review of three core concepts in international relations—sovereignty, the state and the nation—might help begin to unravel this knot. The idea of sovereignty was one of the most important intellectual developments that led to the Westphalian revolution. According to Jean Bodin (1530-96), the French philosopher who contributed much to the development of the concept, sovereignty is the "absolute and perpetual power vested in a commonwealth." <89> Sovereignty is "the distinguishing mark of the sovereign that he cannot in any way be subject to the commands of another, for it is he who makes law for the subject, abrogates law already made and amends law." <90> Sovereignty resides in the state—a body that exercises predominant authority within its geographic borders, possesses a relatively stable population that owes its allegiance to a government and maintains diplomatic ties with other states. A state differs from a nation. A nation refers to a group of people with a shared sense of identity, often based on characteristics such as race, ethnicity, language, history or culture. Consequently, it is possible for two or more states to reside within one nation, or for a nation to exist within two or more states.

The Republic of China exercises predominant authority within its borders, possesses a relatively stable population that owes its allegiance to the ROC government, maintains formal diplomatic ties with roughly thirty of its "little friends" and strong "unofficial" links with many others. Despite PRC protestations to the contrary, it is obvious that the ROC does exist and meets all the requirements of statehood. Bau Tzong-Ho, chair of the Political Science Department at Taipei's prestigious National Taiwan University, explains:

Other arguments employed by Beijing, including the suggestion that the ROC cannot exist because it is no longer a member of the UN, are similarly flawed. According to this logic, the PRC has existed only since 1971 (when it gained admission to the UN) and Switzerland has never existed.

A strong case may be made that two separate states exist within one Chinese nation. Officials in Bonn ultimately reached a similar conclusion with respect to Germany's status prior to that nation's unification. Therefore, the ROC's demands that the PRC treat it as an equal "political entity" or, more recently, as a "state" cannot be equated with independence from China. On the other hand, however, there is disturbing evidence suggesting that Taiwan might be moving beyond this point. A number of developments, including references to the KMT as an "alien" regime, revisions to the island's educational system and efforts to create a "new Taiwanese" identity could all be interpreted as moves intended to foster a new sense of nationalism among the island's population and as a precursor to the establishment of a separate, independent Taiwanese nation.

IV. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The Taiwan case is a most interesting one. To academics who focus on international relations theory, the PRC-ROC dyad represents a wide variety of fascinating puzzles about sovereignty, nationalism and statehood. It also has proved to be fertile ground for game theory and mathematical modeling. However, to foreign policy analysts and practitioners—those individuals who actually craft policy—it represents countless headaches and difficulties.

According to US policy, any resolution of the Taiwan issue must be settled peacefully by both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, Presidents ranging from Richard M. Nixon to William J. Clinton have promised that the US will not support independence for Taiwan. <92> When cross-Strait tensions mounted in July, 1999, James P. Rubin, spokesman for the Department of State, reiterated the US position toward this explosive issue:

Our position on Taiwan's future is clear and unchanging. We believe that it is a matter for the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to resolve. And as you know, and as we've said for some time, we have an abiding interest and concern that any resolution be peaceful. We do not support Taiwan independence. We do not support Taiwanese membership in organizations where statehood is required. We do not support a two-China policy or a one-China/one-Taiwan policy. <93>

It also is noteworthy that the US is not formally committed to Taiwan's defense, As Douglas Paal, a former senior National Security aide observed, "there's no such thing as an ironclad commitment. . . the belief that the US will send [aircraft] carriers any time the People's Republic puts pressure on Taiwan depends on Taiwan's behavior." <94> Nevertheless, as a 1998 National Defense University study observed, "any US administration would come under significant pressure to defend Taiwan were conflict to occur, no matter the cause." <95>

In November, 1998, Jiang Zemin, China's President, warned that Taiwan's "push for independence is a serious contributor to regional, even global, instability." <96> Although some separatists—particularly those residing comfortably in the US or other foreign countries—bravely proclaim that China's leaders are only bluffing, the probability of a PRC negative reaction to Taiwan's independence is very high. During an interview with the author, a Chinese academic warned that the PRC will definitely employ military force against Taiwan even if the US attempts to shield it. <97> The ROC military also has warned that the PRC will attack if the island moves too close to independence. <98> With respect to US policy toward Taiwan's independence, the following points seem paramount:

· In deciding which way to handle the independence issue, US officials must recognize that democracy has complicated Taiwan's politics. Simplistic proposals advanced by former US officials calling for Taipei to "forever foreswear" independence are unworkable. Its time for Americans to recognize that the Chiang era is over. Today, no one on the island has the political clout to guarantee that discussion or consideration of the independence issue will be stifled for all time.

In sum, US officials emphasize that "our one-China policy is based on our national interest." <99> What this means is that it is in Washington's best interest to maintain stable, constructive relations with both Taipei and Beijing. It is not in America's best interest to be permanently at odds with the world's third most powerful nuclear power. Moreover, the PRC's cooperation will be essential if the international community hopes to address a wide range of pressing global problems including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation, health issues, the standoff on the Korean Peninsula, and dwindling energy supplies to name just a few. No other issue holds more potential to damage Sino-American relations than Taiwan independence. In fact, it would threaten peace and stability in the entire Asia-Pacific region. It is for these reasons that the US should continue to pursue a one-China policy and and not encourage, promote or otherwise support Taiwan's independence from China.

<1> See Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Random House, 1938), pp.33-89.

<2>See John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p.28.

<3>Taiwan Affairs Office, The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China (Beijing, China: Information Office State Council, August 1993), p.1.

<4>Ibid., p.2.

<5> Ibid., p.4.

<6>Ibid, p.9.

<7> Author's interview with Dr. Ding Juisong, Director, Division for North American Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Beijing, PRC, October 9, 1998.

<8> Li Jiaquan, "Mainland and Taiwan: Formula for China's Reunification," Beijing Review, Volume 25, Number 5, February 3, 1986, p.24.

<9> Ibid.

<10> Steven Mufson, "Beijing Assures Taiwan Will Not be Swallowed," China Post (International Airmail Edition), October 16, 1995, p.1.

<11> Ibid.

<12> Author's interview with Dr. Xu Shiquan, President of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at China's Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China, October 8, 1998.

<13> Ibid.

<14> Christopher Bodeen, "Taiwan Retreats on Independence," Washington Times, July 15, 1999 on the world wide at http://www.washtimes.com/internatl1.html

<15> Vice Premier Qian Qichen issued this warning in January, 1999. See Daniel Kwan, "Taipei Told to End Stalemate," South China Morning Post, January 29, 1999 on Lexis/Nexis.

<16> Jasper Becker and Dennis Engbarth, "Taiwan Belongs to Us, Says Li Peng," South China Morning Post (Weekly Edition), February 3, 1996, p.1.

<17>"Foreign Minister on Taiwan Issue, Beijing, March 11, 1997" Embassy of the People's Republic of China on the world wide web at http://www.china-embassy.org/Cgi-Bin/Press.pl?50

<18> Ibid.

<19> Zhu Rongji, PRC Premier, used this to justify Beijing's position. See "Taiwan Finds No Comfort in China's Missile Stance," Reuters, March 16, 1999 in Taiwan Security Research on the world wide web at http://taiwansecurity.org/Reu/Reu-990316.htm.

<20> See Alice Huang, "Army Town a Reminder of the Past," China Post (International Airmail Edition), January 29, 1999, p.4.

<21> See John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p.30.

<22> The late president made this pledge during his 1979 New Year's message to the Chinese people. See The Republic of China Is on the Move (Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing Company, 1979), p.8

<23> Author's interview with Fredrick Chien, Foreign Minister of the Republic of China, February 7, 1996, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China.

<24> During a fascinating interview with the author, General Chiang was asked whether there was any truth to the rumor that his father, the Generalissimo, had maintained contact with Lin Biao during the 1950s. The General replied, "Oh yes. Lin Biao and even Chou En-lai. Yes, but they were all killed—assassinated. Some people think Chou En-lai died in the hospital, but rumor comes out that he was poisoned. But very slowly—a slow process—and finally he died." Author's interview with General Chiang Wego (retired), Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China, February 5, 1996.

<25> See Mainland Affairs Council, Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, July 1994), p.9.

<26> Author's interview with Fredrick Chien, Foreign Minister of the Republic of China, February 7, 1996, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China.

<27> Mainland Affairs Council, Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, p.10.

<28> Author's interview with a high-ranking ROC military officer who spoke with the author on condition of anonymity, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China, October 1998.

<29> ROC Ministry of National Defense, 1998 National Defense Report: Republic of China (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprises Co., 1998), p.50. Translated from the Chinese by Yang Lien-chung and Chien Wu-nan.

<30> Government Information Office, The Republic of China Yearbook, 1993 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1993), p. 149.

<31> According to ROC policy, the ROC did not cease to exist in 1949. Rather, "the ROC central government relocated to the island of Taiwan." See "ROC & PRC—What is China Today?" Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office on the world wide web at http://www.taipei. org/info/roc/index.htm.

<32> Alice Hung, "Taiwan Stands Firm in Goal of Democratic China," Reuters, December 16, 1998 in Taiwan Security Research on the world wide web at http://www. taiwansecurity.org/Reu/Reu-981216.htm.

<33> Ibid., pp.11-12.

<34> Some claimed that the expression, "one-China," signified the ROC while others suggested that it "refers to China in the historical, geographical, social and cultural sense." See David Wang and Lilian Wu, "Not Yet Time for Unification: Hu," China Post (International Airmail Edition), September 18, 1995, p.1

<35> Gus Constantine, "Taiwan Abandons One-China Doctrine," Washington Times, July 13, 1999 on the world wide web at http://www.washtimes.com/news/news1.html#link.

<36>"Political Talks Offered if Held `State to State,'" Taiwan News (formerly China News), July 16, 1999 on the world wide web at http://www.taipei.org/gionews/chinanews/cn-07-16-99/cn07-16-99-7.htm.

<37> Ibid.

<38> PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen made this statement in January, 1999. See "Reunification Cause Urged," China Daily, January 29, 1999 on the world wide web at http://www.chinadaily.nt/cndy/history/di-lqian.a29.html.

<39> See Tai Ming Cheung, China's Military Agenda Toward Taiwan, CAPS Papers Number 24.

<40> Mark O'Neil, "Beijing Makeover for Chiang Kai-shek," South China Morning Post, October 17, 1998, p.14 in Lexis/Nexis.

<41> Lee Ban-nan, Secretary-General of Taiwan's right-wing, pro-unification New Party, made this statement. See "Lee's Book Sparks Angry Backlash," South China Morning Post, May 20, 1999 on the world wide web at http://www.scmp.com/news/template/China-T...na&template=Default. htx&maxfieldsize=1397.

<42> For a complete text of this interview, see "The Grief of Being Born a Taiwanese," A Dialogue between President Lee Teng-hui and writer Ryotaro Shiba, reprinted from Asahi Weekly, May 6-13, 1994 in Congressional Record, Volume 140, Number 96, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, July 21, 1994, p.S9339.

<43> See Ibid.

<44> See Ibid and Julian Baum, "Tough Talk: President Lee Raises the Ante on Cross-Strait Ties," Far Eastern Economic Review, Nov 20, 1997, p.31.

<45> See Keith B. Richburg, "Leader Asserts Taiwan is `Independent, Sovereign,'" Washington Post, November 8, 1997 in Lexis/Nexis and Jonathan Mirsky, "One China Loses in Taiwan," International Herald Tribune, November 10, 1997, p.8 in Lexis/Nexis.

<46> See "Commentaries View Li, Taiwan Independence," Xinhua, July 24, 1995 in Foreign Broadcasting Information System, China (hereafter FBIS, China) November 7, 1995 on the world wide web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.

<47> See Ibid.

<48> Miu Qun, "Pragmatic Diplomacy Means Independent Taiwan," Renmin Ribao, July 27, 1995 in FBIS, China, November 8, 1995 on the world wide web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.

<49> See Yan Xuetong, "Lee Teng-hui's Book Exposes his True Bias," China Daily, May 31, 1999 on the world wide web at http://www.chinadaily.net/cndy/history/d4-1lee.e3.1.html.

<50> "Lee's Plot for Independence," China Daily, June 4, 1999 in Lexis/Nexis.

<51> See "Press Claws `Traitorous' Lee on Straits Policy Reverse," Hong Kong Standard, July 14, 1999 on the world wide web at http://www.hkstandard.com/today/default. asp?PageType=ach3.

<52>"Mainland Reinforces Threat to Invade Taiwan," South China Morning Post, July 15, 1999 on the world wide web at http://www.scmp.com/News/China/Article/FullText_asp_ArticleID-19990715135015578.asp.

<53> See "Independence, Communism Now Legal," China News, April 21, 1999 in Lexis/Nexis.

<54> Ling Yunhe, "Li Teng-hui's Splittist Actions Condemned," Remin Ribao, August 4, 1995 in FBIS CHINA, Nov 8, 1995 on the world wide web at http://wnc. fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.

<55> See Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, "Exclusive Interview: John H. Chang, Foreign Minister of the Republic of China, Asian Defense Journal, August 1997.

<56> Kevin Platt, Christian Science Monitor, December 22, 1998, p.1 in Lexis/Nexis.

<57> See Michael Y. M. Kau, "The ROC's New Foreign Policy Strategy," in the Appendix of Taiwan: The National Affairs Council And Implications For Democracy. Hearings Before The Subcommittee On Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, Second Session, October 11, 1990. (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1991), p.61.

<58> Miu Qun, "Pragmatic Diplomacy Means Independent Taiwan," Renmin Ribao, July 27, 1995, in FBIS, China, November 8, 1995 on the world wide web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.

<59> See The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China.

<60> Author's interview with Dr. Xu Shiquan, President of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at China's Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China, October 8, 1998.

<61> Ibid.

<62> Ibid.

<63> See Jason Blatt, "Taiwan Constitutional Reforms Voted Through After Walkout by Opposition," South China Morning Post, July 19, 1997 in Lexis/Nexis.

<64> See Ibid and Jason Blatt, "Taiwan Risks China Fury on Province Vote," South China Morning Post, July 17, 1997 in Lexis/Nexis

<65> Chen Dawei, "UN Envoy Says Taiwan's `Splittism' Doomed to Fail," Zhongguo Xinwen She (Beijing), February 1, 1997 in FBIS, China, February 5, 1997 on the world wide web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.

<66> Yi Xin, "Commentary Criticizes Li's Constitutional Amendment," Beijing Central People's Radio, June 6, 1997 in FBIS, China, June 9, 1997 on the world wide web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.

<67> Jason Blatt, "Constitutional Reforms Survive Second Round," South China Morning Post, July 18, 1997 in Lexis/Nexis.

<68> See Democratic Progressive Party, Resolution on Taiwan's Future on the world wide web at http://www.dppmission.org/Official/0_5_8.html.

<69> See Flor Wang, "Political Parties Widely Divided on Holding Referendums," Central News Agency, January 10, 1999 in Lexis/Nexis.

<70>"Presidential Advisor Says Taiwan Referendum Inevitable," Lien-ho Pao (Taiwan), April 30, 1999, p.4 in FBIS, China, May 10, 1999 on the world wide web at http://wnc. fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.

<71> See John Pomfret, "Taiwanese City to Conduct Trial Vote on Independence," Washington Post, December 5, 1998, p.A20 in Lexis/Nexis.

<72> Benjamin Kang Lim, "Don't Play with Fire, China Warns Beijing Over Vote," Reuters, December 9, 1998 in Taiwan Security Research on the world wide web at http://www. taiwansecurity.org/Reu/Reu-981209-fire.htm.

<73> John Pomfret, "Taiwanese City to Conduct Trial Vote on Independence," Washington Post, Dec 5, 1998, p.A20 in Lexis/Nexis.

<74>"Spokesman Admonishes Taiwan Splittists," China Daily, Dec 10, 1998 on the www at http:///www.chinadaily.net/cndy/history/d1-5tai.110.html.

<75> Ibid.

<76> See "The Grief of Being Born a Taiwanese."

<77>"Separatist Textbook `Disgusting,'" South China Morning Post, September 27, 1997 in Lexis/Nexis.

<78> Jen Hui-wen, "Beijing Experts' View of Reunification," Hsin Pao (Hong Kong), February 19, 1999, p.18 in FBIS, China, February 23, 1999 on the world wide web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.

<79> Ibid.

<80> See "Lee's Plot for Independence," China Daily, June 4, 1999 in Lexis/Nexis

<81> Author's interview with two Chinese academics who spoke with the author on condition of anonymity, July, 1999.

<82> Dr. Su Chi, presently Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, made this observation. See "No `Taiwan Issue,' Says Taipei," Reuters, January 30, 1999 in Taiwan Security Research on the world wide web at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/Reu/Reu-990130.htm.

<83> See Christopher Bodeen, "Taiwan Retreats on Independence," Washington Times, and "President Lee Reaffirms No Change in ROC's Mainland Policy,' Central News Agency, July 14, 1999 on the world wide web at http://www.taipei.org/teco/cicc/news/english/e-07-14-99/e-07-14-99-5.htm,

<84> See Munakata Takayuki, The True Nature and Solution of the Taiwan Problem (Taipei: Taiwan International Interchange Foundation, 1999), p.15.

<85> See, "AIT Head Hedges on Taiwan Status," China News, February 6, 1999 in Lexis/Nexis.

<86> Author's interview with Dr. Xu Shiquan, President of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at China's Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China, October 8, 1998.

<87> See Munakata Takayuki, The True Nature and Solution of the Taiwan Problem, p.18 and 40.

<88> See "89% Disagrees that Taiwan is a Part of China," Democratic Progressive Party on the world wide web at http://www.dppmission.org/poll/pl_5_3_99.html

<89> Jean Bodin, Six Books on the Commonwealth (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), p.25.

<90> Ibid., p.28.

<91> Bau Tzong-Ho, Cross-Strait Relations from the Perspective of the Republic of China, July 1998, in Taiwan Security Research on the world wide web at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/TS-Bau-2-htm

<92> Simply because the United States has declared on numerous occasions that it has no intention of "pursuing" or "supporting" Taiwan independence, it cannot logically be aruged that the United States necessarily opposes Taiwan's independence or will prevent such a move. For example, when asked during the conference, "Building New Bridges for a New Millenium," (Public Policy Institute, Southern Illinois University, December 7, 1998), if the US policy of not supporting Taiwan's independence means the US opposes it, Winston Lord replied, "not support is not the same as oppose." For more information, also see Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, "America's Two Point Policy and the Future of Taiwan," Asian Survey, Volume XXVIII, Number 8, August 1988, pp.881-896.

<93>"US `One China' Policy Remains Intact," Central News Agency, July 13, 1999 on the world wide web at http://www.taipei.org/teco/cicc/news/english/e-07-14-99/e-07-14-99-24.htm.

<94> See Barbara Opall, "US, Taiwanese Opposition Chart Collision Course," Defense News, Volume 13, Number 12, March 23-29, 1998, p.34.

<95> Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Strategic Assessment 1998: Engaging Power for Peace (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1998, p.46

<96> See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "President's New Tactic on Taiwan; Independence Supporters `Risking Instability,'" South China Morning Post, November 29, 1998 in Lexis/Nexis.

<97> Author's interview with Dr. Ding Juisong, Director, Division for North American Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Beijing, PRC, October 9, 1998.

<98> ROC Ministry of National Defense, 1993-1994 National Defense Report: Republic of China (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprises, Co., 1994), p.87.

<99> US `One China' Policy Remains Intact," Central News Agency.