New Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?

By Shelley Rigger

Foreign Policy Research Institute, Sep. 5, 2003

Early   this   year   Taiwanese   politicians   unveiled   a
controversial proposal  to  resolve  some  of  the  island's
thorniest policy  debates through referendums.  The proposal
provoked  heated   discussion,  in  part  because  it  would
circumvent  the   normal  legislative   process,  but   more
importantly by arousing suspicions in Beijing and Washington
(as well as within Taiwan) that President Chen Shui-bian and
his party  were embarking  on a course that would eventually
undermine the stability of the Taiwan Strait. With U.S.-ROC-
Sino relations  in precarious  balance,  why  did  Taiwanese
politicians introduce  a proposal they knew would shake that
equilibrium? And how should the U.S. respond?

BACKGROUND
The  constitution   of  the  ROC  guarantees  the  right  of
referendum, but Taiwan has never exercised that right at the
national level,  and the Legislative Yuan has never passed a
bill establishing  procedures for  a referendum. That is not
to say,  however, that  Taiwanese have  only just discovered
the idea.  In 1991,  expatriate  activist  Trong  Chai  (Cai
Tongrong) founded the Association for a Plebiscite in Taiwan
to campaign  for a  plebiscite on  Taiwan independence. That
same year,  Taiwan's first  and most  significant opposition
party, the  Democratic  Progressive  Party  (DPP),  formally
adopted the  goal  of  establishing  an  independent  Taiwan
through  referendum.   These   early   conversations   about
referendum, both  of which  assumed that  the purpose  of  a
referendum would  be to achieve independence, created a link
between the  two issues  in the  minds of  many U.S. and PRC
observers.

Enthusiasm for  referendums waxed  and waned over the years.
In 2001, a controversy erupted over construction of a fourth
nuclear power  plant in Taiwan. When the legislature blocked
the Chen  government's efforts  to cancel  the project, Chen
promised a  referendum on  the topic.  But in  July 2001 the
government dropped  the idea,  citing the  risk of increased
social and  political  tension  and  the  absence  of  legal
guidelines for  holding a binding referendum. To resolve the
latter dilemma,  the Cabinet  sent  forward  a  proposal  to
create enabling legislation in April 2002.

In March  2003, the referendum movement picked up steam when
anti-nuclear activists  began pressing  for a  referendum on
the nuclear  power plant  to coincide  with the  March  2004
presidential election.   In  May, a  new issue jumped to the
fore when the PRC blocked the SARS-stricken island's efforts
to attain  observer status in the World Health Organization.
President Chen  called for  a referendum  on WHO membership,
stating that "A referendum would highlight the consensus and
determination of  Taiwan to participate in the WHO." (Taipei
Times, May 21, 2003) The value of such a referendum would be
entirely symbolic: even a unanimous vote would have no power
to compel  the WHO  to admit  Taiwan. With two issues on the
referendum table,  other policy  issues subsequently  gained
the attention  of referendum  advocates, including proposals
to reduce  the size  of the legislature and to eliminate the
National Assembly.

Before any  of  these  referendums  could  be  carried  out,
however, Taiwan needed to establish procedures for the vote.
Thus,  the   debate  returned  to  the  matter  of  enabling
legislation. The  first proposal  put before the legislature
came from  independence fundamentalist  Trong Chai and would
have  allowed   referendums   on   changing   the   national
boundaries, formal  title, and  national anthem,  all topics
guaranteed to provoke a strong reaction from Beijing. Chai's
proposal, which  had strong  support  from  the  Sino-phobic
Taiwan  Solidarity   Union,  was   sharply  opposed  by  the
conservative   parties,   which   boycotted   the   measure.
Mainstream DPP  leaders, cognizant  of Beijing's objections,
sought to distance themselves from the whole matter.

Still, the  referendum idea  would  not  die.  None  of  the
leading political  parties wanted  to oppose  referendums in
general.  Thus,  in  April,  DPP  moderates  put  forward  a
proposal that specifically excluded referendums on questions
of  independence  or  unification,  national  security,  and
military matters.  A KMT  think tank proposed a similar text
and the  TSU a  more provocative text, which was defeated on
June 5.

When  no   referendum  legislation  passed  in  the  regular
session, the  government  stated  its  intention  to  create
enabling rules  through administrative  action, an idea that
provoked outrage among conservative legislators. The KMT and
PFP called for a special legislative session to consider the
matter, which  was finally  held the second week in July. At
that  session,  which  considered  several  other  items  of
legislation besides  the referendum  proposals, KMT  and PFP
legislators pursued  a complex strategy aimed at foreclosing
the possibility  of a referendum on Taiwan's status while at
the same  time embarrassing  the DPP  and establishing their
own  pro-referendum   credentials.   Instead   of   opposing
referendum  altogether   --  a   position  that  had  become
politically untenable -- KMT legislators planned to vote for
Chai's proposal after amending it to exclude a referendum on
Taiwan's status.  They knew  the DPP caucus would oppose the
measure, since  the party's  own bill  was still  before the
legislature. They  hoped to  use  the  DPP's  votes  against
Chai's  referendum   bill  to   argue  that   the  DPP   was
inconsistent in its support for referendum.

In the  end, the speaker of the Legislative Yuan, KMT member
Wang Jin-pyng,  ended the  session without calling a vote on
the referendum  bills, citing  the need  for further  inter-
party consultations.  KMT and other conservative legislators
were furious,  and while  DPP legislators  leapt  to  Wang's
defense, his  party brethren  hurled abuse  from the  floor.
Wang later  commented that no progress was likely before the
next legislative session, scheduled for November. Even then,
he said, passing the legislation would be difficult.

With enabling  legislation stalled, President Chen's cabinet
moved   to    create   a    framework   for   a   referendum
administratively and  issued its guidelines in early August.
However, the  framework's legality  is in  doubt, and  local
politicians representing the KMT and PFP have said they will
refuse  to  carry  out  a  referendum  under  administrative
guidelines. On  September 4, the cabinet spokesman announced
a plan to "mobilize policemen, teachers, employees of state-
run enterprises  and local  taxation offices"  to carry  out
referendums where  local officials  resist.  In  short,  the
battle lines  are drawn  for a  showdown if the DPP tries to
push forward with a referendum in the absence of an enabling
law.

MOTIVE
No matter  how earnestly  he promises  to exclude and eschew
independence as a referendum topic, PRC leaders believe Chen
is dissembling.  Once the  machinery of  referendums  is  in
place, they  fear, the parameters will change, and Taiwanese
will vote on independence.

There  is   more  than  just  the  historical  link  between
independence  and  referendum  to  support  this  fear.  The
enabling legislation  would permit  Taiwan, should  the  PRC
launch a  military attack  on it,  to  declare  independence
quickly and  seek international  recognition and assistance.
Without having  the enabling  legislation in place, it might
be impossible to carry out a referendum in a crisis. The DPP
proposal preserves  the option for a "defensive referendum,"
but this  option may  not  be  necessary.  If  missiles  (or
paratroopers) were landing in Taiwan, all bets would be off,
and the legalities of referendum would matter little. Still,
the argument's  existence lends  support to  the  belief  in
Beijing that  "creeping independence"  lies at  the heart of
the referendum movement.

But the  desire to move the independence cause forward would
not explain why referendum has caused the hubbub it has this
summer.  Other   motives  add   up  to   a  more  convincing
explanation.

Ideology. The  DPP, born  out of  a  desire  to  democratize
Taiwan, has  a longstanding commitment to reforming Taiwan's
institutions to  make them  more democratic.  Most Taiwanese
believe  that   referendums  are   a  standard   feature  of
democratic systems,  and referendum  is  guaranteed  by  the
constitution. It  is nearly  impossible, then,  to  make  an
ideological case  against referendum  in  Taiwan.  Once  the
issue was  raised, it  was difficult for any party to oppose
it entirely.

Politics. Referendums, especially symbolic ones like the WHO
membership  proposal,   can  help   the   DPP   politically.
Organizers anticipate that giving Taiwanese a chance to vote
on these issues will mobilize the party's committed base. If
the  referendum   is  held   on  or  near  the  day  of  the
presidential election  (March 20,  2004), the enthusiasm for
it should spill over into the presidential race. The DPP and
its candidate, Chen Shui-bian, will need this boost. If Chen
wins a  second term,  it will  be by  a  narrow  margin:  he
currently trails the KMT-PFP ticket by about 10 points.

To make  matters worse,  social movement  activists recently
formed an  alliance aimed  at driving  Chen to  the left  on
social  issues.   The  alliance  is  considering  running  a
candidate in  the presidential  race. Finding  ways to  keep
alliance  voters  on  Chen's  side  is  important,  and  his
enthusiastic endorsement  of referendums is one strategy for
achieving this.  (If the alliance asks anti-nuclear activist
Lin Yi-hsiung,  a former  DPP chairman, to be its candidate,
as it  has said  it may,  this would  have to  be  aimed  at
pressuring Chen  to sponsor  a  referendum  on  the  nuclear
issue.) Finally,  the DPP  can use  referendum to draw votes
beyond its  traditional supporters,  appealing to patriotism
and promoting the DPP as Taiwan's most devoted advocate.

Reform.  Referendum  also  allows  the  DPP  to  bypass  the
legislature to  carry out  its unfinished reform agenda. The
referendum debate began with the idea of a referendum on the
fourth nuclear power plant, a policy-driven proposition. But
DPP leaders  were soon applying the idea to reform proposals
that had  stalled  in  the  Legislative  Yuan,  proposing  a
referendum on  reducing the  size  of  the  legislature  and
abolishing the  National Assembly. Shrinking the legislature
is popular  with voters, who believe its large size makes it
unruly   and   inefficient   and   allows   legislators   of
questionable  credentials   to  win   seats.  However,   the
legislature has  little  interest  in  streamlining  itself.
Thus, the DPP argued, the only way to reform the legislature
is by going directly to the voters.

POPULAR REACTION
The idea  of referendum  has been  highly popular  with  the
public. KMT  and PFP  leaders who initially opposed the idea
quickly changed  their tune  in response to public pressure.
The issue  has been  defined in  a way  that pits  affirming
Taiwan's democracy  against the  fear that the PRC will look
askance. Taiwanese  would be  disinclined to sympathize with
Beijing under  any circumstance,  much less  when  Beijing's
reactions  appear  paranoid  or  even  as  evidence  of  its
determination to  put Taiwan's  every action  into the worst
possible light.   By opposing referendum, PRC leaders oppose
Taiwan's democracy  itself, which wins the PRC no supporters
on the island.

If referendum in principle is popular, not all of the issues
that have  been suggested  as topics  for  referendums  are.
Clearly,  a   referendum  asserting  Taiwan's  right  to  be
included  as   a  participant   in   the   WHO   would   win
overwhelmingly, and  a referendum  to reduce the size of the
legislature would also likely prevail. However, anti-nuclear
activists would  likely lose  any vote  on the nuclear power
plant,  making   their  fight  against  nuclear  power  more
difficult in  the future.  And as for a referendum on Taiwan
independence, it would be exceedingly difficult to word this
in a  way that  would give independence more than 15 percent
of the vote.

PRC REACTION
Beijing's reaction  to the  referendum fracas has been firm,
but  not   overwrought.  PRC  leaders  seem  keen  to  avoid
overreacting, which  has backfired  on them  in the past. So
far they  have moderated  between interpreting  the issue in
the best  and worst lights. The worst-case interpretation is
that the  passage of  enabling legislation  is a  deliberate
step toward  a declaration  of independence  for Taiwan; the
best-case interpretation  is that the referendum proposal is
an ill-considered  step on an uncharted path that could lead
nowhere. So  far, leaders  in Beijing  have  chosen  not  to
assume the  worst, although  they have  issued a  number  of
statements warning  Taiwan that a referendum on independence
would have  dire consequences  and that Taiwan would be wise
to avoid the whole referendum issue.

A central  question that seems not to have a clear answer in
Beijing is whether Taiwan will cross a red line with Beijing
if it  holds a  referendum on  a policy  issue. Even  if the
topic of  the referendum  has nothing  to do  with  Taiwan's
status or  sovereignty, would (and should) Beijing interpret
the legislation as a provocation?

The weight  of the  referendum issue  may be  as symbolic in
Beijing as  it is  with Taiwanese. The use of referendums to
resolve "national"  policy  issues  itself  suggests  Taiwan
statehood. It  defines the  decisive polity as the people of
Taiwan, without consideration of the preferences of Chinese.
The Taiwan  legislature still  includes a number of at-large
seats  whose   origins  lie   in  seats  once  reserved  for
representatives of  mainland China.  The  idea  of  deciding
policy questions  through popular referendums would bare for
the world  to see  Taiwan's political  separation  from  the
Mainland.

Beijing is  clearly anxious  that if  referendum is  a  step
(though not  the final  step) on  a  slippery  slope  toward
statehood, it might be about to miss its chance to avert the
process.  In  the  mid-1990s,  Taiwanese  of  all  political
parties  reached   a  consensus   that  a   declaration   of
independence was  unnecessary because  the ROC  was  already
independent and  sovereign.  This left the PRC struggling to
devise a  definition of "independence" that Taiwan could not
incrementally circumvent.  Chinese strategists,  unsure what
independence will look like, are left to wonder whether they
will recognize it when they see it, and how they can be sure
that referendum isn't independence.

Recent statements by Chinese officials suggest they will not
treat referendums  as a red line. The State Council's Taiwan
Affairs Office  has said  that China would firmly oppose any
attempt to  use a  referendum to change Taiwan's status, but
according to  a report  by the  Hong Kong-based  Wen Wei Po,
knowledgeable observers  interpreted the  statement to  mean
that referendums  on policy  issues  unrelated  to  national
sovereignty would  be acceptable to Beijing.  Similarly, the
Chinese  official   responsible  for  Taiwan  affairs,  Zhou
Mingwei, said  China could  live  with  policy  referendums,
given reassurances  from the  U.S. that  Taiwan would not go
beyond public  policy issues  to change Taiwan's status. The
U.S. may  not  welcome  being  responsible  for  controlling
Taiwan's referendum  debate, but  should be assured by these
statements that  China has  decided not  to assume the worst
about the  referendum issue  and is  willing to  trust  U.S.
officials' conclusion  that the referendum need not become a
source of conflict.

U.S. REACTION VIS-A-VIS THE PRC
Clearly, U.S.  officials have advised leaders in Beijing not
to panic  or otherwise  overreact to  the referendum debate,
which is  the  correct  approach  to  take.  Nor  are  these
assurances disingenuous:  Taiwan's political  leadership  is
simply too  divided and  disorganized to  plan and execute a
strategy of independence, whether by stealth or other means,
even if it wanted to.

Support for immediate independence is very weak. Support for
eventual independence  is stronger,  but most  Taiwanese are
well aware  of the costs of precipitous action in pursuit of
formal  independence.   They  support   actions  to  enhance
Taiwan's international status, but only if they estimate the
cost of  those actions to be manageable. Most Taiwanese hope
to preserve  Taiwan's dignity, but they are cognizant of the
threats facing  their country.  The primary reason they want
to increase  Taiwan's  international  recognition  is  their
belief that  isolation leaves  the island  vulnerable to PRC
annexation.

If PRC  leaders want  to reduce  what support  there is  for
Taiwan independence,  their best  bet is honey, not vinegar.
Weak support  for independence  will strengthen if Taiwanese
perceive the  PRC as  aggressive. In  particular, the  PRC's
intransigence on  the issue of observer status for Taiwan in
the  WHO   is  counterproductive,  as  are  its  efforts  to
downgrade Taiwan's  status in  the World  Trade Organization
and exclude  it from  track-two activities. China can send a
clear   message   that   Taiwanese   moves   toward   formal
independence will  not be permitted, but it does not need to
insult  Taiwanese   at  every  opportunity.  Ambassador  Sha
Zukang's spiteful  rejoinder to Taiwanese journalists at the
World Health  Assembly in  Geneva this May ("Who cares about
you?") did unnecessary harm to cross-strait relations.

U.S. REACTION VIS-A-VIS TAIWAN
The U.S. should address the referendum issue through private
channels as  well as  public statements.  It should publicly
acknowledge that  referendums are  a tool  of democracy that
Taiwan has  the right  to use.  At the same time, Washington
should reiterate  its  confidence  that  Taiwan  is  prudent
enough to  not take  precipitous action  to achieve symbolic
ends. It  could also  provide some  context and  perspective
from the  U.S. experience  with  referendums  (including  in
California).  Specifically,   Taiwanese  should   know  that
referendums are  a clumsy  way to  make public  policy,  and
often have unintended consequences. As frustrating as it is,
the legislative  process is  usually a better way to resolve
complex policy  issues. U.S. officials could also stress the
constitutional limits  on  referendums  that  exist  in  all
democracies.   Ruling out  a referendum on Taiwan's national
definition  is   no  less  appropriate  than  ruling  out  a
referendum aimed  at silencing  dissident speech would be in
the United States.

Privately, Washington  should  continue  to  urge  Taiwanese
leaders  to  carefully  weigh  the  costs  and  benefits  of
referendums, being  candid in describing the shortcomings of
referendums as  a policy-making  tool and  as a  shortcut to
democracy. Circumventing  the legislative  process will have
long-term consequences  for the  legitimacy and authority of
Taiwan's political  institutions. Taiwanese leaders might be
reminded of  the many  issues of  importance to  the  United
States that  remain unresolved, including defense reform and
WTO compliance.

Finally, U.S.  officials might want, while reminding them of
the risks  involved in  provoking the PRC, to call Taiwanese
leaders' attention  to the  current state  of  U.S.  defense
commitments  and  to  remind  them  of  the  United  States'
reluctance to  be drawn  into  Taiwan's  domestic  politics.
Especially to the extent a particular referendum proposal is
meant to influence the outcome of the March election, Taiwan
should not expect a hearty U.S. endorsement of the proposal.
In sum,  with the  war on  terrorism in  progress, this is a
terrible time to start a problem for Washington.

Shelley Rigger  is Brown  Assistant Professor  of East Asian Politics at  Davidson College  and a  Senior Fellow at FPRI.