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R-E-S-P-E-C-T!
By Ralph A. Cossa
Pacific Forum, PacNet 13A, Apr. 2, 2001
The collision
between a Chinese Air Force fighter and an American reconnaissance aircraft
in international airspace over the South China Sea represents an unfortunate,
unplanned, but nonetheless important test of the maturity of the Sino-U.S.
relationship and of the Chinese leadership as well. Thus far, Beijing
appears to be flunking the test.
While more information will no doubt further explain what actually happened,
the most credible explanation to date is that the collision -- which clearly
occurred in international airspace while the American plane was on a routine,
unarmed mission -- was most likely caused by overzealousness on the part of
the Chinese interceptor pilot. Chinese jets routinely conduct intercept
training against these convenient American "targets" but have
reportedly been more aggressive, if not reckless, in conducting these
missions in recent months. The rules of the road call for the faster,
more maneuverable Chinese F-8 jet to yield to the slower, less maneuverable,
larger EP3E propeller-driven 737-sized aircraft. This, plus the U.S.
tendency to actually admit when it is at fault in an accident -- witness
Washington's response to the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade in May 1999 and the more recent tragic collision between a U.S.
submarine and a Japanese fisherman training ship -- would seem to give the
benefit of the doubt to the U.S., pending more details becoming available.
The Chinese immediate handling of the incident -- to publicly blame the U.S.
even before the facts were known and to protest the U.S. spy plane's
"violation" of Chinese airspace (by flying to Hainan Island and
landing without diplomatic pre-clearance, despite the obvious emergency
nature of the "mayday" divert) -- was reminiscent of Beijing's
handling of the aftermath of the Belgrade bombing, which China's leadership
immediately branded as a deliberate act. It seems that Beijing's
automatic reaction to any mishap is to immediately incite rather than mollify
anti-American sentiments. This seems counterproductive to Beijing's
stated desire to develop improved relations with Washington. Having
portrayed the incident in a way that generated the type of protests (thus far
peaceful) already occurring in Chinese streets, Beijing can now point to this
public reaction to justify a more hardline approach toward the U.S. in
dealing with the aftermath of the incident.
Equally disturbing was Chinese refusal to grant American diplomats immediate
access to the crew or to the plane, which is loaded with sensitive
surveillance equipment (although much of it was no doubt destroyed or
rendered inoperable by the crew as it diverted to the closest, in this case,
Chinese airfield). It will be interesting to see if China -- the
self-proclaimed defender of national sovereign rights -- will treat the plane
as the piece of American sovereign territory that it is, or (as already
rumored) board the plane and attempt to exploit the sensitive equipment on
board. How China behaves will be an indicator of just how important
maintaining good relations with Washington really are.
China has long accused the U.S. of harboring a "cold war
mentality." But it is China today that is demonstrating such a
mindset in the way it has reacted to this tragic accident, which resulted in
the Chinese fighter's crash into the sea and apparent death of its
pilot. In President Bush's recent meeting in Washington with Chinese
Vice Premier Qian Qichen, Bush pledged to treat the Chinese leadership with
respect. But respect must work both ways. The longer it takes for
American diplomats to meet with the crew members and the longer their release
is delayed, the more one must conclude that Qian's pledge to cooperate with
Washington was an empty promise.
Statements by Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Qian Qichen, and others since
Bush's inauguration have also sent mixed signals as to whether China plans to
follow a more cooperative or more confrontational approach in its own future
dealings with the U.S. Attempts by China to unnecessarily detain or
seize the EP3E will lay this question to rest and will no doubt be played
back in kind by Washington. As U.S. Ambassador to Beijing Joseph
Prueher noted, "the downside potential if we do not resolve this well is
fairly high because it can bleed over into some other areas."
However, press speculation to the contrary, this incident is not likely to
play a large role in the Bush administration's final decision regarding
future arms sales to Taiwan, although continued Chinese heavy-handedness will
certainly result in more calls for increased arms sales by Taiwan supporters,
and any attempt by Beijing to trade the crew or aircraft's release for a
reduction in arms sales is sure to backfire. The U.S. decision to keep
three destroyers in the South China Sea during this period of increased
tension is likewise primarily symbolic and not a signal of an impending
military showdown.
Nonetheless, poor handling of this incident by either side can result in a
serious setback in the broader relationship and would magnify the impact of
other decisions. Instead of merely asserting that the other is to
blame, both sides should agree to cooperate in a full inquiry into the
accident, aimed first and foremost at ensuring that this type of tragedy does
not occur again in the future. The Chinese government also needs to
ensure that a full, fair, and objective account of what actually happened
reaches the Chinese people.
Ralph A. Cossa is President of Pacific Forum CSIS.
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