Cross-Strait Relations in the Aftermath of the Election of Chen Shui-bian

By Dennis Van Vranken Hickey and Yitan Li
Political Science Department, Southwest Missouri State University

July 2001

The Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) enters the new millennium as an economic powerhouse and one of the world’s fledgling democracies. In fact, Taiwan is now described officially by the US Department of State as a “multi-party democracy.” In March, 2000, the island elected a new president—the first opposition candidate to win the office of the presidency in the history of the ROC. It is clear that momentous changes have come to Taiwan. However, dramatic transformations in Taipei’s relations with arch-rival Beijing have not accompanied these changes.

This paper examines the Chen Shui-bian administration’s approach to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Beijing’s perceptions of the new government and its policies. The authors suggest that, despite fears that the election might have put Beijing and Taipei on a collision course, the new administration has proved to be surprisingly pragmatic in its ties with the PRC. At the same time, however, it is a gross exaggeration for the Chen administration and its supporters to contend that there exists a so-called “stabilization” in cross-strait relations that bodes well for cross-strait relations and for peace and stability in the western pacific. The potential for a sharp and dangerous escalation in tensions remains.

I. THE ELECTION OF CHEN SHUI-BIAN

On March 18, 2000, Taiwanese voters went to the polls to elect the tenth president of the Republic of China. The election was significant in several respects. First, it marked only the second time that the ROC had conducted a direct presidential election. By most accounts, the election was free and fair. Moreover, it was the first time that a candidate outside the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) had been elected president of the country. Finally, like the 1996 presidential contest, it showed that the Taiwanese electorate will not yield meekly to threats or intimidation from Beijing. Once again, the voters chose a presidential candidate who appeared to be despised by authorities in mainland China—Chen Shui-bian.

The son of a poor farmer and leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a party that supports Taiwan’s de jure independence from China, Chen received only 39 percent of the vote (see Table I). In other words, he did not receive a strong mandate from the island’s voters. But many analysts believe that it is unlikely that the independence issue played a critical role in the election. The chief issue during the campaign was corruption or what the Taiwanese press describes as “black gold.” During the late 1990s, Chen had served as an efficient, popular and incorruptible mayor of Taipei. Taipei’s remarkable metamorphosis from a dirty and congested city into a world-class metropolis may be traced largely to his administration. As James Lilley, former US Ambassador to China, observed, “he won because he was anti-corruption.”<1>

Table 1: Outcome of Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential Election

Candidate	Political Party	Percent of Popular Vote
Chen Shui-bian	DPP	39
James Soong	Independent	37
Lien Chan	KMT	23

Source: Michael Hirsh, Russel Watson, Melinda Liu, Brook Lamer and Mahlon Meyer, “Pointing to Trouble,” Newsweek, March 27, 2000, p.38 in Lexis/Nexis.

During much of the presidential campaign, Chen appeared to make an effort to avoid provoking the PRC. In fact, he made several goodwill gestures to the mainland. For example, Chen indicated that he would be willing to go to China for talks with PRC leaders and/or invite mainland leaders to visit Taiwan. He compared himself to the late US president Richard Nixon, who had been a staunch opponent of communism but managed to bridge the gap between Washington and Beijing. If elected, Chen said he would negotiate with the mainland leadership about any issue and lift the ban on full scale exchanges.<2> Perhaps most notable, however, he seemed to soften his position toward Taiwan’s independence and said that he would support an island-wide referendum on the issue only if China attacked. Nevertheless, only three days before the election, Chen responded to saber-rattling in Beijing by declaring that “Taiwan is an independent, sovereign country.”<3>

II. CHEN SHUI-BIAN’S MAINLAND POLICIES

Its been over one year since Chen Shui-bian’s stunning election victory. For many, the promise of Chen’s victory has turned to disappointment. The economy has been badly battered and unemployment has surged. In May 2001, unemployment hit 4.22 percent—the island’s highest ever jobless rate in modern history.<4> Moreover, according to most calculations the stock market has lost nearly fifty per cent of its value since Chen took office. As Chu Yun-han, a professor of political science at National Taiwan University, observed, “the state of the economy now is worse than at the height of the Asian financial crisis.”<5>

In addition to the island’s severe economic difficulties, Chen has confronted gridlock within the legislature and a series of factional feuds within his own party. He also has been accused of incompetence and an inability to craft clear and consistent policies by an increasingly hostile press. In short, it has been a rough year for the new administration.

According to some analysts, one of the few bright spots during Chen’s tenure of office has bee his approach to cross-strait relations. Indeed, one observer describes his mainland policy as “the most outstanding achievement of the Chen administration and the DPP.”<6> But is such an enthusiastic assessment warranted? The discussion below examines Chen Shui-bian’s initiatives toward the PRC since his inauguration.

The First Five No’s

Following his election, Chen continued to tone-down his pro-independence rhetoric. Perhaps most significant was his inaugural address on May 20, 2000. In the speech, the new president referred to himself as the president of the Republic of China (not Republic of Taiwan as some feared he might) and outlined what has become known as the “Five No’s.” Chen proclaimed that, as long as the PRC did not use military force against Taiwan:

· he will not declare Taiwan independent of China;

· he will not support changing the national title of the Republic of China;

· he will not push for the inclusion of Lee Teng-hui’s “state-to-state” description in the ROC Constitution;

· he will not promote an island-wide referendum on the island’s status and

· he will not abolish the National Reunification Council or the National Reunification Guidelines.

Chen’s inaugural address was received enthusiastically in Taiwan. Public opinion polls revealed that almost 80 percent of Taiwan’s populace was satisfied with the content of the speech, while roughly 63 percent believed it expressed “goodwill” toward the PRC.<7> In the US, analysts described Chen’s address as “a significant effort to accommodate the United States and reach out to Beijing.”<8> Ambassador Lilley described it simply as “brilliant.”<9> Indeed, the speech was so conciliatory toward Beijing (and Washington) that some suspected that it had been drafted by the American Institute in Taiwan (US officials strongly denied news reports that Washington had sought to influence the content of Chen’s inaugural address).<10>

Political Integration

Following his inaugural address, Chen Shui-bian continued to seek to alleviate fears that he would inch the island closer and closer to war with China. One of his most significant gestures occurred in January 2001 when the president delivered his New Year’s Address. During his speech, Chen made his customary reference to “One China” as a “question for the future.” However, he also offered something different.

Perhaps borrowing some ideas of the opposition—particularly former Premier Vincent Siew—Chen raised the prospect of Taiwan’s eventual “political integration” with mainland China. Chen proclaimed that “the integration of our economies, trade, and culture can be a starting point for gradually building faith and confidence in each other. This, in turn, can be the basis for a new framework of permanent peace and political integration.” But what exactly does this mean?

According to an American observer, President Chen “appeared to commit himself as clearly as any of his predecessors to the goal of ‘one China’ in the sense of an integrated political future.”<11> Some Taiwanese politicians concurred that the speech was a step in that direction. Chen Kuei-miao, a senior New Party official, suggested that “the political integration concept outlines an intermediate stage in the eventual unification process with mainland China.”<12> But other politicians put a different spin on the integration thesis.

Frank Hsieh, chairman of the DPP, claimed that the president’s call for political integration should be considered only as a “goodwill gesture” and that the word “integration” does not mean “reunification.”<13> Shen Fu-hsiung, a DPP lawmaker, used an American analogy to describe the meaning. According to Shen, “it means we’ll live under the same roof, but we’ll have different homes—its like an American duplex.”<14> Perhaps the most all-encompassing definition, however, was offered by a Taiwanese academic. According to Byron S.J. Weng, the integration concept means “independence with the possibility of unification [and] unification with room for independence.”<15>

The Three Mini-Links

Despite the explosion in cross-strait trade, investment and travel, the ROC continues to prohibit “direct” transportation, trade and postal linkages with the mainland. Beijing has long called on Taipei to lift the ban on “the three links.” The Chen administration has surprised some observers by making a move toward meeting Beijing’s demand—albeit a small one.

In January 2001, Taipei authorized the three “mini-links” between the two offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu and the Chinese mainland. The initiative was described by the island’s press as “the most significant move made by the DPP since winning power in the March 2000 election.”<16> John C.C. Deng, Vice Chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, explained that “the intention behind the three mini-links is to express our goodwill to Beijing and to build mutual cross-strait trust and act as a warm-up to the three major links.”<17> He boasted that “we’ve taken concrete measures to improve the cross-strait relationship.”<18>

The Second Five No’s

In May 2001, President Chen journeyed to Central America and the Caribbean—a region of enormous importance to Taiwan as it represents the island’s last diplomatic stronghold. While traveling to the area, Chen made a two-day stop-over in the US where he met with American lawmakers. The visit came only days after the George W. Bush administration approved a massive multi-billion dollar arms sales package to Taiwan. It was feared that any (or all) of these developments might trigger a strongly negative reaction from Beijing. After all, it was Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Cornell University that prompted the PRC to suspend cross-strait negotiations and initiate a series of provocative missile tests off Taiwan’s coastline in 1995.

Perhaps in an effort to assuage Beijing’s fears and avoid a repeat of nosedive in cross-strait relations that occurred during 1995, President Chen unveiled five new no’s during a tea ceremony in Guatemala. Chen proclaimed that:

· Taiwan’s recent arms purchases and his travel to the US were not intended to provoke Beijing

· Taiwan will not misjudge or miscalculate the current state of cross-strait relations

· Taiwan is not a vassal state or pawn of the United States

· Taiwan will not cease in its efforts to improve relations with the PRC and

· Taiwan is a sovereign state and will not become a pawn in power politics.<19>

Other Developments in Cross-Strait Relations

The discussion above outlines only several of Chen Shui-bian’s major initiatives toward the PRC. A more complete discussion would explore other developments as well. For example, Chen has pledged to eventually lift the ban on the three direct exchanges and revise (or drop) the previous administration’s policy curbing trade and investment in the mainland (the so-called “go slow” or “not haste, be patient” policy).<20> The president also appeared to make a major move toward resolving the contentious “one China principle” quandary when he acknowledged in his 2001 New Year’s address that the concept was endorsed by the ROC Constitution. Turing to more practical matters, the Chen administration has backed Beijing’s bid for Permanent Normal Trade Relations with Washington, its drive to enter the World Trade Organization and the successful campaign to bring the 2008 Olympic games to China. Finally, Taipei has permitted reporters from the PRC to be stationed in Taiwan and it has promised to ease restrictions on travel by mainlanders to the island.<21> When combined with the other measures described above, Chen’s supporters contend that these moves prove that the present administration is determined to improve its relationship with Beijing.

III. CHINA’S RESPONSE TO CHEN SHUI-BIAN

Some observers in Beijing quarrel with the suggestion that Chen Shui-bian seeks to improve cross-strait ties. In fact, many suspect that he only seeks to “buy time” while inching moving the island closer and closer to de jure independence from China. This sentiment is especially strong within elements of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). There is some evidence to support this view.

The campaign to downplay Taiwan’s cultural and historical links to China—a drive initiated by Lee Teng-hui—continues in the island’s educational system and other institutions. Moreover, high-ranking Chen administration officials have strong ties to the separatist movement. For example, Annette Lu, the Vice President of the ROC is an unabashed independence advocate who has not softened her position since taking office. During a visit to El Salvador in September 2000, Lu declared that “I agree there is only one China in the world, namely, the People’s Republic of China. But Taiwan, with its 23 million inhabitants, is also a sovereign state that does not belong to that one China.”<22> As Andrew Yang, one of Taiwan’s leading political analysts, observed, “Annette Lu is a die-hard independence supporter. She won’t compromise her position.”<23> Chen also appointed Alice Kung, an independence advocate who holds both ROC and Japanese citizenship, to a post as national policy adviser.<24>

Despite toning down his own independence rhetoric, Chen continues to make personal appearances at events sponsored by separatist groups. At one such meeting, a gathering of the World Taiwanese Congress, he shouted, “Taiwanese Stand Up!” and “I am the president of Taiwan!”<25> Finally, Chen refuses to clearly and unequivocally embrace the “one China principle” (he describes it as “a question for the future”) and continues to insist that unification is not the only option for Taiwan. All of these developments have been observed and carefully chronicled by the PRC.

Beijing and Chen’s Cross-Strait Initiatives

President Chen’s cross-strait initiatives have failed to impress Beijing’s leadership. The inaugural address (the speech outlining the first “five no’s”) was met with guarded optimism. Some Chinese authorities simply reiterated the position that they would judge the new Taiwan leader by “deeds, not just words.” Others described the speech as “vague” and “insincere.”<26> The second five no’s received an even cooler response. Analysts in Beijing described the president’s new promises as “one of Chen’s `small tricks’ that try to create a false impression that cross-strait relations remain relatively stable.”<27> Zhang Mingqing, spokesman for the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office, found disturbing similarities in the two sets of pledges. According to Zhang, “the common thing for this new ‘five no’ and his old “five no” is not to admit the one-China principle, so I think the new “five no” is trying to hide something but actually is more revealing.” <28>

Officials were similarly disdainful of Chen's’ approval of the so-called three mini-links between the offshore islands and the mainland. According to the People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, the chief aim of Chen’s three mini-links initiative is “the goal of creating a false impression of improving cross-strait ties, while cheating the Taiwan people and international public opinion.”<29> Finally, Chen’s call for a possible future “political integration” with mainland China received little attention as few can figure out what it really means. As one PRC scholar explained, “the meaning is ambiguous.”<30>

In short, Beijing has not responded positively to Chen’s initiatives. In fact, many suspect that the PRC has opted to ignore the Taiwanese president. Chen’s calls for a “direct dialogue with Mr. Jiang Zemin” have been rebuffed.<31> Rather than negotiate with Chen, Beijing prefers to go around him. Since late 2000, a number of high ranking KMT officials—including KMT Vice Chairman Wu Po-hsiung and former Premier Vincent Siew—have received a warm welcome in Beijing. Xu Shiquan, head of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of Taiwan Studies, explains that “the contacts between the KMT and the mainland will play a stabilizing role” and apply “pressure on the DPP to accept or move closer to the one-China principle.”<32> High ranking members of the New Party (NP) also have received a friendly reception in Beijing When meeting with these delegations—and refusing to meet with DPP officials—CCP representatives explained that the party “opposes the exchanging of opinions with independence-minded parties and people in Taiwan on issues related to peaceful unification and the development of cross-strait relations.”<33>

It is easy for one to jump to the hasty conclusion that Beijing has adopted an unreasonable and unfair approach to the Chen Shui-bian administration. To some, it appears as if the new Taiwanese president has been rebuffed at every turn since Beijing refuses to have any direct contact with his administration. Upon closer examination, however, the PRC’s response to Chen was quite predictable. In fact, from Beijing’s perspective, it is quite reasonable.

As described, Chen Shui-bian has toned down his independence rhetoric. Nevertheless, he maintains strong links to the separatist movement and makes public appearances at gatherings sponsored by independence organizations. Chen also insists that unification is not the only option for Taiwan. Formal independence from China remains a distinct possibility. Consequently, Beijing’s suspicions that the president is “insincere” about unification may hold some merit.

Chen’s “bold” initiatives toward Beijing received a lot of positive publicity in the international media. Upon close examination, however, these moves appear somewhat less than courageous. The so-called “mini-links” (described by Taipei as the “most significant” move by the DPP toward the mainland) provide an excellent case in point. Direct trade and travel between the offshore islands and the mainland, albeit illicit in Taipei’s opinion, has been the norm ever since Beijing sanctioned the practice many years ago. Consequently, Beijing’s cool response to the mini-links is understandable. Chang Jung-kung, Director-General of the KMT’s Department of Mainland Affairs, explains:

The DPP government has shown its goodwill to Beijing in a very unskillful way. Without a cross-strait agreement on these links, Beijing officials don’t think we want to forge a better relationship. They think we’re using the links to enhance our stature on the international stage. We’re just allowing what they’ve already done, but we’ve created a media event out of it. How can Beijing be happy about that?<34>

Others contend that the real purpose of the mini-links is to bolster the sagging economies of the offshore islands (the de-militarization of the islands during 1990s caused the local economies to collapse). As hopes for transforming Kinmen and Matsu into tourist destinations faded, the mini-links came to be viewed as a “quick fix” for these territories’ economic woes. Still others suspect that the mini-links are “a move to distance the residents of the outlying islands from Taiwan and move them closer to the mainland, making an independent Taiwan easier to achieve.”<35>

The opening of Taiwan to mainland tourists also has received a lukewarm reception in Beijing. After all, improving cross-strait ties appears not to be the driving force behind this initiative. Like the “mini-links,” the move seems designed to bolster a segment of Taiwan’s sagging economy (the tourist industry). As one KMT lawmaker explained hopefully, “if we allow entry of 1 million mainland tourists, it can help boost Taiwan’s economic growth by an estimated 2% and lower the jobless rate by 0.5%.” <36>

Taipei’s Response to Beijing’s Initiatives

Much has been made of the Chen administration’s moves to “stabilize” cross-strait relations and move Taipei closer to the “one China principle.” Very little attention, however, has focused on Beijing’s innovative efforts to find a formula acceptable to both sides of the Taiwan Strait and Taipei’s tepid response to these initiatives.

To much of the world, the one-China debate appears to involve semantics of little consequence. To Beijing and Taipei, however, the quarrel is critically important. For decades, both sides had claimed to be the legitimate government of all China. But Taipei began to move away from the one-China principle when it accepted the possibility of dual diplomatic recognition by foreign governments and launched an aggressive campaign to return to the world’s major international governmental organizations—including the United Nations—during the Lee Teng-hui administration. The two sides managed to reach some sort of a “one China” formula that would enable both parties to meet and discuss their differences in 1992.<37> Beijing, however, claims that Taipei violated the agreement when Lee Teng-hui journeyed to America in 1995 and, more recently, when he launched the controversial “state-to-state” theory. Consequently, meaningful cross-straits negotiations have been suspended for almost a decade.

Beijing refuses to return to the negotiating table until Taipei returns to the “one China principle.” But some authorities in Taipei describe the “one China principle” as a “trap” and contend that acceptance of it means acquiescing to the position that Beijing is the sole, legal government of China of which Taiwan is just one, tiny part. Indeed, some DPP lawmakers have called on the president to formally scrap the principle “as the phrase confuses the international community into believing that Taiwan is a part of the PRC.”<38> Others, however, argue that Chen should return to the “one China” principle—a position shared by many members of the opposition KMT and NP.

There is mounting evidence that Beijing is sensitive to Taipei’s concerns and that its definition of “one China” might be softening into something acceptable to many elements in the Taiwanese polity. In January 2001, Qian Qichen, the PRC’s Deputy Prime Minister, appeared to offer a major concession when he advanced a very broad interpretation of Beijing’s “one China” position. At the time, Qian explained that “they (Taipei) think that Taiwan being part of Chinese territory means Taiwan and China are not equal… to ease this doubt, we said the mainland and Taiwan belong to the same one China. At least, I think it shows some kind of equality.” As one PRC official speaking on the condition of anonymity observed, this position represented a major shift in PRC policy:

Once we said we would liberate Taiwan, then we said Taiwan was just a province of China, now are saying Taiwan can be our equal. For the mainland to make these kind of adjustments is not an easy thing. We have people who fought and defeated the Nationalists and sent them running to Taiwan. For these old cadres, treating Taiwan as an equal is a very difficult thing to accept. They think, `you lost the war, how can you be my equal.’<39>

Since making his initial proposal, Qian has reiterated that “both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China,” and argued that this position is “pragmatic and more inclusive” than previous formulations.<40>

Unfortunately, Taipei has failed to respond positively or otherwise capitalize on Qian’s new formulation. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council dismissed the statements as “nothing new.” As for Chen Shui-bian, he responded only by claiming that “its virtually impossible to know for sure whose statements are true and final and who actually represents the government.”<41> Consequently, cross-strait talks remain stalled.

Summary

The PRC remains very wary of Chen Shui-bian and his administration. According to some analyses, however, Beijing’s leadership cohort is divided over how best to deal with the new Taiwanese president.<42> It is believed that one group favors threats and saber rattling—perhaps even limited military strikes—to bring the rebellious province back into the fold. Another faction agrees that Taipei is moving toward independence, but wants to postpone a showdown over the issue until China has the requisite strength to confront the island and its chief protector—the United States. A third group, described as “less visible,” believes that past policies toward Taiwan have proved to be counterproductive. These individuals support a more conciliatory and flexible approach to Taipei.

Despite the fact that Beijing continues to ignore the Chen administration, there is evidence to suggest that the third group—a faction supporting a more conciliatory policy—is gaining influence. Qian Qichen reformulation of the “one China” position is a case in point. Moreover, Beijing appears to have toned down the fiery rhetoric it directed toward Chen and Taiwan. As one Chinese official explained, “we gave Chen Shui-bian a lot of political capital…we gave him 50 percent of his success. The more we attacked him, the higher his star rose.”<43> There is some evidence suggesting that the Taiwan populace appreciates the softening tone emanating from Beijing. According to public opinion polls, the number of Taiwanese who consider the PRC as hostile has dropped perceptibly in recent months (see Table II). However, it appears that news reports suggesting that there is a significant rise in support for Beijing’s “one country, two systems” reunification scheme are inaccurate.<44> Scientific polls reveal that the overwhelming majority of Taiwanese still oppose the PRC’s unification proposal (see Table III).

It remains unclear how Beijing ultimately will choose to deal with Chen Shui-bian, his administration and the new Taiwan. Much depends upon the 16^th Communist Party Congress that will convene in 2002. Five of the PRC’s seven top leaders are scheduled to retire during this conclave and Jiang Zemin will step down as party head and president in 2002 and 2003 respectively. As Chen Shui-bian observed, “whether the new leader will be overly conservative on cross-strait issues, and whether mainland China will continue its arms buildup and missile development are issues that deserve attention.” <45> In other words, political developments in Beijing may ultimately have a major impact on relations across the Taiwan Strait.

IV. THE PRESENT STATE OF CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

In some respects, it is easy to identify positive trends in cross-strait relations. Economic exchanges between the two rivals continue to expand. During Chen’s first year in office, cross-strait trade increased 21% over the previous year. Exports from Taiwan to the mainland rose 17.4% while exports from the mainland to Taiwan soared 37.5%.<46> According to most calculations, Taiwan now has invested roughly US $50 billion in the PRC. Interestingly, during the Chen administration, Taiwan’s investment in labor-intensive industries is no longer the major form of economic exchange with the mainland. Rather, Taiwan firms are now investing heavily in other areas such as high-tech, the service industry and intellectual property. In short, more economic channels are being opened across the Strait and Taiwanese businesses are said to have contracted “Shanghai fever.”

In addition to the surge in economic activity, cross-strait educational and cultural exchanges have accelerated. For example, during the 2001 Taipei-Shanghai City Forum, officials from both of these “sister cities,” agreed that a student exchange program “should be the first thing implemented, saying it could be kicked off this summer if everything goes smoothly”. <47> This exchange program will include the exchange of students, teachers and lecturers, and resident artists. It will also provide for the hosting of academic seminars; assistance for the education of Taiwan business people’s children living in Shanghai; the holding of sports competitions and performances in each other’s city; the swapping of visits by business and industrial groups; incentives for investment in each other’s city; and assistance to investors from the other city. <48> It is noteworthy that this is not an isolated case. Xiamen and Kaohsiung have entered into a similar cooperative arrangement. In fact, this relationship has become so cordial that Frank Hsieh, Mayor of Kaohsiung and Chair of the DPP, has declared that “Xiamen and Kaohsiung are two cities in one country.” <49>

This explosion in the “low politics” of economic and cultural exchanges is viewed by many political scientists as a positive development. Those who subscribe to the functionalist approach to comparative politics are especially optimistic. As David Mitrany suggests, through such activities “the basis would be created for a thickening web of structures and procedures in the form of institutions. It is believed that successful cooperation in one functional setting will enhance the incentive for collaboration in other fields”. <50> With further collaboration in many other common areas, some hope that this cooperation will eventually spill over into sensitive political areas and contribute to the reunification of China.

To be sure, the past year has witnessed some positive developments in cross-strait relations. According to Chen Shui-bian, “the current [cross-strait] situation has improved immensely from the same time last year (May 2000).” <51> In fact, the president often boasts that “we have stabilized cross-strait relations.” <52> Despite these optimistic assessments, however, there remains the ever-present danger that relations between Beijing and Taipei could deteriorate sharply with little advance warning.

Authorities in the PRC bristle at claims that the new Taiwanese president has somehow succeeded in stabilizing cross-strait relations. According to Zhang Mingqing, Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman, “the Taiwan leader says that cross-strait relations are stable and even better than during the time of his predecessor. I think this is a way of ignoring the facts and trying to present a false picture of peace and stability.” <53> An editorial drafted by the PRC’s official Xinhau News Agency opined that relations actually have deteriorated. According to the article, “during the year that Taiwan leaders have been in power, cross-strait relations have fallen into an impasse and not only have tensions not eased, hidden dangers have grown bigger.” <54> Xu Shiquan, head of the Institute of Taiwan Studies concurs. Xu cautions that the current “dangerous deadlock” is “very precarious” and that “nobody can be sure there will be no crisis in the future. Nobody can say that cross-strait relations will remain stable.” <55>

To many observers, it is unclear what exactly Chen and his supporters mean when they claim that he somehow has “stabilized” cross-strait relations. It also is not clear whether or not this is a positive development. On the one hand, one might argue that relations have not nosedived dramatically. On the other hand, however, one could suggest that relations remain perilous. As Wu Yu-shan, a professor at prestigious National Taiwan University, observed “cross-strait relations are stagnating and tense.” <56>

V. CONCLUSION

Many, if not most, of the troubles plaguing the current state of cross-strait relations cannot be traced to the actions of Chen Shui-bian or his administration. The sharp downturn in Taipei’s relationship with Beijing occurred well before Chen’s election as President of the ROC. As Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s senior minister, observed, Chen inherited a difficult situation:

For China, Taiwan was one of a dozen important problems. Lee Teng-hui’s achievement has been to make Taiwan China’s overriding problem. Chen Shui-bian has unfortunately inherited this position. <57>

To be sure, Chen’s administration deserves some credit for its adroit handling of relations with Beijing. Thus far, the bloodshed and conflict that some predicted would accompany the election of a DPP candidate as president of the ROC has been averted. Chen has taken a series of prudent steps to avoid provoking China. For these actions Chen must be commended. At the same time, Beijing must be lauded for adopting a “wait and see” attitude toward the Chen administration and toning down the fiery rhetoric that became a hallmark of cross-strait dialogue during the waning years of the Lee Teng-hui administration. Nevertheless, there is still ample cause for concern.

Despite the political rhetoric emanating from Taipei, it is a gross exaggeration to suggest that cross-strait relations have “improved” significantly or even “stabilized” during the Chen era. China continues to deploy over 300 missiles directly opposite Taiwan. According to some estimates it is now adding up to 50 new missiles per year and the total could reach 600 to 800. <58> Moreover, the ROC Foreign Ministry claims that Beijing is accelerating its campaign to lure away all of Taipei’s diplomatic allies. In other words, the diplomatic tug of war is escalating. As Tien Hung-mao , ROC Foreign Minister, observed, “my feeling is that they are increasing pressure, not decreasing” since Chen’s election.<59> Taipei also claims that Beijing has stepped up efforts to block the islands arms acquisitions. Perhaps most worrisome, the PRC still refuses to rule out the use of force to take Taiwan.

Changes with unforeseen consequences may also be on the horizon in Taipei. An alliance between Lee Teng-hui—probably the most hated man in China—and Chen Shui-bian appears to be materializing. This surprising shift carries important implications for both the island’s domestic politics and its relationship with the mainland. As Chu Yun-han, a political scientist at National Taiwan University, observed, “the political landscape will be reconfigured as a result of this. There is no question about that.”<60> The emergence of a Chen-Lee partnership is described by other political observers as “both risky and provocative.”<61> Moreover, some of Chen’s supporters are urging the president to adopt a more hardline approach to China. These constituents complain that the president has been “too soft” on Beijing.<62> They are pressuring him to more aggressively push for Taiwan’s formal independence from China.

In sum, it is clear that the election of Chen Shui-bian has ushered in a new era in Taiwan’s politics. It may also have ushered in a new era in cross-strait relations. It still remains to be seen, however, how the administration of this self-avowed independence activist will ultimately impact upon cross-strait relations. Whether or not Beijing and Taipei will be able to resolve their differences peacefully will have a lasting impact on the future of China. In fact, it may also have a major influence on peace and stability in the Western Pacific.

Notes

<1> Bay Fang, “Taiwan Shows What Democracy Can Do,” US News and World Report, April 3, 2000, p.13 in Lexis/Nexis.

<2> See Crystal Hsu, “One Year On: National Security-Cross Strait Relations are as Chilly as Ever,” Taipei Times, May 20, 2001 in Taiwan Security Research on the world wide web at http://www.taiwan security.org/ (hereafter TSR).

<3> Michael Hirsh, Russel Watson, Melinda Liu, Brook Lamer and Mahlon Meyer, “Pointing to Trouble,” Newsweek, March 27, 2000, p.38 in Lexis/Nexis

<4> See, “Resignations Called For in Face of Economic Crisis,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), June 22, 2001, p.1.

<5> Mike Chinoy, “Chen’s First Year Tarnished by `Mediocrity’ CNN.COM, May 19, 2001 on the world wide web at TSR.

<6> See Joesph Wu, “An Historic Turning Point for Taiwan,” on the website of the Republic of China’s Government Information Office on world wide web at http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/520annual/520_b.htm

<7> See “78% Satisfied with Chen’s Inaugural Address, Liberty Times (Taipei), May 22, 2000 in Taiwan Headlines on the world wide web at http://th.gio.gov.tw /show.cfm?news_id=350.

<8> See Stephen J. Yates, “Better US Treatment of Taiwan,” Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum, Number 694, September 11, 2000, p.1.

<9> See Sangwon Suh and Allen T. Cheng, “A Flash of Hope,” Asiaweek, June 2, 2000, p.24 in Lexis/Nexis.

<10> According to some accounts, Raymond Burghardt, Chief of the AIT’s Taipei office, had met with Chen many times and helped influence his inaugural speech. See, “AIT Head Denies Role in Drafting of Chen’s Inaugural Speech,” Central News Agency, May 13, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis.

<11> See Harvey Sicherman, “Taiwan’s Chen Shui-bian: A President’s Progress,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 11, 2001 in TSR.

<12> Fang Wen-hung, “Politician Says Chen’s ‘Political Integration’ Interim Stage to Unification,” Central News Agency, January 7, 2001 in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 9, 2001 in Lexis/Nexis.

<13> Maubo Chang, “DPP Head: ‘Integration’ Not Necessarily Means Reunification,” Central News Agency, February 2, 2001 in Lexis/Nexis.

<14> “Taiwan Wary of China’s Approach,” Associated Press, February 9, 2001 in TSR.

<15> Byron S.J. Weng, “Modes of National Integration,” Peace Forum Essays on the world wide web at http://www.dsis.org.tw/peaceforum/p_2e.htm#1.

<16> Pat Gao, “Bridge over Troubled Water,” Taipei Review, April 2001, p.30.

<17> Ibid.

<18> Ibid

<19> See “President Chen Unveils New Five Noes Policy,” Financial Times Information, Global News Wire, May 29, 2001 in Lexis/Nexis

<20> Under the “go slow” policy, Taiwanese firms are prohibited from investing in infrastructure projects in the PRC and prohibited from investing more than NT $50 million in any other projects. See “Government to Study further Easing of Mainland-Bound Investment,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), June 22, 2001, p.1.

<21> According to plans being drawn up in Taipei, the number of mainland tourists allowed to visit the island will be limited and the tourists must follow the “group in, group out” principle (they must join tour groups). Background checks on tourists also will be conducted and only reputable tourist agencies will be allowed to conduct the tours. See, “MAC Unveils PRC Tourist Blueprint,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), July 6, 2001, p.4.

<22> See, “Vice President Lu States, “One China Exists But It Doesn’t Include Taiwan,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), September 27, 2000, p.1.

<23> “Lu Raises More Eyebrows,” Asiaweek, December 29, 2000-January 5, 2001, p.10 in Lexis/Nexis.

<24> Kung denies that the ROC exists as a state. See Maubo Chang, “President Blames Opposition for own Poor Performance,” Central News Agency, May 11, 2001 in Lexis/Nexis.

<25> Lawrence Chung, “Chen Takes ‘Middle Road’ with China,” Straits Times (Singapore), March 20, 2001 in Lexis/Nexis.

<26> Ted Plafker, “Beijing Softens Rhetoric on Taiwan,” Washington Post, May 23, 2000 in TSR.

<27> See, “President Chen Unveils New Five Noes Policy,” Financial Times Information, Global News Wire, May 29, 2001 in Lexis/Nexis.

<28> “Beijing Slams Chen’s Reluctance to Accept One-China,” Media Corporation of Singapore, Channel News Asia, May 31, 2001 in Lexis/Nexis.

<29> “China Says Chen Shui-bian Manipulating Public Opinion with Mini-links,” AFX News Limited, January 4, 2001 in Lexis/Nexis.

<30> Fang Wen-hung, Central News Agency, January 7, 2001 as reported in “Politician Says Chen’s `Political Integration’ Interim Stage to Unification,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 9, 2001 in Lexis/Nexis.

<31> “China Rejects Handshake with Chen,” AFP, May 18, 2001 in Lexis/Nexis.

<32> Maureen Pao and Susan V. Lawrence, “Hands Across the Water,” Far Eastern Economic Review, December 14, 2000 on the world wide web at http://www.feer.com/

<33> See “New Party to Meet Chinese Communist Officials,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), July 10, 2001, p.1

<34> See Pat Gao, “Bridge Over Troubled Water,” Taipei Review, April 2001, p.30.

<35> Ibid.

<36> See, “MAC Unveils PRC Tourist Blueprint.”

<37> Beijing apparently expressed the view that there is one China—the PRC—of which Taiwan is a part. Taipei also agreed that there is one China—the ROC—of which the mainland is a part. See Lee Chang-Kuei, “Chinese Confederation versus One China,” Taipei Times, February 23, 2001 in TSR.

<38> “One China Fray Continues to Divide Politicans,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), November 23, 2000, p.4.

<39> John Pomfret, “Beijing Signals New Flexibility,” January 6, 2001 China Post (International Airmail Edition), p..2

<40> Ibid.

<41> See Gary Klintworth, “China and Taiwan: From Flashpoint to Redefining One China,” Taipei Review, March 2001, p.52 and Julian Baum, “Tightrope,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 14, 2000 on the world wide web at http://www.feer.com/

<42> See Dougal Paal, “Cautious Beijing is Bidding its Time,” International Herald Tribune, May 24, 2000 in Lexis/Nexis.

<43> John Pomfret, “Beijing Fears Showdown with US,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), June 25, 2001, p.2.

<44> In June 2001, some Taiwanese newspapers conducted polls showing a sharp rise in support for Beijing’s reunification formula. However, the MAC disputes the results of the surveys claiming that respondents did not know the meaning of “one country, two systems.” As Lin Chong-Pin, Vice Chairman of the MAC observed, “they only gave vague descriptions of the Beijing scheme. For more information, see “Most Taiwan People Oppose Beijing Formula: MAC,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), July 6, 2001, p.4

<45> See, Fang Wen-hung, “ROC President Concerned Over Beijing Leadership Succession,” Central News Agency, March 9, 2001 in Lexis/Nexis.

<46> Across-Strait Trade Continues to be Active, Our Investment to the Mainland Peaks Again, Taiwan National Statistics (in Chinese), Retrieved May 6, 2001 from the World Wide Web: at http://140.129.146.192/dgbas03/bs7/report/20.doc

<47> Taipei, Shanghai to Begin Student Exchange Program, Taipei Central news Agency WWW-Text English February 28, 2001 Retrieved from the World News Connection

<48> Ibid

<49> Julian Baum, “Tightrope,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 14, 2000 on the world wide web at http://www.feer.com/.

<50> Dougherty, James E. and Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations A Comprehensive Survey, 4th Edition, (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1997) p 422.

<51> “Chen Seeks Direct Talks with Beijing for ‘One China’ Definition,” Financial Times Information, Global News Wire, May 18, 2001 in Lexis/Nexis.

<52> Julian Baum and Maureen Pao, “Taking the Lead,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 26, 2000 in Lexis/Nexis.

<53> “Beijing Slams Chen’s Reluctance to Accept One-China,” Media Corporation of Singapore, Channel News Asia, May 31, 2001 in Lexis/Nexis.

<54> “China Warns of Worsening Tensions with Taiwan Under Chen,” Agence France Presse, May 24, 2001 in Lexis/Nexis

<55> Maureen Pao and Susan V. Lawrence, “Hands Across the Water,” Far Eastern Economic Review, December 14, 2000 on the world wide web at http://www.feer.com/.

<56> Ibid.

<57> Phil Revzin, Michael Vatikiotis, David Plott and Ben Dolven, “Lee: The Cruel Game,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 8, 2000 on the world wide web at http://www.feer.com/.

<58> “Taiwan Wary of China’s Approach,” Associated Press, February 9, 2001 in TSR on the world wide web.

<59> “Taiwan’s Tien Says China Turns up Heat on Island’s Allies, Kyodo News Service, Japan Economic Newswire, January 15, 2001 in Lexis/Nexis.

<60> Tyler Marshall, “Unlikely Team For Independence,” China Post (International Airmail Edition), July 10, 2001, p.2.

<61> Ibid.

<62> See Julian Baum, “Tightrope.”

Table II: Taiwanese Perceptions of PRC Hostility Toward the ROC.