Bruce Dickson

It is safe to say that President Lee Tenghui is not a popular man in China, and certainly not in Beijing. His proposal to conduct cross-straits relations on the basis of “special state to state” relations unleashed angry denunciations of both him and his proposal, and the frequency and intensity of Beijing’s outbursts have not diminished. So far, however, Beijing’s response has been primarily rhetorical and it has not yet resorted to more forceful action. Following a week of meetings with foreign policy analysts in Beijing, three conclusions are apparent. These government and academic analysts are united in their opposition to Lee Tenghui’s call for “special state to state” relations between Taiwan and China. They are also generally united in their assessment of Lee’s motives. But they hold diverse views on how China should respond to the recent change in Taiwan’s policy toward the mainland.

As is clear from China’s media, there is no support in China’s foreign policy community for Lee’s new policy and no sympathy for the frustration felt in Taiwan regarding its current status. Lee’s statements were repeatedly described as “splittism” that have destroyed the foundation of cross-straits relations. They see no basis for further negotiations, especially Wang Daohan’s scheduled visit in October, unless Taiwan abandons its new initiative and returns to the traditional interpretation of the “one China” policy.

China’s foreign policy analysts offer two explanations for Lee’s most recent statements. First, they are consistent with the position he has been outlining since at least 1992. They believe his interview on German radio simply provided the clearest statement of Lee’s true pro-independence beliefs. Second, they believe Lee intends the “special state to state” policy to be his legacy to the next president in Taiwan. By establishing this policy now, they believe Lee wants to prevent his successor from pursuing a more accommodating policy toward the mainland. In particular, they believe he wants to undermine popular support for the candidacy of James Soong, who has indicated he prefers a less confrontational relationship with China.

But how should China respond to Lee’s call for “special state to state” relations? On this key question, there is less unity. At a minimum, there is disagreement over whether Taiwan will clarify its position in a way that will allow Wang Daohan’s visit to occur as planned. More importantly, there is deep disagreement over when and how China should respond. Some recommend that China should simply wait until after Lee is no longer in office; others suggest that there is no guarantee that the next president would be any more acceptable to Beijing; and others believe that China cannot afford to wait that long in any event.

At one extreme, some want China to take even stronger action than in 1995-96, although this viewpoint has not crystallized into a specific proposal yet. Other analysts, however, counsel patience, recognizing that drastic action is likely to bring an unwelcome response by the United States, either increased arms sales to Taiwan or direct intervention, as in 1996.

China would also like the United States to take concrete steps. In this regard, President Clinton’s phone calls with Jiang Zemin, his and Secretary Albright’s repeated pledges of commitment to the “one China” policy, and the cancellation of a US military delegation to Taiwan were noted with satisfaction. But there is also the recognition American domestic politics may constrain Clinton from taking more forceful steps against Taipei. If he tilts too far in the direction of Beijing, Congress would most likely act to bolster the American commitment to Taiwan’s defense. Ironically, this line of thought is used to explain why China needs to act now instead of waiting for the US to pressure Taiwan into backing down. But whether that pressure comes from China or from the Clinton administration, Congress is almost certain to intervene on behalf of Taiwan, a fact that Chinese analysts who prefer patience are quick to point out.

The interesting dimension to these debates is that they are taking place within any given institute or think tank. At one institute I visited, officials debated at length whether immediate action or patience was the wisest course of action, and in the end there was no agreement. But these debates over tactics did not distract from a more fundamental point. These analysts see no way for cross-straits relations to proceed unless Taiwan abandons its appeal for state to state relations. The only question they had was how to bring this about.

The answer to that question will likely have to wait until the end of the upcoming leadership meetings at Beidaihe. The Taiwan issue will certainly be at the top of the agenda as China’s top party, government, and military leaders gather at the seaside resort. With Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji already under fire for their handling of foreign affairs and domestic policy, they may find it difficult to persuade colleagues to take a soft line toward Taiwan, even if they themselves wanted to. In fact, one active service officer told me if he was president, he would definitely take strong and immediate action, knowing that if he did not others stood ready to replace him. This is an indication of the kind of pressure that Jiang Zemin may be facing. If Jiang and Zhu want to rebuild the consensus favoring the policy of engagement with the US, and conclude negotiations to enter WTO in particular, they may have to accept a harder line toward Taiwan. This type of deal would be extremely risky for all sides in the current dispute, would further undermine stability in the region, and would also jeopardize improvements in US-China relations. But there is strong sentiment in favor of this approach, regardless of the costs. 

Bruce Dickson is the Director of Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University.