By June Teufel Dreyer

University of Miami

Prepared for the International Forum on The Peace and Security of the Taiwan Strait, Hosted by 21st Century Foundation, Taipei, Co-sponsored by American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC, July 26-28, 1999 Taipei, Taiwan

In accordance with its role of defender of the People's Republic of China, the People's Liberation Army is charged with recouping territories that party and government consider to be part of the PRC. In the half-century since the founding of the People's Republic, the PLA's doctrine and strategy toward Taiwan have evolved from straightforward efforts to dispatch soldiers armed with rifles and grenades from small boats to sophisticated psychological warfare operations involving training exercises simulating invasion, missile tests in the Taiwan Strait, and thinly veiled threats against other countries who might want to aid the Republic of China on Taiwan.

The mainland has said little about the options it has considered for coercive unification with Taiwan. However, the content of official military newspapers and journals as well as semi-official Hong Kong publications known to have close ties with the PLA indicates interest in a number of areas with obvious application to a Taiwan scenario. These include development of more accurate missiles which can destroy the ROC's airports, shipyards, and communications centers intense interest in information warfare, including "acupuncture" techniques, which would allow the disruption of Taiwan's command and control systems purchase of advanced fighter planes from Russia, which could allow the PLA to dominate the air space over the Taiwan Strait a naval modernization plan that has added guided missile destroyers and frigates as well as submarines to the navy's resources, thus enhancing the PLA's ability to establish sea control in the Strait. A report released by the United States Department of Defense in 1999 predicts that the military balance in the Strait will shift in favor of Beijing by 2005.

With Hong Kong, the first of Beijing's three major irredentist claims, having come under PRC rule in 1997 and the second, Macao, scheduled to revert in December 1999, attention became focused on the last and most defiant territory, Taiwan. Concerns over the mainland's continuing inability to absorb the island were exacerbated by events in Eastern Europe. China's public stance on efforts by the North American Treaty Organization to reverse Serbian attempts at ethnic cleansing in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo has been that it is a dress rehearsal of an American-instigated scenario for the dismemberment of the PRC.

In this interpretation, the United States is uncomfortable with the rising power of China and wishes to prevent unification of the mainland and Taiwan, as well as to support independence for Xinjiang and Tibet. Hard-liners in the PLA and civilian leadership have argued that the PRC must counter these moves by enhancing its military capabilities. They have pressed for major additional commitments of resources to the military. Opponents have countered that this is exactly what Washington wants: it forced the Soviet Union into an arms race which eventually caused the collapse of the USSR, and hopes for the same result in China.

In 1993, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) announced a new strategic doctrine: local war under high-technology conditions. This represented a modification of the previous strategy, adopted in 1985 and focusing on local, limited wars on the periphery of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The stimulus for the addition of high technology conditions is believed to be military leaders' assessment of the role that sophisticated weaponry had played in the United States-led coalition against Iraq in the Gulf War of 1991. The new strategy has applicability not just to the PRC's designs on the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, but also to both other territories whose sovereignty it disputes, including the Spratly, Paracel, and Diaoyutai (Senkaku) islands and to PRC territories which have separatist movements. The latter include Tibet and Xinjiang. <1> Consonant with this revision in strategy, troops were to receive better education in science and technology, and be trained in the use of more sophisticated weapons.

Although the revised strategy was applicable to areas besides Taiwan, 1993 was also the year that, according to U.S. government sources, the PLA's weapons procurement from the former Soviet Union began to be directed to the Nanjing Military Region, directly opposite the ROC. Military training activities in and near the Taiwan Strait increased as well. This configuration persisted, indicating that Taiwan had become the focus of the mainland's military preparations. <2> In the minds of the mainland's leadership, this was a logical progression: Hong Kong reverted to Chinese rule in 1997, and Macao in 1999. This left Taiwan, the last and most important of the areas for which Beijing had created the jurisdictional category of Special Autonomous Region, as the focus of the leadership's attention.

Taiwan was, and remains, the most difficult of the three to absorb. Unlike Hong Kong and Macao, the ROC functioned as an independent sovereign state. And unlike the United Kingdom and Portugal, who made few pre-conditions for acceding to the PRC's claims to their colonies, Taiwan had a powerful protector, the United States, which insisted that unification must not be effected through force. The Taiwan Relations Act, passed by congress in April 1979 and signed by then-president Jimmy Carter, mandates the United States to provide Taiwan with such defensive weapons as needed to maintain a balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. The Beijing leadership, realizing it was likely that only force could bring about unification, steadfastly resisted American blandishments to foreswear the use of military action again Taiwan.

In mid-1998, the ROC's Ministry of Defense outlined its assessment of the most likely options for a PLA invasion as declaring a partial naval and air blockade of Taiwan's offshore islands or certain other areas imposing a comprehensive naval and air blockade in the waters and air space around Taiwan proper and its offshore islands attacking Taiwan's offshore islands from the mainland to force Taiwan to come to the negotiation table blockading the offshore islands and launching a triphibious offensive against Taiwan proper establishing a partial or comprehensive blockade against Taiwan in the name of testing the M-family of missiles or carrying out military exercises with the participation of submarines in certain areas. <3>

While none of these scenarios can be ruled out, and there is some overlap among them, some seem more likely than others. A partial blockade would be very difficult to enforce, as well as slow to achieve results. This delay would allow sufficient time for countermeasures to be put in place. Seizing the heavily fortified offshore islands would be wasteful of the PLA's manpower and materiel, with these high costs having to be measured against the realization that occupying the islands would yield a relatively small strategic advantage. Moreover, such an action would not necessarily force the ROC into negotiations. On the contrary, the Taipei government might conclude that it would be unwise to appease aggressors, lest this encourage further aggression. It would be likely to reply that mainland forces must vacate the islands before representatives could talk. The resolve of other countries---Japan, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, the Philippines, and India---involved in territorial and other disputes with the PRC to resist, and perhaps even unite, could be stiffened.

An all-out attack seems even less likely. It would tax PLA manpower and resources to a much greater extent than an attack on the offshore islands, with proportionally greater adverse effects on the mainland's economy. Although the success of the invasion would represent a far greater achievement than that of seizing the offshore islands, the possibility of a humiliating failure is also much greater. At present, the Chinese military would have a difficult time establishing the air and sea superiority that would be needed before a successful invasion could take place. It is doubtful that Beijing would attempt such an invasion without much higher odds for success than currently exist.

An amphibious invasion would also be very risky, given the PLA's current lack of amphibious lift capability and the rate at which it seems to be acquiring such. Suggestions that troops can be landed from fishing junks on deserted beaches of Taiwan are fanciful. On this densely populated island with its large fishing fleet, deserted beaches are extremely scarce. And the number of fishing junks that would be required to effect such a landing could not help but attract attention.

Neither weather nor geography lends itself to the success of such an invasion. The PLA's 1996 exercises in the Strait were called off before completion because of bad weather. Unfortunately for an invading naval force, rough seas and storm conditions are very typical in the Strait. As for geography, Taiwan's west coast is surrounded by large, shallow mud flats that would make it nearly impossible for amphibious ships to get close enough to land troops and their equipment. A knowledgeable American naval officer predicted that this kind of operation would amount to a "million man swim," with the swimmers burdened by their weapons, radios, and other cumbersome impedimenta. An amphibious assault on Taiwan's east coast would involve transporting men and equipment to the side of the island further from the mainland, thus lengthening supply lines and increasing the opposing side's chances for detecting the force. Assuming that they arrived successfully and undetected, the invaders would find mountains and cliffs bordering the ocean, with some narrow strips of land giving limited access. The military advantage would be to the defenders. <4>

A blockade, while not risk-free, would be far less costly and dangerous to the PLA. If successful, it could cripple Taiwan economically without destroying its infrastructure or killing many people. The mainland's large submarine force and many surface ships and airplanes could drive away shipping. The blockade could escalate gradually, beginning with Beijing's announcement of "quarantine" areas in which it planned to hold "exercises." Any ships that attempted to use these areas would be fired on and seized or destroyed. Taiwan's ports could be mined. The ROC's much smaller naval assets would probably be unable to keep the island's ports or sea lanes open. The disadvantage of a blockade is that it takes a long time to succeed. Anticipating that such a scenario could occur, the Taiwan government has stockpiled petroleum and other needed resources. The Taiwan Strait is an important and busy waterway used by the commercial shipping of many countries: closing it would harm their economies as well as that of the ROC. International pressure to open the Strait is likely to be substantial. And the mainland leadership could not rule out third party intervention, most likely from the United States and its allies. Since the U.S. sent two carrier battles groups to the area near the Taiwan Strait in 1996 to ensure that the PLA's exercises did not escalate into an invasion, Chinese leaders must also take seriously the possibility that an invasion of Taiwan would pit the PLA against US forces as well as those of the ROC.

The fifth and final scenario, missile strikes, would have the advantage of speed: targets would be destroyed with little or no warning. No advance notice need be given, thus minimizing the possibility of third party intervention. Because of the speed of the missiles and the short distance across the Strait, Taiwan would have very little time to prepare its defenses. Missile attacks are likely to take the form not of "city-busting" but of high-volume precision strikes against the island's command and control centers: military airbases, radar installations, and port facilities.

Though the most likely strategy, even missile attacks are not guaranteed success. An ROC general recently opined that the general public overestimates the effect of missile attacks; unless the missiles are equipped with nuclear or biochemical warheads, they will not cause much damage to the island. Their main effect is psychological rather than practical. <5> U.S. defense officials indirectly corroborate this, adding that in order to take Taiwan, the missile firings would have to be coordinated with other concurrent military operations such as air and maritime engagements. The PLA could encounter difficulties in attempting to do so. <6>

In June 1999, a Hong Kong magazine quoted General Chi Haotian as warning the PLA to "make five preparations well": win local high-tech warfare against the United States win modernized blockade and anti-blockade warfare in the Taiwan Strait win modernized warfare against the military provocations by the U.S.-Japan alliance win the third world war launched by the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against China and many other countries and regions to fight well counterattack warfare against U.S. nuclear strikes against China. <7>

It is clear that the PLA anticipates that a war to take Taiwan is likely to be a war with the United States as well.

In 1986, then-Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping initiated Program 863, an ambitious plan to bring the PRC up to world levels in science and technology by the year 2000. Program 863's most senior engineers were involved in strategic military programs. Areas of major military concern included

automation technology: the development of computer-integrated manufacturing systems and robotics in order to increase production capability, focussing on the areas of electronics, machinery, space, chemistry, and telecommunications. These could standardize and improve the mainland's military production biological warfare: a research project on gene research with applications to biological warfare exotic materials: optoelectronic information materials, structural materials, special function materials, composites, rare-earth metals, new energy compound materials, and high-capacity engineering plastics. These projects could advance the mainland's developments of materials for military aircraft and other weapons laser weapons: development of pulse-power techniques, plasma technology, and laser spectroscopy, which are collectively useful in the development of laser weapons military information technology: the development of intelligent computers, optoelectronics, and image processing for weather forecasting; the production of submicron integrated circuits on eight-inch silicon wafers. These programs are crucial to the development of military communications systems; command, control, communications and intelligence systems; and advances in the development of military software nuclear weapons: the development of high-temperature, gas-cooled reactors which facilitate the development of nuclear weapons space technology: the development of satellites with remote sensing capabilities which can be used for military reconnaissance as well as space launch vehicles.

In 1996, Beijing introduced the "Super 863 Program," which extended the time-frame of its similarly named predecessor through 2010. The fact that it was felt necessary to create Super 863 seems to indicate that at least some of the goals of that predecessor had fallen short of success. In the next year, party and government announced a "16-character policy" that portended major emphasis on military modernization:

junmin jiehe: combine the military and civilian

pingzhan jiehe: combine peace and war

junpin youxian: preference to military products

yimin yanjun : civilian [sector] supports military

This formulation hints at an effort to resolve tension between modernizing the military and developing the economy. Kuang-chiao ching, a Hong Kong magazine reputed to have close ties with the PLA establishment, has several times alluded to this tension, and specifically in the context of Taiwan, saying, for example, that "once mainland China gets onto a sustainable development path of a relative balance between military and economic spheres, this will not only shrink room for Taiwan independence forces…but mainland China's steadily growing economy will also be bound to play an ever more important role in cross-strait reunification." <8>

Whether or not a balance has been achieved, some of the profits from the mainland's economic development have indeed been used to purchase modern weaponry. The bulk of these purchases have been from Russia, totaling over a billion U.S. dollars annually and accounting for nearly a fifth of the total volume of trade between the two countries. <9> Acquisitions have included 50 Su-27 jet fighters and the production rights for 200 more; 72 Su-30 fighter-bombers with negotiations on licensed production of an additional 250 planes; <10> four Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines, which are much quieter and difficult to detect than the PRC's older models as well as equipped with advanced sonar equipment; two Sovremennyy-class guided-missle destroyers equipped with Sunburn anti-ship missiles and said to be an order of magnitude beyond those of the ROC; cargo planes; and SA-10 missiles. <11>

Israel has also sold military technology to the PRC, some of it believed to be re-exports of American technology in violation of agreements between the two allies. These include avionics for the F-10 fighter being developed for the PLA as well as cruise, air-to-air, and ground-to-air missile technology. An Israeli newspaper also reported that its nationals were helping China develop Nautilus laser weaponry, originally developed by the U.S. to intercept Soviet Katyusha rockets. <12>The Israeli government has denied these and other similar charges.

More worrisome to the U.S., however, has been the Chinese theft of American military technology. According to the 1999 Cox Committee report on this matter, the blurring of lines between military and commercial operations in the PRC makes it difficult for American intelligence to monitor technology transfers for national security purposes. <13>Among other improvements the purloined technology will allow the mainland to make are the guidance systems for the very M-9 and M-11 missiles that are aimed at Taiwan. <14> The theft of information on multiple reentry vehicles will make it easier for the mainland to defeat the ROC's anti-missile defenses. <15>

In 1999, director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency George Tenet testified at a Senate committee hearing that "China is developing and acquiring air and naval systems intended to deter the United States from involvement in a Taiwan Strait crisis and its extend China's fighting capability beyond its coastline… [while it] continues to place its best new military equipment opposite the island." <16>

Early in the same year, the ROC government discovered that the number of missiles aimed by the mainland at Taiwan had greatly increased. While Beijing hinted that the buildup had been undertaken in retaliation for Taipei's expressed interest in acquiring a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system, U.S. Defense Department sources said that the missile buildup had in fact occurred gradually over a period of several years---i.e. before TMD began to be discussed. <17>

Other worrisome developments included reports that the PLA had developed laser weapons with which to destroy US satellites and other intelligence collection nodes, the object being to deter the United States from intervening so that it could seize Taiwan with a minimum of bloodshed. At the same time, American defense analysts noted that a satellite tracking and control station the Chinese had established at Tarawa in the south Pacific allowed the PLA to track American and ROC fleet operations via signal intercepts from the ships. <18>

To regular readers of the Chinese military press, these were not surprises. Since 1997, such publications as Jiefang junbao (Liberation Army Daily), Guofang (Defense) and Conmilit have regularly carried articles on how the PLA's laser and other jamming devices would allow it, a technologically inferior force, to defeat the U.S. in asymmetric warfare and allow it to "re"take<19> Taiwan despite American help. There were also reports of PLA scientists making advances in the development of particular weapons which contained American technology whose transfer had not been authorized by the US government---one example involved a variable-degree sonar; another a short-range ground- and ship-based solid-propellant theater defense missile. <20>

In early 1999, Taiwan military sources disclosed that the PLA had constructed an exact duplicate of the ROC military base at Chingchuankang, including its bunkers and runways. The replica base, located at Dingxin military airport in Gansu, was being used to train pilots and missile units for an attack on the ROC. <21>

Alarmed at the trend across the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. Congress had attached a provision to the Fiscal Year 1999 Appropriations Bill directing the Secretary of Defense to provide it with a report on the security situation in the Taiwan Strait, including an analysis of the military forces facing Taiwan from the PRC and evaluating recent additions to the offensive military capabilities.

The report, whose release was delayed for over a month because the Clinton administration feared that it would anger Beijing, appeared to have been framed to answer very narrowly the questions posed by congress. Even so, it had chilling implications for the defense of the ROC:

Missiles: by 2005, the PLA is expected to have deployed two types of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and a first generation land-attack cruise missile (LACMs). An expanded arsenal of accurate, conventional SRBMs and LACMs targeted against critical facilities, such as key airfields and C4I nodes, would complicate Taiwan's ability to conduct military operations.

The size of the PLA's SRBM force is expected to grow substantially in the next few years. The PLA currently has one regimental-sized M-9 (also known as CSS-6 and DF [Dongfang]-15) SRBM unit deployed in southeastern China. The M-9 is a solid propellant, road-mobile missile which can deliver a 500-kilogram(kg) conventional payload to a maximum range of 600 kilometers (km). The M-11 (CSS-X-7) is also a solid propellant, road-mobile SRBM but with an estimated range of 300 km. The M-11 has not yet entered the PLA's inventory; an improved, longer-range version may be under development. Both the M-9 and M-11 are expected to incorporate satellite-assisted navigation technology to improve their accuracy. In an armed conflict with the ROC, the PRC's SRBMs are likely to traget air defense installations, airfields, naval bases, C4I nodes, and logistics facilities.

Land-attack cruise missiles are believed to have a high development priority, with research and development facilitated by help from Russia and technology illegally acquired from the U.S. The first LACM to enter production is expected to be air-launched and could be operational early in the 21st century.

As for anti-ship cruise missiles (ACSMs), technological improvements to the C-801/Sardine and C-802/Saccade are providing a gradual upgrade to the PLA's antiquated first-generation CSS-N-1/Scrubbrush ASCMs. Although many of the PLA navy (PLAN)'s ships are obsolescent and it lacks operational experience and is unable to resupply ASCMs at sea, PLAN could put together a sizeable anti-surface warfare force against Taiwan. It is likely to be able to saturate the ROC navy with barrages of ASCMs. PLAN Air Force (PLANAF)'s B-6D bombers can fire C-601/Kraken ASCMs; its new FB-7 bomber will probably carry C-801/C-802 ASCMs. China's ASCM capability is expected to further improve as the above-mentioned Sovremennyy-class destroyers with SS-N-22/Sunburn ASCMs enter PLAN's inventory.

The ROC has limited ability to defend itself against this growing arsenal of ballistic missiles, which pose a serious threat to non-hardened military targets, command and control nodes, and the island's military infrastructure. Taiwan has purchased the Modified Air Defense System (MADS), which will be deployed around Taipei. But this will not sufficiently offset the overwhelming advantage in offensive missiles that the mainland is expected to possess by 2005.

Air Force: It is believed that in 2005, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) inventory will still be composed of second and third generation aircraft, plus a limited number of fourth generation models. Although there will be many more PLAAF planes---a projected 2,200 tactical fighter aircraft, 500 ground attack planes, and 400 bombers----command and control constraints and constricted airspace will limit the number of aircraft that can be deployed at any one time in an air battle in the Taiwan Strait.

With regard to fighter planes, the F-10, China's first domestically-produced fourth-generation fighter, is apparently still undergoing testing and evaluation. The F-10 is likely to be armed with advanced beyond-visual-range (BVR) active radar (AR), air-to-air missiles (AAMs) and may be air refuelable. Domestic assembly of Su-27s has begun, with Russian assistance. The Su-27s originally purchased from Russia are PLAAF's only fighter aircraft with sufficient combat radius for extended operations beyond the PRC's borders. PLAAF is expected to have made modest improvements in its aerial refueling program by 2005. It is anticipated that, in additiion to the F-10, the F-8-II and other third-generation aircraft modified to incorporate some fourth-generation technology, will have aerial refueling capabilities.

PLAAF has a number of air-to-air missiles which are superior to those of the ROC air force. The Russian-built AA-11/Archer infrared (IR) AAM carried on the Su-27 is superior to the ROC's AIM-9/Sidewinder and indigenously produced Tien Chien -I/Sky Sword-I IR AAM. On the other hand, the PRC's AA-10a/Alamo missiles are judged roughly comparable to or slightly less capable than Taiwan's AIM-7/Sparrow AAMs. China's F-7 is capable of carrying the PL-2A and PL-5B IR AAMs, as well as the all-aspect PL-9 IR AAMs, while its F-8-IIs are capable of carrying the PL-2A, PL-5B, PL-8, and BVR semi-active radar (SAR) PL-4 and PL-10 AAMs. All these missiles are comparable to Taiwan's AAMs. By 2005, Beijing is likely to have an AR AAM in its inventory, and could adapt it for use on a larger number of platforms than Taipei. PLAAF is also developing BVR AAMs for use on its fourth generation fighter aircraft.

PLAAF's bombers are the B-5/Beagle, whose lack of speed and standoff capability make it vulnerable, and the B-6/Badger. Like the B-5, the B-6 is aging, but one of its variants is designed to carry an anti-ship cruise missile and another is being developed to carry an air-launched cruise missile. The newer models might have better success against the ROC's air defenses.

Transport: Modest improvements have taken place in PLAAF's ability to provide airlift for PLA operations. Until recently, aircraft that were antiquated and of limited capacity meant that ground forces could not be quickly moved even to distant areas of China. The purchase of IL-76MD/Candid and Y-8/Cubs from Russia has helped this situation somewhat. However, only about a dozen of the former and fifty of the latter have been acquired. PLAAF could, in time of hostilities, commandeer planes from the PRC's recently enlarged civil aircraft fleet to supplement its transport capability.

Airborne: The 15th Airborne Army is the PLA's primary quick reaction force and has been designated a "strategic rapid reaction unit." It comprises three airborne divisions, each with about 10,000 troops. It is, however, handicapped by insufficient lift. Acquisition of additional aircraft and modern equipment plus the recent increased emphasis on utilizing airborne forces during training exercises is expected to result in marginal improvement in the 15th's combat capabilities.

Ground-Based Air Defense: Considerable efforts are being made to establish an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) at both the strategic and tactical levels. The PRC's air defense technology lacks many crucial components and lags well behind western standards. China's Tactical Air Defense System (TADS) has been described as a rudimentary tactical IADS capability. It is not expected to have a fully operational IADS capability by 2005, but could establish one by 2020.

Navy: Except for the surface combatant fleet, which has remained approximately the same size, PLAN has been replacing its large number of older ships with fewer, more modern platforms. Nonetheless, it lags behind other regional navies, including that of the ROC, in most technological areas, especially air defense, surveillance, and C4I.

Submarines: PLAN is beginning to produce more modern submarines with the aid of Russian technology. The current force is oriented principally toward interdicting surface ships using torpedoes and mines, although some submarines will soon be arms with a submerged-launch cruise missile. Submarines' ability to conduct ASW operations is expected to improve through 2005, helped by the acquisition of Russian Kilo-class boats and greater emphasis on ASW training. Department of Defense analysts believe that China's submarines will enable PLAN to control the sea lanes and mining approaches around the ROC, as well as posing a growing threat to submarines in the East and South China seas.

Surface Combatants: All surface combatants carry ASCMs, ranging from the antiquated first- generation CSS-N-1/Scrubbrush to the more advanced C-801/Sardine and C-802/Saccade. The arrival of the two Sovremennyy class destroyers equipped with SS-N-22/Sunburn ASCMs will enhance PLAN's ability to carry out surface warfare. During the next several years, PLAN's surface fleet is expected to improve its readiness and endurance for extended operations within the region and around Taiwan. It is likely to conduct more realistic training exercises and deploy more advanced anti-ship, air defense missiles, and electronic countermeasures.

Amphibious Forces: PLAN amphibious forces have sealift sufficient to transport approximately one infantry division. PLAN also has hundreds of smaller landing craft, barges, and troop transports, all of which could be used together with fishing boats, trawlers, and civilian merchant ships to augment the naval amphibious fleet. However, deficiencies in long-range lift, logistics, and air support severely limit the PRC's ability to project amphibious forces.

Naval Air Forces: PLANAF's 150 non-standoff B-6/Badgers, A-5/Fantans and B-5/Beagles give it a limited maritime strike capability, but they would be only marginally effective against most modern navies. Some of the approximately 30 B-6Ds provide PLANAF with a cruise missile ship interdiction strike capability utilizing the C-601/Kraken ASCM. The standoff-capable FB-7 fighter-bomber, equipped with the C-801/ASCM is expected to become operational within the next two to three years; it will eventually replace some of PLANAF's B-5s and A-5s.

Ground Forces: Particularly since the 1991 Gulf War, the PLA has made considerable efforts to develop special operation forces (SOFs). These units are likely to have been assigned specific missions and tasks in a variety of Taiwan contingencies---for example, locating or destroying C4I assets, transportation nodes, and logistics depots; destroying air defense assets; and conducting reconnaissance operations. Although only the most highly motivated and best trained SOFs are likely to be dispatched against Taiwan, morale and educational levels in the ground forces are quite low. The ROC's soldiers are better educated and better trained than their PLA counterparts, and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. They will also have the advantage that accrues to defenders fighting for their homeland. The PLA has the advantage of overwhelming numbers. Also, the use of ground forces in a Taiwan confrontation will mean that the island's attempts at air and sea control will have failed and there will be little purpose to fighting on except for terrorist operations or guerrilla attacks.

Information Operations: The Defense Department report to Congress published in February 1999 describes the PRC's information warfare (IW) program as in the early stages of research; U.S. intelligence sources tell the author that some breakthroughs have been achieved since the report was compiled. <22> The PLA's efforts have been geared toward both offensive employment of information warfare against foreign economic, logistics, and C4I systems and developing effective countermeasures to protect China's own systems from foreign attack. Some of the technologies being pursued could provide enhanced defensive or offensive capabilities against Taiwan military and civilian information infrastructure systems. Examples include computer anti-virus solutions, network security, and advanced data communications technologies. PLA publications claim that IW-related scenarios have been incorporated into recent operational exercises. Other military publications assert that achievements have been made in measures against computer viruses.

In computer warfare, there has been interest in inserting computer viruses into foreign networks. Electronic warfare equipment includes a combination of 1950s through 1980s technologies, with only a few select PLA units receiving the most modern components. The PRC is acquiring state-of-the-art technology to improve its intercept, direction finding, and jamming capabilities. In addition to providing extended imagery reconnaissance and surveillance and electronic intelligence collection, China's unmanned aerial vehicle programs will probably serve as platforms for improved radio and radar jammers. Existing earth stations can be modified to interfere with satellite communications. The PLA is developing an electronic countermeasures (ECM) doctrine, and has performed structured training in an ECM environment.

With regard to antisatellite programs, the PLA can detect and track most satellites with sufficient accuracy for targeting purposes. However, its only current known means of destroying or disabling a satellite is to launch a ballistic missile or space launch vehicle armed with a nuclear weapon. Articles cited above indicate the PRC's interest in a laser anti-satellite capability; the PLA may already be able to damage optical sensors on certain satellites.

The PLA is acquiring and developing new systems which will give the military a variety of targeting capabilities it has heretofore lacked. Detection and targeting are expected to improve over time, as space-based sensors are launched; long-distance reconnaissance drones are produced; and airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft are put into service. Several reconnaissance satellites are reportedly being developing which could provide initial targeting data to long-range reconnaissance aircraft. PLAAF has placed high priority on acquiring an AEW platform capable of conducting data relays. It is expected to mount several Phalcon AEW systems on Il-76 airframes. PLAN is also reportedly receiving Skymaster AEW radars. Chinese officials assert that these radars will be used for search and rescue operations, although they could be used in AEW and surface surveillance roles.

The PLA could have fully operational AEW platforms by 2005. By 2000, it is expected to have access to commercial remote sensing overhead imagery in the 2.5 meter resolution range. Access to new overhead imagery platforms in the near term will enhance China's mapping, surveillance, and targeting capabilities. The Chinese already have access to commercial satellite imagery from the French SPOT satellites, Indian IRS-1c satellite, Canadian RADARSAT, and various Russian satellites. This widely available commercial satellite imagery can be used to develop digital terrain maps for targeting, missile guidance, and mission planning.

The PRC's telecommunications infrastructure, including both civil and military communications networks, is being modernized, with specific attention to C4I infrastructures supporting all levels of military and civilian leadership. Multiple transmission systems are being employed to create a military communication system that is survivable, secure, flexible, mobile, and less vulnerable to exploitation, destruction, or electronic attack. While the country's command and control networks could be degraded, it is unlikely that they could be knocked out completely. <23> Overall network performance is judged as adequate. The PLA's lack of communications satellites could force it to rely on foreign satellite services to meet military needs in time of hostilities. The PLA would probably pre-empt domestic satellites for combat operations. Within the operational forces, mobile communications equipment are expected to be fielded in greater numbers to maneuver units and to increasingly incorporate features such an encryption and frequency hopping. This will enable the PLA leadership to control its forces in a faster, more secure fashion over a wider range of missions than currently possible.

Chinese military writings include the belief that high-technology warfare requires the development of denial and deception techniques for countering the enemy's precision weapons, advanced reconnaissance sensors, and command and control warfare doctrine. A 1993 PLA National Defense University publication, High Technology and Military Camouflage, stresses the value of conducting denial and deception operations in a crisis involving Taiwan, in order to create ambiguity about Beijing's intentions and force the ROC political and military leaderships to misallocate resources. The study notes that camouflage and deception can disperse an enemy's troops, waste his firepower, and disrupt his high technology weapons.

Psychological Operations or "psyops" have been part of the PRC's military strategy since at least as early as the founding of the People's Republic. Past conduct indicates that Beijing is not above planting erroneous information ("black" propaganda) and spreading disinformation. One recent technique has involved using a publication known to have close ties with the PLA to disseminate the view that the balance of force is quickly changing against Taiwan, and that the island's leadership had better come to an agreement with Beijing soon, before its bargaining position is further eroded. <24>

In consideration of the factors summarized above, the Department of Defense Report concluded that, despite anticipated improvements to Taiwan's missile and air defense systems, by 2005 the PLA will have the capability to attack the ROC with air and missile strikes which would degrade key military facilities and damage the island's economic infrastructure.

The Chinese leadership, civilian and military, unanimously aver that there are no differences between them on the Taiwan issue: all citizens of China stand as one in their heartfelt desire to see the island united with the ancestral land as quickly as possible. All allegations to the contrary have come from the Hong Kong press. For example, in the wake of the Yinhe incident<25> of the early 1990s, a Hong Kong newspaper stated that hardliners within the PLA's high command had written a letter to then-relatively-newly appointed General Secretary Jiang Zemin urging him to take a tougher stand with regard to U.S. A few years later, the Hong Kong press alleged that in return for the PLA giving its support to Jiang, he had agreed to give its voice greater weight in foreign policymaking, with specific regard to Taiwan. There is no independent corroboration of these rumors. Moreover, it cannot be assumed that the military---any country's military---is necessarily more hard-line on foreign policy and defense matters than its civilian leadership. There are documented instances when just the opposite is the case.

This said, two lines of reasoning have been evident in recent months, and particularly since the United States led a NATO coalition to reverse Serbian attempts at the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo province. Just as they had regarded the Bush administration's attempt to reverse Iraq's forcible occupation of Kuwait in the Gulf War of 1991, the Chinese leadership saw a precedent being set for Taiwan. This precedent would allow the sovereign territory of another state to be invaded by foreign forces in the name of humanitarian assistance. Control over Tibet and Xinjiang as well were believed to be jeopardized by this new American policy. The disagreements are not strictly military versus civilian: representatives of each group can be found in both the moderate and the hardline groups.

When an American plane dropped bombs on the PRC embassy in Belgrade, the Chinese leadership rejected the U.S. explanation that it had been an error, choosing instead to interpret the bombing as at attempt to "probe" Chinese defenses. It quickly suspended the military cooperation program with the United States and asked rhetorically how China could possibly be expected to participate in the "strategic partnership" that had been a pillar of the Clinton administration's policy toward the PRC. A wave of patriotic fervor appeared to be encouraged by party/government and media. <26> For example, considerable publicity was accorded to an internet appeal for money to buy an aircraft carrier to ensure that China would not be bullied by Western imperialism. The appeal was made by a civilian; <27> the military expressed no public opinion on the desirability of acquiring the carrier.

While a Hong Kong magazine carried an article headlined "Chinese Military Clamors For War: Vows To Fight With U.S.", the actual quotes its author cited were considerably less inflammatory. General Zhang Wannian said that U.S. hegemonism "could be the detonator of a world war," and General Chi Haotian that "China's strategic principles and policies toward the U.S. will be readjusted." <28> The military's own newspaper, Jiefang junbao, expressed outrage and indignation at American tactics but advocated only that officers and troops "take up the rigorous challenge" they had been presented with and redouble their efforts to master high technology. <29> The need for advanced knowledge of science and technology had, of course, been high on the military's agenda for the better part of a decade.

Another Jiefang junbao article stressed that peace is always fragile and that, although the "wolf" had yet to come, the sound of its claws sharpening could be heard from time to time. With proper preparations, there would be no danger. <30> The wolf analogy was used again a few weeks later, this time by General Secretary Jiang Zemin. While the wolf analogy is unflattering to the United States, Jiang's use of it was benign. He stressed that although everyone understands that the wolf is going to attack man, we still need to deal with the wolf---to "dance with the wolf," he added. This is the reality China must face, and the diplomatic strategy that must be adopted. <31> In other words, Jiang and Jiefang junbao advocated being wary of the wolf rather than seeking confrontation with it.

Nor were there public calls for increasing the defense budget to cope with the American threat. On the contrary, a book authored by two PLA colonels and issued the PLA Literature and Art Publishing House in July 1999 stated that developing countries, including China, should avoid falling into the trap of engaging in a high-tech arms race with rich countries. This, the authors argued, was precisely what the United States wanted. China's economy would collapse, and American would have achieved the dismemberment of the state just as it had with the Soviet Union.

These and other publications stressed the need to utilize existing resources better, and to work on techniques such as asymmetric warfare which will allow poor countries to defeat wealthier states without trying to match their assets. <32> They do not call for additional resources to cope with perceived danger. While the articles cited argue against a hard-line position, therefore implying the existence of people who are arguing for increased resources, the voice of the hard-liners themselves has not been heard. Though the US actions in Kosovo are clearly interpreted as a threat to PRC control over Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, there is no evidence that the PLA as a corporate entity is attempting to use the issue to drive policy in a more extreme direction.

If, as the 1999 Department of Defense report on the security situation in the Taiwan Strait concludes, the balance of power will shift to the mainland by 2005, there is, from the PLA's point of view, no need at present to take a more active role on the unification issue. The least risky policy is the current one: to continue working on building up the military as the economy expands and to engage the United States ("dance with wolves") on Taiwan and other issues. If time is indeed on the side of the mainland, attempting to reduce the level of U.S. support for Taiwan is far preferable than provoking a confrontation with it.

One must, however, question the immutability of the trends noted in the Defense Department's report. There is little doubt that the PLA has made considerable progress from the "short arms and slow legs" military of a decade ago. Yet extrapolating on the basis of current trends fails to take into account events that may change those trends. Beijing's efforts to restructure the country's economy have thrown hundreds of thousands of people out of work and increased the level of social unrest. The banking sector is teetering on the brink of insolvency, and environmental problems continue to worsen.

Even assuming that none of these disasters occur, there are other limitations on the continuing growth of the mainland military's ability to threaten Taiwan. The emphasis on asymmetric warfare implies that China is the only country to have thought of this technique. In fact, the notion of focusing one's comparative advantages against the enemy's relative weaknesses is as old as conflict itself. The concept of asymmetrical warfare is central to the myth of Achilles' heel and to the confrontation between David and Goliath. With specific reference to information warfare---blinding satellites, the insertion of computer viruses, and so forth---the mainland will be pitting itself against Taiwan, one of the world's most computer-sophisticated societies, and one whose hackers have already demonstrated impressive skills in creating and disseminating viruses.

An American intelligence agent who has spent considerable time researching the PRC's information warfare capability concludes that "there is a big difference between what they want to do and what they can do," adding that, although the Chinese have numerous advantages, they lack the technological sophistication to mount credible attacks in the electronic warfare, electronic countermeasures, smart weapons systems, and command and control areas. <33>

Heightened security measures adopted at American scientific research facilities as a result of the Cox committee report may slow down thefts of technology in the future. Moreover, acquiring information does not necessarily translate into the ability to absorb and integrate that technology into deployed weapons systems. Training and maintenance systems lag behind the rate of acquisition. Party/government funding for technology development, especially in applied sciences, conflicts with other priorities, including supporting state-owned enterprises as they attempt to restructure. Pervasive corruption dilutes the effectiveness of monies that have been allocated to weapons development.

Although the countermeasures taken by the ROC are beyond the scope of this paper, they must nonetheless be taken into consideration. Taiwan's more efficient economic system and democratic government make it less vulnerable to socioeconomic unrest than the mainland. Nonetheless, the very success of the economy has made military recruitment difficult: private sector jobs are more remunerative and less physically demanding. And, due to pressure from the mainland, Taiwan's military has been denied certain key technologies that are important to maintaining its defense.

In sum, despite trends in the military balance across the Taiwan Strait that seem to favor the mainland, there are too many unpredictable factors to assume that these trends will continue indefinitely.

<1> Separatist sentiment also exists in Inner Mongolia. However, because the ratio of Han to Mongols in Inner Mongolia is on the order of eleven to one, the possibility of separatism there is less worrisome to the central government.

<2> John Culver, "Defense Policy and Posture II," in Hans Binnendijk and Ronald N. Montaperto, Strategic Trends in China. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998), p. 72.

<3> Lu Te-yun, "MND Officials Assess Mainland Electronic Warfare Capability," Lien-ho Pao. 16 May 1998, p. 3.

<4> Eric McVadon, "PRC Exercises, Doctrine, and Tactics Toward Taiwan: the Naval Dimension," in James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, Crisis in the Taiwan Strait. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997), pp. 249-276, considers these scenarios in detail.

<5> Lin Chien-hua, "Military Personnel Said: It is Normal Military Deployment," Tzu-li Wan-pao, 11 February 1999, p.2, in FBIS-CHI 216, 17 February 1999.

<6> (no author) Report To Congress Pursuant to the Fiscal Year 99 Appropriations Bill, U.S. Department of Defense, 26 February 1999, p. 15. Hereafter cited as FY 99 Report.

<7> Li Tzu-ching, "Chinese Military Clamors For War: Vowing To Have a Fight With the U.S." Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), 1 June 1999, p. 17.

<8> Pei Fang, "New Directions in Weapons Development," Kuang-chiao ching (Wide Angle Mirror), 16 January 1999, p. 31.

<9> Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, "A Triangle in Shoulder Boards," Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Moscow), 16 June 1999, in FBIS-FSU 7 July 1999.

<10> Cary Huang, "Beijing Buys Russian Jet Squadrons," Hong Kong Standard, 21 June 1999.

<11>(no author), "Destroyers A Threat To Taiwan," South China Morning Post, 6 April 1998, quoting U.S. Rear Admiral (retired) Eric McVadon. McVadon, a former U.S. naval attache to Beijing, described the Sovremenny's SS-22 Sunburn missiles as skimming the water at 2.3 time the speed of sound, and therefore very difficult to detect.

<12> Amnon Barzilai, "China-Israel Arms Ties Are Revealed," Har'aretz, 3 February 1999.

<13> Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns With The People's Republic of China, United States House of Representatives, Report 105-851 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), p. 46. Hereafter referred to as "Cox Report."

<14> Cox report, p. xii.

<15> Cox report, p. viii.

<16> Statement of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet to Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Current and Project National Security Threats," 2 February 1999, in http://www.cia.gov/cia/public-affairs/speeches/ps020299.html

<17> (No author), "China Missile Threat Is 'Old News,' " Straits Times (Singapore), 13 February 1999.

<18> Bill Gertz, "Chinese Army Is Building Laser Weapons," Washington Times, 3 November 1999; Barbara Opall-Rome, "PLA Pursues Acupuncture Warfare," Defense News (Washington, D.C.), 1 March 1999, p. 4. There is a chapter on the PLA's acupuncture warfare in Lin Chong Pin, Heba (Nuclear Hegemon), (Taipei: The Student Publisher, 1999).

<19> The "re" is in the original text. I have added quotation marks, believing that, since the PRC has never administered Taiwan, it is erroneous to say that the PLA could re-take the area.

<20> (No author), "China Develops French-Type Sonar With U.S. Technology, " Jane's Defence Weekly (London), 7 October 1998, p. 6. The first case involves a version of France's DUBV-43; the second, the FM-80 (HQ-7), both to be used on PLAN's Luda class destroyers.

<21> Lilian Wu, "MND Not Surprised By Beijing's Building of Simulated Airport," Central News Agency (Taipei), 28 April 1999. Hereafter cited as CNA. See also Robert Karniol, "Replica Warfare," Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 May 1999, p. 18.

<22> Author's interview, 9 July 1999.

<23> FY 99 Report, p. 10.

<24> See, for example, (no author), "News Square" program, Chinese People's Radio to Taiwan, 8 July 1998; Yuan Lin, "Probing Capability of Taiwan's ABMs," Kuang-chiao ching, no. 311, 16 August 1998, p. 61. The first of these sought to convince ROC residents that President Clinton's iteration of the "three noes" during his visit to Shanghai represented a deterioration in U.S. support for Taiwan; the second judged the performance of certain PLA military equipment to be far better than comparable items possessed by the ROC military and warned that "peaceful negotiations are the only way out."

<25> United States sources alleged that the Chinese ship Yinhe was carrying certain components for chemical warfare to Iran; the Chinese objected to the American military's "harassment" of the ship. Eventually, after the crew would have had ample time to dispose of the offending cargo, the ship was searched. No proscribed materials were found.

<26> The author was in Beijing at the time.

<27> Actually, a former PLA member who signed herself Bingmeizi or "Sister Soldier." The appeal was picked up by Henan Youth Daily; most donations were said to come from students, households, and retired soldiers. See Oliver Chou, "Notes On China," South China Morning Post, 14 June 1999.

<28> Li Tzu-ching, "Chinese Military Clamors For War: Vows To Fight With U.S.", Cheng Ming, no. 260, 1 June 1999, pp. 15-17.

<29> See, e.g. Zhu Wenquan and Zhao Taizhong, "Focus On Key Aspects, Enhance Sense of Urgency---View Deep and Protracted Learning of High-Technology Knowledge in Light of the Kosovo War," Jiefang junbao, 25 May 1999, p. 6.

<30> Pan Shunrui, "War Is Not Far From Us," Jiefang junbao, 8 June 1999. p. 6.

<31> Yu Ching-sheng, "Jiang Zemin Repeatedly Expounds China's Domestic and Foreign Policies in Three Internal Speeches Giving a Quick Response and Winning the Support of the Public," Ching Pao (Hong Kong), no. 264, 1 July 1999, pp. 24-26, in FBIS-CHI 7 July 1999.

<32>(No author), "New Book Published by PLA Literature and Art Publishing House Calls For Countering Military Powers By Hook Or By Crook," Ming Pao (Hong Kong) 2 July 1999, p. A13; Cary Huang, "'No Holds Barred' Warfare Advocated." Hong Kong Standard, 3 July 1999. The authors suggest using every means available, including guerrilla warfare and terrorist strikes.

<33> Author's interview, 7 October 1998.