Peter Kien-Hong Yu

Engagement between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) is going nowhere, especially after the latter proposed a special state-to-state relationship in July.

In other words, very thorny obstacles remain before Wang Dao-han, chairman of the Beijing-based Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, and Koo Cheng-fu, the head of the Taipei-based Straits Exchange Foundation, can resume their second round of serious negotiations since April 1993.

Beijing wants to conduct political negotiations right away. By that, it means Taipei should publicly accept the one-China principle, as understood by Beijing. If agreeable, the PRC can compromise a great deal on other issues.

On the other hand, the ROC wants incremental reunification, in which a consensus of what constitutes one China would be reached only at the end of the negotiation process.

To resolve the deadlock, the PRC should announce that from Jan. 1, 2000, if not earlier, ROC naval forces can partol up to Brijing's self-declared baseline, (which is not as close as the shoreline), of mainland China, but within the zonal waters know as the Taiwan Strait.

It should be very clear by now that the ROC under the rule of Kuomintang will not legally break away from China.

And while it is almost certain that the opposition Democratic Progressive Party will not be able to capture the presidency in March, there is no guarantee the Kuomintang can win the following election. If Beijing bullies the people of Taiwan too much, the latter may deliberately choose a member of the Democratic Progressive Party as the president. As a matter of fact, many native Taiwanese like to gamble, President Lee Teng-hui included.

In his recent book, "Viewpoints of Taiwan," Lee said the Tiawan Strait is the common property of the international community. Yet, the PRC and the ROC by now have selectively publicized the parameters of the areas under their respective jurisdiction. From there, each can have its own territorial sea, contiguous zone, Exclusive Economic Zone, etc. That is to say, there is no more room for open seas in the Taiwan Strait.

Why, then, did Lee and others like ROC Defense Minister Tang Fei say there are high seas in the Taiwan Strait? For one reason, they want to confuse those who do not understand laws of the sea. Secondly, they want to preserve the sovereign status of Taiwan, be it called the ROC or something else.

Finally, under the September 1997 Review of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, Japan can comply with an American request to help sweep sea mine in the high seas. In a nutshell, if the Taiwan Strait has high seas, Taipei feels, at least psychologically, safer.  

 Then why do we propose that ROC naval forces be allowed to patrol or manage the entire Taiwan Strait?

In January 1997, PRC Chairman Jing Zemin, for the first time, said: "Taiwan's armed forces are also Chinese forces." In April 1999, Wang said Taiwan's armed forces are the PLA's youjun (friendly forces).

In February 1998, a PLA Navy magazine made a similar remark, and a Taiwan official publication reported on that. Needless to say, Taipei should test Beijing's sincerity in making those statements.

Would the ROC Navy attack the mainland if it can patrol and manage the Taiwan Strait affairs? Certainly not. According to the PRC sources, the ROC stopped its harassment of the coastal area of the mainland in 1969. Some Chinese and foreign military analysts say by 2005, the PLA Air Force vis-a-vis the ROC Air Force, for the first time, would be able to maintain air superiority.

There also is the issue of the Tiawanization of the ROC, and how to reinforce Chinese identity. Formerly, ROC military ships bore names such as Yuefei, who is a traditional Chinese hero. After the mid-1990s, names such as Yushan, which is the highest mountain in Taiwan, and Danjiang which is a river in Taipei County, began appearing.

In other words, the PLA Navy must make the ROC naval officers and crew members proud of the fact that they are also able to defend China along the coastal area, thereby becoming more Chinese than Taiwanese.

Finally, the possibility exists that the ROC may reject the Strait for Peace alternative. Even so, Beijing conceivably can score propaganda points.

In a word, the PLA does not really lose. Since February 1984, it has been acknowledging the existence of a middle line in the Taiwan Strait. Yet, the Strait for Peace alternative can help to maintain peace and tranquility in the Taiwan Strait for the next several decades.

Peter Kien-hong Yu will be teaching at Lingnan University Hong Kong, in September.