Taiwan Independence and the U.S. Response

By Martin L. Lasater

Taiwan Security Research, July 31, 2002

              Recent statements by current and former Taiwan government officials have raised the issue of the island one day following its own path toward national independence. Many Taiwanese share this aspiration; and it goes beyond the de facto independence that Taiwan now possesses to a formal existence as a nation-state, such as the Republic of Taiwan, completely separate from mainland China.

              As is well-known, the People’s Republic of China has threatened to attack Taiwan should Taipei pursue such a policy, but relatively little attention has been given to the probable U.S. response to a move toward Taiwan independence. Several U.S. administrations have promised not to support Taiwan independence, but the issue is complex and no policy is cast is stone. Depending upon the circumstances, there is a possibility – albeit remote – that Washington could upgrade its relations with Taipei should Taiwan seek to become an independent nation-state.

              The purpose of this article is to identify several of the major factors that might influence the U.S. response to a decision by Taiwan to establish an independent country separate from China. The factors are circumstantial in nature and are considered individually, with no attempt to list them in order of importance, group them in a hypothetical scenario, or propose policy recommendations.

 Factors Influencing the U.S. Response

              At least fourteen factors can be identified that could influence an American decision on whether to support the independence of Taiwan. Since long-standing U.S. policy does not support Taiwan independence, a significant change in the domestic and international environment would likely have to occur before Washington would so dramatically alter its China policy. In the brief discussion accompanying each of the following factors, there is an attempt to note those conditions under which U.S. recognition of an independent Taiwan would be most likely, or, conversely, those conditions under which recognition would be least likely to occur.

              1. China’s reaction to independence of Taiwan. The first factor is whether the government of mainland China would agree to Taiwan becoming an independent nation. If China and Taiwan could reach such an agreement, the United States would almost certainly support this arrangement because dual-recognition of Beijing and Taipei would serve American interests in maintaining friendly relations with both sides. On the other hand, if China continues to strongly oppose Taiwan independence, then U.S. interests in maintaining normalized relations with China would probably prevail and the United States would not recognize an independent Taiwan – unless other compelling circumstances existed.

              2. Strength or weakness of China. The second factor is whether China would be able through force of arms to prevent Taiwan independence. If China is so weak that it cannot defend its territorial interests, then the United States would not stand in the way of Taiwan declaring its independence. In all probability, several other parts of China (perhaps Tibet and Xinjiang) would be doing the same thing; and there is nothing Washington could do to prevent the disintegration of China in any case. A strong China, on the other hand, would almost certainly use military force to prevent Taiwan’s move toward independence. Because such a conflict could adversely impact some U.S. interests in the Far East, American policy has been designed in part to discourage such a move on the part of Taipei.

              3. China’s relations with the United States. A third factor is whether Sino-American relations are generally friendly and cooperative, or hostile and strategically competitive. If China is hostile toward the United States, or poses a strategic threat to America’s position in East Asia, there might be debate in Washington over whether U.S. policy should have as its goal the division of China. On the other hand, if China were friendly and cooperative with the United States, there would be little sentiment in Washington to support Taiwan independence if Beijing strongly opposed that independence.

              4. China’s system of government and the likelihood of political reform. A fourth factor is whether the central government in mainland China is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party or is moving toward a multiparty democracy. As long as the CCP dominates Beijing, there will be widespread popular opinion in the United States that Taiwan independence should be supported. There would be much less American support for an independent Taiwan if the central Chinese government were attempting to implement political reform on the mainland.

              5. The scope of Taiwan independence. A fifth factor might be called the “scope” of Taiwan independence, and it has to do with the perception Americans have of the reason Taiwan is seeking independence. If Taiwan’s objectives were to preserve its freedom and prevent its absorption by the communist-controlled mainland, then U.S. support for Taiwan independence would be much greater than if Taiwan’s objectives were to separate itself completely from the historical China. There is an important distinction between the PRC and this broader concept of China, and this difference might influence the degree of recognition the United States would accord Taiwan should it move in the direction of formal independence.

              6. The level of consensus on Taiwan. A sixth factor is the level of support for independence on the part of Taiwan residents. If the Taiwan government is sharply divided between political parties with divergent views on the issue of independence, and public opinion polls show that independence is not an overwhelmingly favored option, then the reaction of the United States to Taiwan independence would likely be far less supportive than if there was a consensus among the people of Taiwan that the island should become a separate nation-state.

              7. Taiwan’s ability to withstand a PRC attack. A seventh factor is whether Taiwan would be able to withstand the initial PRC retaliatory attack. China might well open an offensive with an intense missile strike, followed by air, naval, and airborne operations. If Taiwan quickly folded, the wisdom of U.S. intervention would be questioned in American government circles, and the possibility of U.S. recognition of an independent Taiwan would be very low. If Taiwan resisted effectively and appeared determined to fight on, then American military and political support might increase dramatically.

              8. The circumstances of Taiwan’s move toward independence. An eighth factor is the circumstances surrounding the declaration of Taiwan’s independence. A declaration made as part of Taipei’s response to an unprovoked and vicious PRC attack would be far more likely to receive sympathetic attention in Washington than a declaration of independence that triggered a PRC military response. The United States would probably help Taiwan defend itself even if the Chinese attack was seen as being provoked by Taipei, but American support for official recognition of Taiwan would be greatly reduced.

              9. Political support for Beijing and Taipei in Washington. A ninth factor is the degree of political support for the two Chinese sides in the various foreign policy establishments in the United States, including Congress. The American government is characterized by divided power and jurisdictions of responsibility; however, in a highly politicized environment such as that created by a possible conflict with China and possible establishment of formal ties with Taiwan, the degree of congressional and bureaucratic consensus would be an important determinant of whether a fundamental shift in U.S. China-Taiwan policy would be desirable or feasible.

              10. The President’s inclinations. A tenth factor is the personal preferences of the President of the United States. The President can extend diplomatic recognition to foreign countries; and while he or she would listen carefully to the arguments of policy advisors both in and out of government, the President will decide on a certain course of action. In the event that a decision must be made on whether to recognize the Republic of Taiwan, the President’s decision could be influenced by personal perceptions of the circumstances surrounding the situation and feelings such as animosity or friendship toward Taipei and Beijing, ideological commitment, and sense of history.

              11. Availability and utility of American forces. An eleventh factor is whether or not sufficient American military forces are available to intervene effectively on Taiwan’s behalf against the expected PRC military reprisal for Taipei’s move toward independence. Since the United States has global security responsibilities, there might be a demand elsewhere for the all-important aircraft carriers and long-range strike aircraft. If the forces were available, then the likelihood of their being deployed to the Taiwan area is high, with the probable result being the defeat of the PRC offensive. An effective U.S. military response would give valuable time to officials in Washington to decide whether to extend recognition to Taiwan in the aftermath of the conflict. If U.S. military intervention is not effective, then recognition is not a viable policy option.

              12. American grand and regional strategies. A twelfth factor is the reason for U.S. military intervention on behalf of Taiwan and for Washington’s consideration of possibly recognizing an independent Taiwan. If the United States maintains its current strategy at both global and regional levels, then the probability of American military intervention in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait is high but the probability of the United States establishing formal relations with Taiwan is low. If U.S. strategy becomes less ambitious, then American intervention might be less certain. No doubt, a U.S. political decision on whether to recognize Taiwan’s statehood would be influenced by whether U.S. strategy assumed China to be a potential strategic partner, competitor, rival, or threat.

              13. Outcome of U.S.-PLA confrontation in the Taiwan area. A thirteenth factor is American political reaction to the expected war in the Taiwan area. This reaction is difficult to predict, since an overwhelming American military victory over the PLA might not lead to political support for Taiwan independence; and unexpectedly high American casualties might not diminish political support for recognition of an independent Taiwan. Domestic reaction to the costs of war in the Taiwan Strait would have to be weighed at the time by policymakers in Washington before reaching their decision.

              14. International reaction to conflict in the Taiwan Strait. A fourteenth factor is the international reaction to a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and a declaration of Taiwan independence. Although the rest of the world would watch the U.S. reaction, major U.S. allies and Asian nations in particular could define their interests differently than Washington. And since the United States plays a leadership role globally and regionally, it would have to weigh carefully what its major allies and regional states were saying. Most likely, other countries would not be in favor of prolonged Sino-American hostilities or U.S. recognition of the independence of Taiwan. But, here again, the circumstances of the situation might dictate a different conclusion on the part of these governments.

Analysis of Factors

              In the United States today there appears to be mixed signals in regards to an independent Taiwan. The vast majority of Americans strongly believe in freedom and democracy, and they view communism on mainland China as a morally corrupt and failed system that should not be allowed to extend its control to Taiwan. Moreover, a great many Americans already view democratic Taiwan as being an independent political entity distinctly separate from communist China.

              Most Americans would probably approve of their government’s intervention on Taiwan’s behalf if it were attacked by China. It is also probable that a majority of Americans would approve of their government extending diplomatic recognition to Taiwan if that island were besieged by Beijing. But relatively few Americans would want deliberately to provoke China by recognizing Taiwan’s independence simply because Taipei announced that it was pursuing such a course.

              In other words, like most residents on Taiwan, the great majority of Americans probably believe the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is preferable to a war with China or a major Sino-American political confrontation over upgraded U.S. relations with Taiwan.

              This public support for the status quo, coupled with long-standing U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan, means that the United States is not likely to recognize an independent Taiwan. That policy is in a state of quiet inertia, if you will. It would take some extraordinary force to move the American government toward recognition of Taiwan as an independent state separate from China. Further, since Taiwan is small and China is large, and since the geographical-historical-cultural logic of Taiwan being part of China is so compelling, it probably would require a unique combination of circumstances to change American policy toward China and Taiwan.

              The list of the various factors influencing an American decision on the issue of Taiwan independence illustrates the complexity of trying to forecast the U.S. government response. Based upon that list, however, we can speculate that American recognition of Taiwan independence could occur under some of the following circumstances:

·       The PRC agrees that Taiwan can become an independent country.

·       China is too weak to defend its territorial integrity.

·       China and the United States are enemies.

·       China remains a communist country and its path toward democratic reform appears permanently thwarted.

·       Taiwan is seeking independence to remain free from communist domination, but not necessarily to separate permanently from the historic “China.”

·       There is strong consensus on Taiwan in favor of formal independence.

·       Taiwan is able to withstand an initial PRC attack and to wait for American intervention.

·       Taiwan declares its independence in reaction to an unprovoked PRC attack.

·       Political support for Taiwan in the United States is high, while political support for mainland China is low.

·       The U.S. President is inclined to support Taiwan militarily and politically, and his chief foreign policy advisors are similarly inclined.

·       American military forces are available and sufficient to deter and defeat the PLA in the Taiwan region at a cost acceptable to the American people and the U.S. government.

·       American global and regional strategies are based on an active forward defense posture, continued American political leadership, and the assumption that China is a strategic rival or potential threat.

·       American public opinion favors defending Taiwan and upgrading U.S. relations with the island republic.

·       International support exists for U.S. military intervention on Taiwan’s behalf and upgraded U.S. relations with Taipei.

              A few of these factors can be subjectively identified as being the most influential in a possible U.S. decision to recognize the independence of Taiwan. The most highly determining factors would appear to be:

·       Beijing agrees that Taiwan can become an independent country, separate from China.

·       China is too weak to defend its territorial integrity and the country appears to be disintegrating.

·       There is a strong consensus on Taiwan in favor of formal independence.

·       Taiwan is able to withstand an initial PRC attack and to wait for American military intervention.

·       Taiwan declares its independence in response to an unprovoked PRC attack on the island.

·       The U.S. President supports Taiwan militarily and politically, principal foreign policy advisors are also supportive, and the Congress concurs.

·       American military forces are able to defeat the PLA in the Taiwan Strait at an acceptable cost.

·       U.S. global and regional strategies are based on forward defense, American political leadership, and on the assumption that China is a strategic rival or threat.

Conclusion

              There seems to be only one factor that would absolutely determine that the United States would extend diplomatic recognition to an independent Taiwan. If Beijing agrees that Taiwan can become an independent country, separate from China, then the United States would almost certainly recognize Taiwan as an independent country. Without that condition, the precise combination of factors that would guarantee a U.S. decision to extend diplomatic relations to Taiwan is almost impossible to predict.

For comments, please contact the author at mlasater@comcast.net