By June Teufel Dreyer

 Foreign Policy Research Institute, June 30, 2000

Of all the issues now straining relations between Washington and Beijing -- the large trade imbalance in favor of the PRC, Chinese allegations that the U.S. knowingly targeted its embassy in a bombing raid on Belgrade, American suspicions of Chinese espionage and involvement in nuclear proliferation, and concerns over human rights -- none has more potential for immediate escalation into armed hostilities than the stand-off in the Taiwan Strait.

The potential for escalation to armed conflict this time is greater than four years ago. In 1995-96, Beijing urged people not to vote for incumbent president Lee Teng-hui because he covertly favored Taiwan's independence. However, whatever his hidden sentiments, Lee never publicly called for independence, whereas his major opponent, Peng Ming-min, advocated independence in the most outspoken terms. The invective heaped on Lee notwithstanding, the Chinese leadership well understood that Lee was by far the preferable candidate.

Beijing now confronts a much different situation. The "moderates" lost the election to Chen Shui-bian, whom Beijing has much more reason to think seeks independence for Taiwan. Although he toned down his rhetoric during the election campaign, Chen has for many years championed the idea of holding a plebiscite on Taiwan's status. Since opinion polls have consistently showed that only a small minority of the Taiwan's citizens favor unification, Beijing has vehemently opposed such a plebiscite -- unless mainlanders are allowed to vote as well. Even those in Taiwan who favor unification generally add important preconditions, such as mainland democratization, that are unlikely to happen soon, if ever. Moreover, apart from his stance on a plebiscite, Chen is an unknown quantity to Beijing, whereas Lee had been president since January 1988 and vice-president for some years before that. Hence, the Chinese leaders are much more apprehensive about the new president and his likely course of action.

Adding to the tension is the marked growth in Beijing's military capabilities since 1995-96. To cite just a few examples:

* Chinese missiles pointed at Taiwan are more numerous and more capable than ever. Several hundred M-9s and M-11s -- solid-fuel, road-mobile missiles -- now target Taiwan's air defense installations, airfields, naval bases, and logistics facilities, and land-attack cruise missiles are in development. [1] In addition, China apparently viewed the NATO bombing of Kosovo as evidence of the importance of air defenses. U.S. intelligence recently discovered that two new bases are being built opposite Taiwan for Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missiles. [2]

* China has new surveillance planes. In late April, the Hong Kong press reported that eight Shaanxi Y-8s are being converted to maritime patrol. [3] These are 4-engine turbo-prop transport planes equipped with the Racal Skymaster, a British maritime search radar that can detect and track multiple surface targets, even small boats and submarine periscopes, at a range of more than a hundred nautical miles. Among other benefits, they will greatly enhance the range of the Chinese navy's missiles.

* China is acquiring AEW (airborne early warning) aircraft, which will allow the air force to make much better use of the new planes acquired from Russia, the Su- 27s and Su-30s. China will buy one or more Phalcon airborne radar systems from Israel, despite objections from Washington. The Phalcons, to be fitted onto Russian- built Il-76 transport planes, will replace land-based systems, thereby enhancing the Chinese air force's reach and flexibility. [4] Recently improved mid-air refueling capabilities increase effectiveness still further. [5]

* China has purchased the Sunburn SS-N-22 missile (Moskit) from Russia, which will be fitted onto two Sovremenny-class destroyers also bought from Russia. The Moskits are reportedly designed to carry a nuclear warhead equal to 120,000 tons of TNT, which would make them six times as powerful as the atomic bomb used against Hiroshima. Even with non-nuclear warheads, the Moskit is a very menacing weapon, traveling at 2 1/2 times the speed of sound, skimming along the water in a very low flight pattern, and capable of agile end-maneuvers to throw off defenses. American military sources have stated that the Moskit is possibly the most lethal anti-ship missile in the world and that the U.S. Navy has nothing that can stop it. The navy's Phalanx system can detect the Moskit, but has less than three seconds to calculate a fire solution - - not enough time to stop the 750-pound warhead. The Sovremenny destroyers themselves were designed to "kill" aircraft carriers--and aircraft carriers were exactly what Washington sent into the Taiwan Strait as a deterrent in 1996. [6]

Aside from the acquisition of weapons, several other developments have also enhanced the strength and effectiveness of the Chinese military. The PLA began training exercises in April and announced more for the period just before and after Chen Shui-bian's inauguration as president. [7] Intensified propaganda within the military has gotten troops accustomed to the idea of fighting what the indoctrinating officers referred to as "real wars." [8] In recognition of the military's need to enhance its proficiency in science and technology, new educational programs are being phased into military academies and a "National Defense University for Science and Technology" has been founded.

In the foreign policy arena, a number of high-ranking military and diplomatic officials have traveled abroad or entertained their opposite numbers in Beijing as part of an effort to gain other countries' agreement that there is just one China, that Taiwan is a part of that one China, and that other countries will not interfere in China's definition of China's domestic affairs. In other words, they seek assurances that there will be no third-party intervention if China attacks Taiwan. Mainland leaders are also narrowing the scope of the cross-strait negotiating process by adding new conditions for talks. For example, the February 2000 White Paper said that Taiwan could not be permitted to delay unification talks indefinitely, but added that Taiwan's new president would have to accept its definition of one China -- i.e., a China that included Taiwan -- before the mainland would negotiate. This is tantamount to ordering Chen to give away his negotiating position before talks begin, a patent impossibility.

Chen has already been criticized at home for having given away too much to the mainland. Constituents have objected, for instance, to Chen's claim that he would be "China's Nixon," the implication being that the most hard-line person may be the one best able to take the greatest steps toward compromise. Pointing out that Nixon paid the price of Taiwan in order to bargain with China, they asked what Chen thought he could use as a comparable bargaining chip, and warned him of the reaction of Taiwan voters. When Tsai Ying-wen, the new head of the Mainland Affairs Commission, announced that the Chen administration would not use the phrase "special state-to-state relations" in its official statements, normally pro-Chen constituencies fulminated that the new president had retreated even before the mainland applied pressure. [9]

Meanwhile, as China quietly and methodically puts into place the building blocks that will allow it to seize Taiwan by force, Taiwan's military suffers from major deficiencies. Unlike the PRC, with its new long-range surveillance aircraft, Taiwan lacks any similar capability and has to rely on much shorter-range planes for maritime patrols. Moreover, the publicized acquisition of high-tech foreign planes obscures serious problems. Taiwan has already lost four of its 150 US-made F-16s in crashes since May 1998, as well as one of its 60 Mirage 2000-5s. The backbone of the air force, Taiwan's 130 IDFs, have been described by a knowledgeable former American officer as essentially "toys," since the aircraft can carry either ordnance or fuel, but not adequate amounts of both. In any case, Taiwan faces a shortage of pilots to fly the planes. [10]

The Clinton administration has yet to acknowledge the ominousness of the situation and appears determined to suppress any information that might suggest otherwise. In February, a Pentagon report indicated that Taiwan was far more vulnerable to attack from China than previously recognized, and that the isolation of its military was causing further technological shortfalls. Because the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act requires the United States to supply Taiwan with such defensive weapons as are necessary to maintain a balance of power in the Taiwan Strait, the implication of the Pentagon report was that additional weapons sales would be necessary. Instead, the administration stamped the report "secret" and essentially tried to bury it, although news of the study was apparently leaked to the Washington Post in late March. [11]

In April, the administration denied Taiwan's request to purchase four Arleigh Burke-class destroyers equipped with Aegis anti-missile defense systems. It promised to sell a Pave Paws radar, but refused to specify the exact model, which could significantly affect Taiwan's ability to detect missile launches and incoming aircraft. The administration agreed to the sale of AMRAAMS, but demanded that they be stored in the United States, prompting Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to ask whether Taiwan was supposed to wait until it was attacked and then call Federal Express to request delivery. [12]

Consensus as to the wisdom of important arms sales is still nowhere to be found. Some have argued that keeping the AMRAAMS in the United States could serve as a warning to the Chinese not to buy a comparable air-to-air missile, the AA-12 or R-77 "Amraamski," from Russia. The greater ranges of those missiles (up to 150 km) reduces the effectiveness of the center line of the Taiwan Strait as a buffer, since the strait is only about 100 km wide at its narrowest point. This reservation, however, was rendered moot by recent reports that the Chinese air force would shortly receive the first batch of AA-12s from Russia. [13]

The usefulness of the Aegis system for Taiwan has also been disputed. Michael Tsai, a legislator from Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party, has argued that the military would benefit from greater efficiency more than from a missile system, [14] although there is no reason to consider them mutually exclusive. Proponents point out that Aegis will enhance defense against cruise missiles and provide Taiwan with the integrated technological base for sea-based ballistic missile defense by enabling the military to share data among airborne radar aircraft and surface ships. [15]

Theater Missile Defense (TMD) has raised further questions about feasibility and cost-effectiveness, which have been compounded by the PRC's determined opposition to its development. Beijing has in fact warned the United States and Japan that deploying TMD would touch off an arms race in the region.

The merits of specific weapons sales aside, there is a larger question of defense versus security. It has often been argued that providing advanced arms to Taiwan would ultimately undercut the island's security by goading Beijing into more aggressive behavior. On closer inspection, however, this argument has little merit. If Beijing's anger induces Washington not to sell arms, then Beijing will learn only that its threats have their desired effect. Every parent knows that backing down in the face of threats of a temper tantrum will simply encourage more threats. Even the Clinton administration appeared to acknowledge this after a recent warning by China that it would be forced to modernize its nuclear forces if Washington were to proceed with a national missile defense system. An unnamed senior official in Washington indicated that the administration believed that the PRC would continue to modernize its nuclear arsenal regardless of U.S. action. [16]

Despite sharp debate, analysts agree that the most pressing needs of the Taiwanese military include improved defenses against cyber attack and incoming missiles, better anti-submarine warfare capability, expanded military training programs, and a restructuring that would emphasize naval and air power rather than ground forces. The United States has an obvious role to play in some, though not all, of these areas. Yet U.S. arms sales to Taiwan were down by 62.4% in fiscal year 1999 vis--vis 1998, from $1.5 billion to $559 million. [17] Many of the weapons purchased in the 1992-98 period resulted from agreements made by the Bush Administration. The precipitous drop in 1999 would appear to indicate that the Clinton Administration is loathe to approve new sales.

In sum, whether by intention or inattention, the administration's actions have weakened Taiwan's defense while playing down China's buildup. Still, Taiwan's democratic government and way of life enjoy broad American support, and the Taiwan Relations Act commits the United States to see that any settlement of the Taiwan issue will be a peaceful one. It is time to take another look at the increasingly dangerous Taiwan Strait.

Notes

[1] Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY 99 Appropriations Bill, p. 4.

[2] Bill Gertz, "Chinese Missiles Could Hit US Forces," Washington Times, 29 March 2000

[3] Trevor Hollingsbee, "Spy Plane Adds To PLA Arsenal," South China Morning Post, 24 April 2000.

[4] William Safire, "Ally Vs. Customer," New York Times, 6 April 2000, p. A29; Greg Torode, "The Military Ties That Bind With Israel," South China Morning Post 13 April 2000.

[5] "China Refuels, Mid-Flight," Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 May 2000, p. 12.

[6] Charles Smith, "Navy to Get Russian 'Sunburn' Advanced Missile. Nuclear Warhead Version Already in China's Hands," ChinaGate 25 April 2000.

[7] Brian Hsu, "China Preparing Post-Inaugural Military Exercise," Taipei Times 25 April 2000.

[8] "PLA Reportedly Preparing Troops for War With Taiwan," Ming Pao, 25 April 2000.

[9] Cao Chang-ching, "Has Chen Already Failed 'One China' Test?" Taipei Times, 5 May 2000; Staff Writer, "DPP To Avoid References To 'Special State-To-State'," Taipei Times, 5 May 2000.

[10] AP, "Jet Fighters Aplenty, But Where Are the Pilots?" Straits Times, 26 April 2000.

[11] Thomas Ricks, "Taiwan Seen As Vulnerable To Attack," Washington Post, 31 March 2000, p. A1; Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Inside the Ring, Taiwan Report Held.," Washington Times, 31 March 2000.

[12] Jane Perlez, "US, With Eye on China, Settles on Weapons for Taiwan," New York Times, 18 April 2000, p. A3; John Godfrey, "Taiwan's Defense Package Criticized," Washington Times, 19 April 2000.

[13] Nikolay Novichkov, "First Lot of Moskit Missiles Shipped To China," Moscow, Itar-TASS (English), 16 May 2000, via internet

[14] Michael Tsai, "Military Needs Efficiency, Not Aegis," Taipei Times, 23 April 2000.

[15] Quoted in William Ide, "No Go For Aegis Viewed As Prudent Move," Taipei Times, 29 April 2000; personal communication from Dr. Wortzel, 8 May 2000, Washington, D.C.

[16] Jane Perlez, "China Likely To Modernize Nuclear Arms, U.S. Believes," New York Times, 12 May 2000, p. A7.

[17] Herman Pan and Sophia Wu, "US Arms Sales To Taiwan Down 62.4% in FY 1999," CNA 17 April 2000, citing annual report to Congress on arms sales.

June Teufel Dreyer is Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami in Coral Gables and Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The third edition of her book China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition was published by Longman's earlier this year. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard in Government and Far Eastern Languages in 1973.