The United States Should Adopt a Two-China Policy

Martin L. Lasater

Aug. 13, 2003

It is no longer in the U.S. interest to support a one-China policy that recognizes the government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.

That formulation, which is the basis of Sino-American normalization of relations, is gradually placing the United States in a dilemma that it cannot resolve in a way compatible with American values and strategic interests.

The PRC is strangling Taiwan internationally; the people of Taiwan are less and less likely to want to unify under mainland threats; and Washington is being forced into an untenable position of either stepping aside while Beijing absorbs Taiwan into a quasi-communist system (the one country, two systems formula is not working out as promised for Hong Kong), or reluctantly fighting the mainland to defend Taiwan independence.

It is not in the U.S. interest to support the division of China, but nor is it in the U.S. interest to see the democratic society on Taiwan pressured relentlessly by a hostile government in Beijing. There has to be another way, and that way is for the United States to recognize both the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China as two separate nation-states.

This is not a permanent division of China any more than two Germanys or two Koreas were a permanent division of Germany or Korea. It is a way for the United States to have the best of both worlds: support for a unified China in the future – hopefully under a non-communist government – and recognition of Taiwan as a nation-state, but not a state independent from China.

The PRC will scream bloody murder about such a change in U.S. policy, and a temporary downgrading or breaking of relations can be expected.

But in reality, a U.S. two-China policy serves the interests of China in the long-term by eliminating the possibility of U.S. recognition of an independent Taiwan and serves the interests of the PRC in the short-run by dramatically reducing the possibility of a Sino-American war over Taiwan.

Such a policy also serves the interests of the people of Taiwan, although those who want Taiwan to be a country completely separate from China will protest loudly. Taiwan is too close to the mainland and too small to ever be a viable country separate from China. The mainland has not threatened to attack the Republic of China; it has threatened to attack Taiwan if its government seeks independence from China. U.S. recognition of the Republic of China would provide the people of Taiwan with international credibility and support, while assuring both Taiwanese and mainlanders that their eventual destiny will be as one nation – when the circumstances are right and when the people of Taiwan want to formally unify with their cross-Strait brethren.

Such a policy will also serve U.S. interests in avoiding a war with China over an independent Taiwan, in supporting the democratic society of Taiwan, and in ending the continual charade of treating Taiwan as if it both existed and did not exist in the international community. There is every reason to expect that a more friendly U.S. relationship with Beijing will evolve, since the main obstacle to friendly relations – the possibility of U.S. support for Taiwan independence – will effectively be removed.

A U.S. two-China policy will be highly controversial domestically and internationally, but it makes a great deal of sense if viewed objectively.

As the world’s only superpower, the United States has both the means and the will to effect such a major change in China policy. Once the smoke has cleared, there will be ample opportunity for both sides of the Taiwan Strait to deal equally and fairly with one another for their mutual benefit, and it will be possible for Washington to have cordial, friendly relations with both Beijing and Taipei.

In the immediate sense, the PRC will view itself as the major loser in the U.S. adoption of a two-China policy, but it is not the responsibility of the U.S. government or the American people to help the Chinese Communist Party achieve unification under its banner. The United States does not need the PRC as a strategic partner against a vital threat to American interests; no such threat exists. What the United States needs is a cooperative China at peace with itself and its neighbors. And that cooperation and peaceful environment will surely be strengthened under the conditions of Taiwan not seeking to become an independent country separate from China, and the United States not posing a threat to China’s security because of a looming conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Under a two-China policy, the PRC and its CCP leadership can take all the time they need to evolve the mainland’s political, economic, and social systems into something more compatible with the 21st century. Taiwan will not run away. The United States will not attack the mainland. The Taiwan Strait region can realize its full potential as an economic powerhouse in East Asia.

Because of its controversial nature, the adoption of a two-China policy will take time. But it has some very strong points in its favor, and it is now appropriate for these merits to be openly considered by all concerned.

Dr. Lasater is a non-resident Senior Fellow with the Asian Pacific program of the Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington, D.C. A specialist in East Asian security matters, Lasater has served as an administrator and policy analyst with various think-tanks in the Washington, D.C. area. For comments, please email the author at mlasater@comcast.net