Supporting the Status Quo

By Martin L. Lasater

Taiwan Security Research Center, Apr. 17, 2004

The hostility between Beijing and Taipei has many Americans concerned about the possibility of a future conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Such a war, probably involving the United States, is indeed possible. And its outcome would likely be the defeat of the PLA and continued diplomatic non-recognition of Taiwan by the international community. A war would most likely result in a return to the status quo, because the United States – unless seriously targeted by the PRC – would not seek to greatly harm China nor would it seek to separate Taiwan permanently from China.

In other words, war in the Taiwan Strait is not a rational solution to cross-Strait differences since the probable goals of such a conflict – reunification on the part of Beijing and independence on the part of Taipei – are highly unlikely to be realized. The United States is the critical variable. If Washington removes itself from the equation in the Taiwan Strait, then the odds shift greatly in Beijing’s favor. This explains the continuous efforts of both the PRC and ROC to court Washington’s support and to undermine the other’s case to American audiences.

There are many reasons why the United States is involved in the Taiwan issue, but the United States has no strategic or other interest in compelling the free people of Taiwan to join politically with the communist mainland, and no interest in trying to separate Taiwan from Chinese territory and thereby earning the enmity of Beijing forever. American interests are in preserving the status quo, until such time as the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can come to a mutually agreeable solution to their problems. Despite all the hoopla over ROC constitutional reform and PRC missile deployments, it also is in the interests of both sides to find that eventual solution.

The solution, however, will take some time to mature and come to fruition, and it will require some adjustments in the policies of Beijing and Taipei. The irreplaceable contribution of the United States to this issue is in providing both sides with enough time to work out their differences. China needs time for its reforms – including political reform – to take hold; Taiwan needs time for the pent-up frustrations of the Taiwanese to be addressed.

Many of the conditions for a workable agreement between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are already in place:

· Economic integration is proceeding so fast that no government can stop it or control it. There is no way Taiwan will not become part of a greater China economic union of some sort.

· Taiwan’s democracy is (almost) firmly rooted, and soon it will be impossible to take away. Taiwan is not like Hong Kong and thus the Hong Kong model for Taiwan is a non-starter.

· China’s multifaceted reforms are rapidly changing the country, and these reforms will likely result in a mainland more compatible with conditions on Taiwan. Like moderates everywhere, the current Chinese leadership seeks practical solutions to most problems.

Much has been made recently of the determination of President Chen Shui-bian to reform the ROC constitution, but this is not a real issue. Constitutional reform on Taiwan is necessary because the political institutions of the country are outdated and ineffective. The Chen government has pledged not to change the name of the country (Republic of China), its flag, or the definition of its territory. These are minimal requirements for Beijing to be able to claim that Taiwan remains part of Chinese territory. Hence, even though the PRC is protesting constitutional revision and painting dire consequences should Chen’s referendum plans go forward, a tacit agreement between Taipei and Beijing has already been reached. There is a clear understanding on both sides of where the line is drawn in the sand.

While remaining alert and able to respond to provocations, the United States should not be unduly upset by developments in Taiwan or warnings from Beijing. Washington should continue its present course in policy: upgrading Taiwan’s defenses when necessary as required by the TRA, upholding the (wonderfully vague) one-China principle as promised in the communiqués, and urging both sides to find a peaceful resolution of their differences.

President Chen Shui-bian and the DPP will continue to hope for and strategize to achieve an independent Republic of Taiwan, with no attachment whatsoever to the mainland. And the CCP will continue to hope for and strive to achieve political control over Taiwan. However, as long as the United States stays the course of its present policy, the zero-sum aspirations of the DPP and the CCP cannot be realized – even in the case of war. Under these conditions of prolonged stalemate, the pragmatism for which Chinese and Taiwanese alike are famous will probably, and eventually, prevail.

If Washington decides to withdraw from the Taiwan issue, all bets are off. But chances are that President Bush and successor administrations (next year or four years hence) will draw the same conclusion as their predecessors: U.S. interests are best served by supporting the status quo until a peaceful resolution can be found by the Chinese themselves.

Dr. Martin Lasater is a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC. He may be reached at mlasater@comcast.net