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The Bush Administration and Taiwan By Dennis van Vranken Hickey Political Science
Department Testimony
submitted for a pubic hearing held by the US-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Room 192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington,
D.C., February 6, 2004. On December 9, 2003, President George W. Bush warned the Taiwanese government about a proposed referendum that is certain to irritate China. He declared that the US is opposed to any action that “might unilaterally change the status quo” across the Taiwan Strait. The White House apparently feared that Taiwan was inching closer and closer to declaring itself independent of China—a move that could ignite a major conflict in East Asia at a time when US forces are tied down in the Middle East. Not surprisingly, Bush’s statement angered some pro-Taiwan members of Congress and others who support the island democracy. The president’s critics accused him of “appeasing a dictatorship” and having “lost his bearings.” On January 6, 2004, a Democratic candidate for president, Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), even went so far as to blast Bush for “turning his back on Taiwan.” It’s time for a reality check. Without question, the Bush administration is the most “pro-Taiwan” administration since the United States broke relations with Taiwan and recognized the mainland Chinese regime in 1979. Indeed, the administration has carried out a significant readjustment of US policy toward the island, while continuing to abide by the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act. Like previous administrations, however, the Bush administration also recognizes the value of engaging the People’s Republic of China (PRC). I. US POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN On December 15, 1978, the US announced the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the PRC, to become effective January 1, 1979. In order to achieve normalization, Washington acquiesced to Beijing's three long-standing demands: (1) termination of formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan; (2) removal of all US troops from Taiwan and (3) abrogation of the 1954 US‑ROC Mutual Defense Treaty. Since 1979, American policy toward Taiwan has been guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and three US-PRC Joint Communiqués: (1) the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué; (2) the 1979 Normalization Communiqué and (3) the August 17, 1982, US-China Joint Communiqué. The TRA provides a legal framework for America's commercial and cultural relations with Taiwan. It also outlines the terms of Washington's "unofficial" governmental relations with Taiwan and includes provisions for its defense. In the communiqués, the US recognizes the PRC as the legitimate government of China and acknowledges Beijing's position that there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of it.[1] Washington also promises not to pursue a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" and stresses that the resolution of the Taiwan issue is a matter for the Chinese themselves to decide peacefully. The US
security commitment to Taiwan is outlined principally in Sections 2 and 3 of
the TRA. Section 2 (b) states: It
is the policy of the United States . . . to consider any effort to determine
the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or
embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and
of grave concern to the United States; to provide Taiwan with arms of a
defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States to
resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize
the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan. In terms of American arms sales to Taiwan, the most
pertinent passages of the TRA are to be found in Section 3: (a)
In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United
States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services
in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability. (b)
The President and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense
articles and services based solely upon their judgement of the needs of
Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination
of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by the United States military
authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and Congress. Should the security or the social or economic system of Taiwan be threatened, Section 3 also states that "the President is directed to inform the Congress promptly . . . . (and) the President and the Congress shall determine in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger." In addition to the TRA, critical elements of US policy toward Taiwan may be found in the three US-PRC Joint Communiqués. In the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué—a document that helped pave the way for eventual normalization of US-PRC relations—Washington reaffirmed "its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question." In the 1979 Normalization Communiqué, Washington also stressed that "the United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.” In the August 17, 1982, US-China Joint Communiqué, American authorities once again emphasized that Beijing must "strive for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question." In the same agreement, however, the US promised to eschew long-term arms sales to Taiwan and to keep sales from exceeding either the quality or quantity of arms sold to Taiwan after the US established relations with the PRC. This document also apparently committed the US to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan gradually. US policy toward Taiwan is both ambiguous and contradictory. For example, the TRA warns that the US would consider any hostile actions directed against Taiwan as "a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the US." But Washington is not committed to Taiwan's defense. Furthermore, in the August 17, 1982, US-China Joint Communiqué, Washington promised to reduce its arms transfers to Taiwan. But since 1982, arms sales have escalated. Washington steadfastly refuses to accede to Beijing's demands that these arms sales be curbed. II. US-TAIWAN RELATIONS IN THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION During
the first months of the Bush administration, there seemed to be little
indication of a major shift in US policy toward Taiwan. Indeed, the
administration appeared determined to maintain cordial relations with China.
By mid-2001, however, it was clear that the administration was prepared to
upgrade ties with Taiwan and increase arms sales to the island. Arms Sales As described, according to the TRA—the legislation that guides official American policy toward Taiwan—the US will “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” During the late 1980s and 1990s, a variety of considerations—including the PRC military build-up, the end of the Cold War, Taiwanese lobbying and domestic political pressures—had contributed to an escalation in arms sales. Indeed, by the time George W. Bush assumed office, sales of American-built military equipment had included missiles, advanced fighter aircraft, sophisticated anti-submarine helicopters, warships, transport planes, tanks, long-range radar and the Patriot Anti-Missile System.[2] But other weapons systems—including submarines and AEGIS equipped destroyers—were denied to Taipei. US officials took the position that submarines were offensive weapons and therefore could not be sold to the island. Moreover, PRC threats that the AEGIS would be “the last straw that breaks the camel’s back” and Pentagon warnings that China’s military might launch a preemptive strike against the vessels contributed to the Clinton administration’s decision to block the sale of the AEGIS to Taiwan. From the outset, members of the US Congress lobbied the Bush administration to sell additional arms to Taiwan. Especially high on Taipei’s 2001 shopping list were P-3C anti-submarine aircraft, diesel powered submarines and AEGIS equipped destroyers. Taiwanese officials expressed hopes that these requests would be approved. But many Taiwanese defense experts doubted that Washington would sell such weapons to Taiwan. As might be expected, Chinese authorities urged the Bush administration to reduce arms sales to Taiwan. In April 2001, President Bush announced that he had decided upon an arms sales deal with Taiwan that was “the right package for the moment.” The president approved the sale of four Kidd-class destroyers and 12 P-3C Orion submarine-killer aircraft. He also agreed to help the island secure eight diesel submarines. The AEGIS decision was deferred, with the administration suggesting that a future decision might depend upon the deployment of PRC missiles opposite Taiwan (China has deployed roughly 450 missiles opposite Taiwan). Following the president’s announcement, Representative Tom DeLay (R.-Texas) proclaimed that “the Bush administration has approved the most robust package of defensive weapons approved for Taiwan in over a decade.” A study conducted by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) concurred with this assessment. It is noteworthy that the arms sales package enjoyed widespread support among the media and the US Congress. There was little partisan bickering. Indeed, some leading Democrats argued that the sale didn’t go far enough. Probably referring to the April 1, 2001 mid-air collision between a US spy plane and a PRC fighter jet, Representative Richard Gephardt (D.-Missouri), declared that the president also should have approved the sale of the AEGIS in response to China’s “military buildup and other provocative acts.” Only days after approving the sale of the destroyers, aircraft and submarines, President Bush announced that he would end the practice of employing an annual review to determine Taiwan’s defensive needs—a policy that had been in place since 1982. The annual review had degenerated into an annual quarrel between Washington and Beijing. Since 2001, the Bush administration has continued to offer generous weapons packages to Taiwan. For example, in 2003, Taiwan’s air force took delivery of US-made AIM 120 medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAMS) that will boost the firepower of its F-16s. Moreover, the administration has pushed the Taiwanese to enhance its C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities and approved the sale of the Link-16 C4ISR system to Taiwan. The Taiwanese finally agreed to purchase a scaled-down version of the system in late 2003 (unfortunately, Taiwan has yet to move forward with plans to purchase the submarines or P-3C Orion submarine-killer aircraft that the administration has offered to sell). In June 2003, Taiwan announced that it would move forward with plans to purchase three Lockheed-Martin PAC-3 units and upgrade its two PAC-2 Plus units to PAC-3 standards Military Cooperation As a pre-condition for the normalization of diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1979, the US agreed to remove its troops from Taiwan and abrogate the 1954 US-ROC Mutual Security Treaty. As a consequence, military cooperation between the two governments decreased markedly. The Bush administration, however, has sought to reverse this trend. In March 2002, Tang Yiau-ming, Taiwan’s Defense Minister, journeyed to the United States to attend a “private” meeting in Florida. He was the first Taiwanese Defense Minister to be granted a visa to the US for other than a transit stop since 1979. During his visit, Tang met with Paul Wolfowitz, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, to discuss arms sales and defense issues In another sharp departure from past policy, the Bush administration approved sending military teams to Taiwan to observe military exercises. According to the Pentagon, US military personnel are deployed to the island for the purpose of “observing and assessing” Taiwan’s armed forces so arms sales may be tailored to meet Taipei’s needs. According to Taiwanese press accounts, the US defense experts have inspected Taiwan’s military equipment (including its midget submarines) and offered suggestions as to how the military might best improve its C4ISR capabilities. Finally, President Bush has signed legislation to enhance military ties between Taipei and Washington. In 2002, the president signed into law the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003. According to Section 1206 of the law, “for the purposes of the transfer or possible transfer of defense articles or defense services, Taiwan shall be treated as though it were designated a major non-NATO ally.”[3] The president also signed into law an Act calling on the administration to study the feasibility of expanding US-Taiwan military ties. Security Commitment As described, the US security commitment to Taiwan is discussed in the TRA and three joint communiqués with the PRC. Some argue that the TRA mandates an American military response to a PRC attack. But these individuals are mistaken. The TRA provides the US only with an option to defend Taiwan, it does not necessarily commit the US to Taiwan's defense. On April 25, 2001, however, President Bush was asked whether the US had an obligation to defend Taiwan if it was attacked by China. The president replied, “Yes, we do and the Chinese must understand that. Yes I would.” When asked if this meant protecting the island “with the full force of the American military,” Bush replied, “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend theirself (sic).” No other president has made such a sweeping commitment to Taiwan’s defense during the post-normalization era. Some initially dismissed the president’s statement as a “slip of the tongue.” It is noteworthy, however, that it continues to be cited by senior administration officials as official US policy. Moreover, US officials have continued to reassure the international community that, despite Taiwan’s controversial referendum plans, the American security commitment to the island remains strong. On January 14, 2004, Adam Ereli, Deputy US Department of State spokesman, told a gathering of foreign correspondents that the president had made clear his commitment to Taiwan’s security and that he will not compromise on it. Political Ties Like many other countries, America maintains a curious relationship with Taiwan. For years, Taiwan was treated like a third-class country. For example, the president of this democratic state and other officials were strongly discouraged from visiting the US. The Bush administration has expanded the range of acceptable contacts with Taiwan that had been curtailed following the recognition of the PRC in 1979. In May 2001, President Chen Shui-bian was granted a transit visa to “rest” in New York City and Houston while en route to Central America. The administration also indicated that it would not oppose Chen’s plans to meet with American lawmakers during the visit—an abrupt change from the past treatment accorded to high-ranking Taiwanese officials. Consequently, President Chen met with Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and 20 legislators during a three-day stay in New York City and enjoyed a barbecue with Representative Tom DeLay during a visit to Texas. President Chen returned to the US for another high-profile visit in 2003. In addition to President Chen, a steady stream of other high-ranking Taiwan officials to have journeyed to the US since Bush took office. These visitors have included Vice President Annette Lu (an independence activist once described as the “scum of the earth” by PRC authorities), Defense Minister Tang Yiau-ming, Wu Shu-chen (the president’s wife) and a host of lawmakers and politicians. Indeed, Lien Chan, Kuomintang Party Chairman and the party’s 2000 and 2004 presidential nominee, attended a dinner at the White House in June 2002. In some instances, the US is the final destination for the visitors. In other cases, however, officials are granted transit visas. For example, Vice President Lu’s three-day visit to New York City was officially designated as a “stopover.” These leisurely transit stops have prompted members of the press to quip that the visits appear to be journeys to the US followed by short stopovers in Central America. In addition to the escalation in high-level visits and exchanges, the political relationship between Washington and Taipei has changed in other subtle ways. As described, President Bush signed into law the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003. The new law permits incumbent diplomats to accept assignments in Taiwan and expresses the “sense of the Congress” that the US flag should be displayed at the “unofficial” US embassy in Taiwan (the American Institute in Taiwan or AIT) and at the residence of the AIT director “in the same manner as US embassies, consulates and official residences throughout the world.” On September 11, 2002, the US flag was flown at the AIT in Taipei for the first time since the US broke diplomatic relations with the island. Finally, President Bush has signed legislation directing the Department of State to devise a plan whereby Taiwan will gain observer status at the World Health Organization. During a closed-door meeting of the World Health Assembly in 2003 during the SARS crisis, the US delegation spoke in favor of Taipei’s admission to the WHO As Tommy Thompson, Secretary of the US Department of Health and Human Services, explained, “We know this is a controversial issue, but we do not shrink from taking a public stance on it. The people of Taiwan deserve the same level of public health as citizens of every nation on earth, and we support them in their efforts to achieve it.” CONCLUSION The discussion above provided only the most dramatic examples of changes in American policy toward Taiwan. A more complete description would include other developments as well. For example, the administration quietly jettisoned President Clinton’s “Three No’s Policy.” On the other hand, officials publicly embraced the former president’s pledge that any resolution of the Taiwan issue must be acceptable to the Taiwanese people. As Representative Robert Wexler (Democrat-Florida) observed in January 2003, “the relationship between the US and Taiwan has never been stronger in terms of its totality.” To be sure, Washington has moved closer to Taipei. Arms sales have escalated, high-level military contacts have been reestablished, America’s security commitment to Taiwan has been bolstered and political ties have been strengthened. So why has President Bush criticized Taiwan’s proposed referendum? Having recently returned from Taiwan, perhaps I could shed some light on this issue. In March, Taiwanese voters will go to the polls to elect a president. The incumbent, President Chen Shui-bian, is in deep trouble. The economy remains stagnant and unemployment has hit record levels. Chen has seized upon the idea of a referendum as a desperate tactic to salvage his faltering re-election campaign. A negative reaction from China will only boost his popularity. Taiwanese voters have displayed a tendency to rally around any candidate who is criticized by Beijing. In other words, domestic political considerations are driving the referendum plan. Chen’s referendum gamble holds the potential to ignite a conflict between China and Taiwan. This is a very dangerous game for everyone involved—including the US. President Bush has now made it clear that he wants to preserve the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. Despite our long-standing friendship with democratic and free Taiwan, Bush realizes that the US needs China. Beijing’s cooperation is essential if the US hopes to address a wide range of pressing global problems, including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation, health issues, dwindling energy supplies and the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula to name just a few. The president also realizes that an unnecessary military conflict with China over Taiwan will not serve anyone’s interests. It is for these reasons that President Bush called on President Chen to exercise restraint and call off his controversial referendum scheme. Fortunately, President Chen has toned down his controversial referendum plan in recent weeks. American officials have welcomed these moves and hopefully the “referendum crisis” is being defused. Differences over this thorny issue have not diminished America’s friendship with Taiwan or the Bush administration’s commitment to abide by the terms of the TRA—support for the island’s security remains strong. And despite the angry accusations of a small group of politicians, academics and paid lobbyists, President Bush has not turned his back on Taiwan. Rather, the Bush administration is the most “pro-Taiwan” administration in over three decades. ------------------ [1] The word
"acknowledge" was deliberately chosen as it indicates cognizance
of, but not necessarily agreement with, the Chinese position. Interestingly, the Chinese version of the
communiqué states that both sides “agree” that there is only one China and
that Taiwan is a part of it. See Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, “America’s
Two-Point Policy and the Future of Taiwan,” Asian Survey, Volume XXVIII, Number 8, August 1988, pp.881-896. [2] In addition to
arms, the US has transferred critical technologies to Taiwan. This technological assistance has enabled
Taipei to domestically manufacture a wide range of military
hardware--including advanced warplanes, missiles, warships and tanks. [3] When signing the law, however, President Bush voiced objections to it on “Constitutional and procedural grounds” and warned that it “could be misconstrued to imply a change in the ‘one China’ policy of the US when that US policy remains unchanged.”
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