Why China May Elect to Use Force in the Taiwan Strait

Martin L. Lasater

Aug. 13, 2004

It is commonly assumed that the People’s Republic of China would attack Taiwan under certain previously defined circumstances. According to the U.S. Department of Defense 2004 Annual Report on the Military Power of the PRC, these circumstances include “a formal declaration of independence by Taipei, foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs, indefinite delays in resumption of cross-Strait dialogue, Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, and internal unrest on Taiwan.” (p. 46)

 

However, a greater near-term danger to peace in the Taiwan Strait is the conclusion of Beijing’s political and military leaders that there is no possibility of a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue and that a military use of force is a viable option for China. Such a conclusion could be reached if the following set of conditions becomes reality:

 

  • Taipei continues to reject the “one country, two systems” formula for unification and refuses to accept the “one China” principle in some form; and Beijing does not foresee any fundamental change in political direction on the island.

 

  • Beijing is unable to revise or moderate its proposals to Taiwan, because the Taiwan issue has become so politicized on the mainland.

 

  • The PRC concludes that ROC President Chen Shui-bian is totally untrustworthy, so that any conciliatory moves by the Chen government are viewed with suspicion and any new proposals by the Chen government are rejected out of hand.

 

  • China concludes that the United States will not or cannot exert sufficient pressure on the Chen government to stop “incremental independence,” such as (in Beijing’s view) revision of the ROC constitution.

 

  • PLA leaders are successful in arguing that the new round of modernization of the ROC’s armed forces with U.S. assistance will make it increasingly costly for China to utilize military means to force Taipei to negotiate terms of reunification – the implication being that it is better for the PLA to act sooner rather than later.

 

  • The PLA and Beijing’s political leadership are convinced that China will be able to deter effective American intervention in a Taiwan Strait conflict or, if deterrence fails, to absorb American military strikes without excessive damage to China’s modernization or to the Chinese Communist Party’s political control.

 

  • The PRC concludes that its political costs in a display of force in the Taiwan Strait will be minimal, regardless of the outcome of any military conflict between Chinese and U.S.-Taiwan forces – e.g., that international support for Taiwan independence will be contained, that China will continue to command regional respect and influence, that the United States will not view China as a long-term enemy, that China’s economic modernization will not be permanently derailed, and that the CCP will continue its political leadership role.

 

  • Leaders in Beijing are convinced that the PLA has the operational readiness and ability to carry out its assigned military missions against Taiwan and the (likely) American intervention.

 

  • Beijing believes that the level of resistance against its occupation forces from Taiwan private citizens will be manageable, and that a cooperative local government can be formed within an acceptable period of time.

 

  • PRC leaders are convinced that the vast majority of mainland Chinese citizens would support their military action against Taiwan to stop the perceived drift toward independence; and, further, that what matters most to the Chinese public is defense of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

 

  • Chinese leaders conclude that the PRC’s foreign trade and investment flows will be restored soon after the war, since China’s massive economy is now interdependent with the rest of the world.

 

  • Beijing concludes that the PRC’s diplomatic and strategic position will not be too heavily damaged by war in the Straits, because China is too big and powerful to isolate or contain.

 

  • PRC leaders believe that the United States will not invade mainland China or attack high-value Chinese infrastructure targets in order to avoid escalation to a full-scale Sino-American war.

 

  • PRC leaders believe that the United States, even if it defeats PLA forces attacking Taiwan, will not diplomatically recognize an independent Taiwan or fundamentally change the U.S. long-term policy of engagement with China.

 

It is important to note that these conditions might lead Chinese leaders to use forceful options in the Taiwan Strait even without the provocation of a formal declaration of Taiwan independence or any of the other previously publicized justifications for war.

 

Most of these conditions are actually perceptions on the part of Chinese political and military leaders; they may or may not be true. China is a superpower in its own backyard, and that means that it can do largely what it pleases when its leaders determine what actions are in the nation’s best interests. As a global superpower, the United States exercises some constraining influence over China, but not completely and certainly not decisively on the Taiwan issue. The United States cannot conquer China in the way that it defeated Iraq and the Taliban.

 

What this means is that war or peace in the Taiwan Strait will largely be determined by political perceptions in Beijing, Washington, and Taipei. The military balance has some influence on those perceptions, but not decisively so, particularly in a situation where Chinese nationalism and sense of honor are involved.

 

There are many policy implications that can be derived from the above observations. What is critical, however, is the conclusion that leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait need to show much greater flexibility in their positions at this time. It is absolutely crucial that the two sides attempt to restore some measure of trust through confidence building measures. Otherwise, the hypothetical perceptions in Beijing outlined in this article may soon become accepted reality.

 

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Dr. Martin Lasater is a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. He may be contacted at mlasater@comcast.net.