In Search of a Common Vision

Martin L. Lasater

Taiwan Security Research, Feb. 3, 2002

A peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue is possible but very difficult to achieve. The key is perhaps the emergence on both sides of the Taiwan Strait of far-sighted leaders with a big mind (cheng-chi ling-shou) who are able to develop and share a vision of what China should be in the future and what role Taiwan should play in the realization of that goal.

The difficulty in finding a common vision is self-evident in conflicting interpretations of “one China,” debates over whether the Republic of China on Taiwan is “sovereign and independent,” and the delay in the two sides sitting down to discuss even the most simple of cross-Strait issues. Some looked with hope at Vice Premier Qian Qichen’s recent announcement of relaxation of contact with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), but even that announcement was conditioned on Taiwan accepting the “one China” principle as the only foundation for building ties with the mainland. And in a non-surprising response, DPP Secretary-General Wu Nai-jen emphasized that Taiwan is a sovereign, independent country whose formal title is the Republic of China.

As an American, I find it impossible to support the idea that Taiwan should become part of a China controlled by a communist central government. Around the globe, communism has failed miserably as an ideology and way of life. Modern society is far too complicated for such a hierarchical structure of control; and the communist party in China, as elsewhere, must change with the times else face extinction.

On the other hand, I find it difficult to support the idea that Taiwan should be separated from China. The people of Taiwan are overwhelmingly Chinese in their ethnic origin, language, and culture; and the island’s location off the central coast of China makes it inconceivable that any strong mainland Chinese government would allow Taiwan to go its own way.

And yet, when one examines the positions advanced by Beijing and Taipei, there is very little in substance being offered between the PRC view that Taiwan should become part of the People’s Republic of China and the Taiwanese view that Taiwan should be recognized as an independent nation-state. The problem is that neither of these mutually exclusive views can occur without a major war in the Taiwan Strait – and that war almost inevitably would draw the United States into a military conflict with China.

The most likely scenario in that conflict would have the United States defeating the PLA, but Taiwan would probably suffer greatly as well. Furthermore, even if China did fail in its attempt to take Taiwan by force, most nations – the United States included – probably would not establish full diplomatic relations with Taipei. Certainly, U.S.-China relations would suffer tremendously at a time when the integration of China into the world community is an important long-term American strategy to ensure global peace and security. And for China, fighting the United States could result in severe economic and perhaps political turmoil. In other words, there would likely be no clear winners in a major conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Despite these predictable costs, the probability of war in the Taiwan Strait appears higher now than in the past. (This, despite increased economic integration across the Strait pulling in the opposite direction.) China is rapidly acquiring the military means to give its political leadership confidence that the PRC can both defeat Taiwan and deter the United States. Taiwan is responding with its own military modernization, and the process of Taiwanization on the island is being accelerated. For its part, the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan is stronger than ever, reinforced by growing perceptions that in the 21st century China may attempt to displace the United States as the predominant power in the littorals of East Asia.

Under these circumstances of continuous tension in the Taiwan Strait, rapid military buildup on both sides, increased Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism, a firm U.S. commitment to help Taiwan defend itself, and growing strategic competition between the United States and the PRC – all of the elements are in place for a possible major war in East Asia. Despite the fact that few, if any, want such a conflict, the trends pointing toward a military confrontation over Taiwan are clear.

As mentioned earlier, a countervailing trend is the increased trade across the Taiwan Strait and growing Taiwanese investment on the mainland. There is a possibility that increased economic interdependence will lead to closer cultural affinity and eventually some sort of mutually acceptable understanding between Taipei and Beijing. But I tend to be skeptical even while remaining hopeful.

The reason for the skepticism is that economic interaction across the Taiwan Strait has not been accompanied either by growing cultural affinity between mainlanders and Taiwanese or by movement toward reconciliation. These developments may come in time, but without a common vision of what China is to become in the future and what role Taiwan will play in that future, cultural and political integration will be nearly impossible. Thus, even if the pocketbooks of some are getting fatter, the trends toward conflict may be stronger than the trends toward peace.

But how can such a common vision emerge under the conditions that exist today on the mainland and on Taiwan? And it is possible for the United States to play a constructive role in this process? Since the likelihood of conflict in the Taiwan Strait may be increasing, these questions ought to be considered by everyone concerned with U.S.-China-Taiwan relations.

Clearly, the vision of a future China and Taiwan’s relationship to that China must be defined by the people of China and by the people of Taiwan. However, the United States – and a great many other countries – are indirectly involved and have an interest in that vision. From an American perspective, it would seem that certain realities have to be accepted by both Chinese sides if such a vision is to emerge.

First, it should be recognized by the PRC that there is no way – other than through force – that Taiwan will agree to become part of China as long as the central Chinese government is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. Taiwan is an established democracy; and as sloppy as its democratic processes appear to be at times, a free people in this day and age would never willingly place themselves under a communist government.

Second, it should be recognized in Taipei that there is no way – other than through force – that China will accept Taiwan becoming an independent country separate from China. Taiwan is vitally important to China’s maritime security, and the forces of China’s unity are far stronger now than perhaps anytime in recent history.

Third, the effort to define a vision of what China and Taiwan ought to be in the future is a task that must be taken up by the highest political leadership on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Without extraordinarily enlightened leadership playing a central role in this defining process, the divisiveness of the Taiwan issue will paralyze any forward movement on this understanding of a future China and Taiwan.

Fourth, it is impractical to expect that Taiwan will in the short run agree to become politically linked to China, even if such a vision can be defined. The process of political integration will take a long time – and only under conditions of peace, cooperation, mutual prosperity, non-aggression, and freer interaction across the Straits.

Fifth, it will take time for China to gradually change its political, economic, and social structures to those more in harmony with their Taiwan counterparts. This will be a long and difficult process for China, and it will require a peaceful, cooperative international environment and myriad favorable conditions on the mainland for the transition to take place.

Sixth, both sides of the Taiwan Strait have to increase their contact and interaction on practical issues. These cooperative and mutually beneficial steps should take place without preconditions, without preconceived formulas, and without zero-sum strategies being played in the background.

Seventh, a growing sense of confidence and trust on both sides of the Strait needs to emerge. If fear and distrust forever characterize cross-Strait relations, it will be impossible for a common vision of the future to unfold. A very positive step in this direction would be a reduction in the number of missiles aimed at Taiwan from eastern China.

Eighth, both sides have to tone down their competition within the international community. Beijing needs to give Taipei breathing space and dignity in international circles, while Taiwan should avoid using its enhanced presence to further separatist ambitions.

And ninth, China should carefully weigh the costs and benefits of directly competing with the United States for leadership in Asia. The events surrounding the September 11 incident of last year may have opened a window of opportunity for Sino-American relations to move away from strategic competition.

In terms of what the United States can do to help this process of defining and realizing a vision for the future of both sides of the Taiwan Strait, several policy guidelines might be useful – most but not all of which are already in place.

First, the strategic goal of the United States on this issue should be threefold: (1) the maintenance of peace, stability, and prosperity in the Taiwan Strait area; (2) the encouragement of both Chinese sides to work out their differences peacefully and for mutual benefit; and (3) the integration of China as a partner into the emerging world order of the 21^st century.

Second, U.S. policy should be a sophisticated mixture of maintaining a stable balance of power in the Taiwan Strait, pursuing friendly relations with both Beijing and Taipei within the guidelines of the three communiques, preserving American leadership in the Western Pacific, and avoiding – if possible – military confrontation with China.

Third, the United States should upgrade the visibility and level of its contacts with the Taiwan government. Washington should not recognize Taiwan as an independent country or establish diplomatic relations with Taipei, but short of that standard all contacts should be expanded. U.S. political support for Taiwan’s involvement in international forums where representatives of both the PRC and Taiwan can participate on an equal basis should be given early priority.

Fourth, the United States should work with both Chinese governments to help modernize their societies in order to enhance cooperation across the Strait and to strengthen interaction with the international community. The United States should not support any formula or solution to the Taiwan issue unless both the government of China and the government of Taiwan support this approach.

And fifth, the United States should try to reconcile its interests with an emerging China that will increasingly become a stronger military, diplomatic, economic, and cultural power in Asia. Since the costs of a Sino-American conflict could be high for both sides, it is worth the effort to try to find some way to accommodate America’s need for forward security and China’s need for regional influence. However, for its own interests and the interests of regional peace and stability, the United States cannot give up its leadership role in the Asian Pacific.

In sum, to find an equitable solution to the Taiwan issue requires the governments of China, Taiwan, and the United States to make adjustments in their policies. The likelihood of these policy adjustments being made is not high given the political sensitivity of the Taiwan issue in all three capitals. But because the consequences of war in the Taiwan Strait are so potentially damaging, all sides may yet find the inspiration necessary to define an acceptable vision and work toward that future in peace.